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This thesis explores the factors influencing governmental policy preferences on the uncertain issue of shale gas 
development. I argue that there is no convincing expected utility of shale gas development, and that, in light of 
conflicting evidence, governmental decision-makers cannot believe it to be so. The notion of a ‘rational actor’ 
government deciding on shale gas based on its utility offers limited explanatory value. I am telling a more 
comprehensive story of shale gas and by using different clues taken from political economy and behavioural economics 
theory, develop several narratives about respective dimensions of the decision-making process: a rational expected 
utility analysis, a perspective on the influence of private interest groups, and a narrative on capture through ideational 
repertoire and cognitive biases. To this end classical literature of decision-making under risk and uncertainty is 
reviewed and political economy theory is brought in to widen the debate. The key arguments of this study are that 
policy decisions on shale gas are irrational from a classical political science perspective; that economic claims made 
about policy decisions are defying economic logic; that strong interest groups are distorting a market-based energy 
policy; and that pre-existing ideas about the energy system unduly influence the decision process regardless of their 
actual applicability. I suggest that fracking is simply so compatible with the current repertoire of ideas, practices and 
tools around energy policy, that engaging in it becomes a logical conclusion, whereas not to engage in it would require 
a paradigmatic change. These arguments are taken forward by an in-depth analysis of the decision-making around 
shale gas made by the United States government and the United Kingdom government since the commercial 
development of shale gas became possible through technological innovation in the 21st century. The thesis serves to 
shine light on the story of shale gas policy, but also to explore separate dimensions of policy-making under uncertainty 






I Chapter One. Introduction: Shale gas and decision-making under 
uncertainty 
 
This thesis originates in puzzlement about the popular resurgence of unsustainable energy 
sources in the form of investment in novel technologies to exploit shale gas reserves. The 
political decision to develop the unconventional fuel goes beyond any, already 
contentious, argument to utilise the leftover reserves of conventional fossil fuel sources. 
After years of arguing for the gradual transformation of energy systems from traditional 
fuels towards sustainable alternative energy sources, a new argument is made in favour of 
a different transformation and an increase in the use of unsustainable fuels. Adding to 
this puzzle is the fact that shale gas development involves a high level of uncertainty in 
regard to the consequences of its production as well as considerable known risks to the 
environment and the economy.  
To this end in my thesis I consider the favourable decisions made in the United States 
and the United Kingdom regarding the development of shale gas through hydraulic 
fracturing (‘fracking’). Approaching this policy outcome from an angle of decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty as well as the notion of irrationality, I discovered a gap in the 
related literature. Comprehensive theoretical consideration of risk decision-making was 
trending in the discipline of economics in the middle of the 20th century, then in a small 
body of literature by behavioural economists in the 1970s and 1980s and again with 
sociologists in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1971, Graham Allison famously argued that not 
just individuals but entire governments act irrationally in situations of uncertainty when 
he researched the policy decisions behind the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet the topic has only 
been gaining traction in political science and political economy in recent years of the 21st 
century, following the global financial crisis and several high profile natural disasters as 
well as increasing concerns over climate change.  
In my thesis, I am using different bodies of literature to develop stories about respective 
dimensions of the decision-making process that resulted in the support for shale gas. 
Taking inspiration from Graham Allison’s multidimensional approach to decision-making 
in Essence of Decision (Allison 1971), I develop three separate narratives that sensitise me to 
different aspects of the decision-making process through qualitative, case-oriented 
research.1 The three narratives are devised using traditional literature on risk preferences 
                                                 
1 In regard to Allison’s models of research, I follow a similar overall approach in questioning the rational 
actor model and providing separate distinct narratives to examine the same dependent variable. I do not 
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as well as political economy theory and consist of a rational expected utility analysis, a 
private interest power perspective, and an assessment of ideational constraints.  
Whether or not it can deliver economic benefits, shale gas is essentially a delay to the 
introduction of sustainable and clean energy sources which are needed to keep global 
warming to a minimum and reduce the risks to humanity and the environment brought 
on by climate change. The energy economy is a key component of any plan for dealing 
with these risks. Already the political response is slow and inadequate considering the 
largesse and nearness of the problem, and shale gas appears to be turning the clocks 
backwards on progress. The development of this thesis gave me an opportunity to shed 
light on some of the reasons behind the political decision to return and add to 
unsustainable energy development. Any decision made by the government to support 
shale gas as part of the national energy mix is a decision made in a situation of clear 
uncertainty and in acceptance of known risks. Hence the topic allowed me to consider 
the more abstract theoretical issue of how to deal with uncertainty and risks in policy 
decision-making which are key features of the energy sector. Due to the impact of 21st 
century events involving uncertainty and largely unexpected risks such as the Fukushima 
nuclear incident or the global financial crisis the topic is gaining momentum in political 
science and my dissertation adds to the debate.  
 
 
I.1 Problématique  
The technology of hydraulic fracturing is used to access and develop previously 
inaccessible unconventional gas reserves, such as shale gas. Evidence that hydraulic 
fracturing is responsible for a variety of environmental and health risks, including 
pollution and seismic activity, is amassing,2 while strong doubts about the economic 
benefits of shale gas are also on the increase (Groat and Grimshaw 2012; Helm 2013; 
Carrington 2013b; Cherry et al. 2014; Stamford and Azapagic 2014; Christopherson 2015; 
Neate 2015).3 A factor that both the positive as well as much of the critical output on 
fracking may underestimate is the degree to which the economic arguments in its favour 
are unfounded or inaccurate. I address this through a detailed comprehensive analysis of 
                                                 
use the same models. Qualitative methods make sense for my case study as they are inductive and 
grounded in empirics which befits a novel topic.  
2 Which ultimately result in adverse economic effects as well.  
3 Of course, depending on definitions of growth and how important one values the environment as an 
economic asset, the environmental concerns were always also economic in nature. Yet this link is not 
often made explicit in official or public discussion of the issue. More on this in chapter four and eight.  
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shale gas and how it fits into the respective U.S. or UK energy sector in chapter four. Yet 
largely, and that is part of the bigger puzzle which I focus on in this thesis, emerging 
research that is doubtful about the economic benefits of shale gas has been ignored in 
political deliberation on the topic. The shale story should be much tougher to promote, 
at a time when the oil and gas industry is in turmoil and renewable energy is becoming 
more profitable (Amin 2015; Taylor 2016; Stevens 2016; Ancygier and Hare 2016).  
Beyond the aspect of risk and uncertainty it is the impression of unreasonable or baseless 
decision-making which is most interesting and unnerving about fracking policies. If there 
is no concrete data available based on which policy makers can make an informed 
judgement, then why is the lack of such data being ignored? Worse, if there is concrete 
evidence or at least research strongly suggesting negative outcomes of the policy, these 
appear to be equally ignored. 
The arguments made in support of fracking are based, on the surface, on classic economic 
assumptions of rationality and efficient cost-benefit analysis in a free market-based 
system. Fracking is suggested to be compatible with this market and to deliver energy 
security, revenue and jobs, and increase a country’s energy independence. Yet the highly-
publicised introduction of generous subsidies such as tax breaks or similar incentives for 
fracking operations undermines this assertion and ensures that shale gas does not have to 
compete in a truly free market system. Paradoxically, the supporters of shale gas are 
arguing for enabling market intervention while they are promoting the resource within 
frames of standard economic reasoning (Bawden 2013; Gosden 2013c; Macalister and 
Harvey 2013; Murray 2014; BBC News 2014b). If fracking requires subsidies and support 
on such a scale, then why do governments and companies appear to genuinely embrace 
the notion of its economic success?  
Conventional public policy discussions, which tend to deal with such puzzles, assume 
these factors would come into play in the discussion – if they do not, the reasons behind 
that can be political. In other words, the argument for shale gas is not purely economic 
but political economic, driven by interested parties. Is shale gas driven by parochial 
interest, dressed as it were, under the guise of traditional utility arguments? The influence 
and political power of interest groups, pressure groups and lobbies has become a central 
theme in modern political science studies, especially in political economy. Research that 
questions concrete economic rationality in the reasoning behind energy policy often shifts 
focus on concerns around lobbying (Crooks and McGregor 2012; Buisset, Øye, and 
Selleslaghs 2012; Cusick 2013; Tansey 2014; Brown 2015). I explore this approach in 
chapters five and six, after conducting a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits 
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of introducing shale gas into the energy mix in chapter four using a classical cost and 
benefit approach. 
From a political economy perspective, it is interesting to investigate why such apparently 
contradictory factors are being ignored through a third lens. A different approach to 
distorted decision-making within the discipline focuses on ideational influences. Allison 
also suggested that in situations where policymakers feel they cannot base their decisions 
on conclusive data, they may simply ignore those facts that do not fit their vision: this 
appears possible in the story of shale gas. Literature developed since, mostly in 
behavioural economics, and (constructivist) approaches in political economy which focus 
on the power of ideas, are helpful in considering an alternative approach based on 
cognitive constraints. To this end I add a third narrative to the shale gas story which 
considers cognitive factors and constraints to objective or rational decision-making. This 
allows me to consider several so far barely researched aspects of the decision-making 
process that preceded shale gas support. Through investigating these three separate angles 
on the decisions in favour of fracking, I add a political economy perspective to a gap in 
theory concerning the discussion of how decisions are made under uncertainty in political 
economy, and in particular why such decisions can seem irrational from a cost-benefit 
analysis point of view.  
The story of shale gas raises questions of policy under conditions of uncertainty and risk. 
It is the unlikely nature of claims and impossible-to-prove promises that so perplex about 
the shale gas story. Shale gas is marketed as economically sound and environmentally safe 
and clean (or at least cleaner than coal) before there is evidence for either claim. One 
cannot help but be reminded of the 1980s nuclear discussion: for example, a month before 
Chernobyl the Economist expressed the prevailing opinion that the technology was “as safe 
as a chocolate factory” (The Economist 2012a)4. The discussion on shale gas is for all 
appearances incomplete and arguments in its favour are likely irrational.  
This discovery leads me to a puzzling oversight in the existing theoretical literature on 
decision-making under uncertainty. Few researchers concerned with policies or 
technologies of which such varying accounts exist make reference to uncertainty; most 
tend to consider risk as a rationally calculable variable (Beck 1998; Cox 2009; Aven and 
Renn 2009; Nelson and Katzenstein 2010; Mildner and Boeckelmann 2011). Research 
does exist into risk and uncertainty specifically, and in this field I found considerable 
affirmation of my thoughts on the variety of preferences yet little answers about their 
                                                 
4 There is no page number given to this reference as it is an online article on a single page. From here on, 
direct quotes without page numbers can be assumed to be online articles.  
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formation. Many case studies for example attest preference and decision divergence 
between EU and U.S. risk regulation policies, which lead to very different regulation and 
policy outcomes but also of course cause difficulties in international policy cooperation. 
Diverging risk preferences by countries and policymakers are assumed and attested for in 
case studies. However, and this is the second and particularly puzzling oversight, in this 
research there is a distinctive lack of attention paid to explanatory factors behind different 
policy decisions on uncertain issues, i.e. behind the formation of such preferences (Shaffer 
2004; Christoforou 2004; Kelemen and Vogel 2009; Breggin et al. 2009; Quick 2011; 
Jasanoff 2011; Stern and Wiener 2011; Gray, Rogers, and Wiener 2011; Eichbrecht and 
Wilber 2011; Vogel 2012; Wiener et al. 2013).5 There is no widely accepted comprehensive 
theory explaining how individuals, groups or elected policymakers form preferences 
under risk or uncertainty (Mildner and Boeckelmann 2011; Rieger, Wang, and Hens 2013).   
 
 
I.2 Central research question, theoretical framework and approach 
The central research question is derived from the identified gap in current research – the 
lack of comprehensive analysis of what formed the policy decision to move towards shale 
gas which poses so much risk and is surrounded by so much uncertainty. My overarching 
research question is as follows:  
Which factors decisively shape the risk preferences of political decision-makers regarding fracking when 
the decision is made under uncertainty?  
To answer it I draw on theory from several disciplines. The study of decision-making in 
situations of risk or uncertainty has only recently arrived in political research. Yet 
decisions under risk and/or uncertainty have been an established topic in the discipline 
of economics since the first half of the 19th century (Knight 1921; Arrow 1951; John 
Maynard Keynes 1921; Ellsberg 1961) and have been a topic for interdisciplinary 
economic researchers forming links with psychology or behavioural studies in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Bell and 
Raiffa 1978; Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky 1988; March 1978). The more classical economic 
works provide rational, calculative accounts of how decisions on risk should be formed. 
Interdisciplinary works offer accounts mostly of how biases and constraints can override 
                                                 
5 There is also a large group of scholars who dispute this idea of different risk attitudes in general between 
the U.S. and the EU, mainly (Wiener 2011; Walsh 2011; Miller 2011; Freestone 2011) and no evidence 
exists of cultural effects on risk attitudes (i.e. ‘pioneering U.S. vs precautionary Europe’).  
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rational decision-making, yet they tend to focus on individual decision-makers only.6 This 
work was based on theoretical reconsideration but also empirical studies detailing the 
contrast between actual decisions and the predictions of these gained by purely rational 
calculations using expected utility functions (for example Pauker, Pauker, and McNeil 
1988; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1986). Modified 
versions of these heuristics have been suggested or even proven to be influential in 
shaping governmental decisions under risk (Allison and Zelikow 1999).  
With Ulrich Beck the topic of uncertainty in policy-making briefly became a hot topic in 
sociology and political sociology (Beck 1986, 1998); his and following work in sociology 
were often inspired by concerns about climate change as well as new technologies such 
as nuclear power (Beck 1995; Leiserowitz 2006; Vogel 2012; Kelemen and Vogel 2009; 
Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003; Horlick-Jones, Sime, and Pidgeon 2003). In most 
of these works, preferences under risk and uncertainty are considered a given and instead 
risk perception or specific risk communication is discussed. Unlike traditional studies of 
calculable risk preferences, these modern approaches focus on uncertainty, and the 
acknowledgement of risks which cannot be either assessed or expected.  
The few examples of more recent literature from the social sciences that consider 
preferences and decisions under risk and uncertainty outside of economic risk modelling 
tend to focus on individual risk preferences, or those of the public compared to that of 
scientific experts (Beck 1986, 1995, Sjöberg 1999, 2000; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; 
Leiserowitz 2006). If any are focused on governmental decision-makers, then there is no 
thorough testing of hypotheses but the studies rather focus on historical comparison, or 
indeed have a largely normative focus (Kelemen and Vogel 2009; Vogel 2012; Wiener et 
al. 2013).7 Lacking from this is a discussion of why decisions are made as they are under 
uncertainty in politics, and in particular why such decisions can seem irrational from a 
cost-benefit analysis point of view.  
There is a tradition of interest in decision-making under uncertainty and risk which 
surrounds issues of new technologies such as genetically modified organisms (GMO) and 
                                                 
6 The first major strand of literature on preferences or decision-making (judgment) under risk and 
uncertainty which questioned the calculable nature of economic risk preference theory focused specifically 
on cognitive constraints to rational cost-benefit calculation. It was pursued by a mixed group of 
academics from economics, especially behavioural economics, and psychology and began to gain more 
prominence in the 1970s and 1980s (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Bell and Raiffa 1978; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1980, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Taylor 1982; Langer 1982; Fischhoff 1982; Einhorn 
1982; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982a; Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky 
1988). 
7 Research tends to focus on singular events such as 9/11 or the Fukushima nuclear accident, yet some of 
it looks at systemic or long-term risks such as climate change or financial crises (Mildner and 
Boeckelmann 2011; Mair, Mildner, and Wodni 2012; Wiener et al. 2013).  
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especially energy technology, such as nuclear, or issues closely related to energy such as 
climate change (Beck 1995; Anthony Leiserowitz 2006; Vogel 2012; Kelemen and Vogel 
2009; Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003; Horlick-Jones, Sime, and Pidgeon 2003). 
Shale gas is as of yet not researched in much detail and is a fitting opportunity for further 
work in this direction.  
In the following chapters I draw on arguments about factors influencing decision-making 
using insights from theories of international political economy and comparative political 
economy. I consider influences on decision-making on the uncertain issue of fracking 
development from private interests as well as through cognitive constraints. Political 
economy is a fitting discipline from which to approach this puzzle, as it studies interaction 
between the state, the society and the market and economy, tracing links between 
economic and political elements; and it has a history of research through multidisciplinary 
approaches and inclusion of theory from a variety of social sciences (Hall 1997; Blyth 
2009; Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016).8 Given that the first and most of the work on 
irrationality in risk preferences came from the field of economics yet much recent work 
on risk is centred in political science, they need to be considered together theoretically. 
Political economy, in which insights from both disciplines have been used together, is the 
discipline most helpful to draw on for this research. My case study also touches upon core 
issues of international political economy. Concerns have been raised that the shale gas 
story is a result of private economic interests lobbying policymakers. Moreover, the 
political decisions being taken are interlaced heavily with ideas of economic reasoning. 
The thesis begins by establishing why existing approaches to analysing preference 
formation under risk and uncertainty do not help in explaining the support for shale gas 
and do not provide the framework needed to investigate decision-making behind current 
energy policy.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Following Blyth I consider political economy a “way of doing comparative politics” but also a “distinct 
way of doing political science in and of itself” (Blyth 2009, 194): importantly, I agree that it has come to 
“the decay of the boundary that traditionally set … international political economy apart from 
comparative political economy” (Blyth 2009, 194; MacKenzie 2006; Hobson and Seabrooke 2007). 
Therefore, I mostly use the term political economy, even if my focus is comparative.  
Following Blyth and Hall, I prefer to divide between ideas, interests and institutions rather than structure, 
rationality and culture (Hall 1997; Blyth 2009). For this study I attach the variable rationality, as suggested 
by Blyth (2009, 216), to the troika, but for reasons explained in this chapter I spend less focus on 
institutions.   
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I.3 Research design: Methods and structure of the thesis 
To add empirical knowledge to the narrative of shale gas development as well as advance 
the theoretical discussion on decision making and risk preference formation in this thesis 
I develop three distinct analytical approaches in response to the above-mentioned 
questions. Following the impression that reasoning behind the dash for shale gas was 
both unclear and possibly irrational, the logic behind my thesis’ research design was 
inspired by political scientist Graham Allison’s analysis of the governmental decision-
making during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Essence of Decision (Allison 1971; Allison and 
Zelikow 1999).  
Allison used information about the decision-making process behind the Cuban crisis as a 
case study into governmental decision-making in situations of risk and uncertainty. His 
motivation for the book came from his conviction that at the time of writing in the 1970s, 
the disciplines of political science and international relations were relying heavily on ideas 
of rational expectations in decision-making which they had taken over from the discipline 
of economics. He mentions specifically that the saturation of political science with 
assumptions about rationality and expected utility was based on models such as game 
theory, for example and challenged this orthodoxy (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 
1999). His book title is based on a quote by John F. Kennedy himself that reads: “The 
essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the 
decider himself” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, xi; Sorenson and Kennedy 2005). Further, 
he argued, to be ‘rational’, governmental decision-makers tend to ignore, either 
intentionally or not, certain data points that do not fit into their modelling of utility 
(Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999). Allison introduced several different 
approaches, or as he calls them, models, of decision-making that may have affected the 
decisions in Cuba: the classical rational actor model, the organisational behaviour model, 
and the governmental politics model. He successfully showed that the explanatory value 
of a rational actor government calculating utility was insufficient in the case study, and his 
other approaches instead added value to the analysis.  
I am using clues taken from political economy theory, economics and behavioural 
economics to develop three separate narratives about respective dimensions of the 
decision-making process. Each of the narratives serves as a lens that sensitises me to 
different aspects of the process which lead to a decision on fracking. It is known that a 
decision was made, but there is little knowledge about how the decision was made outside 
of policymakers’ declarations that the rationale behind commencing fracking lies in 
positive economic effects outweighing negative ones, suggesting a cost-benefit analysis. 
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In this thesis, I want to open the black box of the decision-making processes as far as I 
can. I am telling the story of shale gas and the reasoning behind it from several different 
perspectives, to show that the official ‘rational economic reasoning’ is if anything but one 
possible explanation, which offers limited explanatory value, and instead I consider other 
explanations.  
To explain the dependent variable of risk or uncertainty preference, which is stated 
through a country’s commitment to hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, in this study I am 
searching for a common factor most likely responsible for the similar policy decisions 
made by the U.S. and the UK. I test three separate hypotheses about the influential 
independent variable with three approaches concerning different dimensions of the 
decision-making process.  
The plan of the thesis is supported by the following claims: 1) That a decision on energy 
policy involving a new, not thoroughly tested and researched technology is a decision 
made under considerable uncertainty. 2) That a decision to add fracking for shale gas to 
a country’s energy mix is a decision made under awareness for the potential of 
consequential risks to the environment (such as pollution and land degradation), to 
human health (such as water and ground contamination and radioactivity) and to the 
economy (such as market bubbles, neglect of other important economic assets such as 
alternative energy, or labour market shifts). 3) That there are viable alternative energy 
policy paths known to the governmental decision-makers. 4) That a decision to accept 
the risks brought on by engaging in fracking is expressed through both the governmental 
decision to commence exploratory and commercial fracking as well as through statements 
made by official decision-makers and official decision-making bodies and institutions. 5) 
That an examination of the reasons that factor into a governmental decision on an energy 
policy which entails risk will enhance our understanding of the reasoning behind the 
current energy strategy as well as behind decision-making in the face of risk and 
uncertainty.  
Some scholars have criticised this type of approach in which the case selection is based 
on the dependent variable – i.e. a case selection because of an outcome of a decision-
making process and a subsequent analysis of the factors influencing said outcome and 
their causal relation (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). However, in this particular research 
project the case selection based on the dependent variable can be justified by the specific 
puzzle – of which the outcome, i.e. the decision is known, but the path that led there is 
not – and also by previous successful application of this type of research (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994).   
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The cases selected to analyse and compare are the United Kingdom and United States of 
America. A comparative study of the two countries was chosen for the following reasons: 
First, too few countries have sufficiently developed a shale gas sector to merit an in-depth 
study. Among those, the U.S. and UK appear most committed to shale gas, and their 
economic policies are well documented. Second, the U.S. and the UK are distinctive 
enough to offer a good basis for comparative case studies.  
The two countries represent two of the most advanced and best documented economies 
in the world and hence focus on them is both justified by interest as well as facilitated by 
previous work. Yet, despite a shared historical or cultural background, the United 
Kingdom and United States have very diverging economic capabilities and strategies 
regarding their energy sector, and have very different regulatory and bureaucratic systems 
governing it (IEA 2002, 2003, 2005; Helm 2008; DECC 2011; DoE 2011; MIT Energy 
Initiative 2011; IEA 2012b; White House 2012; EIA 2013a; DECC 2014; IEA 2014, 
2015b, 2015a, EIA 2015e, 2015c, 2015f).9 10 This fact directly causes the disbelief of many 
experts, especially in the UK, that an approach that, apart from being rather new and 
uncertain, has been used only within a very specific sector setting in the US, should be 
emulated in the UK (Stevens 2010; Boersma and Johnson 2012a; Carrington 2013b; BGS 
2013a; Anderson 2015). Given the above, I approach my comparative analysis like a most 
dissimilar systems design (MDSD) aiming to find common factors influencing the 
decision.   
The U.S. and the UK have sufficient data available, while the political process is 
documented enough as to prove fruitful for investigation. Their engagement with shale 
gas is closely monitored by other states – China, Argentina, Poland for example – 
concerned with their energy supply security and interested in joining the shale gas market 
example (Stevens 2010; Tian et al. 2014). Ergo further analysis of the strategic decision-
making around shale gas policy in these cases is needed. Following this line of thought, 
Canada was deselected for being too similar to the United States in sector history and 
practices (IEA 2016). Australia and New Zealand are deselected due to legal uncertainties 
at the beginning of the research about whether or not fracking would be pursued or 
continue unhindered – moratoria are still discussed (ODT 2012; ABC 2016). In Poland, 
major companies have quit drilling due to geological differences that meant the hydraulic 
                                                 
9 I forego the argument over left vs right wing political parties and their influence by including a change 
of government in each country within my timeframe.  
10 The United Kingdom may after the events of 2016 decide to leave the European Union – however, a) 
this was not foreseeable before the write up stage of this PhD, and b) there is so far no knowledge on 
whether the country will truly leave the bloc and if so how closely its energy sector but also overall legal, 
regulatory, economic and environmental frameworks will still be tied to the EU.  
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fracturing process was not functioning the way it did in the U.S. (Anderson 2014). South 
Africa has had its drilling ban lifted but there is hardly any data on the production and 
policy process available publicly (AFP 2016). China (IEA 2016) is deselected for the same 
reason.11  
Considering the small number of cases studies, a very strict or randomised case selection 
design is neither possible nor appropriate. Yet from early reading and research into the 
topic what stood out is the discrepancy between the situation of the energy sector in the 
United Kingdom and the United States (Stevens 2010; Petersen 2013; Chestney 2014; 
Stevens 2014).  
To sum up, the United States and the United Kingdom have been chosen for comparison 
as they are two countries seriously engaging in policy decisions around shale gas, with 
their governments officially pro fracking12; due to their very different energy sectors they 
have enough variation on the dependent variable to make for a productive comparative 
analysis (Keohane, King & Verba 1994). Further, they are chosen as they are both 
pioneers in the domain of shale gas (the U.S. more so than the UK). The United Kingdom 
and the United States came to the same conclusion on the risks of fracking and made 
similar political decisions, but it is very unclear why they should have done so. Their 
decisions came with a difference in timing, which will be taken into consideration in the 
study, but which arguably has not altered the key variable of uncertainty. The introduction 
in chapter two establishes a basic overview of the two countries’ energy systems which 
provide discrepant opportunities and challenges for shale gas exploration, for example in 
terms of reserves as well as structural and regulatory factors (further analysed as part of 
the detailed case study in chapter four). I will respect the inherent limitations of a 
qualitative case study with a small-n sample by refraining from generalising and by acting 
aware of the fact that there lies uncertainty in my inferences.13  
Shale gas is a very current issue and a newly relevant method of energy generation, which 
in the past decade has been increasingly employed in the United States and has been 
gaining traction in early, not-yet commercial stages in Britain since 2011 (BBC News 
2011). Hence the timeframe for this study is 2001/2 – the approximate beginning of 
commercial fracking on a large scale with the first successful horizontal well in the U.S. 
                                                 
11 Fracking policy decisions in Argentina commenced too long after this research project did (Gutman 
2017).   
12 That is at least until summer 2016, the last included date and dating of submission for this thesis.  
13 To include detailed control cases for my MDSD would not be feasible within the time constraints of 
this work, and control cases are also limited due to the novelty of the case study; but where possible I 
reference comparable examples from other countries.  
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Barnett shale play (Stevens 2010, 14) until 2014/2015, the last available point of time for 
many of the data sets used.14  
I devise a more traditional analytical perspective, what Allison would call ‘rational actor 
model’, in chapters three and four to consider the merits of a cost-benefit analysis of the 
shale gas decision made under the impression of rational, homo economicus type of decision-
making. In the theoretical chapter I consider traditional and critical research on this topic, 
and in the analysis chapter I use comparative economic, geological and structural data. 
The sub-hypothesis for this dimension is as follows:  
H1: The decision will be made that benefits of fracking outweigh risks if the expected utility of the measure 
is convincing. 
In order to consider the expected revenue from shale gas, in chapter four I examine the 
resource endowment for both countries and compare this to resource needs and energy 
consumption patterns. This is to provide a better overview of the energy economic 
situation and potential impact of shale resources. Further I assess in this chapter structural 
factors such as the diverse legal framework, gas pricing systems, infrastructure, and 
population density. Revenue is measured as the estimated potentially recoverable shale 
gas resources in consideration of costs likely to arise from factors such as the expenses 
mentioned. All of these affect the expected utility of fracking and political decision-
makers can be assumed to be well informed about them. Another factor explored is the 
need for energy supply security. Information is presented from primary sources such as 
international data and national statistics, as well as secondary sources on the countries’ 
energy supply and its energy demand compared to production, imports and exports.  
Rational choice in political science is a very large theoretical field that has been developing 
in multiple directions and dominating several key subfields and journals for over fifty 
years (Green and Shapiro 1994; Friedman 1996). In my thesis, I cannot do justice to the 
diverse variations of its approaches. Instead I focus on one basic core assumptions that 
is a) at the heart of all rational choice theory and b) key to risk preference theory, which 
is that all actors seek to maximise value or utility. This behaviour is considered rational, 
and political actors are construed as rational beings capable of pursuing it (Green and 
Shapiro 1994; Friedman 1996). Considering the rational choice options for political 
decision-makers in my case study, then, I take into account possible goals other than 
national or public benefit, for example parochial sectoral benefits or short-term goals such 
as re-election, personal gain and approval. In chapter four, public attitudes towards 
                                                 
14 Of course, I will consider theory, reports and regulation from outside this time frame that concern or 
affect actions and decisions within it.  
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fracking are considered under the assumption that they count for political decision-
makers’ efforts to gain re-election, to give room to testing a popular, more narrow 
definition of rational choice and narrower conceptualisation of politicians’ interests as 
that of seeking re-election (Downs 1957). Another interpretation of maximising utility 
allows for the possibility that politicians act in someone else’s but the public’s interests: 
here I also consider in chapters five and six theoretical approaches about lobbying for 
parochial interests and case evidence on the latter.15 The possibility of a time lag, that 
politicians will accept future risks and losses at the risk of short term gains, is less relevant 
with shale gas, firstly because many risks, such as earthquakes, are experienced almost 
immediately, and secondly because very negative public perception of shale gas could 
have an impact in the short term, on the next election.  
In this second analytical dimension, I examine private interests in shale gas and the 
institutional access granted to them first in a theoretical review introducing political 
economy approaches applicable to the case study (chapter five) and secondly by 
considering data available on such interests in the U.S. and UK and their respective 
institutional positions (chapter six). This corresponds to Allison’s third model on 
bureaucratic politics but whereas he focuses on interest from within the government, I 
am considering private interests.   
H2: The decision will be made that benefits of fracking outweigh risks when private (as opposed to public 
or national) interests align with it and are able to conduct significant lobbying for this policy to go ahead.  
To investigate lobbying activity around shale gas I consider the relative strength and 
history of the gas and oil lobby in either country, then turn specifically towards the top 
energy firms interested in fracking. In order to establish a comparison, I also spend time 
on examining the lobbying capacities of the opposition to shale gas. To judge the vital 
role of institutional access by private interests to policymaking I include a section on the 
links between companies and the relevant regulatory institutions as well as key 
policymakers.   
In the third dimension of the case study in chapter seven and eight I review the influence 
of entrenched strategic ideas as well as cognitive biases as to their impact on the shale gas 
decision, a situation which I call ‘cognitive capture’. This framework is based on risk 
theory and decision-making literature from the field of psychology, decision analysis and 
                                                 
15 One approach to policymakers’ rationality that is not considered in this thesis is the more recent approach of 
considering politicians’ desire to fulfil the interests of investors rather than other market players (Streeck 2013, 2013, 
79). It isn’t a much discussed or well documented field in the area of the energy market and at the time of 
commencement of this thesis there were clear issues of data availability. However, later data shows that this story 
could be promising regarding shale gas and should be researched in future (EIA 2013b; The Economist 2015; Ward 
2016; Scott 2017).  
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organisational behaviour theory as well as IPE literature on ideational and institutional 
constraints. This corresponds to Allison’s second model of organisational process in so 
far as I consider potentially subliminal constraints to action and change.  
H3: The decision will be made that benefits of fracking outweigh risks when they fit within the 
government’s repertoire of strategic ideas and when cognitive biases exist that suggest this course.  
In order to analyse the ideas behind current energy policy, strategy documents for both 
governments’ energy policies are assessed and compared. As the focus is on ideas the 
study will look at primary sources expressing exactly those, ideas and preferences, namely 
the white papers (UK) and strategic plans (U.S.) by the countries’ governmental energy 
departments (DoE and DTI, BERR, DECC).  
The outline of this thesis is as follows: In the following second chapter I introduce the 
key issues around shale gas and hydraulic fracturing technology, and the related respective 
policy decisions made. The main part of the thesis from chapter three to eight puts 
forward the three separate analytical approaches to consider three different aspects of 
decision-making on shale gas; each approach is subdivided into a first theoretical chapter 
and second chapter presenting data and subsequent analysis. In chapters three and four I 
consider the traditional approach of decision-making under risk and uncertainty of cost-
benefit analysis and expected utility: the third chapter provides a historical and literature 
review, criticism and developments, and the fourth chapter presents the related data for 
the U.S. and UK shale gas case and an ensuing analysis. I then focus on two further 
dimensions to the story behind shale. The second narrative, also divided into a theoretical 
chapter six and a data and analysis chapter seven, considers the influence of private 
interests and their access to governmental institutions as a factor in shale gas policy 
support. The third dimension in chapter seven and eight focuses on various cognitive 
constraints, including specific heuristic biases and broader ideational constraints, to 
rational decision-making. A conclusion follows in chapter nine.  
In this thesis, I do not strictly follow a positivist approach but neither do I strictly follow 
an interpretivist approach. My work is based on the methodology set out by Graham 
Allison in his book Essence of Decision. In the book he explores a decision taken under risk 
and uncertainty during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 
1999b).  
Allison’s methods of contrasting diverging explanations for similar situations was aimed 
to show the degree to which theory can help select certain evidence while deselecting 
others. Considering that it is impossible to study historical events without theory, the 
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contrasting method he employed leaves it to the reader to adjudicate among diverging 
explanations. Strictly Allison’s approach is not the typical interpretative approach. He 
treats interpretation as a form of a narrative, or a story telling, and he employs divergent 
theoretical frameworks to generate such narratives. These narratives are not based, of 
course, on pure fiction but on evidence. Yet, the fact that three very different narratives 
are founded on different theoretical frameworks show the power of theory to distort 
evidence. Allison acknowledges, of course, that the quality of the narrative is partially 
dependent on the narrator: the skill by which the researcher is able to combine a 
theoretical framework with empirical evidence to generate convincing historical 
narrative.  But, the skill of the narrator is no guarantee that the story they are telling 
describes what really matters. In that sense, Allison is not a positivist. He rejects the notion 
of the possibility of any ultimate truth or approximating truth in historical studies. The 
best the social scientists can say is that one set of theories or theoretical framework is able 
to produce a narrative that appears more convincing or comprehensive than another. 
Allison was able, then, to present his own estimation of the comparative quality of the 
narratives generated.  For instance, he thought that a straightforward rational decision-
making approach produced poorer results. His preferred finding was that the insofar not 
recognised issue of bureaucratic politics seemed most influential. His approach was to 
present evidence to the reader as openly and transparently as possible and let the reader 
make up their mind.  
Like Allison, I develop three scenarios of decision-making based on three theoretical 
perspectives. My approach of describing how a decision is made under certain conditions 
rather than empirically proving one correct hypothesis explaining the causal link in general 
terms falls in line with methodological nominalism rather than essentialism (Shearmur 
2002; Parvin 2013). My aim was to give each the best ammunition possible, so that they 
each would read as plausible explanations, and as able to partly explain the decision taken. 
Nonetheless, each has its limitations. Allison disproved the notion that the reasoning 
behind the decisions taken in Cuba was as straightforward as suggested by the rational 
actor model. Similarly, by presenting three different scenarios I show that the decision 
behind supporting shale gas exploration is unlikely a straightforward, rational economic 
decision.  
By using this unconventional approach, like Allison, I am not claiming that I can 
ultimately prove causality links (i.e., which sets of causes led to a given outcome, in this 
case, the shale policy). The method used in my thesis helps towards questioning the 
validity of the official reasoning. I personally, find the least explanatory power in the 
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classic risk preference rational model (chapters three and four), and that a different 
narrative, the one about cognitive capture presented in chapters seven and eight, has 
particular internal consistency and apparently more explanatory value. 
In constructing such narratives, this thesis deals with several phenomena which are 
unobservable, for example ideational constraints or the direct impact of lobbying. One 
can demonstrate, for instance, that certain efforts were expanded by lobbyists in support 
of certain policy outcomes, and then one can show that the policy options chosen were 
identical to the ones favoured by certain lobbyists. Yet, even in this, rather rare situation, 
this does not constitute a causal link between one and another. Political scientists seek 
additional evidence for causal links between lobbying and policy outcomes by 
interviewing actors, examining primary literature and or working out whether one 
narrative or causal link appears more persuasive then another.  None of these approaches 
can establish a line of causality with absolute certainty. My approach relies, therefore, on 
existing secondary literature on lobbying in the U.S. and the UK and alternative energy, 
combined with an evaluation of the likelihood of the narrative presented. The same is the 
case when it comes to ideational constraints, or cognitive capture. Scholars have argued 
for decades that strong ideas about how the economy should work, such as a subscription 
of Keynesian or neoliberal beliefs, can have an actual effect on economic policy. This has 
been researched for example famously by Peter Hall (1993). Looking at the adoption of 
Keynesian politics he argued that in the absence of proof of other direct causal links or 
pressures leading to the adoption of specific policies, one could establish whether 
Keynesian ideas existed and were accepted before the adoption of the related policy. 
Scholars have argued for years that the way in which an actor perceives the world dictates 
how they interact with it (Wendt 1994; Blyth 2009; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010; 
Rodrik 2014). Yet again there are no methodological approaches which can establish a 
causal link with absolute certainty.  
Therefore, the decision to include mixed methods and allow for interpretative elements 
amongst positivist empirical research seems natural and not diminishing to the quality of 
my results. My decision follows longstanding methodological research refuting the notion 
that positivist and interpretative research need be separate or mutually exclusive but rather 
that they can be mutually supportive (Luthans and Davis 1982; Lee 1991). When drawing 
conclusions, I aim to not present them as ‘provable’ facts and do not consider them as 
such but make every effort to outline my analysis and the logic behind my conclusions.  
Materials used in this thesis stems from mixed method research. The first research model 
on rational economic risk preferences includes data from official governmental statistics 
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by the departments entrusted with economic policy, energy policy, environment, budget 
or statistics, third party data from bodies such as the IEA or OECD, and data from 
independent scientific research published in recognised journals (e.g. IEA 2002; DTI 
2003; IEA 2005; BERR 2008; Owen, Inderwildi, and King 2010; Urbina 2011; IEA 2012; 
Bolton 2013; International Energy Agency Staff 2013; EIA 2013b, 2015c, 2015a, 2016; 
IEA 2016).16 The second model uses a variety of data available on lobbying: the official 
independent lobbying register from the Centre for Responsive Politics (CRP), Pro 
Publica, Data from the United States Congress’ records and investigative journalism 
collections as well as data from independent academic research in the United States case 
study (e.g. Lustgarten 2009; Buisset, Øye, and Selleslaghs 2012; Martin 2014; Horn 2013; 
Tansey 2014; DeGette 2015; Jones and Rowell 2015; European Commission and 
European Parliament 2016; CRP 2016). For both countries, data about institutional 
connections and lobbying was drawn from the business intelligence tool Boardex 
(BoardEX 2016). Data on lobbying in the UK was less plainly available than in the United 
States due to a difference in lobbying register. It is based on primary data from 
parliamentary publications and records and the Lord’s Committee of Economic Affairs 
but also the EU lobbying register, supplanted with data from independent academic 
research as well as from investigative journalism (Mitchell 2012; DECC 2012; Carrington 
2013b; Parliament Publications & Records 2013; Lords’ Committee on Economic Affairs 
2014; Pratley 2015; Athena 2015). For the third model, the materials considered are all of 
the respective official energy strategy plans within the timeframe of research: the UK 
Energy White Papers from 2001 – 2015 and the U.S. Strategic Energy Plans from 2001 – 
2015 (DTI 2003, 2007; BERR 2008; DECC 2009, 2011, DoE 2006a, 2011, 2014a; White 
House 2014). These documents are the blueprints for all energy policy within a country, 
showcasing the ideas held by official energy policymakers tasked with writing energy 
related legislation and the ideas that future policy is drawn from. Therefore, to my line of 
research they have proven more conducive than official statements by elected 
Congressmen or MPs who are not actually tasked with writing energy legislation or 
transcripts of parliamentary debates on the issue, as these rarely go into detail. Interviews 
would have been a helpful addition to the dataset. However, after completing a first round 
of interviews with parliamentary researchers and researchers at the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change in the United Kingdom, it became impossible to replicate these 
interviews in the United States during my research there. Hence interviews do not form 
                                                 
16 The variety of sources is needed both to fill gaps in data that would otherwise arise, especially when 
needed for comparison between the two countries keeping different records, but also to increase accuracy 
and objectivity. 
 18 
part of my dataset in this chapter, but I acknowledge that they can be a fruitful future 
addition to the case study.  
The study excludes culture and cultural impacts on decision-making. The idea that cultural 
differences between the U.S., UK and Europe may explain risk preferences and resulting 
policy towards energy and new technologies has been raised by Wiener et al. (2013). The 
literature on the subject, however, is highly inconclusive: While the various case studies 
in Wiener et al. (2013) hint at the possibility that culture may be used to explain otherwise 
unexplainable phenomena, there is no concurrence or clear strategy. Some studies argue 
that the U.S. more risk averse than the EU, while others argue the other way around 
(Vogel 2003; Kelemen and Vogel 2009; Jonathan B. Wiener et al. 2013). Many dispute the 
notion of cultural divergence and risk appetite between nations (Walsh 2011; Miller 2011; 
Freestone 2011; Wiener et al. 2013). In my study, I chose not to engage with the variable 
of culture as I did not see how it might add to the project without sacrificing clarity. 
Finally, the variable of party identification is sometimes used in the context of culture. 
However, my research timeframe is such that it covers separate governments from 
different parties with different party identities in both case study countries. Since in each 
country parties from either side of the political spectrum chose to engage in shale gas 
(also counting the coalition government in the United Kingdom), party identification does 
not appear to have an impact as a variable and will be disregarded.  
In my thesis I consider the influence of institutions, often considered one of the three 
pillars of comparative political economy (Hall 1997; Soskice and Hall 2001; Blyth 2009), 
not as a separate model but within the other three narratives. Peter Hall defined 
institutions as “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices 
that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and the 
economy” (Blyth 2009, 197); Douglass North defined them simply as “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (Blyth 2009, 197).17 Institutions in the sense of 
structuring possible economic policy are considered in chapters three and four when 
structural, legal and bureaucratic factors facilitating shale exploration are assessed. 
Institutions in their role of structural positioning mediating interests (i.e. providing access 
to policymakers) are considered in chapters five and six on shale gas and interest politics. 
Institutions in their role of norms and guiding principles are core to the third model I 
group around ideas in chapters seven and eight.  
                                                 
17 The notable difference lies between the origin of institutions – in Hall’s version they appear to exist prior 
to the agents who may use them or be constrained by them, whereas North allows for the idea that agents 
may chose and create institutions to streamline interaction in their favour. (Blyth 2009, 197). 
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Many reviewers of Allison pointed out the overlapping issues within his second and third 
model (Smith 1980; Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006; Alden and Aran 2016), further 
encouraging me to not try and divide up institutions as a specific model. The very nature 
of institutions as structuring opportunities for other behaviour makes their inclusion into 
each of the narratives seem natural.  
Another issue is the problem of assessing the difference between openly stated and 
expressed ideas, interests and preferences versus potential hidden but true ideas, interests 
or preferences. However, this study assesses ideas and interests once they have been 
publicly expressed and assumes that the latter, hidden kind, cannot have influence on 
policy process any more after this has happened. Woll states that preferences 
unfortunately “come with an epistemological problem: the only thing a scientist can 
observe is an individual’s behaviour. One can thus only infer which preference an actor 
was pursuing with a certain behaviour and only make assumptions about the degree to 
which such a preference corresponded to the actor’s actual interest” (Woll 2008, 31). 
However, this should not impede nor further concern my research, for two reasons: first, 
there is no solution to this issue other than impossible telepathy or illegal spying. Second, 
the preferences taken are those of governments, not the individuals within them, and even 
when they are, they are made in such an official capacity and, more importantly, with such 
an impact, that they count for more than an individual’s preference, as they lead to policy 
or at least cannot be taken back as easily since they are public.  
 
I.3.1 Core findings and contribution of the study  
The thesis adds to current knowledge and debate on energy sector policy through a new 
interpretation of empirical data to highlight current challenges regarding shale gas that 
hinder a transformation of energy sectors to alternative fuels. Breaking such impediments 
and moving on with climate change action through the support of renewable energy 
sources is one of the 21st century’s key challenges. The thesis also adds to theory and 
research on decision-making under risk and uncertainty in political science by testing the 
classical expected utility approach and considering a combined political economy 
approach.  
The empirical investigation of my three narratives provides some important insights about 
the realities of the shale gas story for the U.S. and UK economies as well as insights about 
the role of private interests and the impact of cognitive constraints on decision-making. 
In particular, I find the expected utility and cost-benefit analysis does not recommend 
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shale gas development for either country but especially not for the UK due to the 
diverging geological and structural factors but difference in timing and new insights about 
shale gas. This notion both contradicts official statements by policymakers that claim the 
move towards shale is based on rational economic consideration, but also as a by-product 
disputes the theoretical arguments that put forward this approach. In reality, shale gas 
relies heavily on subsidies and support, but governments and companies embrace the 
ideas about the fossil fuel’s economic success. Classical political and economic theories 
of rational decision-making do not explain these preferences. My research hence adds 
analytically to the discussion of a broader question at the very forefront of political 
economy: why are certain economically irrational decisions maintained despite concrete 
evidence to the contrary? Specifically, why do current policies on energy diverge from the 
fundamental economic concepts they are based on?  
The aims and means of private interests and lobbying are found to strongly positively 
correlate with the decision on fracking in the United States and to a slightly lesser degree 
with the United Kingdom, too. Through this narrative the evidence I present lends 
empirical support to theories of IPE that emphasise the influence of private interests on 
policymaking, especially to arguments about the effectiveness of lobbying strategies that 
favour quiet politics and close relations with regulators. A tendency for supporting the 
status quo over change can also be confirmed to a lesser degree – even if shale gas does 
not exactly represent the status quo, it fits the theme.   
Lastly through my discussion of cognitive capture I discover support for my hypothesis 
that cognitive capture in the form of biases and key ideas constrain policy options, 
prohibiting an inclusive debate and change. This provides some confirmation for both 
IPE theories on the influence of ideas and behavioural economics’ theories about the 
influence of cognitive biases on decision-making under risk and uncertainty. It also helps 
in explaining the success of shale gas, as the UK and U.S. energy policy strategy appear 






II Chapter Two. The story of fracking and why it is important 
 
In this chapter I will introduce the energy market phenomenon that is called hydraulic 
fracturing or ‘fracking’ and the story of its development until 2016. This serves firstly to 
familiarise the reader with the resource and the technological innovation that has led to 
the commercialisation of its development, to clarify terms and concepts used in the 
following thesis. But beyond that, this clarification is needed in order to understand why 
shale gas is currently an unusual contender on the energy market, why its development is 
controversial, and why a policy decision in favour of or against its development is a 
decision involving uncertainty and serious risks that is worthy of policy analysis.  
The chapter is set up as follows: I first explain the currency, technology and history of 
hydraulic fracturing of shale gas; then I discuss why it is controversial following 
environmental as well as economic considerations. This is followed by a small section on 
issues around data reliability. Lastly, I elaborate on the puzzle that is posed by recent 
policy decisions on shale gas development in the modern energy market which prompted 
this study.  
 
 
II.1 Shale gas: A primer  
What appear to be substantial unconventional gas resources have recently been located in 
countries across the globe, predominantly the United States, Canada, Mexico, China, 
Argentina, South Africa, Poland, Bulgaria and France. They have only become accessible 
due to recent technological innovation. The discovery is considered as a potentially game-
changing resource opportunity for these countries’ energy mix by some governments and 
as a substantial business opportunity by major multinational oil and gas companies 
(Stevens 2010; The Economist 2012b; EIA 2012b). So far, the United States alone have 
made significant use of the newly accessible resources: shale gas has increased from 
accounting for 1% of United States energy production in 2001 to accounting for 20% in 
2009 (Stevens 2010; EIA 2012a).  
Unlike the production of natural gas, due to shale gas’ location in tight shale rock, its 
production through hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’ involves not only vertical but also 
horizontal drilling, a process only recently deployed on a large scale (Wright 2012). Hence 
it belongs within the group of unconventional gas. Whilst horizontal drilling is attractive 
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in that it offers the possibility to drain a larger area with a single drilling platform, stable 
drilling is much more difficult in horizontal boreholes. These difficulties are only 
enhanced by the fact that shale drilling normally takes place in much deeper layers of rock 
formation than conventional gas (Fjaer et al. 2008, 309).  
 
Figure 1 above (GFZ 2016) illustrates the difference between conventional drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing. Fracking is undertaken by pumping a combination of water, sand (or 
alternatively tiny ceramic balls), and a mixture of chemicals into the shale rock with very 
high pressure (Nestler 2012). Hydraulic fracturing “takes place when the fluid pressure 
within the rock exceeds the smallest principal stress plus the tensile strength of the rock” 
(Fjaer et al. 2008, 369); the result is a controlled explosion, fracturing the rock. The high 
water pressure serves to break open the deep formation of rock, the sand or ceramic balls 
are pumped down to keep open the fractures for the gas to be able to flow out. The small 
images illustrate the fractures in the shale, artificially created through controlled 
explosions, which give the procedure its name. Conventional gas does not require such 
efforts and, under normal circumstances, flows easily once tapped by a well shaft.  
At least around 5% of the liquids used in fracking are chemicals that fulfil various tasks – 
decrease friction, support the transportation of sand or ceramic, and prohibit the 
formation of bacteria and foul gases (Nestler 2012). But 5% is the minimum – in 
Figure 1: Conventional and Unconventional Gas Well & Fracking (GFZ 2016) 
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commonly used fracking fluid concoctions, between 5% and as much as 28% can be acids 
alone (hydrochloric or acetic acids), used to prepare the shale for fracking; other chemicals 
include citric acids, guar gum, borate salts, and isopropanol (The Economist 2012b). 
Some of the chemicals contain gelling polymers often found in food or cosmetics, some 
contain friction reducers normally used in diapers: overall a mixture of several dozen 
different chemical ingredients is used (Wright 2012). Not all of these chemicals are 
dangerous for the environment or if they were to come into contact with humans, but 
part of them have been proven to be so (Daly 2012). The mixture depends greatly on the 
specific area and situation of each individual shale basin, and the impact it will have varies. 
The environmental impact of fracking also differs greatly on how and where the fracking 
fluid is disposed of once the fracking process is completed (Nestler 2012). Whilst general 
information about fracking is available and fairly well understood, it varies so greatly from 
each different basin or layer that it is hard to make overall assumptions about the safety 
of fracking and fracking fluids (Nestler 2012; GFZ Helmholtz Centre 2013). A problem 
with estimating the safety of the process lies in the fact that to ensure competition, U.S. 
companies are not required to disclose the exact chemicals they use during production 
(Schrope 2013; Terrell, Tinley, and Souther 2014).  
Figure 2 above (Stevens 2010, 15) sheds light on another factor rendering shale gas so 
desirable: domestic energy independence. If those estimations were to hold up and the 
majority of shale layers proven to contain substantial amounts of gas that are viable to 
recover, then North America, which possesses a comparatively small amount of 
conventional proven gas resources, is estimated to possess unconventional gas resources 
potentially greater than the overall gas resources of the Middle East or Russia. The United 
Figure 2: Estimates of Global Gas Reserves 2010 (Stevens 2010) 
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States are known to have expressed a strong desire for energy independence in the past, 
both from the government (White House 2012) but also by the public (PEW 2012). 
However, the reserve size statistics projected for shale gas resources have previously been 
revised, are doubted by experts and difficult to judge without insights into the detailed 
geological situation (DECC 2013b).  
The context of the excitement about the so-called shale gas ‘revolution’ can be accounted 
for by the interplay of several important factors. First, and quite simply, despite the fact 
that fracking was first attempted in its current form in the United States in 1947 (Styles 
2014), large-scale commercial fracking operations have only become possible and 
affordable through technological progress in the 2000s (DoE 2015; The Economist 
2012b; Wright 2012). Secondly, only the increasing awareness of the limitations of ever 
declining, slowly depleting conventional fossil fuel resources (Longwell 2002) favours the 
exploration of less accessible resources such as unconventional gas, and production has 
accordingly increased manifold in the past decade. Thirdly, the interest can be further 
explained by the fact that large parts of the expected resources are situated in countries 
which are traditionally not overly rich in conventional oil and gas resources, such as 
Argentina, France or Poland (EIA 2012b). This has the potential of changing the global 
landscape of trade balances.  
Global trends support the movement towards new resources in general. World energy 
demand is expected to grow by 37% by 2040, and with much stronger demand from the 
Asian markets than previously (especially from India and China), import demand 
competition is on the rise (IEA 2014). Improvements in energy efficiency have the 
potential to slow increasing energy demand of course. A further shift affecting the energy 
market is the approaching retirement of almost half of the current operating nuclear plants 
before 2040, mostly in the United States, Europe and Russia (IEA 2014, 4). All major 
regions with the exception of Europe are to see an increase in natural gas output of above 
50%. Gas is expected to “draw level with coal as the second largest fuel in the global 
energy mix, after oil” (IEA 2014, 2). A large share of this prediction concerns 
unconventional gas reserves.   
Both the United States and the United Kingdom are currently in the process of reviewing 
oft-changing information about the amount of shale gas resources available respectively 
(Stevens 2012), with both governments considering claims that the new resource could 
change the energy landscape lastingly and supply a significant amount of the respective 
country’s energy need for the immediate future (MIT 2011; BGS 2013a). Already an 
established business within the span of only a decade, in the United States hydraulic 
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fracturing of shale gas is the new much-discussed phenomenon said to be transforming 
the energy market. In the United Kingdom, the government has granted several rounds 
of increasingly liberal fracking licenses and changed regulation such as specific industry 
taxes with the shale gas industry in mind. Yet owing to both strong local opposition and 
several well-publicised mishaps in the early stages, such as earthquakes in Blackpool, 
fracking has not yet reached a commercial stage in the UK and test drilling has been 
prevented in several cases. After fracking was briefly suspended in 2011 the UK 
government once again backed and allowed hydraulic fracturing in Britain in late 2012 
(Harrabin 2012).  The official U.S. government’s stance on shale gas is to support its 
extraction and that it has provided the economy with positive growth (Pasternak 2001; 
Lustgarten 2011; Snyder and Klimasinska 2012; White House 2014; Krukowska 2014). In 
the United Kingdom the Cameron government has decided in favour of supporting its 
deployment and is actively pushing for shale-friendly legislation (Carrington 2013a; 
Cameron 2013; BBC News 2014a; Osborne 2015). Top policymakers in both countries 
have recommended shale gas in the highest tones (Lustgarten 2011; Snyder and 
Klimasinska 2012; Cameron 2013; Chazan 2013; Vaughan 2013a; Carrington 2013a; 
Krukowska 2014; BBC News 2014a; Blake 2014; Osborne 2015).  
However, “political, environmental and … scientific concerns have risen along with 
production, as evidence mounts that fracking is responsible for everything from polluting 
subterranean aquifers to causing regional earthquakes” (Daly 2012). 
 
II.1.1 Controversies around shale gas development: environmental and economic considerations   
Shale gas has to compete with the shift towards cleaner and sustainable energy sources. 
The environmental credentials of shale gas are controversial for two reasons. Shale gas is 
of course an unsustainable resource, which raises questions about its impact on the 
economy, the depletion of resources, and its impact on global warming. Its environmental 
credentials are controversial for two key reasons.  
Firstly, the detrimental impacts of shale gas production on the natural environment and 
the process of global warming are uncertain yet likely considerable. Many supporters 
consider and promote shale gas as comparatively clean or at least cleaner than coal 
(Chazan 2013; Leadsom 2015): this claim is unsubstantiated as of 2016. Instead most 
research points towards greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas being higher than those 
from natural gas and even higher for the amount of energy produced, or more potent, 
than those from coal (Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011; Boersma and Johnson 
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2012b; Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2012; Hirst, Khor, and Buckle 2013). One study 
projected that the fracking boom may increase global carbon emissions by almost 12% 
(Bichard 2014). It has also caused pollution near drilling sites (Soraghan 2011; Osborn et 
al. 2011; Vaughan 2013b).  
The breaking up of the shale can be rather noisy due to the heavy machinery at work, yet 
it will usually take up only around a week. Afterwards, once the gas starts flowing, the 
landscape can be mostly reclaimed by nature and can return to its original state, apart 
from – comparatively discreet – pipework and some water storage. This is a key reason 
as to why shale gas extraction is advertised as a cleaner and greener alternative to coal by 
the supporters and companies investing into fracking (Wright 2012). Environmental 
concerns around the practice of shale gas development other than its carbon footprint 
include the potential for water and ground pollution, large water consumption, seismicity, 
landscape degradation and radioactivity (Nestler 2012; Daly 2012; Boersma and Johnson 
2012b; Groat and Grimshaw 2012; Helm 2013; Stuart 2013; Davis and Fisk 2014; Cherry 
et al. 2014; Herbert and Jones 2014; Stamford and Azapagic 2014; Vaughan and Mason 
2015). Scientists have complained about the limited opportunities and time given to 
research about these risks, resulting in gaps in knowledge about many aspects of the 
process, including how to explain and prevent frequent leaks, effects of chemicals on 
ground and groundwater, or the overall impact on human health (Schrope 2013; 
Semeniuk 2014; McCarthy and Semeniuk 2014; UKERC 2015). Researchers lament the 
“current incomplete state of knowledge about shale gas” (UKERC 2015, 5). Some urge 
that it should result in a ban on fracking until more is known and until conditions 
necessary for safe exploration that are so far not in place are met (UKERC 2015, 5). 
Uncertainties remain, about best practices to avoid seismic activity or setting free 
radioactivity, or indeed how much gas is leaked during the life cycle of a well, combustion 
chamber and pipelines (Boersma and Johnson 2012b). It is said that “fracking outpaces 
science” (Schrope 2013) to the point where even risks that could be calculated remain 
uncertain.  
Secondly, shale gas has high potential to draw support and subsidies away from 
renewables (Stevens 2012) and to continue the trend of favouring fossil fuels with 
subsidies over renewables (ONS 2004; Athena 2015; Cheon, Lackner, and Urpelainen 
2015). The UK specifically was recently reprimanded for this very policy as UN scientist 
Prof McGlade surmised “what’s disappointing is when we see countries such as the 
United Kingdom that have really been in the lead in terms of getting their renewable 
energy up and going – we see subsidies being withdrawn and the fossil fuel industry being 
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enhanced” (Harrabin 2015b). While shale gas use has led to a decrease in coal use in the 
United States, this coal is now used in Europe and other countries – and the inherently 
global nature of climate change means that this replacement is an entirely pointless 
measure to combat emissions (Broderick and Anderson 2012; Warrick 2015).   
Despite policy output suggesting that fracking for shale gas is meant to, at least to a certain 
extent, replace conventional gas drilling once the conventional gas reserves are depleted, 
it has to be taken into account that this requires new, different technology and possibly 
new infrastructure and hence new investment and structural changes. Any cost-benefit 
analysis should take into account that even the best of estimations over the amount of 
shale resources have to concede that it is an unsustainable resource with a limited time 
span of usability.  
Many environmental concerns raised by anti-fracking lobbies in connection with shale gas 
production have been scientifically and independently confirmed to varying degrees. They 
include groundwater and freshwater contamination and water use, adding to water 
scarcity (Osborn et al. 2011; MIT 2011; Horn 2013a; Stuart 2013; Begos 2013). In 2011, 
a study published by Duke University into fracking safety looked at groundwater probes 
from wells near the Marcellus and the Utica shale basins and found much higher 
concentrations of methane in the groundwater than usual. The isotopic signature of the 
leaked methane gas made it possible to identify it as gas from the fracking wells and 
allowed researchers to exclude the possibility that it was a previously present 
concentration of methane, which is otherwise possible and must be considered (Osborn 
et al. 2011). The study even determined potential explosion hazard near fracking wells in 
some areas due to the very high concentration of methane. However, they did not find 
traces of fracking fluid, which led to the conclusion that the methane most likely stemmed 
from leaky well casings. Similar findings of the increased occurrence of methane near 
fracking sites were confirmed by another Duke study in 2013 in Pennsylvania (Begos 
2013). In this work, it was highlighted that in water wells closer to fracking sites, methane 
levels were six times as high and ethane levels 23 times as high as average levels. Other 
proven effects include death of wildlife (MacKenzie and Papoulias 2013), smaller seismic 
activity as well as record-tying earthquakes (White 2011; Kiger, 02, and 2014 2014; 
Oklahoma State Gov’t 2015; Tagesspiegel 2015; Chokshi and Fountain 2016), land 
degradation and many more (Helm 2013). Whilst not excluding that other factors can 
lead to their occurrence, these have been directly causally linked to the practice of 
hydraulic fracturing (Anderson 2014; Bailey and Preston 2015; Krahmann 2011; Schrope 
2013) and many experts predict more adverse environmental effects in the future (Groat 
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and Grimshaw 2012; Rahm et al. 2015; Terrell, Tinley, and Souther 2014). This is mainly 
owing to the particular process of horizontal drilling in hard rock layers, as explained 
above, but also with regards to specific regulation and industry practices such as non-
disclosure policies (to ensure competition) for chemicals, and exemptions from 
environmental acts such as the Clean Water Act (Schrope 2013; Terrell, Tinley, and 
Souther 2014). Findings of a study by the University of Texas covering research into 
fracking showed that all steps of the fracking process (construction, operation, flow-back, 
spills and blow-outs) except the actual fluid injection have resulted in some form of 
environmental contamination (Groat and Grimshaw 2012). Yet when it was released, 
several press reports stated erroneously that the study had found no evidence at all of 
such incidents (Munro 2012; Vaughan 2012).18   
Besides environmental concerns, “hardly anybody seems to have asked the one question 
which is surely fundamental: does shale development make economic sense?” (Morgan 
2014). This line of questioning began much later, and this study aims to add to it in a 
substantial manner. Evaluating the success of the fracking boom shows up many 
problems. Potentially the biggest problem facing the shale industry is the disappointing 
performance of shale wells combined with the hype around the resource: their output 
declines so quickly that they “will never be profitable” according to one expert (Morgan 
2014). Unlike conventional gas drilling, through which regular well rates tend to decline 
between 7-10% per year, the production rates of fracking wells drop between 60-90% in 
the first year of use (Murray and King 2012). Overall, the ultimate recovery on a shale gas 
well is between 8-30%, much lower than the 60-80% for a conventional well (Stevens 
2010). Former Amoco geologist Berman illustrated this point with the example of the 
Eagle Ford shale field in Texas: $10-12 billion would be needed to drill around 1,000 wells 
each year just to try and counteract the decline in productivity (Stafford 2012). Meanwhile, 
investors have poured billions of dollars into she shale sector (Morgan 2014). By investing 
that much one naturally gets very many shale wells off the ground, even if they are much 
more expensive than regular gas wells – therefore, initial production figures will be 
impressive (Morgan 2014).  
Recently there have been more critical reviews of the economic impact of fracking shale 
gas. Around 80% of U.S. shale gas production comes from five shale fields, several of 
which are already in decline with the rest tipped to peak before 2020 (Hughes 2012). The 
                                                 
18 In general, the University of Texas has extensive links with the oil and gas industry, for example, Royal 
Dutch Shell is a very big sponsor of the University, but there were also contributions from Halliburton, 
Exxon Mobil and others (Zaragoza 2012). There are concerns that the findings of the study were toned 
down or altered and released accordingly in order to please these connections (Henry 2012).  
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industry appears to struggle (Fowler 2012; Monks, Penty, and Vynck 2013; Crooks 2016). 
Criticism of reserve sizes is a new development but has been growing stronger in the past 
few years. A substantial gap (DECC 2013a) usually exists between promising estimations 
of gas reserves and the amount of gas that is technically recoverable, let alone 
commercially viable to recover. There has been very little effort to fix said discrepancy – 
in 2011, the New York Times reported that “energy executives, industry lawyers, state 
geologists and market analysts” privately questioned whether companies were 
“intentionally, and even illegally, overstating the amount” of their resources and the 
productivity of their wells (Urbina 2011c). This concern was only raised internally by the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) at the time (Martin 2010). In 2012, U.S. 
Energy consultants’ findings further consolidated the strong basis for doubt about the 
reliability and durability of U.S. shale gas reserves (Lowery 2012). Questions are being 
asked as to whether or not the industry has overstated shale gas reserves (The New York 
Times 2011; Urbina 2011c; Lowery 2012; DECC 2013b); whether fracking economics 
pose an incentive for the public at all (Bawden 2013; Inman 2014; Christopherson 2015), 
and whether the fracking method is cost-efficient or whether it ends up resulting in major 
losses for the involved industry (Anderson 2014; Crooks 2016).  
Arguably, the UK government’s interest in shale gas exploration that followed the 
experience in the United States may be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
effect of shale gas on the U.S. economy – which several independent experts consider 
“negligible” (Mathieu, Spencer, and Sartor 2014).  
 
II.1.1 Issues with data presentation 
Before assessing the available data on shale gas resources, to facilitate a comparison 
between expected revenues of the countries in my case study, it is important to note that 
there is a difference in methodologies for assessing shale gas basins worldwide. Especially 
a difference between two assessments is often overlooked (DECC 2013b). There are “in-
place resource estimates based on a geological model, volumetrics and gas contents” 
compared to “technically recoverable resource estimates based on well technology, well 
performance, well density” (BGS 2013b, 10). The first estimate is a top-down approach, 
gathering information about likely resource size by method of deduction, when there is 
more knowledge about the shale than the gas it contains. The second is comparable to 
induction, a bottom-up approach based on actual observations, i.e. information gained by 
test-drilling in specified basins. The latter has unsurprisingly proven considerably more 
accurate for predicting actual availability of gas reserves. Simply put, the resource estimate 
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is a – not always verifiable – estimate of the amount of gas present in the shale. This gas 
may be easily accessible, but it may also be impossible to access, or only partially accessible 
or too costly to access. The reserve estimate goes beyond this assessment to make a 
statement about the amount of gas that it may be possible to extract and use, depending 
on technology, investment and other factors (BGS 2013b, 24). “Gas in-place (GIP), 
original gas in-place (OGIP) or gas initially in-place (GIIP)” all describe the same very 
speculative estimate which is made early on, often before the drilling situation has been 
tested, in order to inform investors or stakeholders (BGS 2013b, 25). The latter method 
has been discovered to differ strongly from the first on a number of occasions (EIA 
2013b; BGS 2013b). For example Norway’s shale gas assessment dropped from an initial 
83tcf resource estimate in 2011 to a 0tcf reserve estimate in 2013 after disappointing 
results from several test drill sites – in the parts of the basin considered the least complex 
(EIA 2011, 2013b). All operations ceased in Norway after the tests, as there was no 
economic incentive to continue. Similarly, Poland’s shale gas estimate for the Lublin Basin 
was lowered from 44tcf in 2011 to 9tcf in 2013, plus the country’s overall reserve 
estimates were accordingly slashed by a quarter and are awaiting further tests (EIA 2013b; 
Dittrick 2013). This could still happen in the United Kingdom: as of early summer 2016, 
no production has taken place in the UK and hence no shale gas direct production data 
is available. The first approval for drilling was granted in late May 2016 in Yorkshire (BBC 
Business News 2016). The distinction between the two methods of estimation and 
especially the distinction between resources and reserves is very rarely made by 
policymakers, interest group publications or indeed the media (DECC 2013b). For 
example, the promising numbers announced in certain British news casts (Webster 2013) 
should have to be at least divided by between 5-10 for the recovery factor: between 8-
20% is the average recovery factor for shale gas in the U.S. (POST 2013). Most of those 
receiving the news will not be aware of this. To address this in the UK briefing papers 
were recently published by the DECC and the Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (POST) to point out the distinction and its importance (POST 2013; DECC 
2013b).   
A third method of measuring and expressing the available amount of gas reserves is 
through the term of “technically recoverable resources”, used by the U.S. Geological 
Survey to estimate the amount of gas likely to be extracted (Charpentier and Cook 2011).19 
This has proven more helpful and reliable than even the second method of reserve 
                                                 
19 It would be particularly helpful and less confusing if these were called reserves as they follow after the 
second method estimate, not resources after the first method.  
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estimate as it is based on more experience with a play, necessary because “a large 
variability in shale gas well productivity has been experienced in North America, where 
the gas from wells in ‘sweet spots’ far exceed the average recovery from wells across the 
play area” (BGS 2013b, 6). This third estimate gives reason for concern about ‘sweet 
spots’ and their implications for the future of the U.S. shale industry.  
Another distinction needs to be made regarding the terminology. Importantly, the word 
‘fracking’ is used to mean different things. Politicians, media and shale critics use the term 
loosely to describe the entire process involved in producing the gas, while people from 
within the industry often use it to describe only one aspect of the production, the injection 
of chemicals, sand and water to fracture the rock (Soraghan 2011). Of course, supporters 
as well as critics can and have used the differentiation to help their argument. When 
fracking supporters say that fracking is entirely safe, they may do so while purposefully 
omitting serious risks from other parts of the process already known to them, and 
knowing that their audience will think they mean the entire process. For example, the 
insistence that fracking does not contaminate water, often repeated publicly, is such a 
case: most industry members who state it are fully aware that the necessarily connected 
stages of the drilling process have proven to do so (Soraghan 2011). On the other side, 
critics are not specific about their complaints either: many for example do not voice their 
knowledge that exemptions from environmental and safety regulation do not cover every 
aspect of gas production and therefore that their opponents are not acting entirely 
unsupervised (Soraghan 2011).  
Given that it is the process in its entirety that is responsible for economic and 
environmental outcomes, and that journals, newspapers and policymakers mean the 
entirety of the process when they discuss their support for or opposition to fracking, in 
this thesis ‘fracking’ will adhere to the common use of the word to describe the entire 
process of shale gas development.  
 
II.1.2 Uncertainty and puzzles 
There are a number of illogical puzzles when it comes to public policy on fracking in the 
United Kingdom, as well as in the United States, where it was first conducted 
commercially. The arguments made in support of fracking are all based on classic 
economic assumptions of rationality and efficient cost-benefit analysis, as well as an 
assumption of an equal and free market. Fracking is suggested to be compatible with this 
market and to deliver both product and revenue as well as jobs, and beyond that to 
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increase a country’s energy independence. And yet there is both little confirmation of 
these claims as well as considerable research output which renders doubtful the beneficial 
aspects of shale gas. In fact, some research suggests that fracking will not only fail to 
generate any relevant benefit but will also end up harming both the recovering economy 
as well as the environment. Policy support for fracking tends to be based on core ideas 
of standard economics such as the assumption of efficiency in a free market. Yet, given 
incentives and subsidies such as tax breaks, shale gas is unlikely to operate in anything 
near a free market.  
There are clearly plenty of reasons why the hike in shale gas development has not been 
met with universal approval. Many grave environmental risks have been pointed out to 
likely be connected, and economic risks such as the rise of a market bubble have been 
suggested. In a nutshell, outside of official industry presentations on shale gas 
(Halliburton 2015) there is much doubt in the fact that shale gas development will be 
profitable or successful for as long as hoped, and doubts about whether it will have as 
profound or positive an impact on the overall economy. Most astoundingly, it is hailed as 
a market-efficient solution to gas shortage (see chapter four) despite comparing badly 
with both conventional gas development as well as modern alternative energy strategies. 
Although it is being suggested that shale gas is meant to, at least to a certain extent, replace 
conventional gas drilling once the conventional gas reserves are depleted, it has to be 
taken into account that the two require entirely different production processes and 
technology, and therefore a lot of new investment and structural changes. This will affect 
the UK industry more than that in the U.S. where there are more established drilling 
operations and because shale fields are often discovered in proximity to those. 
Furthermore, policymakers today are fully aware of the limitations of the earth’s 
ecosystem (Daly 2012; Ekins 2000; Arrow et al. 1996; Longwell 2002). Therefore, the 
move to shale is not a plausible turn but only a postponement of the inevitable depletion 
of the earth's non-renewable energy sources, while potentially speeding up processes of 
land degradation and global warming which add to the problem. The economic rationality 
therefore remains questionable in terms of long-term strategy (Nestler 2012; Stevens 
2012; Powers 2014; Bailey and Preston 2015).  
This section has shown that, given current knowledge of shale gas and its implications, it 
is a resource and a development process that involve several known, if not perfectly 
predictable, risks, as well as a considerable amount of uncertainty (unknown risks). 
Policies towards fracking therefore remain an example of risk preference or indeed 
decision-making under uncertainty. In light of these issues, arguably, a decision on 
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fracking shale gas is a decision made when the consequences are only incompletely 






III Chapter Three. Decisions under risk and uncertainty: Literature 
review and history of the traditional ‘rational’ approach  
 
This thesis is centred around the puzzle posed by the policy decisions made on fracking 
in the United Kingdom and the United States. The problématique derives from the fact 
that the reasoning based on economic arguments used in favour of fracking is implausible 
(outlined in chapter two, in detail in chapter four). On that basis in this chapter I review 
the theoretical arguments that underlie so-called rational preference formation or rational 
actor models, as used by traditional economic theory and political science, to explain or 
predict decision-making.  
The arguments made publicly in favour of shale gas by both the UK and the U.S. 
governments are of an economic nature: that the economic benefits such as growth, jobs 
and revenue outweigh the costs, and therefore should be pursued (Snyder and 
Klimasinska 2012; DoE 2014b; Leadsom 2015; DECC 2016b). The costs include 
investment costs and environmental costs as well as serious economic and environmental 
risks. However, with shale gas, many experts argue this analysis of the costs and benefits 
is problematic and flawed (Martin 2010; Urbina 2011c; Boersma and Johnson 2012b; 
Stevens 2010, 2012; Bawden 2013; Carrington 2013b; Gosden 2013b; Stevens 2014; Fox 
2014). Besides, it is indisputable that with a technology as novel as shale gas, many of its 
costs and benefits remain unknown and uncertain (The New York Times 2011; Schrope 
2013; Ahmed 2013; Fox 2014; British Geological Society 2015).20  
Considering the existence of such risks and uncertainties, I discuss in the first section of 
this chapter the evolution of thought on rational cost-benefit analysis in situations of 
decision-making under risk and uncertainty. I begin by examining the core assumptions 
and theoretical development of the expected utility hypothesis. Through an example I 
confirm the definition and basic premises of expected utility before moving on to a brief 
history of its advancement. There has been a multitude of research on and evolution of 
                                                 
20 As of mid-2016, this ranges from incompletely known environmental costs (Cherry et al. 2014; 
Semeniuk 2014) as well as incompletely known amount of resources available (Urbina 2011c; Weijermars 
and McCredie 2012) and little knowledge about impact from shale on structural factors such as jobs 
(Cusick 2013; Christopherson 2015). In the UK, shale gas was promoted before there was any legal 
framework that would fully cover shale gas related matters (Stevens 2010, 2012). As of early 2016, there is 
still no comprehensive or reliable reserve size estimate for the United Kingdom so investments are made 
on the basis of hope for good results based on initial resource estimates (Schrope 2013; McCarthy and 
Semeniuk 2014). Estimates however can turn out to be misleading, as in Norway’s case (EIA 2011, 2013b, 
2015e).  
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this rational decision-making theory, so I shall focus only on key elements, several 
historical points and important changes to the original concept.  
In section two I discuss existing critiques of rational decision-making through the 
framework of expected utility in economics and behavioural economics.21 This section 
shows that logical flaws were discovered within a decade of the latest and most complete 
publication of the expected utility hypothesis (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; 
Ellsberg 1954; MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979). Section three concerns a second phase 
in the critical literature on expected utility, most prominently by behavioural economics 
and through joint output of economy and psychology scholars. This third section serves 
to further question the validity of the expected utility theory’s ‘rational’ cost-benefit 
analysis for decision-making under uncertainty. In it I also introduce a range of common 
biases and constraints found to be influential on decision-making instead. Then I present 
prospect theory, the other much used and influential modern variant of expected utility.  
Whilst sections two and three are concerned with critique towards the correctness and 
applicability of expected utility and cost-benefit analysis, in section four I turn towards 
more recent, critical theory on rational decision-making in political science and political 
sociology. This body of literature presents further theoretical and empirical evidence 
disputing the validity of the rational actor model and rational decisions under uncertainty. 
Furthermore, it includes arguments from a new critical normative case against the 
hypothesis: scholars question the desirability of making political decisions after a business-
like fashion, purely considering an economic cost-benefit analysis.  
All of the above leads me to include a final section on the important distinction between 
uncertainty and risk, on why the distinction is rarely made but why it is vital. This part is 
firstly significant for the theoretical conception of decision-making under risk: as long as 
factors are considered calculable that are in fact uncertain or entirely unknown, analysis 
remains flawed. Secondly, the distinction is also relevant for the case study in this thesis: 
the development of shale gas entails both known risks as well as a variety of so far 
incompletely known variables.  
 
                                                 
21 At times, it is difficult to put labels on certain authors or articles, as work is interdisciplinary, authors 
switch academic fields and boundaries between disciplines can change in time.  
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III.1 Classic cost-benefit analysis for decisions under risk and uncertainty: 
Expected utility  
“It is no exaggeration to consider expected utility theory the major paradigm 
in decision making since the Second World War” (Schoemaker 1982, 529). 
 
This section introduces the concept of expected utility for decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty by providing definitions and examples as well as a résumé of the origins and 
key changes to the concept. This is crucial because classical expected utility remains the 
standard concept or benchmark for decision-making under risk and uncertainty, from 
which other models derive and upon which critical approaches are based (Treier 2010; 
Rieger, Wang, and Hens 2013; Heal and Millner 2013; Rieger 2014; Strzalecki 2014). I 
explain the basic concept of expected utility before I turn to the development of the 
theory.  
Expected utility is a term that sums up the utility which a subject or group may expect 
from a transaction under specific circumstances, by considering the average returns of 
possible outcomes as well as their likelihood. The term comes from the expected utility 
hypothesis, which states that “under uncertainty, the weighted average of all possible 
levels of utility will best represent the utility at any given point in time” (Investopedia 
2007). The expected utility of every single possible outcome is weighted both according 
to its desirability (or pay off) and the likelihood that the transaction will in fact lead to the 
particular outcome.   
The theory’s application to real world decisions can be made clearer with an example.22 
Before a person leaves their house for a walk they make a decision on what to wear based 
on what they expect from the weather. One would rather not carry a heavy jacket on a 
hot and dry day, but one would prefer to face bad weather with it. There are three possible 
outcomes for the day: either, one will finish it dry and not bothered by too much clothing; 
or one will finish it dry but is bothered with the extra clothing; or one will finish walking 
cold or soaked (as seen in Table 1). There are two possible conditions outside of one’s 
control that are the weather: either good or bad weather. There are two choices of action: 
bringing the jacket, or not bringing the jacket.  
 
 
                                                 
22 The example is based on an explanation from the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Briggs 2015).  
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 Condition 
  Bad weather Good weather  
Action 
Take jacket Bothered but dry Bothered but dry 
Don’t take jacket Wet Dry 
Table 1: Expected Utility Choice Problem (own design) 
From here on one can assign a specific desirability to each outcome. Several other 
requisites have to be met (more on these axioms in the following pages), among them 
that actions and conditions have to be logically independent so that no condition could 
prevent an act. Also, it is essential that each act, given a state, can lead to only one single 
outcome.  
Moving beyond mathematical probability and focusing on the claim of applicability in real 
life scenarios, other issues arise – how accurate can information about the weather be? 
How does one calculate the level of annoyance from carrying an extra jacket before 
experiencing it? What if the rain turns acid? What if preferences change? Expected utility 
cannot include these questions.  
The above illustration leads me to a simpler but strict definition of expected utility: The 
expected utility of a transaction taken depends on two things: the value of each possible 
outcome or consequence, to which real numbers are assigned, and the probability of each 





Here A stands for the transaction, O is the set of outcomes, PA(o) is the probability of 
outcome o conditional on A, and U(o) is the utility of o.  
What is clear from this example is that expected utility assumes total rationality, and that 
it assumes extensive and complete, almost omniscient information on the utility of all 
potential outcomes and the likeliness of their occurrence. (The weather example may 
make it obvious how trustworthy such information can be at times). It also shows that 
expected utility in this case is, in effect, the quantification of a simple cost-benefit 
 40 
analysis.23 As long as a specific number can be assigned to utility and likelihood of 
occurrence, this formula can calculate a course of action: either to explain it once it 
happened or to prescribe a course of action. In sections 2-4 of this chapter I analyse the 
validity of both the mathematical model and its claim to real world application.  
Following the above primer in expected utility theory, I wish to explain the beginnings 
and evolution of this theory in order to better understand its enduring popularity. Early 
debates around decision-making under risk and uncertainty in literature mostly stem from 
the disciplines of economics and financial economics and virtually all assume rational 
behaviour. Most of the early approaches shared ideas and model elements amongst them, 
hence only a few of them were passed on once broadly accepted and used in the research 
disciplines (Treier 2010). Of those, the expected utility hypothesis was key to risk and 
uncertainty modelling since the 20th century (Rieger 2014, 1; Rieger, Wang, and Hens 
2013). It is alternatively used “prescriptively”, “predictively” and “descriptively” across 
the various sciences (Schoemaker 1982, 529). 24 25  
Expected utility theory was originally described by Daniel Bernoulli in an attempt to solve 
the St Petersburg paradox (Quiggin 1993; Treier 2010). This was a lottery: a coin toss in 
which the price doubled with each further round until the wrong side of the coin 
appeared, promising infinite payoff and infinite expected value. Contemporary theory 
could not explain why, presumably, nobody was interested in playing it: the breakthrough 
was to consider not just the price, or value, but the utility to the specific gambler. Bernoulli 
introduced the concepts of subjectivity and of constant relative risk aversion – taking into 
account the subject’s position on risk-taking.26 Subsequently a person’s existing assets and 
potential of losses were considered to play a role in the decision to take a risk. With this 
step, Bernoulli attempted to make a mathematical model fit a real world economic 
decision.  
                                                 
23 Another prominent example of such a choice problem with expected utility is game theory’s oft-cited 
prisoners’ dilemma, used in economics and political science to analyse a range of issues from trade relations 
to the nuclear arms race. It is a modified and weakened version of the expected utility concept as it 
directly states a situation in which information is lacking, namely that of likelihood of occurrence (not 
knowing what is most likely for the other prisoner to choose), but it nevertheless assigns utility rankings 
to possible outcomes and prescribes a subsequent course of action. Game theory is based on expected 
utility. As the prisoners’ dilemma shows, these preferences gained with expected utility models often 
result in outcomes that are not optimal.  
24 Full quote: “It is no exaggeration to consider expected utility theory the major paradigm in decision-
making since the Second World War. … It has been used prescriptively in management science (especially 
decision analysis), predictively in finance and economics, descriptively by psychologists, and has played a 
central role in theories of measurable utility” (Schoemaker 1982, 529).  
25 Quiggin wrote “for most of the post-war period, the economic theory of choice under uncertainty has 
been, in essence, the theory of expected utility” (Quiggin 1993, 2). 
26 Subjectivity in this sense does not imply irrational or biased behaviour, but only rationally assumed 
subjective valuation.  
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Up until the introduction of expected utility, financial calculations related to risks in 
insurance or gambling appear to have only considered the potential winnings, yet not 
losses or related risks.27 As both financial investment and insurance were becoming 
significant sectors of the economy, the model of expected utility quickly gained 
prominence (Strzalecki 2014, 31). In a nutshell, expected utility challenged the 
appropriateness and applicability of purely considering “profit maximization as a basis for 
economic decisions under uncertainty” without considering the circumstances, potential 
losses and subjective attitude towards risk (Quiggin 1993, 7). Another term for expected 
utility used to be ‘moral expectation’ rather than ‘mathematical expectation’ – as it was 
almost considered what we might call behavioural economics at the time of its 
conception.28 Since Bernoulli, economists and scholars of finance have mostly accepted 
the principle of expected utility as a normative standard model (Treier 2010), assuming 
rational choice in risk takers.  
The core concept of expected utility has been adjusted but not significantly changed since 
its creation. Additions made to expected utility theory in the 19th century consisted of 
mainstream classical and neoclassical economic scholars adopting and trialling specific 
concepts of utility (Quiggin 1993). In the 20th century, John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern created the most complete and accepted version of expected utility theory 
as they worked to make the theory more applicable by adding more axioms (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Arrow 1951). These axioms which are now accepted 
for expected utility are:  
1) Completeness, meaning the person or group making a choice has perfectly stable 
preferences and will at all times be able to decide between different options.  
2) Transitivity, which means that the decision-maker who has such stable 
preferences and follows the 1) axiom of completeness also decides consistently 
and does not change preferences.  
3) Independence, meaning when different lotteries are mixed, preferences are 
maintained.29 This axiom prompted much critique (see following section).  
                                                 
27 The expected utility function also showed that a utility function per individual (a concave or convex 
function) could help predict whether the person would invest in risky bets or whether the person was 
likely to buy insurance.  
28 Bernoulli was also one of the first scholars to suggest there to be advantages in portfolio diversification 
for an investor or gambler with a risk-averse nature (Wang 2006). 
29 If a player prefers outcome A over B and they can choose between two lotteries: lottery 1 is a coin toss 
between A and C, lottery 2 is a coin toss between B and C. If the coin coming up either way has anything 
but a non-zero probability, the player should prefer 1 to 2.   
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4) Continuity, which means there is no infinite outcome, i.e. no outcome is so bad 
that one would not chose an otherwise attractive course of action that includes it 
as a possible result.30  
Morgenstern and Neumann’s aim was to make the theoretical model fit better for real 
world scenarios. Some issues were in effect resolved through their new axioms, such the 
independence axiom – but this did not necessarily make the theory more realistic. They 
continued to assume absolute rationality, to assume that decision-makers had a 
comprehensive amount of coherent knowledge over consequences of their actions and 
ready statistical guidance on the likeliness of their occurrence. In combination with this 
assumption of complete rationality, the subsequent assumption that decision-makers 
would not only be able to compare all events and develop rational preferences but also 
do so for a combination of several events is logical yet not realistic.31 32 Morgenstern and 
Neumann at the time responded to criticism by stating that their treatment of utilities as 
perfectly measurable, numerical quantities was necessary to simplify the judgment of risk 
preferences and did not radically affect results (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953, 
16).  
For a brief example of how outdated and long-critiqued much of this work is, consider 
cardinal utility – in brief, it means preferences can be ranked on a cardinal, not ordinal 
scale. Cardinal utility is a concept modern expected utility theory is based on. The idea of 
cardinal utility is quite universally considered outdated in research within the disciplines 
of both mathematics and economics, as there is little evidence for it, but it remains 
prominent in a select few remaining contexts: decision-making under uncertainty and risk 
is one of these contexts (Köbberling 2006).33 Hence, decision-makers faced with risk are 
expected to make use of approximation models based on tools which are severely 
criticised for good reason by many disciplines but also that of its own origin.  
                                                 
30 Assume that variable A stands for going out at night, variable B stands for staying in and variable C 
stands for the possibility of death which in this thought experiment is likelier outside the house. 
Preferences are continuous as C cannot be valued at minus infinity, or else there would be no chance of 
variable A and variable B combined ever outweighing variable C i.e. the house would never be left for 
fear of a however small possibility of death which is likelier to occur outside. 
31 At the time it was thought that a more detailed theory including subjective probability could be 
provided, which was suggested by Pfanzagl (1967). 
32 The upgraded expected utility hypothesis used objective probabilities, supposing that all the agents had 
the same probability distribution, as a convenience.  
33 Cardinal contrasts with the concept of ordinal utility: ordinal utility assumes that it is only relevant to 
assess preferences on an ordinal scale, i.e. simply which one is better than the other, but not by how 
much; whether a utility function is concave or convex is economically inconsequential. Cardinal utility on 
the other hand suggests that differences in preferences are almost equally important; i.e. if A is preferred 
to B by a great margin, but B to C only by a little, this matters. In the context that Neumann and 
Morgenstern use, only the utility function is cardinal but the expected utility function is ordinal.  
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III.2 Early critique of expected utility  
“Might future economists find it peculiar that twentieth century economists 
held firmly to the EU [expected utility theory] in the face of the Allais paradox 
and other violations?” (Harless and Camerer 1994, 1284).  
 
Arguably the most complete formulation of expected utility was in the 1944 book Theory 
of Games and Economic Behaviour, and based itself on four axioms: completeness, transitivity, 
independence and continuity (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Adherence to all 
four of these was considered as rationality; violations of any one of them as irrationality. 
If a choice was made or planned that showed a deviation from expected utility through 
noncompliance with any of its stipulations, the person making the choice would be 
considered to behave irrationally. Such violations however have been abundant, “not only 
as unsystematic errors, but indeed as systematic biases” (Rieger 2014, 1). These have 
eventually led some scholars to another adaptation of expected utility, prospect theory, 
discussed in the following section. The first phase of criticism was fuelled by critical 
experiments gathering empirical evidence of deviations from choices as expected utility 
would predict them (Ellsberg 1961; Allais 1945; MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979). The 
purpose of this section is to assess the first phase of critiques of rationality in decision-
making which mostly came from economists.  
A critical experiment aiming to disprove the independence axiom was devised in the 1950s 
by French economist Maurice Allais. He was working on decision theory in uncertain 
situations in the 1940s independently from his contemporaries Neumann and 
Morgenstern.34 Allais devised an example of a choice problem in which a majority of 
players showed a violation of the predictions gained with expected utility theory. The 
choice problem consists of two different (independent, not consecutive) experiments 
where the participant has to choose between two games of luck each. The payoffs of these 





                                                 
34 The lack of academic discussion between the scholars, and the fact that Allais published his early work 
in French suggest that they were.  
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Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Gamble 1A Gamble 1B Gamble 2A Gamble 2B 
Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance 
$1 million 100% $1 million 89% Nothing 89% Nothing 90% 
  
Nothing 1% $1 million 11% 
  
  
$5 million 10% 
  
$5 million 10% 
Table 2: Allais Choice Problem 1 (Allais 1945), own design 
The specific incompatibility with expected utility lies as follows: in the first games, most 
people chose the game 1A and in the second they chose 2B. Allais admitted that this was 
in fact a reasonable choice for each of the games to be played alone (MacCrimmon and 
Larsson 1979; Oliver 2003). However, since the subjects are asked about both games, it 
is not. That a player choosing 1A would at the same time chose 2B violates the expected 
utility theory’s expectations – which conclude that whoever chooses 1A will also chose 
2A and likewise with 1B and 2B. Simply put, once they choose the certain gain over the 
higher outcome, their preference should make them do so again. According to expected 
utility theory, equal outcomes are thought to cancel each other out, they should not have 
an impact on the relative desirability of each of the games compared to the other. This is 
illustrated in Table 3 (Allais 1954), where all equal chances are listed together in a row.  
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Gamble 1A Gamble 1B Gamble 2A Gamble 2B 
Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance 
$1 million 89% $1 million 89% Nothing 89% Nothing 89% 
$1 million 11% Nothing 1% $1 million 11% Nothing 1% 
  
$5 million 10% 
  
$5 million 10% 
Table 3: Allais Choice Problem 2 (Allais 1954), own design 
If the first row of the 89% that are the same were to be cancelled out, the leftover game 
of luck is exactly the same for game 1 and game 2. Yet respondents do not react 
accordingly in their choice but overwhelmingly choose option 2B for the second game. 
The previously discussed independence axiom states that preferences stay constant 
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between different gambles. Identical outcomes within a choice situation should be 
disregarded as irrelevant to the decision made in the choice problem overall.  
The choice set of 1A and 2B was rational to Allais and the most common response he 
received in his experiments: therefore, Allais considered mainstream expected utility to 
blame for labelling it an irrational move. Allais asserted at the time what new independent 
studies consistently and repeatedly prove (Machina 1987; Oliver 2003). The Allais paradox 
was not contested despite disproving a key axiom of expected utility theory, but it also 
did not halt or hinder the continued use and popularity of expected utility (Harless and 
Camerer 1994; Harrison and Rutström 2008; Rieger 2014; Briggs 2015).  
In the same line of thinking, economist Daniel Ellsberg designed choice problems to 
show inconsistencies between the predictions gained with expected utility and real life 
human decisions (Ellsberg 1961).35 The better known of two problems that underlie the 
so-called Ellsberg paradox is the one urn problem.  
In the one urn problem, a player is aware that a single urn contains 30 red balls and 60 balls 
that are either black or yellow, but the exact number of those black and yellow balls 
remains unknown (Ellsberg 1961, 563f). The player is then asked to participate in two 
games of luck.  
1) In the first game, one ball is going to be drawn from the urn, and $100 is gained 
when the player bets on the right colour ball – the player can decide if he wants 
to bet on red (1A) or on black (1B). Most players choose to bet on red.  
2) In the second game, the player is asked to bet on red and yellow (2A) as opposed 
to betting on black and yellow (2B): either of them drawn will win the player $100. 
This time the option of 2B is preferred by a majority of respondents (Ellsberg 
1961, 654).  
The paradox lies in the fact that quite evidently, in the first game the players implicitly 
assume there to be more red than black balls inside the urn, yet in the second game they 
assume the opposite.  
The Ellsberg paradox is used to criticise the axioms of independence and preference 
consistency i.e. transitivity which are shown not to be respected. This poses a clear 
violation of the expected utility hypothesis and an apparent irrationality in the face of 
                                                 
35 It is noteworthy that whilst Daniel Ellsberg was the person to modify and bring attention to the choice 
problem or paradox of the same name, Keynes discussed a similar version of it earlier (John Maynard 
Keynes 1921, 75f).  
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almost equal gambling options. Expected utility theory is not able to explain this 
occurrence.  
The paradox adds to evidence for a common heuristic or bias people use when making 
judgments under uncertainty, which is called ambiguity aversion or uncertainty aversion. This 
heuristic describes a detected preference in people that means they prefer what they 
consider to be known risks over unknown elements of risks. It applies to situations where 
risks are expected but uncertainty remains. When faced with a choice between two games 
of luck, most people will prefer to choose the game that has less unknown elements in it, 
even if it has certain risks, and even if the other available game offers better winnings. 
This heuristic of ambiguity aversion has also been used to explain choices besides lottery 
games such as election abstentions or volatility in stock markets (Ghirardato and 
Marinacci 2001). Though the distinction was little discussed at the time, in his paradox 
Ellsberg had in fact shown that even within the controlled realm of a game example, the 
issue of uncertainty rather than calculable risk led to behaviour deviating from expected 
utility predictions.36 37  
Empirical testing of the expected utility hypothesis showed early on, therefore, that it was 
flawed. Controlled tests showed a tendency by decision-makers in situations of 
uncertainty to make decisions which are considered irrational according to expected utility 
theory.38 Accordingly, much effort was made to find a more accurate model in order to 
determine risk preferences in the field of economics. Difficulties and criticism as 
described above have led to a variety of alternatives, simplifications and specifications of 
expected utility theory.39 Most were designed with the goal in mind to fix expected utility 
                                                 
36 It is certainly possible to ‘calculate’ all possible different combinations of black and yellow balls but they 
would amount to even chances, therefore not providing the player with helpful advice.  
37 There were also more radical critiques of the economic principles around profit maximization: Alchian 
suggested in 1950 that uncertainty and incomplete information should be included into analysis (Alchian 
1950).  
38 This subsequently should at the very least encourage an examination of the preferences under this 
pretext. There are ample excuses readily available for decision-makers to behave irrationally, as well as 
ample reason for them to explain lengthy and considerate decisions. Rushing a decision without 
knowledge of all the facts however when theory tells us one is likely to make a wrong decision is 
incomprehensible. (Especially for cases in which the decision is not only made to avert a risk and possibly 
under time pressure, but for cases in which a decision leads to risk once it is made, depending on the 
outcome.)  
39 For another example, economist Harry Markowitz in 1952 created the Markowitz mean variance model 
which is still a ‘standard model’ of risk evaluation today (Markowitz 2013). It is called mean-variance 
model because its predictions are based on the mean (expected returns) and the variance (standard 
deviation) of each of the portfolios. By analysing several portfolios of the given securities and ultimately 
selecting those that are unrelated and would not change in a correlated way, this model is used by 
investors to try and minimise their risk. An investment portfolio is called Markowitz efficient when any 
added diversification of investment could not lower the portfolio’s risk any further and expected returns 
cannot be increased any further without increasing the portfolio’s risk. Markowitz assumes any investor to 
be rational; further, to be risk-averse, wanting to increase consumption (hence has a concave, increasing 
expected utility function). The Markowitz model is both trying to minimise risk in portfolio selection in 
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to the point where it could be seen as consistent with a wider range of choice behaviour 
and its generalised application would be better justified. Different suggestions were made 
but the evolved version of expected utility theory which many economists consider most 
influential since the original theory is prospect theory. Its emergence and key characteristics 
are discussed in the following section.  
 
 
III.3 The second phase of rethinking expected utility: Rationality biases and 
prospect theory   
“One of the enduring contributions of behavioural economics is that we now 
have a rich set of competing models of behaviour in many settings, with 
expected utility theory and prospect theory as the two front runners for 
choices under uncertainty.” (Harrison and Rutström 2008, 134).  
 
In this section I wish to expand on the second notable wave of readjustments to expected 
utility theory. This concerns interdisciplinary approaches between economics and 
psychology, decision analysis and behavioural economics. I present this material for three 
reasons: to further consolidate the critical case against expected utility; to introduce 
several identified common biases that can explain choices which contradict expected 
utility; and to introduce prospect theory. Whereas in section two I discussed work 
designed to disprove expected utility and show ‘irrational’ behaviour, in this section I 
consider works designed to explore mechanisms and reasons behind so-called irrational 
behaviour.  
Theory about imperfect judgment in situations of risk and uncertainty was separately 
developed based on three rather different strands of research according to Kahneman, 
Slovic and Tversky, key authorities within the field (Shafer 1984). This research divide 
began in the late 1950s and 1960s: the comparison of statistical and clinical prediction as 
begun by Meehl, the study of subjective probability after the Bayesian paradigm, and the 
                                                 
practice and trying to forego criticism of the independence axiom in theory, by separating all risk choices 
made. It is important to note that despite criticisms, mainly regarding rationality of investors, systemic risk 
i.e. the impossibility of separating all related risks, and the normal distribution of returns, and the 
assumptions that one can keep choices independent, the Markowitz model remains for the most part 
accepted in modern portfolio theory and therefore implicitly understood as accurate in the judgment of 
risks.  
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work of Simon and Bruner into strategies of reasoning and heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, 
and Tversky 1982).40 41 
A core insight from Kahneman and Tversky’s research is that people making choices in 
situations of uncertainty tend to rely on a limited set of heuristics that reduce the 
complexity of judging probabilities. This is considered the reason they inadvertently 
eschew rationality in its narrowest economic definition and rationality as the expected 
utility theory defines it. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982, 3) and the many that 
followed or updated their work do not consider these heuristic principles problematic in 
all situations, in fact they find them at times useful. However, there is appreciation that 
such biases can also lead to systematic and severe errors in judging uncertainty.  
Representativeness is one of the biases discussed the most often when looking into biases 
and constraints of rational decision-making under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 
1982; Bar-Hillel 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 197; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1972). It is defined as “a subjective judgment of the extent to 
which the event in question is similar in essential properties to its parent population or 
reflect the salient features of the process by which it is generated” (Bar-Hillel 1982, 69). 
For example, asked how probable it is that a given young child will grow up to become a 
scientist, the person asked may consider how similar the image or some characteristic of 
the child is to a stereotype she or he holds of a scientist (Kahneman and Tversky 1972, 
47). This focus will give exceeding influence to variables affecting an event’s 
representativeness, yet not its probability, while it diminishes the influence of such 
variables that are unrelated to an event’s representativeness yet important in determining 
its probability (Bar-Hillel 1982). Availability – or associate distance – is a second common 
heuristic when forming preferences in situations dealing with risk or uncertainty. A person 
employs the availability heuristic when judging probability by estimating “frequency or 
probability [of an event] by the ease with which instances or associations could be brought 
to mind” (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 164). The assumption is that if examples come 
to the mind very quickly, that must be because they are numerous; that if a connection 
can be made easily, then the link must be factual (Taylor 1982, 191f).42 Availability is 
                                                 
40 Their work on judgment under uncertainty takes into account the at the time recent merger between 
the study of judgment and the Fritz Heider – pioneered study of causal attribution and lay psychological 
interpretation.  
41 Kahneman and his colleagues use the words risk and uncertainty separately, however tend not to focus 
on the difference between the two. Their division of the words lies only in terminology in that they 
consider a situation of uncertainty as one that bears risks – they do not specify the level of assessment 
possible for either (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Shafer 1984).  
42 An original example from Kahneman and Tversky’s work is the ‘K’ study. People were asked to judge 
for any given English text whether or not the letter K was more likely to appear in first position in words 
 49 
known to have caused scares, such as increased fear of a crime which occupied the news 
or even a popular movie. People who saw the movie The China Syndrome, which depicts a 
nuclear disaster, showed increased fear following the actual nuclear accident at Three Mile 
Island. Equally, people tend to spend more time thinking about extreme events such as 
lottery wins or aeroplane crashes to the point that extreme events end up appearing more 
likely than they are, because they are readily available in a person’s imagination.  
Another specific issue, which limits traditional rationality that is considered common is 
that of causal reasoning. Several social psychologists argued the fact that thinking is 
heavily causal, which leads to a variety of related biases (Shafer 1984).  Kahneman and 
Tversky suggest that data or information of a clear causal nature will have a greater impact 
on decision-makers than other data which may be equally informative. Subsequently, as a 
causal schema is established, any other information which does not fit this schema will be 
attributed with less or no significance (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 118).43  
Another important consequence of causal judgment is unwillingness to revise existing 
explanations or models of thinking. Kahneman and Tversky found that subjects in an 
experiment were strongly inclined to trust presented and suggested existing models of 
explanation, however unlikely and unfitting they seemed for the case example (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1980). This heuristic fits together with work by political scientists on the 
power of ideas in decision-making, which is discussed in detail in chapter seven.44 
A related observation was that causal judgments cannot be passed on easily – information 
by experts often fails to convince lay people, no matter how cleverly it is presented. For 
example, newly gathered and impressive statistical data circulated by the U.S. national 
                                                 
or in third. It is much easier to think of words where the letter is in the first position, so that is the option 
test subjects overwhelmingly chose. In fact, a typical text contains usually much more words with K in the 
third position than in the first, around twice as many. 
43 Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments on causal judgments follow the influential cognitive theory by 
Harold Kelly called attribution theory. It proposes a view of all humans as lay scientists, forever trying 
their hand at inference, to claim specific causes for observed effects (Nisbett et al. 1976). An example for 
people’s willingness to seek out causal links can be shown with the following problem set. People were 
asked: “Which of the following events is more probable? (a) That an athlete won the decathlon, if he 
won the first event in the decathlon (N=21). (b) That an athlete won the first event in the decathlon, if 
he won the decathlon (N=75).” (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 120). A third option was that both were 
equally likely. Both events are equally probable, and yet the majority of respondents said that option b) 
was the most probable. This suggests a strong underlying causal connection made.  
44 Several authors take the cognitive process around risk preferences further apart: Perceiving risks is only 
the first step in the process of forming a preference on it, the risk will then be evaluated – most likely by 
using a range of biases and heuristics – and then judged on, so that a preference is formed. Others 
combine all of these processes as one and see no distinction worth researching. From all the various case 
studies reviewed in this field it can be assumed that the preference will not be (entirely) rational 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1982), at least not by economic standards. However, there is not much judgment 
of whether or not the lack of rationality postulates adverse effects – the judgment mainly consists in the 
suggestion that a belief in and reliance on rationality where there is none has negative effects.  
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health service appears to have had little effect on peoples’ decision to undergo cancer 
detection screening in the mid-1970s. Studies since have found that the public often has 
very little confidence in experts’ estimations (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006). However, 
public awareness of the mastectomies performed on Ms Rockefeller and Ms Ford led to 
a huge surge in demand for screenings (Nisbett et al. 1976, 116).45 These choice models 
and heuristics are largely devised for the individual, and some are not transferable one to 
one to a governmental body making decisions (for example a very different level of 
information availability needs to be assumed).  
In the wake of these discoveries, and almost thirty years after Neumann and Morgenstern 
had fixed the parameters of expected utility theory, Kahneman and Tversky established 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory is a variant or upgraded 
version of expected utility that stems from their research in behavioural economics. Next 
to expected utility, it remains “arguably the most influential theory for behavioural 
decisions under risk” (Rieger 2014, 1).46 Unlike expected utility, prospect theory is meant 
to be only descriptive of real life choices, and not a normative guide to decision-making. 
The theory states that decisions are made based on separate evaluations of gains and 
losses, not a final outcome only (Wang 2006). It allows for certain heuristics to influence 
these evaluations, amongst them the tendency of risk aversion, i.e. to value losses higher 
than gains. The decision-maker is still assumed to have complete knowledge about all 
potential outcomes, and the ability to rank them.47  
Prospect theory was successful in explaining some observed violations of behaviour 
predicted by expected utility, mainly through its inclusion of risk averse behaviour. The 
main heuristics considered in it include: that losses are always evaluated higher than gains; 
a tendency to ambiguity aversion; that people tend to focus on the status quo as reference 
point for separate gains and loss decisions rather than to look at the final outcome; and 
finally that they tend to overweigh unlikely, rare extreme events and underestimate the 
probability of average events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 
                                                 
45 Scholars further found evidence discrediting the superiority of the economic model argument in that 
experts are not necessarily always better judges of risks than non-experts or members of the public 
(Fischhoff et al. 1978; Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 1982). Important is also the finding that experts 
and the public work with entirely different definitions of risk. A noticeable difference is found in the fact 
that the public usually focuses on potential consequences whereas experts are more concerned with 
factual estimations and probabilities than considering outcome possibilities in detail (Sjöberg 1999, 2000).  
46 “When it comes to modelling uncertainty, most economists instinctively reach for the expected utility 
framework of von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944)” (Heal and Millner 2013, 128).46   
47 Over a decade later, Kahneman and Tversky presented a further development or a new variant of their 
proposed prospect theory: the cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1992). In this context, 
I will only give a precis of the main findings of both prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory 
which could be relevant to the case study.  
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2000).48 However, prospect theory does not allow for uncertainty. It also does not take 
into account major diversions from rationality such as described in the section above on 
causal judgment. Soon after its publication, articles followed in economic journals 
pointing out the respective flaws of prospect theory (Harrison and Rutström 2008; Rieger 
2014; Nagarajan and Shechter 2014). Its improvement on expected utility theory lies in 
that it includes heuristics such as ambiguity aversion or the overweighting of losses and 
therefore a distortion of probabilities.  
This section has shown further fault with expected utility, introduced the other most 
commonly used upgrade of expected utility, namely prospect theory, and discussed several 
specific biases which are thought to constrain rational decision-making. I will now move 
on to discussing other theoretical as well as normative criticism of expected utility.  
 
 
III.4 Modern criticisms of expected utility from the social sciences 
“The view of man as rational is not particular to economics, but is endemic, 
and even ubiquitous, throughout the social sciences” (H. A. Simon 1978, 
64).49  
 
Whereas criticism discussed in the previous sections was focused on sharpening the 
model for cost-benefit analysis to perfection, this section deals with different concerns 
raised about rationality and cost-benefit analysis. In the following paragraphs, I discuss 
contributions from the social sciences, mainly political science and sociology, that 
question whether or not rationality exists, whether or not decision-making based on 
expected utility exists, and whether the latter homo economicus perspective is beneficial.  
These works were prompted by theoretical reconsideration but also by empirical studies 
displaying the contrast between actual decision-making and the predictions gained 
through purely rational calculations with expected utility functions (for example Pauker, 
Pauker, and McNeil 1988; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986). Political scientist James March argued categorically for bounded 
                                                 
48 The main development of cumulative prospect theory compared to regular prospect theory is that the 
weighing of the possible outcomes is applied to the cumulative probability distribution function, as it is in 
expected utility dependent on ranking, but not applied to the separate individual probabilities of 
individual outcomes. It is considered a theoretical improvement of prospect theory as it can transform 
objective cumulative probabilities into subjective probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 2000) but 
especially leads to overweighting of extreme yet rare events and does not solve aforementioned issues.  
49 This is in contrast to March who argues that students of politics, organisations and history have been 
excited to point at flaws in economic models of rational choice (March 1988).  
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rationality when he proposed that pure models of rational choice were appropriate as 
guidelines to intelligent action, yet never appropriate for explaining or predicting 
behaviour (March 1988, 34).50 His colleague Herbert Simon argued that economic 
research ignored the actual process behind rational men reaching decisions and that their 
strategy worked only for “static, relatively simple problem situations” (Simon 1978, 75). 
To him, this “strategy does not work, however, when [they are] seeking to explain the 
decision-maker’s behaviour in complex, dynamic circumstances that involve a great deal 
of uncertainty” (Simon 1978, 75).51  
A prominent name in this field of research is that of Ulrich Beck, who helped popularise 
the term risk society (Beck 1986, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2009). The term risk society aimed to 
encompass the many facets of modern societies both dealing with but also self-producing 
risks. The term is usually associated with a number of key writers: Beck (1986, 1998, 2009), 
Giddens (1998, 1999), Douglas and Wildavsky, and Lagadec who first used the term ‘risk 
civilization’ (Lagadec 1981; Douglas and Wildavsky 1992). Their works originally focused 
mainly on society’s response mechanisms to risks and hazards as well as modern society’s 
obsession with risk avoidance despite a large part of the world arguably being a safer place 
than ever before in the second half of the 20th century. But the focus shifted noticeably 
towards the implications of consequences brought on by modern technology and 
scientific advances, which are designed to bring progress but many of which create new 
risks for humankind or the environment. This was in line with an increase of importance 
of various kinds of risk analysis used by policymakers, most notably in the areas of health, 
technology and environment. Social scientist Beck considers the rational model of 
expected utility not only inadequate but misleading (Beck 1986, 79): “If there is anything 
that produces unity across the entrenched political divides, then it is the conviction that 
we are imprisoned by our dependence on rationality” (Beck 1995, 58). In his writing he 
states his view that political or economic decision-makers tend to make decisions based 
on statistics and with a focus purely on business, ignoring uncertainty (Beck 1986, 1998). 
He labels this “economical one-eyedness” and finds issue with the idea of such rationality, 
whether it can actually exists and whether results from it are desirable (Beck 1986, 80).52 
Beck considers risk preferences not as objective processes but as embedded in the 
surrounding factors of political, economic and social environment (Beck 1992, 1998). In 
                                                 
50 His argument did not only entail the stated problems in calculation of rational choice, but also 
fundamental issues with human behaviour – that preferences and actions may, in fact, be quite separate 
from one another.  
51 To understand an actor’s preferences at any given moment, Simon argues, “one must have a large store 
of knowledge about the minds of the actors, what they know and believe” (Simon 1995, 60).  
52 Beck defines modern society as one where “gain in power from techno-economic ‘progress’ is being 
increasingly overshadowed by the production of risks” (Beck 1992, 13). 
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his work on nuclear development he argued that there is no reflection of such 
embeddedness: that it is instead likely that political decision-makers will argue through 
notions of a purely rational, economic point of view (Beck 1986, 80). In this context, he 
argued that policymakers will use some form of expected utility theory and thereby judge 
risks according to the expected revenue when deciding on a new technology entailing a 
risk the scope of which is as of yet unclear. From this, one can reason that policymakers 
are either unaware of this paradox, or that they purposefully ignore any uncertainty and 
the knowledge that their environment shapes them. This may lead them to think or claim 
that they are rational in situations where they are not and cannot be. 
Several political and social scientists have supported Beck’s view of ‘economic one-
eyedness’ (Stern and Wiener 2011; Gray, Rogers, and Wiener 2011; Hammitt 2011; 
Wiener et al. 2013). They consider economic reasoning to be the determining factor for 
risk preference and according policy preferences, yet not all consider this as problematic 
like Beck did. Some political science scholars have focused on empirical evidence that 
diverging risk preferences can cause very different regulatory behaviour in different 
countries, despite similar economic outset and goals stated, i.e. despite suggested similar 
expected utility (Christoforou 2004; The Economist 2004; Shaffer 2004; Anthony 
Leiserowitz 2006; Breggin et al. 2009; Eichbrecht and Wilber 2011; Stern and Wiener 
2011; Jasanoff 2011; Quick 2011; Vogel 2012).53 These scholars forego any transferable 
conclusions as to why such different attitudes to risk and uncertainty exist – but they do 
strongly question the existence of or adherence to any generalisable model for rational 
cost-benefit analysis.  
Unlike the previously discussed works on calculable risk preferences, most of the new 
approaches from the social sciences focus on uncertainty. There is more open 
acknowledgement of types of risks which cannot be calculated or possibly not even 
expected – ‘unknown unknowns’ (Mildner and Boeckelmann 2011).54 One of these new 
                                                 
53 Another group of scholars focuses on disputing the idea of different risk attitudes in general between 
(mainly) the U.S. and the EU, as no evidence exists of cultural effects on risk attitudes (Christoforou 
2004; Kelemen and Vogel 2009; J Wiener 2011; Walsh 2011; Miller 2011; Elliot and Renn 2011; Cantley 
and Lex 2011; Mildner and Schwarzer 2011; Hammitt 2011; Saterson 2011; Freestone 2011; Mair, 
Mildner, and Wodni 2012). 
54 In his book Risk: A Sociological Theory Niklas Luhmann contributed to the sociological work on risk by 
crossing it with his theory of autopoietic systems (Luhmann 2008). In his theory, risk is a particular way 
of dealing with the future, which needs to be decided by factoring in probability. This leads to the insight 
that the uncertainty of an outcome does not solely stem from reasons of disinformation or incomplete 
information and complexity of a choice, but also from the very process of preference building or 
decision-making itself. For example, there often enough is quite a large gap of time between the moment 
when a decision is made and the moment when its consequences begin to unfold – in the meantime, a 
whole array of seemingly not directly related factors can affect the course of the consequences. Giddens 
(1999) defines ‘today’s risk society’ as “a society where we increasingly live on a high technological 
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concepts is that of systemic risk: these are risks the effects of which may spread across 
national borders as well as sectors due to interconnectedness, and risks so complex that 
it becomes hard to distinguish their creators and their victims. For example, aspects of 
environmental degradation such as pollution and global warming are risks that spread 
borders and affect anyone, not just those who created them. The effects are global in their 
impact. Scholars have stated that the regularly used and accepted expected utility 
framework for risk preferences is likely of limited use when looking at environmental and 
climate policy issues in part due to this very reason (Kunreuther et al. 2012; Heal and 
Millner 2013).  
This section has shown that criticism of expected utility and rationality in decision-making 
continued and spread out from economics into different academic disciplines. It has 
elaborated on the normative beyond the empirical arguments – scholars not only point 
out that expected utility does not work in most real-world scenarios, they also question 
why expected value alone should be a model for decision-making. From the discussed 
critiques, it became clear that many authors find uncertain, not calculable risks, at the 
heart of much policy failure, and that they take issue with the nonspecific use of the terms 
‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’.  
 
 
III.5 Risk and uncertainty: An important distinction rarely made 
“Keynes’ admonition to open up the field of economic decision-making to 
the unknown unknowns was entirely neglected in the subsequent 
development of mainstream economics (including mainstream Keynesian 
economics).” (Beck 2006, 335) 
 
Throughout the previous parts of this chapter an issue has crystallised to which this 
section is devoted: a confusion between the terms risk and uncertainty, and a disregard of 
the latter altogether. In the above reviewed academic literature one often comes across a 
lack of exact distinction between the two terms. In section one, two, and mostly in section 
three as well, risk is discussed as a measurable variable and the possibility of uncertainty 
is ignored – but in section four I mentioned criticism of this oversight and a notion that 
                                                 
frontier which absolutely no one completely understands and which generates a diversity of possible 
futures” (Giddens 1999: 3). 
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the terms are different. In this final section I discuss definitions of the two terms and their 
use in recent literature to decide on a distinction and why it is important.  
It has been stated that in the 21st century, risk has become “one of the most used, abused 
and analysed” (Mudu and Beck 2012, 1217) terms to classify facts, events or the entire 
social reality. To begin with the basics, the Oxford English Dictionary offers several 
definitions for the word risk:  
“A situation involving exposure to danger; The possibility that something 
unpleasant or unwelcome will happen; A person or thing regarded as a threat 
or likely source of danger; A possibility of harm or damage against which 
something is insured; A person or thing regarded as likely to turn out well or 
badly in a particular context or respect; The possibility of financial loss.” 
(Oxford Dictionaries Online 2016a) 
All but one of these possible definitions have a clear negative connotation.55 What these 
standard definitions do not define is whether or not such a risk would be at all measurable.  
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) defines risk as  
“an uncertain (generally adverse) consequence of an event or activity with 
respect to something that human beings value”. (IRGC 2012, 4)56  
Clearly, here, a distinction is made between risk and uncertainty. The definition adds that 
risks  
“are often taken for opportunities associated with initiating activities or 
applying technologies” (IRGC 2012, 4).  
For the word uncertainty, there are less definitions available:  
“The state of being uncertain; Something that is uncertain or that causes one 
to feel uncertain” (Oxford Dictionaries Online 2016c).   
These definitions are surprisingly inadequate not to mention pleonastic: the word 
‘uncertain’ then is further defined with:  
“Not able to be relied on; not known or definite; (Of a person) not completely 
confident or sure of something” (Oxford Dictionaries Online 2016b).  
which indicates that uncertainty is at least clearly defined as something not measurable. 
Uncertainty is defined by the IRGC as referring to  
“a lack of clarity or quality of the scientific or technical data. Uncertainty 
describes the level of confidence that analysts associate with a qualitative or 
quantitative assessment of a specific risk.” (IRGC 2012, 14) 
Here a logical sequence is established between risk and uncertainty. Aven and Renn 
support this, and the idea that uncertainty has little to do with probability or expected 
                                                 
55 In the English language at least, they commonly all entail the potential for adverse effects.  
56 The IRGC in a previous definition explained risk as the potential appearance of tolerated, or 
unintentional i.e. accidental consequences of purposeful human activity which damage a good or goods 
valued by humans (Renn 2005). Whilst this makes room for a differentiation about the certainty of risk 
appearing, it does not specify whether or not this certainty can be calculated.  
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values (Aven and Renn 2009, 1, 4, 10). Risk can involve uncertainties; uncertainties can 
lead to risk. Aven and Renn combine the terms as follows:  
“Risk is a situation or event where something of human value (including 
humans themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain” (Aven 
and Renn 2009, 1).  
Similarly, the Gabler Economic Dictionary defines risk as:   
“Designation of the eventuality that with a certain, specified or unknown, 
probability, a damage or loss may take place, which may also be unknown, 
following an (economic) decision; or equally that the expected benefit may 
remain absent.” (Kamps 2013)57  
The last three specific definitions reviewed here show an understanding that there is a 
clear distinction and possible sequential relationship between uncertainty and risk. The 
International Organization for Standardization takes the same approach to the separation 
of the issues and defines risk plainly as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” 
(InConsult 2009). Similarly, the Financial Times lexicon defines risk as “the measurable 
uncertainty that an investment (or the running of a business) will not generate the 
expected returns (or earnings)” (FT Lexicon 2015).  Risk and uncertainty can clearly be 
divided into two separate categories with one affecting the other. These definitions 
illustrate the existence of a general understanding of two separate scenarios of calculable 
and non-calculable potential for (adverse) effects.  
In the social sciences, many scholars draw on an original definition by the economists 
John Maynard Keynes and Frank H. Knight (Keynes 1921; Keynes 1937; Knight 1921) 
when engaging in discourse on the meaning of uncertainty, risk, and risk preferences.58 
Both Keynes and Knight decided it was necessary to encourage a clear distinction between 
the concepts of uncertainty and risk. There are different approaches for distinguishing 
between levels of information and calculability. In his 1921 book Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 
Knight defines the term uncertainty as the overall term for three possible ‘probability 
situations’:  
• logically deduced probabilities,  
• empirically (i.e. statistically) deduced probabilities,  
• and estimated probabilities (including all probabilities that are based on both estimations 
and intuitive judgment) (Knight 1921; Mildner and Boeckelmann 2011).  
The first two categories, logical and empirical probabilities, are both considered as risks 
                                                 
57 Translated from German: “Kennzeichnung der Eventualität, dass mit einer (ggf. niedrigen, ggf. auch 
unbekannten) Wahrscheinlichkeit ein (ggf. hoher, ggf. in seinem Ausmaß unbekannter) Schaden bei einer 
(wirtschaftlichen) Entscheidung eintreten oder ein erwarteter Vorteil ausbleiben kann.”  
58 A review of many of these can also be found in Mildner and Boeckelmann (2011).  
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by Knight. Only the third category of estimated probability he considers as true 
uncertainty, for which there is no available method of objectively measuring the 
probability of occurrence or impact. As examples he names perfectly unexpected and 
singular situations such as an unforeseen natural hazard.59 His belief in the importance of 
distinguishing outcomes between what is and what is not measurable is obvious. From 
the field of political science, scholar Elke Krahmann distinguishes between three different 
types of risk: known risks, unknown risks, and unknown unknown risks. Occurrences can 
be categorised in this order according to their frequency, their predictability as well as 
overall existing knowledge of the type of risk (Krahmann 2011). Known risks are thereby 
risks which have been experienced before and about the causes of which there exists 
sufficient available and calculable information. Unknown risks to Krahmann are risks the 
probability and impact of which can be calculated quite accurately but not perfectly so, 
leaving room for error. Unknown unknowns are almost perfectly impossible to estimate 
or measure, as we know close to nothing about them and can only speculate as to their 
future occurrence, or never even expect them at all (Krahmann 2011).60  
Several other recent studies in the social sciences do not use the differentiated labels of 
risk and uncertainty but do detect the distinction of the terms. For example, Van Asselt 
and Renn instead differentiate between simple risks and systemic risks (van Asselt and Renn 
2011). Systemic risks are characterised by uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (van 
Asselt and Renn 2011). The IRGC defines systemic risks as  
                                                 
59 Whilst those are more predictable in the 21st century than at the time of Knight’s book, they continue 
to eschew calculation. In the 21st century the now common or standard practice of catastrophe (CAT) 
modelling has been found inadequate in situations of extreme events such as the Hurricane Katrina 
(Westfall 2005) due to unforeseeable attributes.  
60 Several other recent studies (Renn 2005; Daase and Kessler 2007; Nelson and Katzenstein 2010) have 
come up with similar categories with a clear distinction of terms between risk and uncertainty. Daase and 
Kessler distinguish between known knowns: about which there is perfectly accurate information available, 
therefore these count as threats; known unknowns: threats which we know of but which cannot be 
attributed to a particular actor or cause and are difficult to measure, but are considered risks (Daase and 
Kessler 2007; Mildner and Boeckelmann 2011). They can be compared to those risks which Knight 
(1921) considers deducible, however Daase and Kessler point out that there are many different ways to 
calculate a risk which strongly depend on factors such as context, culture etc. and need not be 
mathematically logic (Daase and Kessler 2007; Mildner and Boeckelmann 2011). Further, the authors 
make allowance for political interests to have an influence on the consideration of an issue as a risk 
(Daase and Kessler 2007). Unknown unknowns are called disasters and their definition is closely aligned 
with that of Knight’s “true uncertainty” (Knight 1921; Daase and Kessler 2007): events which cannot be 
estimated or measured neither regarding their occurrence probability nor regarding their consequences, 
including some natural disasters. Daase and Kessler introduce another category of unknown knowns, also 
called ignorance: this encompasses active decisions of remaining ignorant or having other people remain 
ignorant about the causal relations surrounding a risk, which thereby becomes an uncertainty. 
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“embedded in the larger context of societal, financial and economic 
consequences and threaten the functionality of a service or a need that is 
essential for the economy and/or society”; “not confined to national 
borders”; “cannot be managed through the actions of a single sector”; 
“require a comprehensive and systemic governance approach, i.e. an approach 
that acknowledges the interdependencies of the variables and attempts to 
correct the drivers rather than the symptoms” (IRGC 2012, 4).61  
 
Possible examples for systemic risks are climate change or the global financial crisis of 
2008.  
Whichever way the difference in meaning is labelled – and in this thesis, I chose to 
distinguish between the terms risk and uncertainty – the distinction is incredibly important. 
There is a tendency to ignore the possibility of uncertainty or to classify all uncertainty as 
risks.62 For example, Katzenstein and Nelson specifically wrote about the financial crisis 
in which they consider problems arose or were reinforced through a blatant 
misunderstanding of and non-distinction between risks and uncertainty (Nelson and 
Katzenstein 2010). They argued that problems stemmed from the fact that many 
uncertainties were considered as calculable risks. Nelson and Katzenstein attest that the 
element of uncertainty is often masked by an overreliance on quantifiable data and 
complex models which leave little room for an uncertainty factor, specifically in the 
finance sector, including some studies in investment and insurance (Nelson and 
Katzenstein 2010). Such risk attitudes are also at the heart of the problématique of this 
thesis: the next chapters assess whether or not costs of shale gas are considered to a lesser 
                                                 
61 If a systemic risk crosses different societal sectors or even just governmental departments, or beyond 
national borders, a situation of ambiguity arises as there is a further complication of highly different 
preferences towards said risk and its implication (van Asselt and Renn 2011). 
62 Another terminology which it helps to clarify is the term risk preference. Arrow described risk-benefits 
analysis, which in turn may inform a risk preference, as a key tool in modern policy analysis (Arrow 1988). 
One of the earliest mentions of this process is found within Jules Dupuit’s paper on cost-benefit analysis 
(Dupuit 1844), yet it was never practically and consciously applied in arguing for political reasons before 
the 1950s (Arrow 1988), most prominently with many economist scholars (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944; Allais 1945; Ellsberg 1961; Quiggin 1982, 1993). A risk preference describes the 
completion point in decision-making in a situation of risk and under uncertainty. Condensing the Benthin 
Risk Perception Measure (BRPM) (Benthin, Slovic, and Severson 1993), psychologists Gardner and 
Steinberg define it most plainly as “whether one believes the benefits inherent in an activity outweigh [its] 
costs” (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005, p.4). This is how the term will be used in the following: as a 
preference of whether or not to accept a risk which entails uncertain elements and undergo the activity 
bearing it (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Slovic 1987; Wang 2006; Anthony Leiserowitz 2006; Leiserowitz 
et al. 2007; Treier 2010). The concept of risk preference has been in common use for quite some time as a 
factor in manifold studies (Slovic, 1987; Bell et al., 1988; Arrow, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 2000; Leiserowitz, 2006; Leiserowitz et al., 2007; Slovic & IIED, 2010 - to give but a few 
examples), amongst others on voting behaviour, financial investment or foreign policy analysis. In studies 
dating back to before 2000, risk preferences are quite often described by similar terms such as ‘risk 
decision behaviour’, ‘risk attitudes’, ‘preferences in risk attitude’, ‘risk policy preferences’ and others. The 
variety in terminology serves as a further indicator of interest and research into the issue of risk 
preferences as well as an indication of how disconnected these approaches are; that there has been no 
effort to collect and combine multidisciplinary insights into the area as of yet.  
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extent because some are uncertain, not local in their impact and distant – which would go 
against the notion of ambiguity aversion.  
The purpose of this section was to clarify the distinction between risk and uncertainty, to 
settle on definitions for this thesis, and to point out the danger of confusing uncertainty 
for a measurable risk, as the above sections have shown risk preference models to do.63 
Having established that there are means of differentiating between risk and uncertainty 
that are accepted by scholars, this thesis will continue to make the distinction as I deem 
it specifically important for the case study at hand. In this thesis, the term risk will be used 
whenever it is known that a situation may bring with it adverse effects and when it is 
possible to calculate their approximate consequences. Uncertainty will be used as a term 
for situations in which potential negative consequences are expected but little is known 
about their impact or their likelihood and they may not be considered.  
 
 
III.6 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter served the following key purposes: 1) to introduce the reader to the standard 
approach in risk or uncertainty decision-making analysis, expected utility theory; 2) to 
show that this approach has been proven to hardly work; 3) to establish prospect theory 
and introduce common biases in decision-making which become useful later in this case 
study; and 4) to show concerns about the use of such an approach. A 5)th key purpose of 
the chapter was to discuss the distinction between risk and uncertainty, which is a 
distinction rarely made yet very important. Without it rationality in decision-making is not 
feasible. All of the above conclusions make it very worthwhile to look at other scenarios 
when aiming to explain a decision taken under uncertainty.  
I opened this chapter by introducing the prevalent model for rational decision-making 
under risk, namely expected utility theory, with its basic propositions and the history of 
its development and refinement. Throughout several sections I elaborated on consistent 
criticism of this theory for its inability to either explain or predict real decisions, mostly 
from the disciplines of economics, psychology, sociology and political science. There is 
still widespread consensus among current scholars that empirical researchers on 
behaviour and decision-making under uncertainty should take expected utility, or 
                                                 
63 There is obviously an aspect of assumption involved (or character judgment of the respective 
researcher or policymaker) when pointing to uncertainties which were falsely identified as risk. This could 
have occurred due to lack of knowledge, followed from indolence or a wish to conceal uncertainty.  
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prospect theory, as a basis for cost-benefit analysis under risk and uncertainty into account 
as it is the best available model to assess such decisions (Quiggin 1982, 105, 1993; Harless 
and Camerer 1994; Harrison and Rutström 2008; Treier 2010; Rieger 2014; Briggs 2015). 
This consensus I spoke of above about the benefits of expected utility however exists 
mainly between the type of scholars who engage with direct modelling of how to explain 
or predict risk: most of these engage in positivist research on economic issues, or business 
and policy recommendation. Expected utility theory, in a nutshell, will assume that a risk 
is more likely to be taken the higher the potential payoff or revenue is. It takes into 
account that utility is different for different people, that certainty or losses are valued 
differently depending on the original circumstances. It always assumes rationality. The 
economic model of choice that is most popular besides expected utility, prospect theory, 
divides between gains and losses but doesn’t otherwise differ greatly from its parent.  
In further sections of this chapter I discussed several types of critique of expected utility, 
ranging from the kind of critiques based on empirical evidence that aimed to help upgrade 
and sharpen the formula of expected utility, to the kind that denies it any claim to 
usefulness and questions its normative foundations.  
The chapter showed that from a theoretical perspective, there are many reasons to doubt 
the official cost-benefit rationale of a policy made. First of all because the very economic 
concept of cost-benefit analysis under risk, i.e. expected utility, is presumptuous and 
flawed and has been criticised by its own pupils for decades. There is also more recent 
evidence that when this kind of rigorous statistical method is applied, it often gets it wrong 
(Westfall 2005; Clark 2015). I ended the chapter with a discussion of two terms important 
to this work, risk and uncertainty, and the necessity of distinguishing between their 
definitions.  
The chapter conclusions lead me to assess a rational cost-benefit analysis of shale gas 
opportunities for the United Kingdom and the United States considering risk and 
uncertainty involved: Through a concise data and literature review, the next chapter 
argues that in a situation of such uncertainty, a decision on fracking is not ‘rational’ in 
economic terms (chapter four). This entails a weighing of expected revenue and benefits 
against the expected costs, including investment costs as well as costs such as negative 
effects on the economy and the environment, and a comparison of alternative options for 
energy generation. This third chapter, especially where I discussed criticism of expected 
utility, also leads me to look for other approaches of decision-making analysis in the realm 




IV Chapter Four. Comparison of cost benefit analysis for fracking in 
the United Kingdom and United States  
 
In chapter three, I discussed the ‘rational’ theory for decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty. I also considered both empirical and theoretical criticism of expected utility 
theory. Despite its critics, expected utility is still considered a key model to analysing, 
guiding and predicting decisions taken under risk. Hence in this chapter I follow the 
expected utility theory i.e. cost-benefit approach suggested in the traditional literature for 
the decision made on shale gas to assess whether it accurately explains policy decisions 
on shale.64 The rational actor model is based on the following inference pattern: “if a 
nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had ends to which the action 
constituted a maximizing means”, with “national interests” as its key goals (Allison 1971, 
33). Therefore, I will conduct an analysis into the national interest in shale gas.  
As this is a comparative case study, in the opening sections of this chapter I evaluate the 
empirical data on the energy sectors and specifically shale economics for a purely rational 
cost-benefit analysis in a first section for the United States and then in a second section 
for the United Kingdom. I begin the country specific sections by making a wider point 
on the respective country’s energy sector in order to assess how shale gas would fit into 
the mix: a key criterion of expected utility is after all to assess the utility of a course of 
action to a specific case, not its general value. Consequently, a mere discussion of shale 
reserve sizes would be insufficient. Instead it is important to consider each country’s 
specific needs, i.e. overall energy production and consumption play a role, but also 
structural factors such as gas infrastructure and mining rights to assess if it would be 
economically viable to introduce shale gas into the energy mix.65 There are structural 
particularities to gas as a resource and the gas business which make it a very different 
economic resource from oil or coal, notably the different modes of transport and pricing. 
Existing infrastructure should play a major role in determining both the technical ability 
to access shale gas resources as well as their utility, since this is where investment costs 
                                                 
64 I will not attempt to evaluate expected utility in a mathematical sense as there would be too many 
separate choice actions creating a multitude of utility functions. Furthermore, as this chapter will illustrate, 
many factors that should influence policymaking on shale gas are in fact not measurable to the point 
where they could be translated into real numbers. What this chapter aims to determine is whether 
expected utility was considered in the sense of a cost-benefit analysis based on rational assessment of 
known factors, and whether such as assessment was possible at all given the availability of information on 
the resource. 
65 I discuss the U.S. shale cost-benefit analysis in more detail than the UK case, as there is more proven 
data for and experience with the U.S., whereas for the UK mostly plans and the data on which they are 
based will be discussed.   
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are likely to occur. The effect that adding shale gas to the energy mix available to a country 
has also depends on its pricing system. The ownership of below the ground assets is an 
influential variable when calculating both the lucrativeness of shale assets as well as the 
viability of their extraction.    
In a third section I consider the public opinion on shale gas development in the two 
countries. The governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom can be 
expected to, within reason, take their directives from public mandate, if merely to achieve 
re-election (Downs 1957).  
In the final section I establish the existence of alternative energy strategy options for both 
the United Kingdom and the United States, and argue that there is every reason to assume 
that the respective governmental policymakers are well aware of them. This section serves 
to point out the availability of options other than shale gas development, to outline their 
potential and to make sure that information about such strategies was sufficiently existent.  
In this chapter I use data from a number of sources: official governmental statistics from 
the departments entrusted with economic policy, energy policy, environment, budget or 
statistics, as well as third party data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and data from 
independent scientific research published in recognised journals (i.e. IEA 2002; DTI 2003; 
IEA 2005; BERR 2008; Owen, Inderwildi, and King 2010; Urbina 2011; IEA 2012; 
Bolton 2013; International Energy Agency Staff 2013; EIA 2013b, 2015c, 2015a, 2016; 
IEA 2016).  
Before commencing the chapter, it is important to establish how expected utility theory 
will be used. In literature, it has been used descriptively, predictively or prescriptively. As 
I am assessing policy decisions that have already taken place, the latter two are not relevant 
in this context. What I aim to assess is the validity of the underlying principles of expected 
utility: rationality, and basing a decision on a cost-benefit analysis of known data. I wish 
to assess whether expected utility to the proclaimed beneficiaries (the national economic 
sector and the public, and to a lesser degree the industry, the consumers) was derived by 
taking into account all costs and benefits of the policy proposed, and to which degree this 
was even possible. Shale gas development is at very different stages in the two selected 
cases, the United States and the United Kingdom. My strategy to compare them is 
ultimately based on their similar policy decision-making on shale gas, i.e. the decision to 
engage in shale gas development (whereas other governments chose not to66) and their 
                                                 
66 For example, the French and German governments have banned fracking (Hansen and Shalal 2016; 
Felix 2016). There are doubts by green campaigners about true intentions of their governments and 
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favourable treatment of the sector, both in policy statements (Snyder and Klimasinska 
2012; Cameron 2013; Krukowska 2014; Watt 2014) as well as in records of actual 
legislation (Stevens 2012; BBC 2013; DeGette 2016; Carrington 2016).  
I will not, in this chapter, be able to consider the specific environmental costs of shale gas 
extraction as part of the cost-benefit analysis, something that many scientists in the 21st 
century consider should be part of the cost calculation. Within the timeframe of this study 
until the time of writing up in 2016, a variety of environmental disturbances have been 
linked to shale gas drilling, including water contamination, fish kill, earthquakes, pollution 
and many more.67 The evidence speaks for itself that from an environmental standpoint, 
shale gas is not a recommended energy source, and moreover it is not a sustainable 
resource. I consider the environmental costs of a resource as essential to calculate its costs 
and benefits; a recent EU Commission report has shown that if their economic costs 
included data on health, pollution and environmental effects, gas is already costlier than 
wind in the United Kingdom (Neslen 2014). But these kinds of costs continue to be kept 
separate from other economic costs in official energy strategy (see chapter eight) so to 
gauge the decision strategy of a policymaker I will adhere to this method.  
 
 
IV.1 Energy and shale gas in the United States  
It is necessary to make a wider point about the U.S. energy sector to clarify the role shale 
gas can play within its energy resource mix, the role it was hoped to play within it at the 
time of decision-making on shale policy, and what role it played in the first decade of its 
development.  
Coal production in the U.S. was overtaken first by oil production and then by gas 
production within the 1950s (see Figure 3 (EIA 2016b)). Those three major fossil fuels 
have dominated the production sector to varying degrees ever since. The development of 
nuclear energy and renewable energy sources has slowly risen since the 1970s68 but not 
reached the same levels as fossil fuel production.  
                                                 
whether or not the bans may not be revoked in future and whether there are exceptions to the ban. 
However, the official policy decision of both governments was to decide against fracking and therefore 
differs from the U.S. and the British decision.  
67 (Krahmann 2011; Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011, 2012; Nestler 2012; Groat and Grimshaw 
2012; T. Helm 2013; Schrope 2013; Terrell, Tinley, and Souther 2014; Anderson 2014; Bailey and Preston 
2015; Inman 2016).  
68 The steady amount of renewable energy before 1970 is exclusively hydroelectric and biomass.  
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Gas production in the U.S. has risen sharply after a rather steady phase between 1990-
2005, and crude oil production has been on the rise again after a steady decline since 
around 2009. A substantial part of this trend can be accredited to shale gas resources. 
Primary energy production has risen steadily with the exception of coal. Of this, 
unconventional gas constitutes 60% of production growth – this occurrence is estimated 
to be brief (as is the United States place at the top of gas producing countries) due to 
anticipated imminent decline in shale gas (IEA 2014, 2). In short, all types of energy 
production have risen noticeably since 2000, with the singular exception of coal 
production, which has declined since 2008 (EIA 2015b, 14).  
Energy consumption has also risen, and has outpaced production, illustrated in Figure 4  
(EIA 2016b) below.  
Overall consumption of coal has declined over the past decade, and similarly overall 
consumption of petroleum has declined at the same time, until 2014/15 (EIA 2015b, 16). 
However, petroleum has remained the most consumed energy source without 
interruption since 1950, with renewable and nuclear energy consumed the least (EIA 
Figure 3: Primary U.S. Energy Production by Source 1949-2015 (EIA 2016b) 
Figure 4: Primary Energy Consumption by Source (EIA 2016b)  
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2015b, 2013b). Consumption levels of natural gas were at an all-time high in 2014 and 
have been continuously rising in the past decade. Yet when compared to previous gas 
demand peaks in the early 1970s or late 1990s the rise has not been as dramatic as for 
example the rise between 1950-1970.  
The U.S. was still a net importer of energy products in 2015, but the deficit between 
imports and exports, which peaked around 2008, has been almost halved since then (EIA 
2015b, 12). Figure 5  (EIA 2016g, 8) shows 
that energy is actually opposed to the general 
trend in the U.S. trade balance, in which the 
U.S. trade deficit is continuing to grow after a 
brief respite following the global financial 
crisis.  
This trend can be explained by rising 
production levels in unconventional fossil 
fuels. Imports have decreased considerably 
since their peak in 2007, but, more remarkably, 
energy exports have risen significantly since 
2009 to their highest ever levels yet, as visible above in Figure 6 (EIA 2016e). While the 
United States are decreasing their consumption of coal by introducing more shale gas, 
Figure 5: U.S. Trade Balance 1974-2015 (EIA 2016g, 8) 
Figure 6: U.S. Net Energy Trade (EIA 2016e) 
U.S. energy flow, 2016
quadrillion Btu
1 Includes lease condensate.
2 Natural gas plant liquids.
3 Conventional hydroelectric power, biomass, geothermal, solar, and wind.
4 Crude oil and petroleum products.  Includes imports into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
5 Natural gas, coal, coal coke, biofuels, and electricity.
6 Adjustments, losses, and unaccounted for.
7 Natural gas only; excludes supplemental gaseous fuels.
8 Petroleum products, including natural gas plant liquids, and crude oil burned as fuel.
9 Includes -0.02 quadrillion Btu of coal coke net imports.
10 Includes 0.24 quadrillion Btu of electricity net imports.
11 Total energy consumption, which is the sum of primary energy consumption, electricity retail
sales, and electrical system energy losses.  Losses are allocated to the end-use sectors in
proportion to each sector’s share of total electricity retail sales.  See Note 1, “Electrical System
Energy Losses,” at the end of U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy
Review (April 2017), Section 2.
Notes: •  Data are preliminary.  •  Values are derived from source data prior to rounding for
publication.  •  Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.
Sources:  EIA, Monthly Energy Review (April 2017), Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4a, 1.4b, and 2.1.
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they are also increasing their coal exports (Broderick and Anderson 2012; Miller 2014). 
Clearly this renders the ‘clean’ effect of shale gas even more questionable.  
Figure 7 below (EIA 2013a) shows a rough division of end use per sector by the different 
energy sources. This is important because as the overall consumption landscape changes, 
production will have to adjust. There are few changes until 2015 (EIA 2015a).  
Gas is mainly used directly for industrial, residential and commercial purposes or for 
electricity, and these sectors, unlike transportation, have made great advancements with 
renewables. Solar power is becoming one of the cheapest sources of energy for private 
purposes in the United States, while the transport sector is heavily reliant on oil. Natural 
gas, a major part of which comes from domestic shale gas production, only makes up a 
small part of the second largest end use sector, transportation, which remains mostly 
fuelled by petroleum –  of which around ten quadrillion Btu remain imports (EIA 2016b). 
This challenges the argument of shale gas directly generating an increase in energy 
independence.  
Gas plays an important role in the United States energy sector, but it alone cannot change 
the sector’s reliability on imports. Furthermore, it cannot fix the problem of 
unsustainability. What will become clearer in the following section is that beyond these 
Figure 7: U.S. Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector (EIA 2013a) 
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issues, shale gas cannot simply replace conventional gas as an energy source as if they 
were equal.  
 
IV.1.1 Shale gas in the United States  
The supposedly ‘overnight’ success of U.S. shale gas has been decades in the making. The 
first shale well ever drilled in the United States was in Fredonia (NY) in 1821, and the 
first hydraulic fracturing exploration, albeit not connected to shale, was carried out in 
Kansas in 1947 (Stevens 2010). Shale gas has been produced on a small scale for over a 
century in the United States, in the Illinois basin and Appalachian basin (Stevens 2010, 
12). Large scale commercial development tentatively began in the 1980s. In 1986 2000ft 
horizontal shale wells were drilled in the Appalachian basin, and in the 1990s fracking was 
established in the Barnett shale (TX) (Stevens 2010; Styles 2014). For a long time, the 
technology was not financially viable for commercial production. In 2015, the 
Department of Energy concluded that it was technological advances which finally 
rendered the long known resource profitable in the 21st century and confirmed the 
department’s belief that shale gas “has the potential to significantly increase America’s 
security of energy supply, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and lower prices for 
consumers” (DoE 2015). Exact numbers of resource availability vary: the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) originally estimated an original resource amount of 
4644tcf of which they considered around 665tcf recoverable (EIA 2013b, 27) - Advanced 
Resources International considered 1161tcf recoverable (ARI Inc. 2014). But there is 
much doubt about both figures, which I will discuss later in this chapter. Shale gas 
currently encompasses 16% of all natural gas production within the United States (DoE 
2015).  
The following Figure 8 gives an overview of shale gas basins in the continental United 
States territory. This includes all of the discovered and so far evaluated shale gas basins 
on the United States mainland (EIA 2015b). 
The image illustrates how far shale gas development has already progressed in the United 
States in little more than a decade – commercialisation began with the use of hydraulic 
fracturing wells in the Barnett shale basin in 2002 (Stevens 2010). Most of the major 
discovered plays have been accessed, and several new plays are in planning.  
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To further illustrate the development of shale gas in the continental United States, Figure 
9 below (EIA 2016h) shows the current production of shale gas in the active plays in 
billion cubic feet per day. The most productive play by a noticeable margin is the 
Marcellus play in Pennsylvania. Together with the Haynesville play in Louisiana and 
Texas, the Eagle Ford play in Texas, the Fayetteville play in Arkansas, and the Barnett 
play in Texas it makes up the ‘big five’ U.S. shale basins. These five account for the 
majority of shale gas produced, each of them many times over the amount of any other 
shale play. It is important to note that production overall rose mainly due to the tapping 
of new plays rather than a major increase of production in any of the mentioned shales. 
Figure 9: U.S. Dry Shale Gas Production Monthly (EIA 2016h) 
Figure 8: Shale Plays in the U.S. (EIA 2015a) 
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In effect, several of the main shale basins, for example Barnett and Haynesville, are already 
in decline. This raises concerns over sweet spots for drilling, which some members of the 
shale industry and EPA have warned of (The New York Times 2011). 
The following estimations, seen in Figure 10 below (EIA 2016h), may help explain the 
interest in shale gas and other unconventional gas resources in the United States in 
particular. According to this 2012 EIA statistical projection, shale gas will make up for 
half of all gas production. 
 
Figure 10: U.S. Natural Gas Production 1990-2035 (EIA 2016h) 
Shale gas made up around a fifth of all natural gas production within the United States in 
2015 (DoE 2015), and according to the estimation in the above figure by the DoE, there 
is a strong hope to expand its role in providing natural gas. Its production levels are 
predicted to continue rising while production of other natural gas sources is due to 
decline. With this level of importance attached to the success of shale gas, and these kinds 
of prospects for its continued exceptional performance envisioned by the U.S. 
Department of Energy, shale gas can be considered to form a vital part of current U.S. 
energy strategy.69  
 
                                                 
69 It remains to remark that the shale gas ‘revolution’ in the United States has had a few interesting 
consequences in and outside the United States as well. LNG exports originally intended for the U.S. 
market are since flooding other markets instead (Dohmen and Jung 2012).   
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IV.1.2 Structural factors  
Several structural factors, including pricing, infrastructure and regulatory framework, 
affect the costs and gains of shale gas development. In the United States, there is a well-
developed market system for natural gas, with the physical market (actual price at delivery 
points) on one side and the futures market (based on NYMEX) on the other. U.S. gas 
prices are determined by the fundamentals of supply and demand to a stronger degree 
than in many European countries where they are linked to oil prices (EIA 2016f, 2016c). 
Weather conditions or economic conditions affect the demand side, and change in 
production, storage and imports affects the supply side. Competition from other fuel 
sources can have a real impact on gas prices. With natural gas, minor changes in supply 
or demand can result in noticeable price changes because short-term alternatives for either 
consumption or production are limited (EIA 2016f). Therefore, an increase in supply as 
experienced between 2006 and 2014 due to the expansion of shale gas operations led to 
very direct changes in gas prices for some. This is also due to the fact that most natural 
gas consumed in the United States, though not all, comes from domestic production (EIA 
2016c).  
Visible in Figure 11 above (EIA 2016d), the United States Henry Hub gas price has 
decreased considerably correlating with the widespread introduction of shale gas 
operations in the mid-2000s.  Prices fell after an all-time high around 2008 but did not 
sink as low as pre-2000s prices. However, as supply can affect prices, prices can also affect 
supply. For some producers, it cannot be economically profitable to drill for gas once the 
price for it falls under a certain marker. In situations of oversupply of gas and oil, shale 
gas may lose out: it is easier to interrupt shale operations than other energy operations 
Figure 11: U.S. Natural Gas Prices (EIA 2016d) 
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within the U.S., and many shale wells do not turn profit unless the oil price is around 80-
90$ per barrel (Neate 2015).  
Gas is not as easily transported as oil, but it either requires pipelines or, where pipelines 
do not exist, it must be converted to liquefied natural gas (LNG). Therefore, unlike with 
oil or some other commodities, there is different arbitrage and no fixed global price for 
gas, and no global gas market. Therefore, gas prices can vary greatly between regions (EIA 
2016f). (With increasing amounts of gas trade happening via LNG rather than through 
pipelines, this may change in the future (Jacobs 2012)). Global pricing across different 
regional markets is created by the process of physical arbitrage – if that is missing, like in 
the case of gas trade, the result is that there is no internationally comparable price. Equally, 
the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) plays a different, much smaller role than 
OPEC does. The legal framework for development of gas resources also plays a very 
important factor when determining their utility: this includes ownership rights of 
resources i.e. mineral rights.   
Shale gas extraction in the United States is facilitated by already existing favourable energy 
infrastructure. There is a strong gas and oil service industry and easy access to gas 
pipelines (Stevens 2010). Furthermore, the United States possess 150 years of geological 
knowledge and drilling experience (Stevens 2010, 13). The United States onshore gas 
business has also profited from specific geological advantages. Shale gas deposits often 
lie just above conventional gas and oil reservoirs (Stevens 2010: 10) – so in the United 
States, where there has already been extensive exploration of the latter, the existing well 
cores can help estimate shale gas reserves and also facilitate their production. (It also helps 
with public opinion on shale gas that the land is already in use for drilling in many cases.) 
According to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, the 
pipeline network for natural gas onshore distributions forms a “highly integrated 
transmission and distribution grid that can transport natural gas to and from nearly any 
location in the lower 48 States [comprising] 305,000 miles of interstate and intrastate 
transmission pipelines [and] more than 11,000 delivery points, 5,000 receipt points, and 
1,400 interconnection points” (EIA 2016a). 
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Figure 12 (EIA 2016a) illustrates the presence and interconnectedness of the U.S. gas 
pipeline network, with particularly dense connections around the Marcellus shale in the 
Northwest and the Barnett, Eagle Ford and Haynesville Bossier shale plays in the South.  
The slightly more remote new big shale plays such as Bakken in North Dakota/Montana 
and Mancos in Utah had also already been well connected with the national interstate gas 
grid before exploration began. “Rapid development of shale in the United States can also 
be attributed to the easy and low-cost access to the gas transport network” (Stevens 2010, 
12). The United States have a longstanding history with onshore drilling and can now 
utilise the fact that many shale plays are found in close proximity to original, conventional 
oil and gas exploration sites (Stevens 2012).  
The legal framework is another important factor to consider for the ease with which shale 
gas could be developed in a country. And in fact, there are very favourable conditions for 
fracking in the U.S. legislative landscape. An issue likely to prove cost-effective and time 
consuming would be compliance with strict environmental regulation, especially with 
regards to groundwater contamination. Currently, hydraulic fracturing is excluded from 
the Safe Water Drinking Act in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Stevens 2012, 13). There 
is an, as of September 2016 not approved, bill H.R. 1482 awaiting Congressional approval 
which includes removing this exemption (DeGette 2015; US Government Track 2015). 
If it was passed, the Environmental Protection Agency would be allowed to regulate all 
activity of fracking in the United States. The proposal has been attached to three other, 
Figure 12: Natural Gas Pipeline Network in the Continental U.S. (EIA 2016a) 
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previous bills since 200970 and has a prognosis of 1% chance of enactment (DeGette 
2015; US Government Track 2015).  Exxon Mobile has actually included a section in its 
contract of investment in (or acquisition of) XTO Energy: should Congress pass said bill, 
thereby rendering “hydraulic fracturing or similar processes […] illegal or commercially 
impractical” (Kefferputz 2010, 3), Exxon Mobile has reserved the right to reconsider the 
deal.71 Shortly after the groundwater exemption in 2007, a presidential memo by the Bush 
administration “effectively loosen[ed] the limits on air pollution from many natural gas 
wells” (Groeger 2012). In summary, “natural gas drilling companies have major 
exemptions from parts of at least 7 of the 15 sweeping federal environmental laws that 
regulate most other heavy industries and were written to protect air and drinking water 
from radioactive and hazardous chemicals”(Urbina 2011b). The Crude Oil Windfall Profit 
Tax Act of 1980 included a non-conventional fuel production tax credit of 53 cents per 
tcf that ran out in the 21st century (Stevens 2010, 13). The credit was a function of the oil 
price, and an earlier decline in the oil price was evened out by an increase in the tax credit 
to discourage the move from unconventional gas back to oil (Stevens 2012, 13). This 
posed a remarkable incentive for early development of unconventional gas. It was 
discontinued as profitability of unconventional gas rose regardless because of rising prices 
and technological optimisation, so development remained attractive.  
Another factor that has supported the acceptance of shale gas development is also the 
legally proscribed division of profits from its development. Before tax levels become an 
issue, mineral rights have to be considered.  The term mineral rights encompasses all of 
the different possible rights to minerals in the ground, including the right to hold or 
remove minerals from land or also the right to access the land (Farlex Legal Dictionary 
2014).72 In the United States, mineral rights belong to the private person or body who 
owns the ground above. Therefore, it will have to be bought or leased of them. This may 
create a more favourable attitude towards shale operations nearby from the local 
population, as they would profit directly from gas drilling in their land. There are very few 
countries in which ownership of all mineral resources was originally granted to the 
                                                 
70 HR 2766 (111th), H.R. 1084 (112th), H.R. 1921 (113th). Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness 
Chemicals (FRAC) Act.  
71 “The fear of new regulation putting the brakes on hydraulic fracturing, and with it the development of 
shale gas, has been so acutely felt within the industry that ExxonMobil has even inserted an exit clause in 
its $30 billion acquisition of XTO Energy – a U.S. gas independent with solid fracking experience – 
stipulating that Exxon can walk away from the deal should new regulations on fracking damage the 
commercial potential of shale gas” (Kefferputz 2010, 3). 
72 When land is sold there can be made a distinction between the surface sold or the minerals below it 
sold – the original owner could retain all his rights to the minerals and access to them whilst giving away 
the surface and right to build on it to a new owner. Mineral rights can be sold but also leased out under 
specific terms for a specific amount of time.  
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individuals or organisations owning the surface they are found under – namely several 
Canadian provinces, and, most prominently, the United States, for historic reasons. There, 
the land property owner owns both surface and mineral rights. This complete private 
ownership is known as “fee simple” estate (King 2014). A legally binding mineral title 
option is typically the only document that substantiates mineral ownership in the United 
States of America. In the country’s early pioneer days in the 18th and 19th century, when 
land was originally deeded to individuals, the mineral estate naturally came with the land. 
As long as it has not been officially severed through a legal act or legal reallocation, the 
land and minerals remain together and in the hand of whomever the surface belongs to, 
therefore they are often privately owned. In the United States, the laws which govern the 
transfer of mineral rights from one owner to another owner, as well as the laws governing 
the leasing of mineral rights tend to diverge slightly for each individual state. Some states 
do not have rules for unitisation of oil and gas royalties. Other states have them but only 
for wells that produce from certain areas or from certain depths. Most states have laws 
that regulate mining and drilling activity. There are also laws that regulate the sale of 
surface and mineral property.73 However, the important point to take away from this is 
that in the United States, in theory, a landowner would directly profit from leasing out the 
right to drill for shale gas on their own property to a company. This has been a strong 
factor aiding the commercialisation and public acceptance of fracking in the United States 
(Stevens 2014; Anderson 2015).  
Population density is another structural factor with potential impact on the success of 
shale gas operations: in the mature shale areas in the United States, population density is 
usually very low: Texas has got 37.18 people/km2, Arkansas has 21.8, and North Dakota 
3.8. New York State, where fracking is banned, has a population density of 110 (United 
States Census 2010).74   
 
IV.1.3 Assessing the expected utility of the United States shale story so far: Revolution or hype?  
In this part I consider any evidence of issues which put in question the success story of 
the U.S. American shale revolution. This includes data which queries key aspects of the 
fracking success story so far and suggests misrepresentation of the shale gas ‘revolution’, 
as well as data suggesting that the sector is likely to experience problems in the future.  
                                                 
73 These rules can play a critical role in a leasing or resource development strategy. Manifold stories are in 
circulation about drilling company scouts saying "Lease to me now or we will drill your neighbour's land 
and drain your gas without paying you a cent.” (King 2014).  Such practices are possible in some states 
due to absence of specific regulation (King 2014).  
74 For better comparison with the UK, square miles were converted to square kilometres.  
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A first setback for the shale industry is the disappointing performance of shale wells that 
became apparent with growing experience (Chestney 2014). Overall, the ultimate recovery 
on a shale gas well is between 8-30%, much lower (Stevens 2010) than the 60-80% for a 
conventional gas well. All wells are subject to decline rates; but whilst a conventional well 
declines over years, or decades, the production rate of horizontal fracking wells declines 
over weeks or months (Richter 2012). As a result, the production rates of fracking wells 
drop between 60-90% in the first year of use (Murray and King 2012). Their ultimate 
economic recovery – the gas quantity produced over the life span of a well – is still 
unknown as the shale business is so young, but it is expected to be very low (Stafford 
2012; Inman 2014). Meanwhile, gas prices have to be very high for these wells to be 
profitable – conversely, prices have been driven down by the shale industry itself. Many 
shale operations are debt-fuelled, and in order to keep the effect of well decline rates from 
making their income statements entirely unattractive, shale companies began drilling new 
wells to make up for the old ones (Richter 2012; Powers 2014; Crooks 2016). Former 
Amoco geologist Berman illustrates this point with the example of the Eagle Ford shale 
field in Texas, where US$10-12 billion would be needed for drilling 1,000 wells each year 
to counteract the decline in productivity and keep up current rates (Stafford 2012). 
A second problem for the shale industry, the scale of which cannot yet be estimated 
correctly, is the issue of ‘sweet spots’. It is common that within a shale basin, some spots 
are technically very easy to recover the gas from, whereas others are much more 
fragmented, hard to get to and at times no longer economically viable to exploit. The 
smaller and more scattered they are, the less economically viable to recover they become 
(BGS 2013b; IEA 2012b; Stafford 2012; EIA 2013b). In a recent production data report 
it stated that with three of the major shale basins, Barnett, Haynesville and Fayetteville, 
“less than 20 percent of the area currently claimed by companies as productive is 
emerging as likely to be profitable under current market conditions, according to the data 
and industry analysts” (Urbina 2011c). Recently researchers have begun to voice doubt 
over the generous resource estimations: “The government's predictions rely on coarse-
grained studies of major shale formations, or plays. Now, researchers are analysing those 
formations in much greater detail and are issuing more conservative forecasts” (Inman 
2014). The five big U.S. shale plays are all currently under production and have been for 
years, with several of them already in decline (Hughes 2012) and the rest tipped to peak 
around 2025-2030 (Weijermars and McCredie 2012; Inman 2014; Loder 2016).  It is hard 
to imagine how the situation could not spell future trouble for the shale business (Monks, 
Penty, and Vynck 2013).  
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One of the prominent claims of shale gas supporters is the effect that shale gas 
development has had on gas prices in the United States, and how much this has helped 
the residential consumers and the industry sector. However, the results for those are 
mixed as well. For example, industrial gas prices have fallen since 2008, and residential 
ones, too, though to a much lower degree – yet residential and industrial electricity prices 
have continued to rise (Mathieu, Spencer, and Sartor 2014). For households, the effects 
of cheaper gas have been mostly outweighed by the higher electricity prices. The same 
recent study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) calculated that the 
impact of lower gas prices on U.S. productivity should be considered negligible, both in 
income and substitution effects (Mathieu, Spencer, and Sartor 2014).  
Another issue with the economic impact of shale gas revolves around jobs. Shale gas is 
said to create jobs (IHS Markit 2011; Stevens 2012). In fact, one of the key arguments 
made in favour of shale gas development is the promise of job creation (Snyder and 
Klimasinska 2012). "Research firm IHS predicts that as many as 3.8 million new jobs will 
be created in the United States, either directly or indirectly related to the natural gas 
industry, by 2025” (Schulte 2014). Immediately, IHS introduced caveats to this prognosis: 
the numbers would not hold if the industry was weakened by novel regulation, for 
example environmental protection regulation, or a refusal to allow drilling on more federal 
land in the future (Schulte 2014). Yet according to research there is little evidence for the 
significance in numbers of jobs created so far. According to employment statistics, the 
shale industry in the United States has not created many jobs in several key fracking states 
(FWW 2015; Christopherson 2015). Claims include that the jobs had simply migrated 
from one part of the sector to another, therefore from one statistical set to another, 
without actually creating any additional ones (Bawden 2013; Christopherson 2015). 
Beyond that, countless jobs that may have been related to the fracking industry indirectly, 
such as catering, were counted as direct fracking jobs in official industry figures (Cusick 
2013). The fracking process itself does not require a considerable work force in any case. 
Creating the site lasts only a few days, and from then on, the wells only have to be manned 
by very few, single digit numbers of personnel, with highly specialised skillsets. The latter 
means that these workers tend to be brought in from within the industry, mostly foregoing 
the chance for local jobs that is often emphasised in connection with fracking (PA 2014).  
I will illustrate the problem with job forecasts through an example for New York State. 
In 2011, the Public Policy Institute of New York State (PPINYS) claimed that 62,620 jobs 
could be created through fracking operations in New York by 2018 (PPINYS 2011, 3, 
16). Of these, 15,500 would be ‘direct’ jobs through spending by fracking companies (not 
necessarily in the gas sector, but directly created through spending by fracking 
 78 
companies), and another 47,120 jobs would be induced or indirect jobs (PPINYS 2011, 
3, 16). However, this PPINYS report is full of both methodological flaws and inaccuracies 
as well as omissions of information. It is largely based on a report conducted by Penn 
State University (Considine, Watson, and Blumsack 2011). When NGO Food & Water 
Watch ran the same study but with corrections for methodological flaws, it could only 
account for around 6,656 jobs by 2018. The Penn State study had in fact undercounted 
the number of wells previously drilled by almost 10%, and thus overestimated the number 
of jobs created per well drilled (FWW 2015). In-state spending that would lead to job-
creation was overstated: payments to landowners and tax paid on operations were 
counted as in-state spending that created direct jobs; subcontracting was found to mask 
payments as in-state payments that were not. No mention was made that many of the 
high paid jobs in the gas industry have shown to go to experienced transient workers, 
therefore they did not create local jobs. PPINYS did not account for economies of scale 
and gains in productivity and thereby misused results by the Penn State report: these 
would lower future spending on development, further lowering the count of the fraction 
of total spending that goes to job creation. The new figure of 6,656 is not significant 
compared to overall employment figures in New York State, and so far, none of the 
studies have taken into account the possibility that jobs are lost in other sectors due to 
shale development, notably in the agriculture or tourism sectors. This possibility has been 
raised (FWW 2015; Christopherson 2015), but there has been no comprehensive research 
conducted on this issue and hence no data exists to be compared here. However, 
considering the amount of environmental degradation that is shown to go alongside large-
scale fracking operations, the loss of jobs following substantial damage to farming land 
or natural beauty spots are a likely possibility that should be followed up consistently in 
shale employment statistics and shale impact studies more generally.  
The pursuit of this example was undertaken to draw attention to the fact that the very 
promising numbers of jobs created through fracking are highly unlikely to become reality, 
or have in fact already been proven implausible by experience in more mature shale states 
such as Pennsylvania. In fact recent setbacks in the oil and gas industry have led to the 
loss of 86.000 jobs in 2015, which is around 16% of its overall employees, and these are 
unlikely to be regained (Crooks 2016). Therefore, pushing for fracking operations based 
on the expectation of a significant growth in employment was inaccurate and has not been 
rewarded with success.   
A key factor spelling trouble for the shale gas ‘revolution’ is mounting evidence of 
incorrect reserve size estimations. Predictions for both conventional and unconventional 
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gas and oil resources made by the DoE’s Energy Information Administration and private 
companies have been criticised by independent sources and lowered considerably (Owen, 
Inderwildi, and King 2010; Stevens 2010; Weijermars and McCredie 2012; Ahmed 2013; 
WRI 2013).  Many of the DoE’s official projections show the decline of both onshore 
and offshore conventional gas reserves in the United States, but point out that they will 
be replaced by ever increasing shale gas production until 2050 or 2070 (EIA 2012a, 2015b, 
2015b). This trend is considered doubtful by independent researchers (Ahmed 2013; IEA 
2015a, 2014; Owen, Inderwildi, and King 2010; Powers 2014; Mason 2014) but also by 
the industry itself (The New York Times 2011; Urbina 2011c).  
Here comes into play the fact that in the United States, it is not necessary for companies 
to have their resource estimates checked or proven by a third, independent party (Ahmed 
2013). There are concerns that reserves are heavily exaggerated by the industry in order 
to gain financial backing (Owen, Inderwildi, and King 2010; Weijermars and McCredie 
2012; Richter 2012; Ahmed 2013; Inman 2014). These are based on more knowledge 
gained about the fields as test drilling takes place as well as simply very generous 
estimations. For example the recoverable reserve estimates for the Monterey shale – once 
claimed to be the United States’ biggest shale liquids play – was revised down by 96% 
(Morgan 2014). Changes in reserve reporting to the SEC made in 2009 made it easier to 
include undeveloped reserves in official figures as long as they can, “with reasonable 
certainty, be economically produced” in the future (Weijermars and McCredie 2012).  
In an interactive 2011 document the New York Times leaked hundreds of internal 
documents (The New York Times 2011) both from the shale gas industry and lobby, as 
well as from U.S. DoE, EPA and EIA employees.75 In these documents, “energy 
executives, industry lawyers, state geologists and market analysts voice scepticism about 
lofty forecasts and question whether companies are intentionally, and even illegally, 
overstating the productivity of their wells and the size of their reserves” (Urbina 2011c, 
2011d). Most of these documents, many of which are emails or email attachments, also 
express a viewpoint that is “in stark contrast to more bullish public comments made by 
the industry” (Urbina 2011d), bringing to mind similar behaviour seen in insider reports 
about previous market bubbles, such as the dotcom bubble. “Money is pouring in from 
investors even though shale gas is inherently unprofitable” is the comment from an 
analyst with the investment company PNC Wealth Management (Urbina 2011c). In 
another email a former Enron executive compares the shale gas companies’ practice to 
                                                 
75 The very fact that a leak is necessary in order to find out more about these concerns is problematic.  
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Enron76 (The New York Times 2011). A lot of these comments relate to overestimation 
of reserve sizes, to the problem of above mentioned sweet spots and resources that are 
not economically or even technically viable to recover, yet are included in the reserve size 
reports regardless; but the comments also relate to well depletion rates which force 
companies to play catch-up and invest heavily in order to keep up current investment 
(Stafford 2012; Urbina 2011c, 2011d). 77   
The amount of leaked documents, the variety of sources they come from, the very senior 
positions of those who wrote them and the very serious expressions they entail all suggest 
that doubts about the profitability and longevity of shale economics have existed for a 
while within the shale gas industry itself.78 Such doubts however were seldom publicly 
expressed unlike the concerns by academic researchers or international research 
institutions and intergovernmental organisations (Ahmed 2013; IEA 2015a; Loder 2016).  
Adding to the problems for the shale business are official projections about gas futures 
unrelated to the shale gas industry in particular, such as the following by the International 
Energy Agency: “Global natural gas demand remained weak in 2014, growing well below 
its ten-year average, according to the 2015 report. High prices for gas in the past two years 
undermined its competitiveness” (IEA 2015a). At the same time, major companies such 
as Rockefeller or Google have begun to heavily invest in renewable energy instead 
(Kirkland 2011). This is unlikely to change in light of the continuously low oil prices in 
late 2015 and early 2016 (Rowell 2016). In fact, U.S. evidence from these years appears to 
suggest that shale gas development is not economically feasible at oil prices around and 
below $60 per barrel (Russell and Strachan 2015).  
Several analysts now suggest that what we witnessed in the United States was a ‘hype’, not 
a ‘revolution’ of shale gas (Urbina 2011c; Ahmed 2013; Powers 2014; Morgan 2014). 
Investors have been very excited and pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into the shale 
business.79 Given this high level of start-up capital, it is no surprise that great quantities 
of shale wells were built up quickly, even if they are almost doubly as expensive as normal 
gas wells, and subsequently it is no surprise that initial production was very high. Another 
reason for the quick construction of new wells is due to their poor performance and short 
                                                 
76 Enron was a U.S. energy and services company famous for scandals with their accounting and 
subsequent bankruptcy.  
77 There are attempts by industry experts to quantify the uncertainty that is part of resource estimates 
(Lyster 2014).  
78 In many documents the concerned authors mention “market bubbles”, “suspicious behaviour”, 
“unlikely resource estimates”, “the dotcom bubble”, a “Ponzi scheme” or even the phrase “to con Wall 
Street” (The New York Times 2011).  
79 The possibility that the entirety of the shale ‘revolution’ was simply about shareholders’ and investors’ 
games and not about the real economy is intriguing but does not form part of this PhD.  
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productivity lifespan. As discussed above, shale well performance is hugely disappointing 
and short-lived; and shale reserve estimates are lowered constantly, sometimes by as much 
as 95% of the initial estimates such as in the Monterey shale basin. Given the steep decline 
rates the reaction so far has been to leave the U.S. landscape covered in abandoned shale 
wells while drilling new ones in order to keep up production levels as best as possible. 
This is a problem for investors. The result is that “net cash flow from U.S. shale has been 
negative year after year” (Morgan 2014), and the shale business has already been 
abandoned by several of the biggest companies in the energy sector (Eaton 2016). In 
2016, there is a possibility that the U.S. shale story is already in decline and that production 
will diminish rapidly once sweet spots have been depleted. Then the story will have to 
turn towards the clean-up: salvaging the original environment of drilling sites, re-
employment of workers moving about the country in the hope of work for shale gas, and 
the re-entanglement of local licenses, are among the most pressing issues. There is as of 
yet no data projecting the potential costs of this, so it is impossible to attempt any 
estimates at this point. However, research is being conducted into this area (Lu 2014), 
showcasing both that very little is known but also that some form of clean-up operation 
is expected as an accepted future (Bullis 2012; Chameides 2013; Herbert and Jones 2014; 
S. Becker 2015). Whatever the costs for this will be, they are not known and hence do not 
figure in economic calculations on the return of shale. The above explained notion that 
many shale gas workers tend to be non-permanent also leads to the conclusion that they 
will be looking for other work once the operation is finished: whatever the number of 
jobs created through the shale business is, therefore, is a number of jobs that will have to 
be relocated once the operation has concluded. The financial system is also likely to 
experience some form of shock as the shale bubble bursts, albeit probably not a sudden 
shock, as investors have slowly been wising up.  
 
 
IV.2 Energy and shale gas in the United Kingdom 
Britain’s economy depends largely on fossil fuels to make up the country’s energy supply 
(IEA 2012b). The decline of UK domestic oil and gas resources as well as mounting 
evidence of the likely effects of anthropogenic climate change have prompted much 
policy debate in the 21st century around the level of reliance on fossil fuels (DTI 2003; 
BERR 2008; IEA 2012b). Due to declining reserves, the UK production rates in million 
tonnes oil equivalent have been decreasing and are expected to continue to decrease since 
their peak between 1996-2000 (IEA 2012b, 20). The introduction of renewables into the 
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country’s energy supply mix has been a dominant topic in policy strategy reports (DTI 
2003; DECC 2009). Wind, solar and hydro account for less than 4% of energy production 
in 2016, bioenergy and waste for around 8% (DECC 2016c). Compared to other OECD 
and IEA member states, the UK produces one of the lowest shares of renewables (IEA 
2012b, 21).  
The following Figures 13 and 14 (IEA 2012b) illustrate levels of overall production and 
consumption of primary energy in the United Kingdom.  
 
Figure 14: UK Energy Production by Source (IEA 2012b) 
Also clear from the above Figure 14 is that all UK production sources are in decline other 
than wind, biofuels, and “other”. Final consumption in million tonnes oil equivalent 
(mtoe) was 138 in 2010 and is expected to rise (IEA 2012b, 22).  
Figure 13: UK Total Energy Supply (IEA 2012b) 
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The following tables (4 and 5) present the UK’s energy balance overview for the years 
2009 and 2011 and illustrate the very recent, strong trend towards more import 
dependence. The percentage of imports has risen strongly, and it has especially done so 
for natural gas, which could have a strong effect on energy policymakers and the 
government’s strong interest in a fuel like shale gas thought to increase the UK’s energy 
security.  
 
Table 5: Import Share of Total UK Energy Consumption 2011 (IEA 2015b), own design 
However, as shown in Figure 15 below (Bolton 2013, 6) the United Kingdom has only 
been a gas net exporter for a very brief period of time between 1995 and 2003. This should 
factor into the debate around Britain ‘losing’ its net exporter status.  
Table 4: Import Share of Total UK Energy Consumption 2009 (IEA 2015b), own design 
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Proven natural gas reserves in the United Kingdom territory have in fact decreased from 
1.2tcm to 253bcm (trillion to billion, notice) since 2000; the currently remaining reserves 
are almost exactly five times as high as current average annual production (IEA 2012b, 
68). Imports are “relatively diversified between pipeline imports from Norway, the 
Netherlands and other European countries and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from 
various sources” (IEA 2012b, 67). A few years ago LNG overtook gas imports through 
pipelines in supplying the country’s main fuel, which may further result in increased 
flexibility of supply (IEA 2012b, 14). This is important as it leads to the conclusion that 
there is a less urgent cause to fear import dependency as in a situation where a country is 
highly dependent on one single importer, such as the gas trade relations between Russia 
and the Baltic states (Siddi 2016).  
With 42% of total primary energy supply (TPES), natural gas accounts for the largest 
share of the UK energy supply (IEA 2012b, 67). The UK consumes more gas than almost 
any other European country per year with around 85 million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(Mtoe) (IEA 2012b, 67). However, the UK government expects gas demand to decrease 
in the immediate and midterm future (BERR 2008). This could be linked to a number of 
reasons, for example climate change targets, or alternatively lack of trust in GDP growth: 
strong energy demand is linked to GDP growth.80  
 
                                                 
80 Gas demand for power generation, a large part of the UK gas consumption, is sensitive to the relative 
prices of both coal and gas – for example when gas prices went up in winter 2006, some providers 
changed to coal (IEA 2012b, 71).  
Figure 15: UK Natural Gas Net Exports and Imports (Bolton 2013, 6) 
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IV.2.1 Shale gas in the United Kingdom  
The exploration of UK unconventional shale gas supplies has been promoted by the UK 
government to help boost the UK’s dwindling natural gas reserves (Cameron 2013; BBC 
News 2014a). Top policymakers were supporting the shale gas agenda strongly in order 
to follow the U.S. example, with quick decision-making in some cases, such as investment 
incentives for onshore gas production (BBC 2013) and significant tax rate cuts (62% to 
30%) (BEIS 2016). Unlike the United States, the UK has not yet as of 2016 commercially 
produced and included shale gas into its energy supply mix. However, there has been 
legislative preparation, research and policy change undertaken in order to introduce and 
accommodate shale gas into the UK’s energy sector.  
Shale gas resource amounts in the UK are so far not proven through drilling but through 
estimates. The United Kingdom’s most extensive own shale gas study so far, the British 
Geological Society’s (BGS) report from 2013, presents an estimation of 1,329tcf of gas in 
place (BGS 2013a). This is a mean estimate: low to high estimates range from 822tcf to 
2281tcf (23.3tcm to 64.6tcm). The total estimate draws on production from the upper 
shale, 264tcf, plus the lower shale, 1065tcf. Much less is known about the lower shale 
play, and it is harder to drill in (BGS 2013a, 3).81 Ergo, the very large amount of estimated 
resources rests to more than 80% on an estimation that is absolute guesswork about an 
area of the shale dissimilar to known U.S. shales. This number is supposed to inform 
government and investors but it is not particularly useful, as recovery factors are not 
known; they lie at around 8-20% in U.S. experience of sweet spots and favourable 
conditions (POST 2013). Hence these figures represent resource, not reserve estimates. 
The BGS states that “not enough is yet known to estimate a recovery factor, nor to 
estimate potential reserves (how much gas may be ultimately produced)” (BGS 2013a, 3) 
and that “a reliable estimate of recoverable shale gas cannot be made at this time” (BGS 
2013a, 46). The BGS report also states that it “must be noted that this Bowland Shale gas 
in-place (GIP) estimate is very large when compared with the total ultimate recovery of 
gas (i.e. gas reserves plus cumulative production) from the offshore UK” (BGS 2013a, 
47).82 83 In comparison, the unproven yet technically recoverable shale gas resources of 
                                                 
81 “The upper unit is more prospective, primarily due to the better well control which demonstrates its 
closer resemblance to the prolific North American shale gas plays, in which the productive zones are 
hundreds of feet thick. The lower unit is largely undrilled, but where it has been penetrated it contains 
organic-rich shale intervals, whose lateral extent is unknown.” (BGS 2013a, 3).  
82 The offshore ultimate recovery of gas is around 92.7tcf-101.4tcf-109.0 tcf, of which 84tcf were 
developed until the end of 2011 (BGS 2013a, 47).  
83 In their reports on UK shale gas, EIA has already lowered their original 2011 estimations of 97tcf 
‘risked’, of which only 20tcf were considered technically recoverable (EIA 2011, VII-36), to around 26tcf 
considered in a ‘risked’ estimation (EIA 2015c, XI-2). (The terms ‘risked’ and ‘unrisked’, to the best of my 
knowledge as they are not explained by EIA, indicate whether or not any assessment has taken place of 
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the United Kingdom, of 26tcf, are less than 20% of the recoverable resources estimated 
to be found in France or Poland, and less than 5% of the resources estimated to be in the 
United States at the same time (at 622tcf) (EIA 2015f).  It might be considered as a further 
indicator of the UK resources’ scale of importance that in the 2012 IEA report on global 
unconventional gas, it is one of the few countries only listed under ‘other European 
countries’, whereas for example France and Poland are discussed in several page long 
detail (EIA 2011, 2013b).  
It must be stressed that reserve estimates for the UK do not exist as of yet. The efficiency 
and production rate remain an unknown up until this point, and there has been little 
inclusion not just of geological but also of economic, infrastructure and market factors 
for shale gas development in the UK, which are all bound to have an impact on recovery 
rates. Horizontal drilling has as of 2016 not been tried on UK soil (IEA 2012b, 73; 
Gosden 21:10). Following earthquakes induced by well faults in one of the first test 
drilling sites in Lancashire, a moratorium was placed on fracking which lasted for one and 
half a year (Paige 2011; IEA 2012b). Test drilling was allowed to resume in December 
2012, and is currently considered or pursued by several energy companies, such as 
Cuadrilla Resources, Ineos, GDF Suez, UK Oil and Gas and Third Energy (Hellier 
2015b). The first fracking operations since the Lancashire incident are set to take place in 
Yorkshire, where Third Energy was given permission for fracking tests in July 2016 
(Halliday 2016). In terms of resource awareness but also in terms of their planning the 
United Kingdom trails far behind the United States.  
 
IV.2.2 Structural factors 
Structural factors likely to impact on shale gas development are not looking as promising 
for the UK as they did for the United States.  
The United Kingdom’s shale basins are less prone to gas exploration than their U.S. 
counterparts. According to the International Energy Agency’s assessment, British shale 
basins “generally are not simple continuous structures, such as found in many North 
                                                 
the chances of success of a specific exploration – ‘risked’ implies that possible impediments to production 
have been considered. An ‘unrisked’ estimate of a resource means that the company or analyst that made 
the estimation is entirely ignoring all risk and assuming that the production will definitely be successful 
and without complication. The word ‘risked’ implies that some factors affecting the success of production 
have been taken into account and considered as to their likelihood of occurrence. I.e. a gas well with a 
50% estimated rate of possible success could be worth £100m in an unrisked assessment but only £50m 
once it is risked. However, the factors considered in the risking process are not always clear to anybody 
outside the company undertaking the assessment, and certainly not standardised, and none of the 
institutions which publish on shale provide a complete glossary.)  
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American shale regions, but rather typically comprise a series of small fault-bounded sub-
basins” (IEA 2012b, 76). They are not connected to previous onshore gas sites, and 
“geologic conditions are much more complex. Faults are numerous, geologic data control 
is weak, and shale wells are more costly to drill” (IEA 2012b, 73). In 2013 and again in 
2015, EIA offered a similar cautioning opinion on UK shale prospects: “Compared with 
North America, the shale geology of the UK is considerably more complex, while drilling 
and completion costs for shale wells are substantially higher” (EIA 2013b, 73, 2015c, XI-
3). If this holds true it means that to extract gas from the rock would be a much more 
difficult and widespread operation, not only costlier, but likely less productive. The BGS 
(BGS 2013a) estimates that the Middle Cambrian Conasauga shale in Alabama is the one 
that most closely resembles the UK’s Cambrian shale deposits, as they are similar in 
structural complexity and age: but “shale gas development in the Conasauga Shale has not 
been successful to date” (IEA 2012b, 77). It appears that the United Kingdom is expected 
to have shale plays as unevenly distributed as those considered the worst basins – those 
which nobody has yet attempted to exploit – in the United States (IEA 2012a, 77). This 
is likely to result in higher costs of recovery and development, and less productivity.  
A related key factor is infrastructure, and, due to a historically different energy economy 
from the U.S., with only a “small existing onshore conventional oil and gas industry, the 
UK has limited domestic service sector capability for shale exploration” (IEA 2012b, 73). 
Ron Oxburgh, member of the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology and former chairman for Shell, considers Britain not ready for shale gas 
development: “we need new onshore drilling infrastructure which we don't have now” 
(Chestney 2014).  
As of 2016 it remains unclear who would be funding the necessary creation of an onshore 
gas infrastructure that would have to be both more sophisticated and very extensive if the 
shale boom is to have a chance at bringing about the desired revenue. There has been 
interest and investment from several private companies, but senior industry sources have 
repeatedly cautioned that the pace of development and exploration would be much slower 
than the government suggested (Gosden 2014a). Whereas the government suggested 20-
40 wells to be drilled within a year or two, industry sources said they would be surprised 
if it came to any fracking at all in the same time period, and predicted a maximum well 
count of one or two wells completed (Gosden 2014a). (It should be noted that only after 
a well has been drilled and shale gas found does the fracking process begin to test the 
amount of gas actually available.) British energy secretary at the time Chris Huhne stated 
in summer 2011 that the UK’s energy infrastructure and outdated grid was “in such poor 
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state that it would cost scores of billions of pounds to overhaul, even without investment 
in low-carbon generation” (Harvey 2011). At the same time, government estimations 
assume the required investment in the gas and also electricity grid to amount to around 
£200 billion by 2020 (Harvey 2011). In brief: in contrast to the United States “there is no 
comparable onshore oil and gas service industry to provide drilling rigs and other 
equipment” in the UK (BBC Business News 2010)84. It will have to be built up especially 
for the shale gas industry. Whilst there is no argument from either side of the shale debate 
that this would require major amounts of investment, it is so far unclear who would bear 
the brunt of this. There has not been any attempt to calm the concern that investment 
would come from public funding, or at least be offloaded on to the public through a rise 
in gas bills.  
Yet another factor which may impact the success of fracking development in the United 
Kingdom is the likely effect on gas prices. As mentioned above, the gas market is largely 
regional: The U.S. receives almost 90% of its (small) gas imports from Canada (EIA 
2012b); in Europe combined, 45% of gas is imported from inside Europe (i.e. Norway) 
and about 30% from Russia (Escribano, Marín Quemada, and García-Verdugo 2012, 24). 
This implicates that the appearance of shale gas has to result in differently large price 
changes in the U.S. and EU markets. In the United States, as discussed, gas prices are set 
by the fundamentals of a relatively free, simple market system’s supply and demand (EIA 
2016f, 2016c). Petroleum prices can also affect gas demand as petroleum can serve as a 
substitute for gas in heating, power generation and larger consumption. The European 
gas pricing system in which the UK is tied is different to the U.S. system. Commonly, 
long-term take or pay contracts guarantee a minimum purchase of gas indexed to oil 
prices, on the other hand a long-term fixed or at least quite stable price is guaranteed to 
the consumer (The Economist 2012b). The UK has had a strong domestic (North Sea) 
production of gas and can apply market strategies of demand and supply up to a point. 
However, the UK also imports gas, mainly from Norway, and more so since its own 
North Sea production has declined. Norway, a major gas producer in Europe, continues 
to peg its gas price to its oil price (Strauss 2008) and therefore it continues to affect British 
gas prices.  
The claim made by Cameron’s government that fracking will lower energy bills has been 
repeatedly denied by experts (Bawden 2013; Carrington 2013b; Gosden 2013b, 2014b; 
                                                 
84 It is not just Britain that is trailing behind in terms of infrastructure for gas as well as oil production, 
but all of Europe that is currently discussing shale possibilities.  
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Elmes 2014). Then chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne appears to have 
changed his mind about whether or not fracking would lower bills at least twice 
(Carrington 2013b; BBC News 2014b; Gosden 2015b). British gas prices, so far without 
the introduction of shale gas to markets, have been on the rise steadily between 2000 and 
2010 – more so for households than the industry.85 This is visible in Figure 16 below (IEA 
2012b, 77).  
Figure 16: UK Natural Gas Prices 1997–2010 (IEA 2012b, 77) 
There are official government claims that these household prices will fall if shale gas 
resources are tapped but these have so far not been proven or substantiated by any 
research and are doubted by many (Bawden 2013; Dutton and Bradshaw 2013).  
The UK government continues to create a legal framework for productive but also safe 
extraction of shale gas. The regulations covering gas and oil development in the EU and 
thus the UK did not even reference unconventional gas and the EU wide accepted 
definition of ‘gas field’ did not fit for shale gas when the UK government decided to 
pursue shale gas development (Stevens 2010, 2012).86 Experts have accused the 
government of purposefully providing regulatory loopholes to speed up fracking 
permissions and exempt it from safety rules (Carrington 2016). In the Infrastructure Act 
2015 that came into force in April 2016, whether or not a drilling operation is legally 
defined as ‘fracking’ depends on the amount of high-pressured fluid which is used to 
fracture the shale (HM Government 2015). The amount is set so that less than half of 
currently operating fracking wells in the United States would be considered fracking wells; 
                                                 
85 Which prompts a different set of questions that Ofgem has asked several times since 2011 – if it is 
regulation, not gas supplies, that can fix consumer prices.  
86 Usually this is territorially defined in terms of the gas or water contact. With unconventional fields, such 
a contact point does not exist and therefore it is not a defined gas field according to current laws.  
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and the one UK fracking site that caused earthquakes in Lancashire is by that standard 
not considered a fracking well either. Any requirements and procedures that were put in 
place to safeguard environment and public health, such as the need for an independent 
well inspector, will not apply for operations that used less than “1,000 cubic metres of 
fluid at each stage (or expected stage), or the injection of more than 10,000 cubic metres 
of fluid in total” (HM Government 2015, 56).  
As long as the UK is a member of the EU, fracking could yet be seriously challenged by 
current EU and UK environmental legislation. The environmental regulation for the 
entire EU, and particularly at local level, greatly surpasses that of the United States in 
terms of strictness and specificity (Stevens 2010). Until British regulation in this area 
becomes untangled from EU law, there will surely be obstacles – and following the 
earthquakes in the very first fracking attempts near Blackpool, British domestic regulation 
regarding shale gas has already been made stricter on some issues (IEA 2012b).87  
Furthermore, the legal situation concerning ownership of below the ground minerals is 
very different in the United Kingdom than it is in the United States. Throughout Europe, 
these belong to the state or government, and in the UK, they belong in fact to her Majesty 
the Queen. “Ownership of oil and gas within the land area of Great Britain was vested in 
the Crown by the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934. The Continental Shelf Act 1964 
applied the provisions of the 1934 Act to the UKCS outside territorial waters” (British 
Geological Survey 2014, 2016). This takes away a key selling point of the United States 
shale gas boom – royalties for the landowners that have shale gas discovered below their 
property.  
Lastly, a structural factor likely to be influential on the success of shale development in 
the United Kingdom is that of population density. The UK has a much higher population 
density than the U.S. (253 people/km2), especially in areas where fracking is likely to take 
place such as in in Yorkshire (340 people/km2) (ONS 2004) where fracking operations 
were first approved in 2016. Anti-fracking protests have been very common and well 
publicised in the UK between 2011-2016 (Melley 2011; BBC News 2014c; Rhoden-Paul 
and Howard 2015; BBC Business News 2016). Whilst I cannot claim a direct correlation 
between population size and mobilisation against fracking, I find it noteworthy that one 
of the U.S. states with a very high population density, New York State, has also seen large 
                                                 
87 As this thesis is submitted in summer 2016 as planned since 2012, it will include no commentary and no 
speculation on a possible British exit from the EU. The process of untangling energy and environmental 
legislation are likely to be very lengthy as necessary legislation does not exist for the UK outside of EU 
rules.  
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scale protests against fracking operations (Reuters 2014b) and has since banned the 
method (Graves 2016).88  
IV.2.3 Potential obstacles to fracking in United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom has very different economic indicators for shale gas development 
than the United States at the very outset of exploration. In early IEA and EIA reports, 
which were among the first and most comprehensive assessments of shale gas resources, 
the UK is barely mentioned and was not paid a fraction of the attention as many other 
European countries, not to speak of other global shale players (EIA 2011; IEA 2012b, 
2012a, EIA 2012a, 32, 2013b). This does not help to explain the British government’s 
interest in shale gas, considering these reports are the ones which informed most of the 
news at the time and must have tipped off and commenced them.  
The promise of economic growth through shale gas in the UK is very vague. UKERC 
scientists have suggested that assertions about revenue and lower energy prices are 
premature (Bawden 2013; Harrabin 2014a; Gosden 2014b). Then energy minister Rudd’s 
claim of 60.000 new, especially local jobs is not backed by the U.S. experience 
(Christopherson 2015; Pagnamenta 2015). Drilling company Centrica provided the 
DECC with an estimation of 74,000 potential jobs but the DECC revised it to 16,000-
32,000 jobs – nevertheless Cameron and other ministers used the Centrica estimation 
publicly (Carrington 2014a). There are now more cautioning lessons to be learnt from the 
difficulties seen experienced by the maturing U.S. shale gas sector. Besides, shale gas in 
the UK is far from a fait accompli (Morgan 2014). Norway’s shale assessment went from 
unproven technically recoverable 83tcf (2011) to zero tcf (2013) (EIA 2015d). British 
policy is so far relying entirely on resource estimates, so one might be in for a surprise. 
Due to reasons of different infrastructure, different pricing systems and different 
structural factors per se, the UK situation can simply not be compared with the U.S. 
situation, never mind the fact that the latter is a lot less bright than often claimed.  
The United Kingdom is in the unique position of being able to observe prior experience, 
as the one in the United States, and copy successes whilst learning from mistakes. Yet it 
seems problems of the U.S. sector that were widely recognised and discussed publicly 
have not been addressed by the UK government whatsoever. In any case, given the 
difference between the U.S. and UK energy sector and the difference in their shale gas 
potential, or what is known of it so far, it is unlikely that they would have come to the 
                                                 
88 New York State, which includes New York City, likely also has many more flat-owners and tenants in 
comparison to land owners than other states, which may also affect the public opinion as they do not 
profit from gas leases.  
 92 
exact same conclusion based purely on a cost-benefit analysis of the respective energy 
economic data available. As a preliminary analysis I come to the conclusion that there is 
no similarity between the U.S. and the UK in the first independent variable that considers 
the economic costs and benefits of shale gas exploration.  
 
 
IV.3 Public opinion on shale gas and related sectors  
In order to best gauge public interest in and opinions on fracking I provide a meta-analysis 
of several opinion polls on the issue for the United States and the United Kingdom 
respectively. Public opinion can be assumed to count towards policymakers’ cost-benefit 
analysis (Downs 1957; Vogel 2012). If nothing else, even if one were to assume that 
politicians have no interest in the national or public benefit, they tend to have a narrower 
interest in getting re-elected. For this reason, both the state of the economy as perceived 
by voters – on which shale is touted to have a positive impact (Urbina 2011c; Ahmed 
2013; Powers 2014; Morgan 2014) – and public opinion on shale gas exploration do count 
towards a rational choice consideration by elected decision-makers. I supplement this with 
an analysis of surveys on national priorities to see whether the respective public care about 
and are likely to respond to framing around energy security, environmental protection or 
job creation, and which related policy areas are most important to them, e.g. jobs, 
economy, climate.  
 
IV.3.1 Public opinion on shale gas and related sectors in the United States  
In Gallup’s annual U.S. work and education polls the oil and gas industry has been rated 
“very negatively” every year from 2001-2014, ranking 23rd out of 24 sectors compared – 
the only sector regarded even more negatively is the federal government (Gallup 2014; 
Newport 2014; Jones 2015). 89 Public perceptions of the oil and gas industry overall can 
be found above all else to be strongly inversely (albeit imperfectly) related to energy and 
gasoline prices (Jones 2015).   
An early study into perceptions of shale gas industry with robust results by Theodori 
found that the more mature the industry becomes, the more negative public perceptions 
                                                 
89 Given that hydraulic fracturing for shale gas commenced in the early 2000s in the United States, it is 
remarkable that the majority of monitoring of public attitudes towards shale gas only commenced around 
a decade later. (Before 2012, indicators as to the public’s interest in shale needed to be assessed through 
more general polls of the natural gas industry as well as local polls into opinion around shale industry in 
specific basins.)  
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of it become in turn  (Theodori 2012, 280). Reasons given for this trend include that the 
gas industry is operating too close to homes, behaves uncaring towards the environment, 
and becomes too politically powerful – further, those polled near mature shale basins felt 
strongly pessimistic about the possibility that development of shale gas reserves would 
benefit locals (Theodori 2012). 
In recent years, the traditional national surveys by Gallup and Pew have polled U.S. 
American opinions on shale gas very regularly (Princeton Survey Research Associates 
International 2014, 2013a, 2012). As can be seen in Figure 17 below, opinions have 
changed considerably over the space of two years in 2012 to 2014. Shale gas was initially 
favoured in the U.S., by a distinct margin, which is in discrepancy with the UK case study. 
However, the tide appears to have turned since mid-2013.  
A 2013 poll by Gallup (Figure 18) tried to further clarify the issue of preferences by asking 
Americans directly about their priorities if it were to come to a trade-off between energy 
and environmental security – and the responses were evenly divided, even over a long 
period of time (2001-2013) (Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2013b).90  
                                                 
90 Whilst there is a relatively even divide overall, sub groups of those polled have clear preferences. 
Democrat voters favoured environmental protection over energy production by a 64% over 28% margin, 
whereas Republican voters responded the opposite way: 71% over 25% prefer the energy sector to take 
preference. The younger the age group the more significantly favoured is environmental protection (that 
correlation is perfectly linear); with the age groups above 50 years old most decisively deciding in favour 
of energy. This is in line with previous Gallup results which see younger people and Democrats in favour 
of environmental policy over energy or certain economic issues (Princeton Survey Research Associates 
International 2013b), as well as Independents (Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2015). 
As a trend, these attitudes have changed little since the early 2000s.  
Figure 17: U.S. Public Opinion on Shale Gas (Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2014; Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International 2013a; Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2012) 
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Beyond this divide in terms of what should take priority, those polled all tended to agree 
that if possible, the two should be combined i.e. that energy should be generated by more 
environmentally friendly methods. A majority of two thirds thinks that the United States 
should focus on alternative energy sources, specifically wind and solar, over traditional 
energy sources. A preference for focus on energy conservation over increased energy 
production could be seen with a double majority of those polled (Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International 2013b). This has been a consistent poll result for 
several years leading up to the 2013 survey. Since 2013 attitudes have once again favoured 
environment over energy as in pre-crisis years (Princeton Survey Research Associates 
International 2015) – it is a possibility that the return of cheaper gas prices thanks to shale 
production has also brought with it a return to focus on environmental issues.  
It should give a clue towards their attitude regarding shale gas what American citizens 
consider overall national priorities, given that the debate is often clearly polarised around 
economic and environmental issues, no matter how misleading this framing may be. In 
order to gauge these priorities, Pew Research Centre and Princeton University ask for 
public priorities – what president and Congress should prioritise according to the public 
(PEW 2012, 2015). Except for the years right after 9/11 as well as 2015 (potentially due 
to extensive coverage of Daesh exploits), where ‘terrorism’ takes first place of national 
priorities of dealing with an issue, ‘the economy’ is always in the top spot of what citizens 
think needs political attention most urgently, closely followed by jobs. There seems to be 
a case in favour of the shale industry here, which is framed as a major stimulation for the 
domestic economy, less import dependency, and as a job creator. ‘Global warming’ and 
‘the environment’ do not make it into the top 20 priorities before 2003 and 2007 
respectively, as can be seen in Figure 19 below (PEW 2015). The concern with these 
topics is lower in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. Since it has reached the top 
Figure 18: U.S. Priorities in Energy/Environment Trade Off (Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International 2013b) 
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20, the environment has overtaken concern with energy (also only reaching the top 20 in 
2003) for a brief period before the financial crisis and again since 2013, but fell 
considerably below it in the post-crisis years.  
The U.S. public has very mixed and almost evenly distributed opinions on shale gas, with 
a trend towards more negative views on fracking the more mature the industry becomes. 
Their opinion on whether or not the environment or energy are bigger priorities are 
equally similar, ever changing and inconclusive. A majority of citizens would prefer to 
combine these goals and achieve energy through cleaner technology. The oil and gas 
sector are seen very negatively. But the importance of ‘the economy’ overall and jobs in 
particular far outweighs the importance accredited to ‘the environment’, much less to 
‘global warming’. The real impact shale gas has on job creation and growth are not very 
promising (Mathieu, Spencer, and Sartor 2014; Christopherson 2015; FWW 2015). I 
conclude that the public opinion on shale gas in the United States is not primed or 
particularly receptive to shale gas development, but divided relatively equally with a 
growing trend towards opposition.  
 
Figure 19: Select U.S. Public Priorities (PEW 2015), own design 
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IV.3.2 Public opinion on shale gas and related sectors in the United Kingdom  
There have been several successive opinion surveys in the United Kingdom to establish 
public attitudes towards shale gas (Jaspal and Nerlich 2014; O’Hara 2013; UKERC 2014; 
Martin 2014; Vaughan 2014; Whitmarsh et al. 2014). Key findings suggest that public 
attitudes change for the worse both with time and with increasing public salience on shale 
gas (O’Hara et al. 2015) and that the level of public support has been consistently 
overestimated or overrepresented by fracking lobbies (Whitmarsh et al. 2014). In a recent 
survey, the “most strongly disagreed with statement was ‘I feel confident that the British 
Government will adequately regulate shale gas’ [whilst] the most strongly agreed with statement 
was ‘I am concerned about the risks of water contamination from shale gas fracking’  
In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, a quarter of respondents are undecided and around a 
third of respondents consider that risks outweigh benefits of shale gas; a quarter think the 
opposite (Whitmarsh et al. 2014). This can be seen in Figure 20 (Whitmarsh et al. 2014, 
12).  
The risks mainly associated with shale gas include earthquakes (50-70% of respondents 
between 2012-14) and water contamination (35-45% of respondents between 2012-14). 
The benefits it was associated with were cheap energy (40-55% of respondents between 
2012-14) and energy security (50-60% of respondents between 2012-14).91  
Another strong result from a recent survey is the importance of context: while the public 
seems to be divided over whether or not fracking should occur and where, when given a 
choice between different energy production methods they showed a clear and significant 
                                                 
91 Varying local support does not hold up to scrutiny: while it at first appeared as if respondents in areas 
likely to experience fracking were more in support of shale fracking, this difference in location result was 
rendered entirely insignificant and non-existent when tested for demographic and value factors including 
political affiliation, gender, rurality and environmental attitudes (O’Hara et al. 2015). 
Figure 20: Perceptions of Risks vs. Benefits of Shale Gas in the UK (Whitmarsh et al. 2014) 
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preference for renewable technologies. Shale gas in fact was cited as the very least 
favourite preference in the energy mix, following nuclear (Whitmarsh et al. 2014, 17).  
As can be seen in Figure 21 below (O’Hara et al. 2015, 13), shale gas is the recurring least 
or second least supported energy resource of ten put forward in a questionnaire on what 
the public thinks should constitute the UK’s energy mix, and remains steadily so over the 
course of several years of surveys, with a trend of decreasing support since surveys began.  
 
Figure 21: Preferred Resources for UK Energy Mix 2025 (O’Hara et al. 2015, 13) 
 
There have been problems 
with misrepresentation of 
public attitudes in the UK 
– a recent government 
study found only 24% of 
respondents in support of 
shale gas, whilst a study by 
UKOOG had previously 
claimed that 57% of the 
population were in favour of fracking and only 16% opposed to it (Jaspal and Nerlich 
2014). Figure 22 (Jaspal and Nerlich 2014) shows how public support is strongly 
misunderstood by fracking supporters and judged more correctly by its opponents.  
Figure 22: UK Public Support Discrepancy (Jaspal and Nerlich 2014) 
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The UK government’s attempts to make fracking more appealing to local communities 
through monetary compensation have not been viewed favourably:  
“most people agree with the view that payments to communities living near 
shale gas wells are ‘bribes’. 57% of those polled said they believed the 
compensation was ‘to get the community's support for fracking in their area’ 
and almost nine in 10 said the payments were not being paid for the benefit 
of the community” (Vaughan 2014).   
In 2016, the latest available survey, only 19% of the UK public support fracking, down 
from almost 30% in previous years; this is compared to 81% who would prefer renewable 
energy (Vaughan 2016). 
In surveys on important issues facing Britain the economy is consistently considered 
higher than the environment or pollution between 2001 and 2016, except for a switch in 
the summer of 2006 (around 10% over 8%) and the early months of 2007 (around 19% 
over 14%) (Ipsos MORI 2007, 2016). In 2008 worry about the economy jumped from 
20% in January to over 60% at the end of the year whilst those considering the 
environment most important dropped to 6%, most likely in response to the global 
financial crisis. From then onwards, respondents considering the environment paramount 
have remained on the single figure percentage whereas concern about the economy stayed 
very high until late 2014 when it returned to around 30% (Ipsos MORI 2016). In the 
responses to the Eurobarometer biannual surveys on national priority issues since shale 
has become a topic in the UK (2011-2015), the top three spots for most important issues 
in the UK are always taken by ‘unemployment’, ‘immigration’, ‘economic situation’ and 
‘rising prices/inflation’; while ‘the environment’ and ‘climate change’ are continuously at 
the very bottom or second to last spot of the ten points list, and ‘energy supply’ when 
introduced in 2015 outranks them (European Commission 2011, 2013, 2014b, 2015). This 
trend could have an impact on support for shale gas, which the government has connected 
to jobs and revenue (Cameron 2013; PA 2014; Watt 2014) – but it seemingly was not 
enough to convince a majority of UK citizens to support fracking.  
In a comparison with 24 other industrialised nations, the UK public’s concern about 
climate change ranks in the bottom third together with China, Poland and Russia for 
example; they are however the nation that is third most concerned with the issue of energy 
security (Ipsos MORI 2011). While there is no concrete data to support this, a reasonable 
assumption based on this information is that UK politicians are likely well-informed of 
this and hence may use the angle of energy security to promote the shale gas story.  
Shale gas support and opposition are relatively equal in the United States but the 
opposition is growing; in the UK, opposition to shale gas is stronger than support. In 
both countries, more salience of, or experience with, fracking have led to a worsening of 
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public opinion on the resource. Both in the United Kingdom and the United States 
awareness and public knowledge of shale gas are on the rise – in earlier surveys, many 
respondents incorrectly identified either fracking or shale gas or stated that they were 
unaware of it, but this has rarely been the case after 2013 (O’Hara 2013; PEW 2012; 
Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2013b; Whitmarsh et al. 2014; Boudet 
et al. 2014).  
Considering public opinion together with the details on the economics surrounding shale 
gas development, I surmise that there is no evidence of a direct and rational logical 
conclusion for policymakers to support fracking in the interest of their citizens. In Britain, 
the public oppose it quite strongly, and in the United States it would prefer low carbon 
energy generation. Citizens are concerned about the state of the economy, but as 
discussed, shale gas is unlikely to make a lasting meaningful contribution to either 
country’s economy. However, I am also left with the notion that the respective 
governmental presentation of shale gas as conducive to lower bills, job creation and 
economic success are very likely to resonate with the public.  
 
 
IV.4 Alternative strategies for energy policy  
I want to give a brief overview of references to show, firstly, that options other than 
following the shale gas route are available (otherwise, no decision would take place) and 
secondly that they are well known to policymakers deciding on shale gas.92 Clearly, shale 
gas has a questionable environmental track record that adds to its problems of economic 
performance: investing in something so obviously unsustainable, and as discussed above, 
potentially discouraging other investment in renewables, should need to be well-justified 
in comparison to a different energy strategy including sustainable energy.   
From an environmental perspective, for the U.S. and UK government to promote shale 
gas so strongly in 2010-2016 is at the very least surprising. It seems ill-fitting when the 
countries, especially the UK, have projected issues with reaching their renewable targets 
(Harvey 2014b; McGrath 2015) whilst other countries93 have recently succeeded in 
serving almost their entire power consumption with renewable energy (Shankleman 2015; 
Neslen 2016). According to experts, through the use of smart energy and improved grid 
                                                 
92 In this section I am not attempting to cover in detail the variance of different energy strategy options 
available to the United States or United Kingdom, as to do so could well require another full thesis of its 
own.  
93 Portugal and Germany – with the latter rendering the excuse of better weather elsewhere an improbable 
one. 
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this would be possible in the UK as well (Taylor 2016; National Infrastructure 
Commission 2016). The confines of my dissertation make it impossible to include a 
detailed discussion of alternative energy strategies available: suffice to say, they are 
available (British Pugwash 2013; Amin 2015; P. Taylor 2016; McGrath 2016), for both 
the United States of America and for Great Britain, and have experienced a surge across 
the world in recent years, notably in emerging economies (McGrath 2016). And for the 
UK as well as the U.S. government it would be almost impossible not to become aware 
of them.  
Before shale gas entered the market and U.S. energy policy plans, there were alternative 
strategies (IEA 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). United States energy strategy plans do not 
extensively mention the need for new unconventional gas resources even now that shale 
gas is important to the sector (DoE 2006a, 2011, 2014a). Before shale gas became a staple, 
the United States’ national energy policy was quite focused on diversifying energy supply, 
expanding energy generation from renewable sources as well as planning major 
investment in nuclear power provision (IEA 2002). The aim of energy security through 
energy independence has always been predominant in United States energy policy; 
therefore, a diversification through reliance on trade was not likely a preferred policy 
option even before shale gas became commercially interesting (IEA 2002). However, 
previous national energy policy strategy also encouraged the extension of nuclear and 
renewable energy generation to achieve this.  
Shale gas has been lauded as providing the United States energy sector with anything from 
a bridge to renewables, to a fossil fuel prolonging lifeline, or to the key reason behind 
newly found increased energy independence. However, I find little evidence of this. New 
developments such as a low gas price and more experience with well output are not 
brightening the industry’s outlook. Another issue that is confusing investors and feeding 
into the hands of critics of the current UK energy policy is a perceived bias and 
selectiveness when considering energy policy options. As an example, following a recent 
motion to cut subsidies for solar, the then UK governmental minister for energy, Ms 
Rudd, told the chair of the British Photovoltaic Association that job losses were “not part 
of the consultation” (Carrington 2015d). Much of the debate around shale gas and 
protecting the gas industry in general is laced with the argument of providing or saving 
jobs (Cameron 2013; BBC News 2014a; Carrington 2015d). In one of the most recent 
energy white papers, the previous government in fact pledged they would support coal to 
save employment, namely that they had won more flexibility at EU level to “help develop 
new reserves in existing pits where they are economically viable and help safeguard jobs” 
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(DTI 2003, 94). It appears that hypocrisy applies when selecting energy sources that are 
protected or supported in order to create jobs.  
For the United Kingdom, the international scientific research and discussion group 
Pugwash laid out several different pathways for possible future energy strategy that would 
not rely heavily on fossil fuels, let alone shale gas (British Pugwash 2013). In this project, 
they decided to focus exclusively on what was achievable with technology which had 
proven itself and reached commercial maturity, and not to focus on possible yet uncertain 
future technological advancements. Their results were also tested against the DECC’s 
quantitative computer tool ‘pathways to 2050 calculator’ (DECC 2016a). In addition, 
Pugwash draws attention to less quantifiable social, political and environmental outcomes 
of energy strategy and calls for more effort to assess those. Pugwash introduced three 
different strategies that would be arguably feasible and would comply with government 
targets of supply levels and 2050 climate targets: the high nuclear pathway, the high 
renewables pathway, and the more cautious intermediate pathway. The latter includes 
more carbon capture provisions, and is the only pathway that relies to a certain extent on 
future developments not yet guaranteed. Each of the pathways demands a total bill of 
around £2.8 trillion until 2050, which is not unreasonable considering previous 
government annual expenditures for the UK energy supply system, for example 
approximately £95 billion in 2010 (British Pugwash 2013). Of course, all three strategies 
include challenges and may face obstacles in the future. But so does the plan to develop 
unconventional gas, and it includes many more uncertainties. The in 2016 relevant and 
most current United Kingdom Energy white papers that guide national energy strategy 
also consider future strategies to guarantee national energy supply levels with optimistic 
recommendations that do not include shale gas (DTI 2003, 2007; BERR 2008; DECC 
2009, 2011).  
This short section was not intended to elaborate on the details of potential energy strategy 
plans, but to show that they exist and that the respective United States government and 




IV.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter leads to two key conclusions. Firstly, shale gas policy is not a strong logical 
consequence of a ‘rational’ cost-benefit analysis for either of the two countries, but most 
especially not for the United Kingdom. With the uncertain future development of shale 
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gas and uncertain consequences of hydraulic fracturing and related processes, there can 
be no confident result of an expected utility analysis possible that recommends its 
exploration. Secondly, for a MDSD style research design in which similar independent 
variables should have the same impact on the similar outcome, the economic cost-benefit 
analysis of expected utility does not hold true in the case of shale gas as the country studies 
are too diverging.  
Shale gas economics in the United States appear to be a short-term solution, and a hype 
by and for investors that much overstates its actual utility, rather than a lasting, 
economically beneficial opportunity for the energy sector. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, virtually no sound economic reason for the commencement of shale gas policy 
can be found. Outside of official industry presentations on shale gas there is little doubt 
left that shale gas will not, in fact, be profitable or successful for as long as some entities, 
such as EIA, suggest them to be; nor will they have as profound a positive impact on the 
overall economy. The UK case for shale gas development is very weak, but looking at 
U.S. data from 2011-2015 makes the U.S. case look much weaker than originally assumed, 
too. Supporters of fracking connect the resource exploration to classic economic 
arguments of rationality and market efficiency. And yet my analysis in this chapter further 
substantiates a growing amount of research that finds little confirmation of these claims 
and instead throws up doubts about the beneficial economic aspects of shale gas.94 It is 
also rendered doubtful that either the U.S. or the UK government actually intends for 
shale gas to compete in a free market system, given the subsidies and tax incentives it has 
been granted (Groeger 2012; Macalister and Harvey 2013). This continues a long history 
of (at times under-reported) subsidies in the fossil fuel sector. Fossil fuels receive a greater 
share of government subsidies than alternative energy sources but those subsides are 
rarely discussed (Sills 2011; IMF 2015; International Energy Agency 2016; Global 
Subsidies Initiative 2016).95 This goes for global subsidies as well as for government 
                                                 
94 Importantly it should be noted that many basic practices such as labelling and explaining tables and 
graphs, that are considered important in academia, are not exactly followed properly in almost all of these 
datasets given either by research institutes (such as the BGS), the industry, or government-sponsored 
research. Further, short ‘executive summaries’ or ‘media summaries’ can differ starkly from the overall 
report. For example, with the BGS report, the summary sounds much less cautious and much more 
positive and promising than the report, once read in its entirety, actually suggests (BGS 2013a). This 
makes it quite difficult and at the very least enormously time-consuming to compare and check the data 
given. The rest of the BGS study is not labelled ideally and therefore quite hard for anyone but the 
authors to decipher and comprehend. Similar problems are found in most of the other reports reviewed 
above, the main U.S. reports by EIA and DoE especially.  
95 Of course, estimations vary depending on how subsidies are calculated: are subsidies to producers only 
or those to consumers calculated, are they calculated for domestic producers and consumers or foreign 
ones as well? But the major international institutions such as the IMF or IEA agree that fossil fuels 
receive more support than renewables in each case, all things considered.  
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subsidies spent in the United Kingdom and the United States specifically. For example, 
according to IMF estimates the UK spent around £26 billion or almost 1.4% of its GDP 
on fossil fuel subsidies in 2015, around three times more than it spent on renewable 
energy, and is the only G7 country to drastically increase this amount in the past decade 
(IMF 2015; Carrington 2015e). Of course, tax breaks for shale gas will feature in this 
number. In the United States estimations show that renewables have over the first decade 
of the 21st century received around 40% of the subsidies enjoyed by fossil fuels (Adeyeye 
et al. 2009). Another issue that has not been raised publicly in connection with shale gas 
is repeated recent warnings by scientists that no matter how much can be found and or 
proven in extra fossil fuel reserves, they are finite, and some of them will have to stay in 
the ground (Shankleman 2015; Clark 2015) if climate targets are to be met. Whilst there 
are varying estimations of how much can and should still be used, most scientists agree 
that there is a limit.   
The case studies are so different in their capacities that there can be no assumption of 
similarity in the independent variable leading to a similar policy outcome. The United 
States’ and United Kingdom’s energy sectors and energy production capacities (as well as 
consumption levels) are fundamentally diverse. This goes both for the overall energy 
economic sectors, as well as specifically for shale gas. There can therefore be no reason 
to assume that the economic calculation suggested by theory in chapter three is the 
independent variable which has a realistic effect on the decision-making. Due to reasons 
of different infrastructure, different pricing systems and different structural factors per 
se, the UK situation can simply not be compared with the U.S. situation, let alone the fact 
that the latter is a lot less bright than often claimed. It creates a further clean case for most 
dissimilar systems design – both countries could hardly be more different with their 
economic capacity and structural factors regarding shale exploration.  
Both findings, that of a lacking economic incentive and that of a discrepancy between the 
independent variables i.e. the country’s fracking potential, further support the finding that 
the simple cost-benefit analysis suggested by classical theory on decisions under 
uncertainty is not tenable. In a nutshell, the analysis in this chapter appears to invalidate 
the possibility that the economic rationale derived from classical literature on decision-
making under uncertainty (chapter three) serves to explain the decision-making process 
in the shale gas policy debate. It is neither economically calculated and logically conclusive, 
nor is it even calculable. In any case it becomes once again clear that dealing with shale 
gas is dealing with uncertainty. Specific suggestions by the literature such as a tendency 
for ambiguity aversion and considering losses stronger than gains can also not be verified 
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within this data chapter, and neither could the modified assumptions of prospect theory. 
It is not quite possible to fully compare current UK data with the data available in the 
United States after almost a decade of commercial shale gas exploration; however, 
comparisons can be drawn between official resource estimates and the respective 
expected reserve estimates. Given that in the UK, there are as of yet no detailed estimates 
about recoverability and actual gas reserves, statements about the potential of the gas 
should be made very cautiously.96  
Given the avoidance of uncertainty these kinds of calculations tend not to focus on 
environmental costs or social costs, either. Furthermore, this method of calculation leaves 
very little space for reflection on potential flaws with the process of decision-making; 
despite countless studies outlining that it is near impossible to make a perfectly rational 
decision in this fashion, expected utility is still a commonly deployed model in economic 
politics. Most problematic about this may be the utter confidence in this kind of decision-
making: whereas modelling decision options on a basis of expected utility can be argued 
for as a helpful tool when lacking other means to sort through alternative decision 
options, defending it as a fail proof way to end up with correct decisions without allowing 
for uncertainty and biases to be discussed certainly implies not only imperfect but also 
inconsiderate decision-making.  
                                                 
96 Of course, technically recoverable resources or resources economically viable to recover always change 
(usually for the better) in time according to technological advances (as well as commercial and market 
factors): the first shale well in the United States was drilled over a century ago and the first hydraulic 
fracking experiment happened in 1947, but both were not economically plausible at the time on a larger 
scale. Given the time span between 1947-2005, for example, it is however unlikely, despite increased 
technology investment and output, that shale drilling will be revolutionised within a year or two, and in 




V Chapter Five. The political pursuit of private interests: Theoretical 
perspectives 
 
The influence and political power by interest groups and lobbies97 has become an 
important topic in the social sciences. In this chapter I assess the theoretical approaches 
that consider the potential for private and industry interests influencing governmental 
preferences. When economic rationality is not assumed as a key reason for policy 
decisions, social scientists often revert to concerns around lobbying and interest politics 
(Gourevitch 1986; Strange 1988; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Berry et al. 2009; Buisset, Øye, and Selleslaghs 2012; Klüver 2013; Godwin, Ainsworth, 
and Godwin 2013). The focus on private interests is a traditional approach in comparative 
and international political economy and in this chapter I survey key theoretical 
contributions. As the literature shows, one aspect of interest group power is their access 
to and cooperation with institutions tasked with regulating the sectors relevant to them. 
This chapter also includes a brief section about the role of institutions in relation to 
interests. Furthermore, I consider the impact of risk and uncertainty on the ability of 
organised interests to influence political decision-making. There is no reason to assume 
that influence by lobbyists does not occur in a policy area involving uncertainties and risk. 
This might be the case for a situation of the highest level of security risk which remains 
classified for all but government officials. In any other situation of uncertainty, forms of 
lobbying that involve the provision of experts or information may in fact be more likely. 
The role lobbying can play in the formation of risk preferences is accepted, for example 
around weapon provision or new technologies (Hammitt 2011; Gray, Rogers, and Wiener 
2011; Stern and Wiener 2011; Wiener et al. 2013).98 Outside of the disciplines of political 
science and political economy, the connection between lobbying and risk or uncertainty 
has recently inspired research in financial economics (Gregory and Hambusch 2015).99 
Researchers found that lobbying had a special impact on banking during times of risk and 
                                                 
97 The literature is at times not very exact with a distinction so it has to be taken from the context (Beyers 
2008; Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008).  
98 The effect of lobbying on risk preferences was also considered through the lens of social amplification 
of risk. The communication of risk (as occurs through lobbyists) is found highly likely to impact the 
public but can also affect policymakers (Kasperson et al. 2003; Slovic 2010). 
99 This is a new development: lobbying has not been consistently considered and researched as an 
influential contributor to banking sector risk and systemic financial sector risk until the 21st century global 
financial crisis (Blau, Brough, and Thomas 2013; Gregory and Hambusch 2015).  
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crisis, and that in such moments lobbying could have an entirely different impact than it 
would have had under normal circumstances (Gregory and Hambusch 2015).100  
 
 
V.1 Private interests in political economy  
Organised interests and lobbying are an important topic in political science and the 
discipline of political economy is especially concerned with it (Hall and Deardorff 2006; 
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Culpepper 2010; Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013; 
Culpepper 2015; Pagliari and Young 2016). Central to political economy is the analysis 
into how economic interests shape policy outcomes. This includes how they are shaping 
and operating within the particular political environment. By the definition of Beyers et 
al., interest groups classify as such when they have a noticeable political interest, an 
organisation behind them, and if they can be considered as private, not public (Beyers 
2008; Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008).101 A core assumption is that interested parties 
seek to advance their own interests through the organisation of advocacy groups, seeking 
special access to policymakers, and seeking a channel for material contributions. From 
this, one can draw at least two avenues of analysis: either to ask ‘qui bono’ and assess who 
stands to benefit from a policy, or to follow the money (and efforts) in the opposite 
direction and assume that if lobbying takes place then it does so for reasons of self-
interest.  
The topic of interest power remains one of great currency. In the United States, federal 
lobbying expenditures rose from $1.45 billion to $3.20 billion per annum between 1999-
2015 (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, CPR 2016). The groups spending these 
amounts on lobbying “expected to achieve policy goals important to them” and “did not 
believe they were wasting their money” (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 2). 
Lobbying in the European Union has also increased, as is visible from the rising number 
of lobbies registered and rising amount of research based on them (Broscheid and Coen 
2003; Woll 2006; Gullberg 2008). Simultaneously, public interest in and worry over 
lobbying has grown. While according to a 1960’s survey, around 30% of Americans 
thought that very few big interest groups more or less ruled their government and all its 
decisions, a significantly increased proportion of 80% thought so when polled in 2008 
                                                 
100 Such lobbying is found more likely to happen when the policy issue concerned is not one of high 
salience, or considered high politics (a concept explained in more detail below).  
101 This is the case even if they claim to represent interests of the national public or humanity in general, 
such as a cleaner environment or world peace.  
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(Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 1). In countries where it is necessary for lobbying 
entities to register one can witness a steep increase in registered interest groups over time 
(Klüver 2013). This spells a possible indication of their increasing overall influence on 
legislators, but certainly is an indication of an increasing potential thereof.  
 
V.1.1 Different models of influencing decisions   
“Political scientists disagree over the extent to which organized interests help 
or harm the democratic process and the degree to which inequalities in the 
resources of competing interests bias the policy process” (Godwin, 
Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 25).  
 
Of course, there is not only one single way of approaching the study of interests and 
lobbying. The influence of interest power on policy outcomes can be researched from a 
variety of angles. The so-called exchange model of lobbying describes a situation in which 
interests provide resources to policymakers in exchange for favourable treatment in the 
context of related policy decisions (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 15). Some 
scholars simply call this vote-buying, but the term includes a range of activities, for 
example providing expertise and information, arranging campaigns such as television ads 
or letter writing, or arranging meetings with officials (Grossman and Helpman 2002; 
Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 3).  
In this vein, Potters and van Winden suggest that strategic provision of expertise or 
private information is one of the key and most effective lobbying strategies (Potters and 
van Winden 1992).102 Such expertise can include technical knowledge but also real world 
knowledge about the impact of policies such as their effect on jobs and consumer 
behaviour. It could also simply be information about popularity of a policy in a specific 
interest group’s clientele and how the policy may affect their view of the policymaker 
(Gullberg 2008). On certain issues, lobbyists, especially in-house lobbyists, will be among 
the most knowledgeable agents. Their inclusion in the role of advisers and experts is seen 
both as necessary and as highly dangerous, depending on the point of view. Consulting 
industry experts from a specific group only would allow for a very selective provision of 
information to policymakers and intentionally exclude other views. There have been cases 
                                                 
102 Even if lobbyists present not their own but other experts’ opinions, there is no reason to assume that 
governmental risk preferences should not be equally receptive to influence and alteration not only by facts 
or experts’ opinions but also by the presentation, mediation and selection of said facts and opinions. 
Besides, experts do not need to be independent.  
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in which lobbyists were directly drafting legislation for policymakers (Schlozman and 
Tierney 1986; Carrington and Sparrow 2013).  
When providing information, lobbying like-minded policymakers rather than undecided 
or opposed ones is considered rational (Potters and van Winden 1992). Clearly with the 
use of experts who are lobbyists, there is a dilemma. Policymakers have need of such 
expertise however they also need to adhere to and demonstrate democratic legitimacy, 
transparency, inclusion and diversity (Broscheid and Coen 2003). Potters and van Winden 
assume full awareness of this dilemma by policymakers. Moreover, they assume that 
policymakers take into account that certain lobbying experts may see it in their interest to 
provide partial or mis-information (Potters and van Winden 1992).  
How exclusive the access of lobbyists to policymakers is, not only depends on whom 
those policymakers select to advise them but primarily on the level of organisation by 
those interested in lobbying. Only well-organised groups with reputable expertise and 
sufficient funding to maintain the lobbying efforts are likely to be considered. Considering 
the free rider problem and the collective action problem (Olson 1971; Truman 1981), 
supporters of the exchange model or elitism theories of lobbying find that interests have 
an advantage in lobbying if they are strictly organised, rich in resources, and if their pay-
out from lobbying is clear. This implies that a top 100 company lobbying for material or 
structural gains would mostly win out over a part time, single issue civil action group 
which is lobbying for a cause benefitting many indirectly. Followers of the exchange 
model of lobbying tend to invoke the collective action issue and inability of less organised 
groups to equal the efforts of business lobbies; therefore, they consider strong lobbying 
as harmful to the democratic process.   
Unlike in the exchange model, neopluralist theory on lobbing and policy influence 
suggests that not only resource-rich interests can have significant impact on policymaking. 
Instead it proposes that so-called issue networks can have a similar impact and have 
previously successfully lobbied against the aims of powerful industry and business lobbies 
(Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013). Neo-pluralism is based on pluralism theory by 
Dahl (1961) and Truman (1981), but makes even more allowances for differences in 
organisation and capability between interest groups. The neopluralist argument is that 
“most policy issues involve competition among organized interests and that each side has 
sufficient resources to lobby successfully” (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 16). 
Like pluralism it considers not only the number of people interested in advancing an issue 
and their level of organisation, but also the perceived importance of the issue they are 
lobbying as a decisive factor for lobbying success. Importantly, the political arena is 
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considered as very changeable. Depending on who moves into the White House for 
example, the previously weaker side of a struggle around air pollution standards may 
suddenly find itself strengthened due to closeness to the new government’s agenda. As 
neopluralist theory holds that almost any interest can influence the policy process, 
through lobbying but also through parties and elections, they see the practice of interest 
organisation more positively and lobbies as democratic institutions.  
Pluralism and neo-pluralist models of influence remain contested by the exchange model 
and theories about elite dominance of the policy process (Hunter 1953; Mills 1959; 
Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013). The elitism approach concurs with the exchange 
model of influence in that it also considers wealth and structural positioning of an interest 
group as a key indicator of whether or not lobbying can be successful. Besides material 
factors the theory focuses on ‘club behaviour’, suggesting that powerful individuals often 
cluster around the same top universities, companies, clubs, and living areas. But the 
ultimate conclusion is that membership of these is based on wealth. This theory would 
find confirmation of their suspicions in the recent U.S. American political contests: almost 
all the Republican and Democratic candidates in the 21st century were both, 
multimillionaires and graduates of either Harvard or Yale (Godwin, Ainsworth, and 
Godwin 2013; Desilver 2014).  
In the analysis in chapter six, I draw conclusions about these two opposing models 
regarding which of the two provides the more applicable context for lobbying in the U.S. 
and UK energy sector.  
 
V.1.2 Indicators of lobbying success  
“The policy changes that lobbying creates are the best measure of lobbying 
success” (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 99).  
 
The differences in lobbying success have long been a topic of research, often with the 
suggestion that strong divergences between interest groups may undermine democratic 
legitimacy (Dahl 1989). But conclusively settling why some are more successful than 
others is not finished and remains contested. To get an overview, in this section I mostly 
consider meta-analyses of case studies in lobbying practices (Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013). In 2009, a group of prominent political scientists 
published a comprehensive study into the determinants of lobbying success (Baumgartner 
et al. 2009). Through evidence gathered, no unconditional direct link could be confirmed 
as a rule between the size of material resources and the achieved policy results per se. 
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Some of the case studies reviewed found weak results when aiming to prove that powerful 
business interests have increased success with lobbying political struggles (Baumgartner 
et al. 2009). The study did not suggest that there is no payment for political results, but 
that it was often very difficult to pin down the exact linkages and transactions. In less 
comprehensive and more case oriented studies, other scholars have shown correlation 
between political activity, exchange model type lobbying efforts by firms and their 
regulatory benefits (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 2009; Gordon and Hafer 
2005; Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013). Even though overall there is no conclusive 
evidence of a positive link between resource wealth and lobbying power, many case study 
results provide evidence of this correlation as long as certain conditions are met.  
When analysing the distribution of private rather than public goods there is strong 
evidence of materially powerful business lobbies achieving success (Godwin, Ainsworth, 
and Godwin 2013). Whilst introducing a new proposal involving collective goods is seen 
as difficult, attaching benefits regarding private goods to a proposal or omnibus bill that 
is on the agenda has proven successful in lobbying private interests (Godwin, Ainsworth, 
and Godwin 2013, 209).  
Another case in which lobbying has proven effective and where advantages to those 
organised interests with greater resources at their disposal become apparent is that in 
which regulatory or quiet politics, not just high politics decisions, are included in case study 
research (Culpepper 2010; Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013). The distinction is 
made between for example on one hand lobbying for votes in a major election, for passing 
a bill or referendum, and on the other hand changing smaller details of legislation and 
making amendments to regulatory drafts before they are voted on as part of an omnibus 
bill. Therefore it is worth clarifying the distinction between the above-mentioned high 
politics, which often involve issues of high public salience, and lower or routine policy 
issues or quiet politics, in order to judge lobbying success (Culpepper 2010; Pagliari and 
Young 2016). An example of the former would be a decision on going to war with Iraq 
in 2003, against which millions of informed citizens protested. An example of low or 
routine politics would be if a country’s government, which prides itself on its promotion 
of human rights, includes an amendment to a small section of a bill that allows the 
increased sale of arms to the government of a country which it otherwise criticises for its 
human rights record. This practice is not as highly publicised and incendiary, and has the 
added benefit that it is also much harder to detect and measure from the outside (Godwin, 
Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013; Culpepper 2015).  
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It is often routine or low politics regarding the specificities or regulations where most 
(and most successful) lobbying takes place (Culpepper 2010; Godwin, Ainsworth, and 
Godwin 2013). When researching different lobbying strategies for different stages of a 
policy decision in the European Union, Crombez concludes with a policy 
recommendation to interest groups that “if given the choice [they should preferably try 
to] lobby an advocate at the proposal stage” (Crombez 2002, 2971). (This is possible 
under the EU co-decision procedures.) Rigorous expertise and the upkeep of good 
relations and priority access to low politics regulation come at a cost. Being able to lobby 
not just on issues of high politics but also in quiet politics requires more effort, time and 
resources. In addition, lobbyists need to be constantly monitoring policymakers in order 
to stay on top of upcoming legislation they may want to influence. Therefore, and in 
connection to the distinction between high and quiet politics, lobby funds are found to 
play a vital role. A variation in strength and expense of lobbying per sector is also attested 
for (Pagliari and Young 2016).  
Another strategy that has overall proven very successful in lobbying is that of building 
and maintaining long-lasting relationships with policymakers (Godwin, Ainsworth, and 
Godwin 2013). Lobbyists are often found to form close, extended relationships with 
legislators that agree with their overall cause and are likely to support their work (Bauer, 
Pool, and Dexter 2007). Therefore, professional lobbying organisations may enjoy a 
benefit over in-house lobbyists if policymakers are among their participants and they can 
establish regular contact between lawmakers and lobbyists. These organisations hence 
often succeed in creating a sense of reciprocity that helps minimise any free rider issues 
with regulators (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013). In-house lobbyists on the other 
hand are very useful when they can be drafted in as experts and advisers. 
Some scholars argue that little actual changing of policymakers’ minds occurs through 
material lobbying. Instead they suggest that lobbying mainly reinforces politicians’ 
positions, like a legislative subsidy to support already like-minded policymakers, often 
through providing information (Milbrath 1976; Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Potters 
and van Winden 1992; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 2007). There is 
case evidence from both the U.S. Congress and the European Union documenting that 
in fact lobbying of both like-minded and opposition politicians occurs (Austen-Smith and 
Wright 1992; Ainsworth 1993; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Bouwen 2002; Thomson et al. 
2006; Gullberg 2008; Thomson 2011; Klüver 2013). There are also those who disagree 
with the idea of lobbying already friendly politicians (Austen-Smith and Wright 1992). 
While there is evidence of lobbying the opposing side, research on this is rarer and some 
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of this work has been criticised in that it often applies only to special situations, not day 
to day lobbying (Baumgartner and Leech 1996). But the institutionalised access to 
policymakers and idea of them as ‘friends’ to certain lobbying issues is worth considering 
as impacting the success of lobbying.  
 
V.1.3 Institutional relations and lobbying  
“The impact of institutions and the impact of lobbying depend on each other” 
(Heckelman and Wilson 2013, 362).  
 
The social sciences and especially political economy have seen a rich history of research 
on the importance of institutional context, and the difference between institutions 
(Keohane 1988; Laffont and Tirole 1990; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Hall 1997; Soskice 
and Hall 2001; Greif 2006; Eising 2007; Culpepper 2008; Blyth 2009).103 Analysing 
apparent lack of intervention by powerful interests during periods of economic decline in 
Britain, Peter Hall put forward that an interested agent’s structural (material) position 
alone was not sufficient to allow him to impact on policy decisions, but that their 
institutional positioning was similarly decisive on lobbying success (Hall 1986). This 
corresponds with findings about closeness between lobbyists and legislators in the 
previous section. There are many theoretical contributions and evidence on how interest 
groups, specifically business groups, lobby to gain and retain access to institutions, for 
example to those of the European Union (Bouwen 2002; Beyers 2004; Eising 2007). It is 
important to consider not only the apparent motive and resource power of an interest 
group: whether or not they have the necessary access to policymakers to advance their 
interests is also important (Carpenter and Moss 2014, 16).   
An extreme situation of institutionalised lobbying is called regulatory capture. ‘Captured’ 
means institutions promote the political or commercial interests of those they are tasked 
to regulate. Carpenter and Moss define regulatory capture as “the result or process by 
which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from 
the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and 
                                                 
103 This chapter is not the place to provide an overview of institutional approaches to political economy 
or the Varieties of Capitalism approach. I recognise the importance of institutional structure and framework 
guiding policy action and lobbying but do not find it necessary to consider them in detail for this part of 
the thesis. As two liberal market economies, the United States and United Kingdom are close to one 
another on a spectrum of different institutional typologies (Soskice and Hall 2001); I will consider 
differences in lobbying access.  
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action of the industry itself” (Carpenter and Moss 2014, 13).104 Suspicions around 
regulatory capture, whether or not explicitly, are often cited in the media. For example, 
after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, a Wall Street Journal reporter suggested that it was “a 
striking example of regulatory capture”: that agencies which were tasked with promoting 
public interests had “come to identify with the regulated industry and protect its interests 
against that of the public” (O’Driscoll 2010). One can distinguish between different forms 
of capture, more straightforward rent-seeking or ‘bribing’ types as well as implicit cultural 
or social ones (Carpenter and Moss 2014).105 Importantly, the latter version may occur 
without the legislation being fully aware of it, or the pressure group.  
Another newly considered aspect of the institutionalisation of lobbying that is often 
mentioned in combination with the financial crisis of 2008 is that of cultural capture by 
James Kwak. When cultural capture occurs, it is the closeness between the regulatory 
agency and the industry they are regulating, rather than actual barriers (regulatory capture) 
that leads to the regulators favouring the views of the industry in politics (Carpenter and 
Moss 2014). As Stiglitz puts it, “mind-sets can be shaped by people you associate with, 
and [Fed regulators] come to think that what’s good for Wall Street is good for America” 
(Becker and Morgenson 2009). An array of scholarly and journalistic articles was 
motivated by the 2008 financial crisis to consider the informal ties between financial 
regulators and the financial sector (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009a; Seabrooke and Tsingou 
2009b; Pagliari 2012). Cultural capture not only describes a situation in which a regulator’s 
ideas and actions can be influenced by the content of active interest group policy (Kwak 
2013). Kwak also suggest suggests there is a subconscious influence simply by the nature 
of interaction and exchange between them, such as through shared identity, shared 
networks and social connections. This leads to a bias that the regulators may be unaware 
of towards those they consider teammates (Kwak 2013, 84). Therefore, biases towards 
the industry an agency is tasked with regulating may also be unintentional. An example of 
this would be financial regulators who only ever speak with hedge fund managers but 
never with small savers and are therefore likely to begin making assumptions about the 
finance system as a whole based on their very limited perspective on it. The logic behind 
this proposition is not entirely novel. It recalls elite theory, only that whether or not the 
connections are made in ‘elite’ or other groups is not decisive. When Abbott spoke of 
                                                 
104 This definition depends on the definitions of important terms within it, such as public interest or 
intent, which are sometimes contested.  
105 The authors further introduce a distinction, which is quite useful in my opinion, of strong and weak 
capture (Carpenter and Moss 2014): strong capture diverting the outcome so far away from public interest 
that no regulation would be preferable to the status quo, weak capture however where outcomes may be 
compromised by pressure groups but overall the public is still served best by this regulation.  
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‘linked ecologies’ he suggested that within certain networks or peer groups, any discourse 
over different practices and policy goals will only occur within “intersubjective shared 
understanding” (Abbott 2005; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009a, 10) thereby preventing the 
introduction of novel policy outside of that group thinking. It is reminiscent of what Janis 
called groupthink (Hart 1991): he also considered the process of excluding outside ideas 
as less subconscious, however, and blamed the situation on a desire for concurrence 
among elites.  
Studies into lobbying success have furthermore shown that lobbying in support of the 
status quo has overall proven to be successful more often than lobbying for change 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Leighton and Lopez 2013; Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 
2013). It is harder to mobilise people and organise groups to lobby for change than it is 
to mobilise people to protect what status and benefits they currently enjoy and likely feel 
entitled to (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 208). This can sometimes be seen 
reflected in the written rules for policy process – vetoing a proposal is often simpler than 
introducing a new one, which would need approval at every stage of the legislative 
process. Most established democracies have these rules in place specifically in order to 
safeguard the democracy from quick and extraordinary changes. In their comprehensive 
review of lobbying success, Baumgartner et al. (2009) concluded that “the single best 
predictor of a side's likelihood of winning was whether it was protecting the status quo 
or trying to change it” (Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013, 209).  
This is evocative of Graham Allison’s second model of decision-making, which he calls 
‘organisational process model’ and in which he insists on the power of repertoire in shaping 
decisions made by government agencies. Allison finds that the presence of a repertoire of 
procedures and choices to look back to severely constrains options in the future. 
Therefore, to him as well the best way to discover what an organisation such as the 
government is likely to do and why at a future time t+1 is to consider what it has been 
doing at the times t and t-1 (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 175). In combination with 
Baumgartner’s findings this would entail that government agencies should be heavily 





V.2 Chapter summary  
The above review of key themes makes it plausible that private interests may have 
influenced policy decisions on shale gas development through lobbying. While it is hard 
to find evidence for all components of the lobbying process, such as informal meetings 
or information sharing, there are many case studies providing plausible evidence for the 
linkage between interest group lobbying and policy outcomes. Like other scholars, I am 
unlikely to be able to prove the existence and effect of lobbying beyond the shadow of a 
doubt, but, like them, I can show that opportunity existed and results match certain 
interests, and thereby assume lobbying through circumstantial evidence.  
Preliminary evidence exists of lobbying activities taking place in the energy sector of 
countries including the U.S. and the UK  (Gullberg 2008; Crooks and McGregor 2012, 
2012, Mitchell 2012, 2013; Cusick 2013; Richardson 2015), helpful in tracing the lobbying 
around shale gas. Whether or not the private interests for and against fracking have a 
decisive impact on decision-making is dependent on the organisation of the pro and anti- 
campaigns, their resources and their access to policymakers, the status quo and whether 
or not policymakers are susceptible to lobbying. Specific aspects to consider include 
whether or not lobbying takes place in high politics or low politics, whether or not 
exchange of resources such as experts or funding takes place, and whether the institutional 
access and placement of lobbyists may favour their cause. If the presence of any such 
conditions can be established, this would implicate that the resource power of interests is 
also likely influential.  
Following previous chapters, my hypothesis for the next chapter is that a policy decision 
regarding shale gas development is open to influence from a variety of organised interest 
groups rather than them being disregarded by a government considering public or 
national expected utility (h0). A core element of international political economy research 
is the focus on economic interests, and therefore I need to consider the possible 
explanation that the policy decision on shale gas, despite uncertainty and an inconclusive 
cost-benefit analysis, is based on powerful interests lobbying this cause. To this end I 
provide an overview of ‘who is who’ in the lobbying arena around fracking and consider 
their motives, capabilities, access to policymakers as well as more general information on 
lobbying in the sector.  
When assessing to what extent lobbying for private interests takes place and has an impact 
on shale gas policy decisions, I also consider the rationality of such lobbying. 
Conventional interpretations of political economy assume those interests to be rational 
and objective (Woll 2008, 32). This type of analysis implicitly presumes a material 
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rationality not unlike that of expected utility, except the utility of a different player in the 
game. The hypothesis is that interests which have the access and potential to do so will 
lobby the government into doing something, which according to their own cost-benefit 
analysis will advance their material interests. I wish to consider, as much as possible, 
whether or not companies lobbying in favour of shale gas in the U.S. and UK are in fact 
acting rationally according to their own members’ material self-interest. The issue of 
rationality in lobbying has been raised before. For example, like other scholars, Bauer et 
al. discuss and found evidence for the trend of lobbying legislators that are already 
sympathetic or ‘friends’ to an interest group’s cause but they consider this irrational 
behaviour (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 2007). Lobbying already like-minded legislators is less 
complex and expensive. They argue however that failing to focus on undecided legislators 
means that lobbyists give away opportunities irrationally. Whether or not lobbying is 
considered rational to them depends on a cost-benefit analysis (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 
2007; Gullberg 2008). Therefore, to conclude my analysis in the following chapter six on 
groups lobbying for shale gas I will add a brief résumé on the economic rationality of 





VI Chapter Six. Evidence on fracking interests  
 
Following the theoretical chapter on the effect that lobbying private interests can have on 
policy decisions, in this chapter I consider its lessons for the case of shale gas development 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. By establishing if any of the conditions 
identified to enable successful lobbying are in place, in my case studies I examine the 
hypothesis that organised private interests which are influential in the United Kingdom 
and United States may impact the decision on shale gas development. The conditions 
most likely to facilitate lobbying success are close connections between lobbyists and 
policymakers, lobbying quiet politics, the provision of resources including experts and 
information, and help with preparing legislation through surveys, reports or drafts. If 
these conditions are met, resource strength of a lobby also impacts their success rate.  
In a first step I determine who the top potential beneficiaries of fracking operations in 
each country are. My list of prospective interested parties to consider includes energy 
companies that deal in fracking and, in select cases, lobbying groups that represent them. 
In order to establish a comparison as to their resource power and institutional access, I 
also briefly present data on the opposition to fracking: mainly environmental campaigners 
but also, to a lesser degree, the alternative energy companies that can be assumed to be in 
competition with shale gas. I then review some of the energy sector’s history with 
lobbying, whether the policymakers who are influential on shale gas decisions, and the 
institutions tasked with the development of shale gas policy and regulations are favourable 
towards the practice and towards the industry. To judge interest groups’ access to these 
institutions I assess how interwoven the public bureaucracies tasked with shale gas policy 
are with those lobbying for and against shale gas. To further determine the extent of 
revolving door practice and possible regulatory capture or cultural capture amongst either 
country’s relevant policymaking organisations I use the business intelligence tool 
BoardEx. After establishing whether or not certain interest groups have reason, resources 
and access to decision-making, I also briefly discuss the rationality of such interests.  
Data used in this chapter includes all the data available on lobbying from trusted enough 
resources. In the United States case-research this includes the official independent 
lobbying register from the Centre for Responsive Politics (CRP), Pro Publica, Data from 
the United States Congress’ records and investigative journalism collections (from the 
New York Times mostly) as well as data from independent academic research (i.e. 
Lustgarten 2009; Buisset, Øye, and Selleslaghs 2012; Martin 2014; Horn 2013; Tansey 
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2014; DeGette 2015; Jones and Rowell 2015; European Commission and European 
Parliament 2016; CRP 2016). For both countries, data about institutional connections and 
lobbying was drawn from the business intelligence tool Boardex, which I explain in 
context. The lobbying data situation in the UK is less rigorous than in the U.S. because 
of the very limited requirements made by the UK lobbying register, which I discuss within 
the chapter. The UK case data is based on primary data from parliamentary publications 
and records and the Lord’s Committee of Economic Affairs but also the EU lobbying 
register; this is supplanted with data from independent academic research as well as from 
investigative journalism, which has made a strong case about British lobbying for quite 
some time. Where a newspaper is used that is known to tend towards a certain political 
identity, such as the Guardian which mostly favours liberal, left-leaning ideas, I try to 
offset by also using data from newspapers from the other end of the spectrum, for this 
example the Telegraph, as well as public news considered more neutral, such as the BBC.  
This chapter serves to provide a narrative around private interests in shale gas and their 
impact on policy decisions, widening the analysis after previous chapters three and four 
failed to establish a plausible national economic benefit from shale gas development. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, proving the success of lobbying efforts is a difficult 
thing to do (Baumgartner et al. 2009). I will therefore take care to distinguish between 
what can be proven, what can be reasonably assumed, and what is simply a possibility.  
 
 
VI.1 The private interests for shale gas in the United States   
To begin this section, I relate what information is accessible on major interest groups 
likely to lobby on either side of the shale gas issue. I only consider those private groups 
that are involved enough in the process that they can first of all be expected to have a 
reasonable interest in lobbying shale, and second of all that their interest can be known.106 
For clarity I curtail this number and only consider the top groups and firms. My focus is 
on describing potential interest groups, their publicly stated attitudes towards shale gas 
development, and their lines of access to government policy. In order to provide a 
                                                 
106 It is worth noting that it has been lamented by journalists and members of the public how difficult it is 
to receive decent data on shale gas companies, for example answers to questions such as who is drilling, 
where they are drilling, is there fracking near your area. Specifically for this purpose, the University of 
Pittsburgh’s centre for healthy environment and communities (CHEC), funded by environmental groups, 
has set up a new website called FracTracker providing tools to combine data about shale gas exploration 
within the United States (Kusnetz 2010).  
 121 
comparison of the capacities and direction of energy lobbying, I also consider wider 
trends in this sector’s relations with private interests.  
In the United States, where shale gas development is at a more advanced, commercial 
phase compared to the UK, the primary private interest groups in favour of fracking are 
the companies currently involved in fracking. Unfavourable legislation would hurt their 
business interests. There are over 14,000 oil and gas companies operating in the United 
States, many of which hold varyingly large, usually interconnected stakes in the shale gas 
business: Of these, the top forty producers of gas develop more than half of all domestic 
U.S. gas resources (Kusnetz 2011). In order to provide reasonable data to discuss in this 
context, I will limit the discussion to the biggest, top ten oil and gas producing companies 
that are involved in shale gas development.107 In my analysis I also consider companies 
that specifically provide tools or services almost exclusively for oil and gas energy 
products, such as Halliburton. Naturally, many more firms stand to profit from shale gas 
development besides oil and gas companies: material providers such as Silica Holdings or 
General Electric, transportation firms such as Union Pacific, or those managing huge 
shale gas-specific investment funds such as Goldman Sachs. To keep the discussion 
manageable, I do not consider all of those. The list of the ten biggest shale gas producing 
energy firms in the United States is topped by Exxon Mobil108, which produces almost 
50% more than its closest competitor. Exxon is followed by Chesapeake Energy, 
Anadarko, Devon, BP, Encana, ConocoPhillips, Southwestern, Chevron and Williams 
(Kusnetz 2011). Each of them has a large share of their gas development in shale basins.109 
They are expected to lobby for the continuation of any policy favouring its development 
over other policy such as increased environmental safeguards which would hinder the 
cheap exploration of shale.   
The companies named above form part of a strong sector of the U.S. economy. The 
United States have a long history with domestic oil and gas production, both onshore and 
offshore. This led to the industry establishing a well organised lobby and longstanding 
connections to legislature and policymakers in Washington. Amongst the most known 
                                                 
107 There are different ways to measure the size of energy or any other companies – it could be based on 
overall reserves, on revenue or market capitalisation – but experts from the industry have stated that 
production numbers are a good measure because they provide a clear overview (Kusnetz 2011). Also, they 
are helpful to my work as they clearly separate gas and oil development. Therefore, I am considering the 
top energy producers from natural gas by production, of which a significant part is based on shale gas 
specifically.  
108 Note that Exxon Mobil acquired XTO in 2009 (Kusnetz 2011).  
109 The firms’ engagement with shale gas development is taken implicitly as their preference in favour of 
shale gas development. Their actions speak for themselves, but their support for shale gas is also clear 
from public statements (Williams 2012; Dale 2013; Chevron 2015).  
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and active interest groups, which the ten firms listed above are members of, are America’s 
Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA), the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Independent 
Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), the American Gas Association (AGA) and 
the Natural Gas Supply Association (NGSA) (CRP 2016f). In 2015, 784 direct lobbyists 
plus 482 revolvers (former federal agents now hired by lobbyists) for the oil and gas sector 
lobby were registered in Washington (CRP 2016f, 2016g). This compares to 307 and 213 
for the alternative energy lobby, or 346 and 128 for the environment lobby reported in 
the same year (CRP 2016c, 2016a).  
Another indicative factor to consider is the amount of direct contributions to political 
parties and committees made by industry groups. For a different comparison, Figure 23 
below shows the total amount of money contributed to political parties and political 
groups by companies from either the oil and gas sector or the alternative energy and 
services sector (note the different values on the y-axis). 
Both sectors have steadily increased their lobbying contributions and both experienced a 
spike in 2009 (the first year in office of the new administration). Lobbying for renewables 
decreases slightly after 2009 to spike again in 2015. The difference in funding could 
indicate both the larger resources disposable to the oil and gas sector, or a perceived 
stronger need to lobby by them. Given the difference in profiles of the contributors 
though, such as Koch Industries which has deals in oil, natural gas and shale gas, 
compared to the Poet LLC, which deals with biofuel, the former is definitely a factor 
(Forbes 2016; Dolan 2008).  
Figure 23: Lobbying Spending Oil Gas vs. Alternative Energy (CRP 2016e, CRP 2016b) 
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Figure 24 below (CRP 2016e, 2016f) shows the top amounts contributed by oil and gas 
companies and alternative energy companies in the year 2015-16.  
These figures illustrate what appears to be a very strong oil and gas lobby presence based 
on the aspect of resource transfers. In comparison, the 20th biggest contribution by oil 
and gas company Hilcorp Energy is still significantly higher than the number one 
contribution from any alternative energy company (CRP 2016f, 2016c). In terms of sheer 
numbers in funding and resources, one side of the lobbying issue of gas and shale gas is 
disproportionately stronger than the other – and if the right conditions are met, this spells 
lobbying success.  
As they present the group most vocally opposed to shale gas exploration, in Figure 25, I 
include top lobbying contributions by environmental groups (CRP 2016e). They are 
higher than those for renewable energy. Yet they are several times less in total than those 
for the oil and gas sector (and remain so even if combined with those for renewable 
energy). The material strength of the U.S. oil and gas sector and its lobbying arm is crystal 
clear, even if only top contributors are considered. It is reinforced by the number of 
private firms lobbying as well as the number of lobbyists registered permanently in 
Washington. In 2009, the year of recent top lobbying spending for both the oil & gas and 
the alternative energy sector, spending totals of the former were more than five times that 
of the latter. In both sectors, the top contributors (Koch Industries and Poet LLC 
Figure 24: Lobbying Spending by Contributor, Oil & Gas vs Alternative Energy (CRP 2016e, 2016f) 
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respectively) spend more than any 
other contributors by a strong 
margin. Koch Industries clearly 
appears unconcerned by some of 
the main issues found with shale 
gas development, as in a joint 
effort with Exxon Mobile, 
another key shale supporter, they 
have been funding research 
questioning or denying climate 
change for over a decade 
(O’Connor 2015). What this data 
establishes is not as of yet a 
statement on lobbying success, 
but a statement about the 
respective capacity to lobby and 
the resources spent doing so. 
Shale gas lobbyists are among America’s best equipped.  
The discrepancy between lobbying around energy issues is likely influenced by the 
historical difference in the sector’s development. The United States’ oil and gas sector 
was important to the U.S. economy long before the renewables sector became 
commercially important and before environmental protection became as prominent an 
issue as it is in the 21st century. While this needs to be taken into consideration, it does 
not affect the fact that during the time period covered in this thesis, U.S. oil and gas 
companies together account for considerably more contributions to political parties than 
the environmental protection or alternative energy sector and lobby do, or in fact the 
spending of all other energy sectors, coal mining included (CRP 2016d). The oil and gas 
industry lobby combined is ranked in the overall top ten of lobbying contributors to 
Congress in the latest 2015-16 cycle; neither renewable energy, nuclear energy or 
environmental protection lobbying made it into the top fifty (CRP 2016h). Purely 
considering the material resources available to these lobbies on opposite sides of the 
energy question, a metaphor around Goliath and David is not unreasonable. According 
to the theoretical review in chapter five, funding and resources alone do not predict 
lobbying success, but only in conjunction with other factors such as a focus on quiet 
politics or good relations with policymakers. I will turn to examining these in the following 
Figure 25: Lobbying Spending by Contributor, Environmental Protection (CRP 
2016e) 
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pages to gain a more complete picture of the type of lobbying expected from the shale 
gas sector.110  
Current thinking behind lobbying strategies by industry front groups in favour of 
continued or increased shale gas development include the notion that any increase of 
federal or other governmental oversight or regulation in general would lead to significant 
economic losses (Gardner 2010; Tansey 2014). This is actively lobbied for with senators 
by companies BP, Shell Oil and ConocoPhilipps, including campaign contributions and 
supporting votes (Gardner 2010; Kirkland 2010; Mulkern 2011). There is evidence of 
lobbying through providing information and expertise: lobbying activities reported 
include the loaning out of experts as well as the funding and drafting of reports trying to 
reassure the public and officials of the absolute safety of hydraulic fracturing (Gardner 
2010). Several of the reports on the environmental and health effects of shale gas provided 
to regulators by the industry have since been proven to have been misleading or to have 
included data that was indisputably inaccurate (Lustgarten 2009, 2011).   
Shale firms are making strong efforts in order to achieve that shale gas regulation is left 
up to each individual state, and not coordinated through federal law. The industry 
members expressively dislike the possible increase in federal oversight (especially from 
EPA) which it believes would entail stricter regulation (Gardner 2010; Groeger 2012). An 
active lobby group for shale gas developers is Energy in Depth (EiD), created in 2009, 
seemingly as a voice to defend the unconventional gas industry from growing criticism. 
Their website featured especially strong complaints about the movie ‘Gasland’, a 
ProPublica investigation, and the New York Times series ’drilling down’ (Energy in 
Depth 2015).111  
To conclude anything about the relative strength of the pro-fracking lobby in the United 
States, I briefly consider some of their opposition. Among the most vocal in the U.S. anti-
fracking movement are the environmental groups Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, 
who are very active with reports and organised protests; but a brunt of the opposition is 
                                                 
110 In earlier stages there were some reports about the expected lobbying efforts against shale gas by the 
coal industry, arguably a power player in many countries, or Gazprom in Europe (Behr and Marshall 
2009; Buisset, Øye, and Selleslaghs 2012). There has not been much follow up to these reports however.  
111 EiD was lambasted by climate change activists on a news gathering website called ‘DeSmogBlog’ due 
to what the activists considered misrepresentation of interests. According to them, EiD only revealed 
itself as representing small, independent natural gas producers, and not big firms (Energy in Depth 2015) 
– but a leaked industry memo revealed that in fact it was created as part of a giant lobbying campaign and 
with funding from some of the industry’s biggest names indeed, including BP, Halliburton, Chevron, 
ExxonMobil and Shell and the above mentioned API and IPAA, who are considered EiD’s founders 
(deMelle 2011). These are now mentioned on the website, but only after the criticism; none of them were 
acknowledged by the EiD on their website until after the memo leak and ensuing controversy 
(DeSmogBlog 2015; Energy in Depth 2015).  
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by smaller, local groups. The website Americans Against Fracking, which is both an active 
campaigner as well as a national coalition bringing together many smaller groups, counts 
hundreds of various campaigns (AAF 2014). Amongst them are big national lobbies such 
as The Other 80%, Environmental Action and Food and Water Watch, but also seemingly 
unconnected national groups such as Watchdog Progressive, which is more interested in 
the aspect of lobbying shale gas than concerned with shale gas, or Breast Cancer Action, 
and Democracy for America (AAF 2014). There are even more state level groups such as 
Arizonians against Fracking, 350 Silicon Valley, FracDallas or Chefs for the Marcellus 
(AAF 2014). Considering the story of fracking development in the United States, they 
have rarely been victorious – there are hardly reports of such victories, in any case. There 
are several exceptions, one of which is a ban on fracking lobbied for in New York state. 
Just like their opposition several of the anti-fracking groups have misrepresented concerns 
over fracking, either through engaging in a debate that is more emotional than political or 
scientific, or through exaggerating the dangers of fracking (Richardson 2015). Republican 
and Democratic legislators have had several in-house arguments over the quality and 
integrity of scientific data on hydraulic fracturing (Richardson 2015). But little change is 
notable to date. The anti-shale gas lobby has been found successful in their aims at a point 
where they had the opportunity to provide their own in-house experts: in New York State 
a state-wide fracking ban was based on a study that was conducted by anti-fracking groups 
and peer-reviewed by three known fracking opponents (Richardson 2015). The data was 
contested and decried as ‘biased’ publicly by the EiD. The EiD in turn itself was found in 
a report by the Public Accountability Initiative to “distort science to deceive the public 
and policymakers” (Richardson 2015). This further goes to show that contact with 
policymakers and provision of experts is very helpful for lobbying, and that such lobbying 
is common place around the issue of shale gas. The opposition to shale gas just has not 
done so or has not had the chance to do so as frequently as the supporters of it – if they 
did, this would likely be public knowledge, as shale gas supporters were quick to point 
fingers in the New York State case. The provision of biased experts has shown positive 
for lobbying in the case of shale gas as it has resulted in favourable legislation for both 
the pro-fracking and anti-fracking lobby. There are just less reports of anti-fracking 
experts involved in drafting regulation, therefore in most states, shale gas supporters have 
gotten their way. 
My analysis for this part of the chapter finds that there is evidence of favourable 
conditions for lobbying on the side of shale gas in the United States. The literature review 
was divided on the influence of resource capabilities on lobbying success, but confirms 
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this to matter when the good lobbied for is private and when the lobbying occurs in quiet, 
not high politics. As shown, both is the case in the shale gas story. In terms of funding 
and resources the oil and gas sector is substantially stronger than the renewable energy or 
environmental sector. The lobbying forces that favour continued, expanded and 
unhindered shale gas exploration in the United States, both industry and lobbying firms, 
are amongst the country’s strongest and historically most successful interest groups. This 
suggests an advantage for their lobbying success.   
 
VI.1.1 Lobbying and institutions of the United States energy sector  
In the United States, there is a history of doubts concerning the influence of industry 
pressure groups on energy policy, especially regarding generous regulation around the 
fossil fuel industry.112 There are many examples of favourable treatment of the industry 
within the timeframe covered in this thesis. During the Bush administration the 2005 
Energy Policy Act was passed which included several regulations favourable to the 
development of shale gas in particular (United States Congress 2005). The exemption of 
fracking from the Safe Water Drinking Act was expanded in it, for example by excluding 
from the definition “underground injection” all “underground injection of fluids or 
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations 
related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities’’ (United States Congress 2005, 119 
STAT. 694). This covers the main process of hydraulic fracturing injection, which has 
raised many concerns about environmental damage and the effects on human health, and 
basically excludes it from environmental tests. Amongst other things the Act set out that 
a variety of fracking operations, depending on history or size of the gas field, no longer 
require an environmental impact of a statement as originally provided by the 1969 
National Environmental Policy Act (United States Congress 2005, 119 STAT. 748). It 
also excluded oil and gas wastes from a list of hazardous wastes. Waste disposal has caused 
serious concerns about fracking, more so than with conventional gas, and it is allowed to 
go unchecked for the time being.  
G.W. Bush and Cheney in particular received much criticism for what was seen as catering 
to entrenched fossil fuel interests and their aggressive approach to using domestic fossil 
fuel resources – especially through the energy task force headed by Cheney (Pasternak 
2001). Regarding the ‘Halliburton Loophole’, which concerns the extended exemption of 
                                                 
112 There has been a longer history of shale policy and regulation in the United States than in the United 
Kingdom, hence it is necessary to look at two successive administrations with regards to their shale gas 
attitudes.  
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shale gas and fracking from the Safe Water Drinking Act in 2005, one former EPA official 
who co-wrote the exemption later agreed that it “went too far” (Lustgarten 2011). 
Evidence emerged that in its draft version, a 2004 study by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2004) acknowledged fracking-related threats to 
drinking water and underground water, yet in its final version these had disappeared 
(Urbina 2011b). The study concluded that there was little or no threat at all to water 
supplies, raising concerns about the independence and integrity of its content. The change 
was later confirmed by an employee of the agency, citing a strong influence by the 
respective industry and hence political pressure to remove the stronger warnings and 
hesitation form the report (Urbina 2011b). Beyond that the report focused mainly or 
almost exclusively on the injection of the fracking fluids but not on the other connected 
stages of the fracking process, which chapters two and four showed have a considerable, 
equally or more harmful environmental impact as well. An EPA whistle-blower, Weston 
Wilson, stated that five of the seven peer-reviewers involved in the EPA study that 
allowed it were current or recent former employees of the shale gas and gas industry 
(Urbina 2011b): a good example of lobbying through the provision of personnel and 
expertise. One cannot accurately establish how many more similar instances have taken 
place, as it took a whistle-blower to reveal this one. Altering the specificities of a report 
which then clarifies favourable shale policy as part of a larger bill is also of course part of 
an action taken in quiet, not high politics: there is little public salience and attention to it. 
Despite hopes for the Obama administration to tackle the issue, any attempt to close the 
so-called Halliburton loophole, which also exempts fracking companies from having to 
disclose the chemicals and other ingredients injected in the process, has been refuted 
(Cunningham 2013). To remedy this legal exemption would have to grant the EPA greater 
oversight over hydraulic fracturing. There was little doubt from the very beginning of the 
Bush presidency that both Bush as well as Cheney and his energy task force, which made 
said policy decisions, were very close to industry leaders (Pasternak 2001; Doggett 2010). 
The 2005 Energy Policy Act overall appears not strongly environmentally concerned 
(United States Congress 2005). Clearly, major lobbying on behalf of private pro-fracking 
interests can be established to have taken place in the United States.  
The Obama administration until early 2016 was also known for comparatively strong 
support of the natural gas industry, if not decried as overly gas industry friendly the way 
Bush and Cheney were. Analysts suggested that President Obama meant for natural gas 
to replace the environmentally even more harmful coal, which it has not, but either way, 
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that his administration was “fully embracing” gas (Cunningham 2013).113 Obama’s 
administration warned of health and environmental concerns more openly than their 
predecessor by saying “the technologies aren’t as developed as we’d like and so there are 
some concerns” (Berman 2011). This is quite late, as shale gas development was already 
in full swing. These concerns are still around and research results are gathering that declare 
them as valid, yet until 2016 little has been done to mitigate them. In the first months of 
the Obama presidency there were intentions to tighten regulation for fracking as well, 
which were taken seriously enough by the industry. This shows in sharp political replies, 
amongst them the president of the API warning that Obama’s minister of the interior, 
Ken Salazar, would make it “difficult to produce American oil and gas, put more 
Americans back to work and help restore our nation's economy” (Doggett 2010). Salazar 
early on in his term announced he would no longer accept the major gas and oil industry 
as “the kings of the world” they were (to him) under the Bush administration, where they 
could “walk in and take whatever they wanted” (Doggett 2010). Clearly, from his position 
he saw evidence of pro-shale lobbying, too. Lobbying in favour of shale persisted during 
the Obama administration with quiet politics and legislative drafts introducing rules that 
favoured shale gas. The EPA had planned to call for a moratorium on fracking in 2010 
as attested for by one leaked regional briefing and a separate leaked draft by EPA official 
Philip Sweeney: yet this particular part of a bigger EPA recommendation document was 
completely removed before being sent to legislators (The New York Times 2011, 442).114 
More recent drafts by the EPA on a national study on fracking were altered several times, 
until for example some plans of radioactivity tests for drinking water and plans for 
studying toxic fumes released during drilling were dropped entirely (The New York Times 
2011, 260).115 Small reforms were undertaken, assigning a more active role for the Bureau 
of Land Management rather than the industries itself in selecting land to drill for example, 
and holding back or overturning several leases. Yet nothing changed majorly under the 
new Democratic presidency, as the fracking phenomenon was well underway when 
Obama took office. Congress put pressure on Salazar to abandon ideas of increased 
federal oversight over gas production; the House Energy and Commerce Committee also 
criticised the plans of further regulation, saying that in the current climate it would be too 
                                                 
113 “Sometimes there are disputes about natural gas, but let me say this:  We should strengthen our 
position as the top natural gas producer because, in the medium term at least, it not only can provide safe, 
cheap power, but it can also help reduce our carbon emissions” (Obama 2013).  
114 When asked why this happened, an agency scientist replied with the simple statement: “politics” 
(Urbina 2011b).  
115 In the vast amount of documents from EPA leaked by the New York times in 2011, one can also 
review several rather direct letters of pressure from political officials to EPA administrators, particularly 
around the time of the national study planned in 2010, the scope of which they sought to undermine (The 
New York Times 2011, 407).  
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difficult to “oppose growth”, which they claimed shale gas would deliver (NGI 2011). 
The above-mentioned criticism and new investigations lead to somewhat of a change of 
tone in the Obama administration’s treatment of fracking as well as to new federal 
regulation. In March 2015 new regulation was presented, designed to increase drilling 
safety (Davenport 2015). EPA is the key agency concerned with overseeing 
environmental issues of fracking: however, the EPA, as mentioned above, has in fact very 
little jurisdiction over fracking operations. This is both because they are exempt from 
major environmental protection bills and because their regulation largely remains state 
business (Urbina 2011b). The difference between federal land and state land is important, 
not least because a lot of state legislation could be considered quiet politics. On federal 
land, slightly stricter rules for drilling were introduced by Obama’s administration in 2015, 
but almost none of the shale operations take place on federal land, and state regulations 
are unaffected by these new rules (Davenport 2015). At the time, officials expressed hope 
that the new federal regulation, which includes the disclosure of chemicals used as well as 
inspections of wells, will serve as standard for state legislation but there is no mandate 
whatsoever to force the issue (Davenport 2015). API has filed a lawsuit against the 
regulations which it called “a reaction to unsubstantiated concerns” (Davenport 2015). 
The new rules were in fact struck down by a federal judge in June 2016, stating this was 
not to do with shale gas but that the interior department had no authority to make such 
a rule (Jopson 2016).  
Lobbying shale gas is not limited to Washington. America’s Natural Gas Alliance made 
generous donations to ASGK Strategies, a consulting firm favouring gas, several 
Democratic Party as well as Republican Party affiliated PR firms, and Adventures 
Partners, a company producing education curriculums and classroom materials which 
promote natural gas use (Fang 2013). ANGA also made several major donations to media 
outlets, amongst them Bloomberg, the Texas Tribune, the Environmental Media 
Association and the National Journal (Fang 2013). The web of interconnection between 
different energy companies, private institutions and not for profit advisory bodies is 
substantial, and hard to gain an overview of. ANGA is a due-paying member of the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) since 2013. ALEC is another powerful 
player on the state level, private and corporate funded yet non-profit and tax-exempt 
(ALEC 2015). “There is no doubt that corporate sponsors are getting what they pay for: 
the ears of decision-makers whose decisions will have a direct impact on their bottom 
lines” (Ben-Ishai 2012, 23). ALEC is a particularly effective lobbying group as it mostly 
targets state level legislators, who are often ignored by the public in favour of federal 
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politics – so much so that in the 2014 by-election an estimated 25% of state legislators 
ran unopposed for their seats (Mokhiber 2013). But they are certainly not ignored by the 
shale gas industry as most fracking regulation happens at state level. In fact one in four 
state legislators is a member of ALEC according to a recent report, and ALEC prepares 
many drafts for legislation (Oliver 2014; Parti 2015; C. Taylor 2016). One bill targeted was 
the omnibus Electricity Freedom Act, for which ALEC prepared a statement including 
the phrase “BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED that the State of [insert state] repeals the 
renewable energy mandate” (Powell 2014).116 ALEC is an evident example, but not the 
only lobby of its kind. In the particular case of fracking, an important role is also played 
by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)117, or the United States 
Conference of Mayors (USCM)118 (Ben-Ishai 2012, 34). They all cultivate relations 
between policymakers and private interests and create a very rarely publicised web of 
interest access points. This reinforces the role that lobbying resources play in determining 
lobbying success.  
Returning to insights gained from the previous chapter on what constituted lobbying 
success in other case studies, the information laid out above confirms an image of 
closeness between the pro-fracking lobbyists and policymakers. The pro shale gas lobby 
appear to be on good terms with regulators and form part of in-groups which have 
decided energy policy in the past. They are closely interconnected with successful 
lobbying groups, especially at state level. Another indicator of a winning lobbying strategy, 
the focus on quiet politics, is also visible in the efforts of the shale gas lobby. Members 
of lobbying bodies such as ALEC have proven very successful at influencing regulation 
at state level, quietly.119 Lobbying through the provision of experts to help write regulation 
is also confirmed to have occurred in favour of fracking, specifically to water down 
environmental legislation. The sector has enjoyed close connections with policymakers in 
the past, and seconded its own lobbyists to draft legislation. Their opposition does not 
compare to the power, access and influence of the fossil fuel and gas lobbies in the United 
States. Taken together, these signs indicate that the gas and shale gas lobby are well 
situated for very successful lobbying of their goals.  
                                                 
116 This pre-prepared legislative draft was made famous by a lawmaker in effect forgetting to insert the 
name of his own state (Powell 2014).  
117 of which ANGA is a “Platinum Sponsor” and AGA is a “Gold Sponsor” (Ben-Ishai 2012, 28ff) 
118 of which ANGA is also a member  
119 ALEC is strongly backed by the shale gas-friendly Koch Industries: one of their latest joint lobbying 
efforts is to turn revealing the chemicals in shale injections into a criminal offence for doctors, first 
responders or public health officials (Coleman 2014).  
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This section confirms that lobbying efforts by fracking supporters have shown results, 
especially through close relationships with policymakers. Rather than attempting to steer 
high politics – not that there so far was any substantial threat of a moratorium on fracking 
– lobbyists have focused on the specifics of regulation. For example, the exceptions to 
environmental legislation that were gained for the process of hydraulic fracturing in the 
2005 Environmental Policy Act can be considered a major success for the industry.120 
Concerns about the fracking process were conveniently taken out of an official EPA 
report due to pressure from the industry. Through keeping shale regulation on a state 
rather than national level, the shale gas lobby has further helped along its goal to prevent 
the details that matter to their clients from turning into a coordinated or high politics 
issue. Corresponding to the conclusions of the literature review on private interest pursuit, 
lobbyists for fracking have engaged by providing expertise and personnel. Important 
regulatory successes for shale gas were achieved through the secondment of current or 
former gas company employees to draft legislation and close connections with legislators.  
Following the select specific examples above of how shale industry members have been 
spotted to provide expertise to policymakers, the following more comprehensive 
overview of connections between the industry and its regulators consolidates the 
impression of closeness. This overview was gained using Boardex, a subscription business 
intelligence tool designed for networking and possibly lobbying as well as new business 
development (BoardEx 2016). It has also been used as a source of data for academic 
research in areas such as boardroom process, corporate governance and corporate 
connectivity. Boardex contains intelligence such as in-depth profiles of over 700.000 
global business leaders as well data on the relationships between these leaders, their 
companies and staff with one another, all of which is updated frequently (BoardEx 2016).  
The Figures 26 and 27 (BoardEX 2016)121 show the connections one finds when cross 
checking for first degree and second degree links between government and larger interest 
groups with BoardEx. First degree connections imply that a person has direct ties to both 
bodies, for example Centrica and the DECC, because they work for one but sit on the 
board or expert advisory panel of another, or they used to work for Centrica and now for 
the DECC or vice versa.   
                                                 
120 To recall, a major advantage of the regulation is turning shale gas waste products into a non-issue. 
Research has shown that it is often the aftermath of fracking, for example the re-introduction of waste 
waters into the ground, that are responsible for serious environmental and health hazards. Yet at the 
moment, any oil and gas wastes escape regulation through a blanket clause excluding them from the 
definition of hazardous waste and therefore do not have to comply with any standards for ensuring safety 
or allow independent testing of their (waste disposal) activities. 
121 Data is in Appendix.  
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Looking only at first degree connections, there are notable variations between different 
energy companies and lobbies. More notable is a difference between the pro-shale 
interests in comparison to the anti-shale lobbying groups. The gas companies BP, 
Chevron and Exxon Mobile all have multiple direct contacts in the current regulation, 
especially within the DoE. So does the lobbying institute API. Most major pro-fracking 
groups are represented. The connections include current ambassadors to the DoE who 
were previously executives at BP, or a current advisor to the DoE who is still currently a 
chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, or a current consultant at the API who is also a consultant 
for the EPA (BoardEX 2016). The previous director of API is also currently a chairman 
at the DoE (BoardEX 2016). Greenpeace is almost not represented, and FoE are 
exclusively represented in the EPA – a body that as discussed has little authority on 
fracking matters. This reconfirms the above made conclusion that there are close 
connections between industry and policymakers, which theory shows us has positively 
affected lobbying results in the past. The first-degree saturation of governmental 
bureaucracies with members of the oil and gas industry or the industry’s lobbying arm 
suggests that there is much movement of personnel between regulators and those whom 
they are tasked with regulating. This suggests a revolving door scenario, and a potential 
for regulatory capture. The more employees of the gas industry work in regulating the gas 
industry, the more this regulation is likely to favour the gas industry. The level of 
interaction noted and especially the one-sidedness of the revolving door issue leads me 
to contemplate the potential for cultural capture as well. If as much exchange occurs 
Figure 26: Industry and Policy Institution Connections, 1st Degree U.S. (BoardEx 2016), own design 
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between the oil and gas industry and the legislative, it is absolutely possible that 
policymakers genuinely come to think that whatever benefits the gas sector must be 
overall beneficial to the national economy. This is a hypothesis I cannot confirm easily 
but that is suggested by evidence considered; and nothing validates the suspicion that a 
similar situation of cultural capture exists for contact with the alternative energy and 
environmental lobbies. 
Figure 27 (BoardEX 2016) below shows the second degree connections. A second-degree 
connection means that members of the government are currently directly working with 
or have previously directly worked with members of the lobby in question, either in 
committees or working groups or for previous employers, and are therefore connected. 
Necessarily this overview is not as significant as the first-hand connections, but sharing 
relationships through current or previous work connections of course adds to the aspect 
of closeness and relationships that exist between regulators and those regulated.  
 This second degree shows the same trend of discrepancy yet with a much larger margin 
between the number of connections made for the gas lobby as compared to its opposition. 
The connections are however less significant than first degree connections because they 
include differently strong connections: if an EPA official works closely together with a 
Devon Energy chairman in an institute of City Council for almost a decade, this is 
stronger than a connection through a working group that lasted only a year. Still, 
Figure 27: Industry and Policy Institution Connections, 2nd Degree U.S. (BoardEx 2016), own design 
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Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, two major opposing parties to fracking 
development, do not remotely compare in their numbers within the legislative. The two 
biggest groups lobbying against fracking have connections to policymakers that account 
for a fraction of the ones enjoyed by their opponents. Numbers overlapping with them 
include both trustees and employees but also, mostly, simple members of the group, so 
the number of connections should be higher than those with a company which does not 
offer such easy membership status.  
The results further suggest that my second narrative of private interests is more likely to 
explain government decisions in favour of fracking in the United States. Having close 
working relationships and connections with policymakers has helped in lobbying other 
causes in the past. In the United States, employees of several of the selected biggest gas 
companies with interests in shale gas as well as other shale gas supporters have used the 
revolving door between regulation and industry or continue to work for both sides. I 
argue that a decision in favour of favourable shale gas policy is highly likely to have 
resulted from the fact that many of the officials tasked with it have interest or work 
connections with shale gas. The many reports of lobbying activity are to me a much more 
plausible reason for the expansion of shale gas development than its value to the U.S. 
economy.  
The oil and gas interest groups have a long history of powerful organised lobbying 
spanning at least four decades (CRP 2016b). Their lobbying personnel is much more 
numerous and their lobbying spending much higher than that of energy competitors and 
environmental lobbyists. The analysis shows that they have established long term and 
regular connections with policymakers, which the theoretical review revealed as a key 
factor in lobbying success (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 
2013). Since they apply, resource strength, which is considerable with the pro-fracking 
lobby, also impacts the success rate. The alternative energy and environmental lobbies are 
younger, with fewer full time and revolving lobbyists, and to all appearances with less 
embedded connections with policymakers and regulating agencies. The loaning of experts 
to draft legislation has proven successful for both the pro and anti-fracking lobby; yet 
there is so far only one report of state level regulation the latter have won through such 
methods, whereas shale gas supporters have gained several exceptions from national 
environmental legislation through this tactic. The revolving door practice is certainly an 
issue for the energy regulation and the gas industry, strengthening the potential for 
regulatory and cultural capture. To sum up, the oil and gas industry, a majority of which 
now is interested in fracking, clearly has a considerable level of access to and support 
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from governmental institutions, more so than their opponents. Grasping all of these 
developments together, in this chapter I find strong evidence of successful lobbying 
strategies employed by the U.S. shale gas industry that have led to desired results, a clear 
disadvantage for the fracking opposition, and a confirmation of indicators for lobbying 
from the theoretical review. For my thesis, this provides a plausible addition to the shale 
gas story and appears likely to have significantly impacted pro-fracking policy decisions 
in the United States, substantiating the theoretical claims of my second narrative.  
 
 
VI.2 Lobbying fracking in the United Kingdom  
After considering pro-fracking interest groups in the United States, in comparison I now 
identify and assess the private groups that are in favour of commencing or expanding 
shale gas development in the United Kingdom, according to their own statements or 
publicly available evidence. The situation of shale and therefore shale lobbying is clearly 
different to the U.S. case, as there has of yet been no commercial fracking for shale gas 
in the UK (July 2016) and less concrete data on lobbying is available.122  
UK energy companies have actively moved to learn from their U.S. counterparts, asking 
for experience and hiring specialist workforce from successful U.S. shale operations 
(Hellier 2015a). For the purpose of this thesis I am counting as the primary private interest 
groups in favour of fracking the top companies that have applied and received licenses 
for fracking from the UK government and are considered worthy of mentioning by more 
than one author (Gosden 2015c; Hellier 2015a; Howard and Hellier 2015; Shale Gas 
Europe 2016). That list includes Ineos, Cuadrilla, IGas, Total, GDF Suez, Hutton, Egdon, 
Aurora, British Gas and Centrica.123 In 2016 the only company with consent by the Oil 
and Gas Authority (OGA) to undertake hydraulic fracturing in the UK is Cuadrilla, which 
is also likely the most prominent name in the pro-fracking lobby group (Dias 2016). This 
is mostly due to media coverage of an earthquake caused by Cuadrilla’s test drilling for 
shale gas which prompted a short-lived moratorium on fracking (White 2011). Cuadrilla’s 
                                                 
122 One might conclude that lobbyists in favour of fracking have not achieved the same levels of success 
as their U.S. colleagues, as there still is no commercial fracking in the UK. But that would be too 
simplistic, as the opportunity of shale gas in the UK only manifested itself later in time than in the U.S., 
partly inspired by U.S. experience. Furthermore, the UK’s and relevant EU regulation around 
environmental standards for gas operations was more detailed and more difficult to shift to begin with, as 
the following analysis will show.  
123 Until summer 2016, no licenses have been granted in Scotland or Northern Ireland, which have 
banned fracking (Williamson 2015; Brooks 2016). The situation in Wales is undecided but there have not 
been any licences rewarded for shale gas yet and a moratorium is still in place (BBC News 2015).  
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chairman Lord Browne has not been exclusively enthusiastic about shale gas prospects, 
stating that he wants to commence fracking operations and has been held back by 
regulatory impediments, but that he could not predict the contribution of shale gas to the 
UK (Carrington 2013b). He appears to reject most environmental concerns about 
fracking, and was previously reprimanded for failing to disclose damages to Cuadrilla’s 
Blackpool well that could have negative impacts on the environment (Carrington 2013b). 
Another key figure in the shale industry much more eager about promoting shale is the 
chairman of Ineos. He repeatedly claimed that fracking was needed to keep the British 
economy competitive, and that there would be a shale gas “revolution” in the UK (Hellier 
2015a, 2015b).  
It is much more difficult to provide an overview of UK lobbying on shale gas than U.S. 
lobbying because UK regulation on lobbying is very different and there is no acclaimed 
comprehensive third-party source of statistics about lobbying spending and lobbyist 
activity. The statutory lobbying register introduced by the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat government does not in fact require a disclosure of all lobbying spending, nor 
does it actually register a majority of lobbying activity (Who’s Lobbying 2012; Parliament 
Publications & Records 2013).  
The thought that energy policy in the UK may be influenced by specific powerful interest 
groups from within the energy industry is not novel (Mitchell 2013). A concern raised 
about the British energy sector and the DECC in particular is the amount of experts on 
loan that it draws from major energy companies, mainly because certain companies’ 
secondees far outnumber others (Mitchell 2012; Carrington and Sparrow 2013). This 
includes secondees from Centrica, Conoco Philipps and Shell; the highest number of 
employees or experts from any one company involved in advising and drafting policy in 
the DECC are from Centrica/British Gas, who have a considerable interest in shale gas 
exploration in England (Mitchell 2012; Carrington and Sparrow 2013). This is a clear 
example of a lobbying strategy deemed highly successful in the literature on interest 
power, namely the provision of information and experts. Lobbying practice around the 
UK energy sector has previously been the topic of criticism, and plenty of recent criticism 
is specifically generated by anti-fracking campaigns which consider the government and 
pro-fracking lobbies to be severely entrenched, or captured (Leftly 2013; Carrington and 
Sparrow 2013; Carrington 2014a; Mason 2014). A problem with allegations of favouritism 
or regulatory capture in lobbying is always that, if there are no unforeseen leaks, 
instructions to such expert consultants and the discussions held at meetings remain 
entirely confidential and unreported.  
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What can be said in favour of the sceptics is that the lobby register proposed and enacted 
by the current UK government is least helpful in this situation. This is because only 
consultant lobbyists, a minority in the industry, need to be disclosed in it, but in-house 
lobbyists for firms do not, and neither do firms whose main business is not lobbying, 
even if they engage in it successfully (UK Parliament Publications & Records 2013).124 It 
is only a specific image of lobbying that is encompassed by UK legislation: as one 
unnamed director puts it, “at this time, at least according to the Government’s bill, no 
lobbying has been done. If there is no contact with ministers – even if we’ve arranged for 
clients to see ministers unaccompanied – nothing has happened. So 95% of what we do 
is irrelevant” (Cusick 2013). Amongst the actions not necessary to register are therefore: 
policymakers having direct contact with industry figures, professional bodies, former 
ministers with influence, select in-house committee members or advisers; or lobby-
steered agenda setting and choreographing, even information providing to Whitehall and 
to specific ministerial meetings (Cusick 2013). This is the case without documentation or 
transparency as long as the meetings are not attended by the registered lobbyists. For an 
example of how this worked in favour of pro-shale lobbying, in late 2011 a round of 
meetings to discuss fracking with senior ministers in the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change was put on the agenda and organised by Lord Brown, chairman of drilling 
company Cuadrilla and formal non-executive advisor to the Cabinet Office (Cusick 2013). 
Cuadrilla is furthermore understood to have contacted the Treasury, to have drilling 
company corporate affairs consultants and gas company employees help write legislation 
(Carrington and Sparrow 2013; Cusick 2013).125 According to the UK lobbying register 
discussed above, no lobbying took place and there is no official record of any lobbying 
efforts regarding these actions by Cuadrilla. This is an excellent example of lobbying 
through quiet politics and lobbying that stays hidden and elusive to the public or anybody 
outside a select circle.  
Despite the UK’s lobbying register aimed at detecting only professional lobbying bodies, 
regarding shale gas, there is not much information available from the government on their 
activities either. One has to turn to investigative journalism NGO Spinwatch for that 
(Jones and Rowell 2015). Lobbying firms Edelman, Burson-Marsteller, Hill & Knowlton, 
Bell Pottinger and Weber Shandwick were all hired by fracking companies, including 
                                                 
124 There are attempts by NGOs to decipher who is lobbying the UK government by tracking what these 
firms are spending on lobbying in the U.S., as there is no comparable data (Who’s Lobbying 2012). This 
of course also renders it impossible to provide a comparison about the lobbying spending by renewable 
energy firms – yet there is hardly reports about this, suggesting it may not have reached levels that pique 
public interests.   
125 Cuadrilla is also known to have contacted a select group of academics and journalists for their cause 
(Cusick 2013). 
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Cuadrilla, Ineos, or North West to influence the UK government. The practice of the 
revolving door is at its most visible in the UK shale industry in this context: all of the 
above mentioned lobbying firms have either employed ex-regulators or some of their 
former employees now work in government jobs (Jones and Rowell 2015): for an 
example, this includes the energy adviser to Cameron, Ms Singh, who was previously chief 
lobby strategist at Centrica – her predecessor left to advise Riverstone Holdings, who own 
a major share in Cuadrilla.  
The lobbying strategies deemed successful throughout the theoretical review of lobbying 
are all notably in action in this example of fracking lobbying for the UK case study. No 
such report exists about meetings with the fracking opposition. The lobbying is conducted 
as subtly as possible, in quiet politics and through the provision of expertise: current UK 
regulation on lobbying favours this kind of approach. In-house lobbyists are not 
registered, so one cannot begin to estimate how much lobbying has been conducted 
through those.  
Given that most of the specific regulation of Britain’s gas production and environmental 
legislation is in fact dependent on European law, it is necessary to also consider lobbying 
for shale gas on the European level. Cuadrilla, Total, IGas, Ineos, GDF Suez (Hellier 
2015a) are represented by Shale Gas Europe, Euro-Gas, EEF, Europia and Concawe 
(Tansey 2014; Warren 2013), which are actively involved in lobbying at the European 
Union level (Buisset, Øye, and Selleslaghs 2012; European Commission and European 
Parliament 2016). Business Europe is the main representative organisation for European 
employers and represents Total, BP, Cuadrilla and other companies with stakes in the 
shale gas industry (Business Europe 2015). It has lobbied members of the European 
parliament (MEPs), for example to vote against mandatory environmental impact 
assessments for shale gas, ahead of several key votes on energy legislation (Business 
Europe 2013). The group also lobbied to prevent the introduction of obligatory 
independent reports on environmental impact, insisting that gas developers should be 
allowed to prepare those reports on their own (Business Europe 2013). Business Europe 
lobbied to exclude the concern of climate change in environmental impact assessment 
because of ‘legal uncertainties’ around climate change as well as ensuing cost and time 
burdens they did not consider justified (Tansey 2014, 7). Their specific voting 
recommendations to MEPs in my judgment seem to directly oppose their official 
commitment to environmental, sustainable goals (Business Europe 2015). Another very 
active lobby is the International Oil and Gas Producers Association (OGP) which 
represents, amongst others, firms that frack in the United States and are interested in 
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fracking in the UK: Total, GDF Suez, BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips. The 
company has produced several fact sheets which include dubitable and unproven 
statements about shale gas stated as facts, such as that it will not affect support for 
renewables, or that it will increase GDP and job growth, as well as blatantly false 
statements, such as the claim that “there has been no case of hydraulic fracturing 
operations contaminating drinking water resources” (Tansey 2014, 8). It is entirely 
unlikely that at the point of publication, OGP officials were unaware of all cited cases of 
water contamination, or had any proof of other claims they made. Shale Gas Europe 
produces fact sheets which include inaccurate information such as “it can be conclusively 
demonstrated that none of the claims of environmental harm commonly levelled against 
hydraulic fracturing stand up to close scrutiny” (Tansey 2014, 9). The manufacturer’s 
association EEF126 also lobbies for shale gas and in turn is known for its closeness to 
MEPs and special cultivation of relationships between legislators and lobbyists, providing 
both funded dinners and lunches as well as briefings for MEPs, and in general giving 
representatives of the gas industry access to MEPs (Tansey 2014). Also on European 
Union level there is a new network called the European Science and Technology Network on 
Unconventional Hydrocarbon Extraction (ESTNUCE) which is part of the European 
Commission’s in-house science and research services (EC JRC 2015). Advisory groups 
which form part of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) have been previously heavily criticised 
for intransparency and industry links on several occasions, and the European Parliaments 
chose to freeze the ECJRC’s expert group budget twice in four years due to concerns 
about corporate domination of these groups (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014b; 
O’Reilly 2014). A problem with this new advisory network on shale gas is that of its 74 
members, 60 are not direct members of the Commission but advisors, and more than 40 
of these (over 70% of the advisors) are either direct representatives of the shale gas 
industry or have financial stakes in it (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014a). Shale Gas 
Europe is one of the groups involved, as are employees of Total, Shell, ExxonMobil, 
GDF Suez and Cuadrilla, companies which are listed as ‘external beneficiaries’ of the 
group (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014a). The academic and research institutions 
represented in the JRC unconventional gas expert group also have ties with the industry, 
such as the Oil and Gas Institute Krakow, the University of Mining and Metallurgy Yale, 
as well as individual academics who have spent part of their academic career working for 
Chevron or Shale Gas Europe (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014a). Four of the five 
chairs of the group hold senior positions with conflicts of interest: at Cuadrilla, 
                                                 
126 They were formerly known as the Engineering Employers’ Federation 
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ConocoPhillips, at the Polish Geological Institute, another strong fracking supporter 
(Corporate Europe Observatory 2014a), and at the Institute Français du Pétrole et des 
Energies Nouvelles (IFPEN), which has strong oil and gas industry links and has 
campaigned to lift the French moratorium on fracking. The fifth chair is from the UK 
Environment Agency, which has also broadly supported fracking, dismissed or 
downplayed environmental risks and is headed by a former Cuadrilla advisor (Mason 
2014). Clearly, an established network for lobbying policymakers exists to advance the 
case of shale gas for the UK in the European Union, which sets many of its environmental 
standards127. So far, no commercial fracking has occurred on UK soil, which makes the 
amount of preparation through lobbying regulation appear as very thorough planning by 
the industry. The fruitful tactic of lobbying quiet rather than high politics has been 
employed by firms that wish to frack in the UK. There are no notable reports of active 
fracking lobbying in terms of vote swaying around the time of the English or Scottish 
moratorium on fracking. However, there are many reports of lobbyists providing 
expertise, information and personnel to the bodies that end up deciding on fracking safety 
regulation. Another condition mentioned by the literature for the success of lobbying, 
keeping up close relationship with policymakers, is also high on the agenda of the pro 
fracking lobby and has been mostly achieved on EU level, through funded dinners for 
example. The evidence is abundant for both, close relations between interest groups and 
policymakers, and the provision of information and expertise to policymakers by 
lobbyists. This in turn means that resources play a role – and the shale gas supporting UK 
gas industry has created a lot of wealth for itself (Maidment 2006; Jones and Rowell 2015).  
To provide a comparison, let me consider the main opposition to fracking in the UK. 
Major opponents of fracking in the UK are the environmental lobbies Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth, the same ones as in the United States, as well as the newly-founded 
Frack Off lobby which combines many smaller groups. These three were involved in 
organising the high-profile Balcombe protests. There are also numerous local groups 
against fracking, such as Ribble Estuary Against Fracking, Frack Free Fernhurst or 
Residents Action on Fylde Fracking128 (Melley 2011). Many of these campaigns have 
emotionalised the protest against fracking considerably, painting the industry as the 
ultimate evil and claiming there to be scientific consensus on its harmful environmental 
and economic effects (Mathiesen 2015a). Given the connections some of the pro-fracking 
lobbyists enjoy it is understandable that many in the public and media observers are 
                                                 
127 (until now, not considering Brexit).  
128 https://www.facebook.com/RibbleEstuaryAgainstFracking, http://stopfyldefracking.org.uk/, 
http://www.frackfreefernhurst.com/ 
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resentful or suspicious of them; however, the anti-fracking lobby is also guilty of 
misrepresenting factual knowledge and claiming to have knowledge they cannot verify 
(Telegraph 2015). Somewhat more cautious motions against fracking or at least to regulate 
fracking have garnered the support of the likes of the National Trust and the nature 
conservation charity RSPB129, who in 2014 released a joint report about concerns of 
environmental pollution, including calls for increased regulation (RSPB and the National 
Trust 2014). Regardless, there are no high-profile reports of covet meetings between the 
anti-fracking lobby and legislators, neither on UK nor on EU level. If this were the case, 
it would be reported by the pro-fracking lobby and news media sympathetic to its cause, 
just as it was reported in the United States and just as the opposite is reported in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.    
In summary, it is clear that there are considerable interest formations beyond 
governmental policymakers that have a stake, or believe to have a stake, in the decision 
on shale gas development in the UK. Energy companies interested in fracking have 
membership of or are represented by very busy lobbying groups at the European Union 
level that have shown successful in paving the way for shale gas to circumvent 
environmental regulation. In-house lobbyists, namely members of companies such as 
Cuadrilla that are interested in fracking, have held meetings with ministers in the UK (that 
were not registered as lobbying). Strategies suggested as successful by the literature for 
lobbying have been reported in the UK just as they have in the U.S.: close relationships 
with policymakers, connections with ministers, and formal advisory roles for regulation. 
The latter suggests the provision of expertise by lobbies, as former gas company 
employees now work as advisors to policymakers, which the literature lists as another 
proven successful lobbying tactic. Furthermore, the picture emerges that these private 
interest groups have very different levels of resources and different histories of interaction 
with political parties, with the pro-shale gas industry in a more favourable position. The 
interest groups who favour shale enjoy the advantage of providing information to the 
regulating and policymaking bodies.  
 
VI.2.1 Lobbying and institutions of the United Kingdom energy sector  
Within the United Kingdom, a variety of actors is involved in the regulation of shale gas 
policy. On a first level there are the two chambers of parliament who in theory get to vote 
separately on the matter in general – for a fracking moratorium in 2011, to lift it in late 
                                                 
129 Formerly the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds only.  
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2012, and again to affirm the continuation of fracking exploration in January 2015 
(Perraudin 2015; Carrington 2015c). The Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) lead by the Secretary of State for Energy also needs to grant permission.130 The 
British Geological Society plays an important role and has to be consulted for advice on 
reserve sizes and accessibility of shale layers, as well as groundwater contamination fears 
(presumably non-binding, as not stated otherwise). Further along the path in UK 
regulation, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has to regulate on engineering issues, 
approve well design and select an independent well examiner (UKOOG 2015a). Thanks 
to lobbying efforts, it remains possible for the independent examiner to be an employee 
of the operating company (The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering 
2012). Beyond that, the operators currently have to comply with 17 separate European 
Union directives (mostly regarding environmental issues) (UKOOG 2015b).131 However, 
the UK shale gas sector is not yet as developed, there has not been fracking on a 
commercial level: hence, some of the regulators above have not yet been tasked, so 
specific attention should be directed to policymakers about to decide on this issue, before 
those that might come in at the implementation stage.132 As shale gas was not an actively 
discussed topic in the United Kingdom before 2009, there will be no attention paid to 
previous governments’ interest in shale gas exploration.  
So let us consider the official stance on shale gas by key policymakers. Former prime 
minister Cameron has been a strong and constant supporter of shale gas extraction in 
Britain, coining the phrase “going all out for shale” (Cairney 2015; Watt 2014).133 134 He 
revealed his belief that it was the United Kingdom’s “duty to be more energy-
independent” (PA 2014) and has cited energy security as a key reason for his interest in 
shale (Carrington 2015a). At one point Cameron claimed that shale gas reserves could 
                                                 
130 Notably, in this very early stage already there is an obligation for all chemicals used for the entirety of 
the drilling and fracking process to be declared so they can be examined by the Environmental Agency 
EA (or NRW, SEPA). This is important as it is a step entirely lacking in the United States, where 
chemicals used do not need to be declared in order to ensure competition and the protection of trade 
secrets between the companies.  
131 The latest European Commission Impact Assessment considered the current regulation not effective 
and not addressing environmental risks, not sufficient in providing legal clarity or taking into account 
public concerns (European Commission 2014a).  
132 The first permission for drilling was granted by a Yorkshire council in May 2016 (BBC Business News 
2016). Before that, only one application of this kind had been handled in the UK, by Lancashire County 
Council which rejected an application by Cuadrilla. Immediately after this rejection ministers voted in a 
fast track process, taking effect in August 2016. It means that ministers can since override council 
decisions if the councils take any longer than the projected 16 weeks to come to a decision (Clark and 
Bounds 2015).  
133 Until 2016, the end of this analysis.  
134 This case study does not cover the time after Mr. Cameron’s resignation and will not include the new 
mid 2016 UK government under Theresa May, nor the fact that the UK has voted to leave the EU which 
was unforeseeable at time of research or at least impossible to include as a potential future uncertainty. 
 144 
make Europe “wean itself off reliance on exports from Russia” (PA 2014). The data to 
support the claim that anyone in Europe who depends on Russian gas imports could 
replace those with shale gas currently does not exist, and the UK does not rely on Russian 
gas at all. The former prime minister also promised that lower energy bills would be the 
outcome of shale gas operations: “fracking has real potential to drive energy bills down”, 
and “if we don’t back this technology, we will miss a massive opportunity to help families 
with their bills and make our country more competitive” (Cameron 2013).135 136 Cameron 
has made inaccurate statements about gas reserves, likely due to confusion over the 
difference of reserves and resources (BGS 2013a; Cameron 2013). Despite all of the 
evidence against it Cameron connected hydraulic fracturing with the goal of tackling 
climate change (Carrington 2015a; Gosden and Dominiczak 2014). He publicly stated that 
he believed “the U.S. shale gas revolution can be repeated in the UK” (Carrington 2015a). 
This is ostensibly and under any circumstances a falsehood given the analysis in chapter 
four of this work.137 138 Considering Cameron appeared to base his shale gas enthusiasm 
on U.S. experience, it is remarkable that he did not seem to find it possible to base shale 
gas concerns on U.S. experience as well, given the amount of economic and 
environmental problems it has been accused of causing (Groat and Grimshaw 2012; 
Ahmed 2013; Helm 2013; Inman 2014). Some of Mr. Cameron’s explanations: “it’s simple 
– gas and electric bills can go down when our home-grown energy supply goes up” are 
extremely simplified, out of context, and inaccurate (Cameron 2013). Lord Stern labelled 
them “baseless economics” (Bawden 2013).139 Cameron appeared to ignore any 
differences between the UK and the U.S. energy system, such as that of the different 
pricing mechanism, when it did not fit his argument, and to highlight them when it did, 
as in the case with environmental standards. The former prime minister was correct in 
                                                 
135 The lowering of prices and energy bills remains an as of yet unsubstantiated claim critiqued by other 
lawmakers (Bawden 2013; Cairney 2015; Carrington 2013b). The same goes for the promise of more jobs 
(Cameron 2013) which there is no evidence for and hence no reason to believe in following the U.S. 
experience so far (Schulte 2014; Christopherson 2015; FWW 2015).  
136 While somewhat possible that Mr. Cameron did indeed not understand the UK and European gas 
pricing system himself, this is however highly unlikely, given his role and his access to advisers – in which 
case the above statement would have been made without belief in its accuracy.  
137 Despite that it seems that David Cameron was very aware of a key difference between U.S. and UK 
shale: the difference in private gains from reserves to be made by land owners. Possibly to mitigate this 
issue and provide incentives for more support for the controversial technique of hydraulic fracturing 
which has been raising public concerns, Cameron has announced that councils will be entitled to 100% of 
business rates raised from fracking sites and further that “revenues generated by shale gas companies 
could be paid directly in cash to homeowners living nearby” (Watt 2014). 
138 Clearly there is much public concern around fracking and Cameron was well aware of it – recently he 
blamed “lack of understanding about the process” for some of the opposition and stated that this would 
be “addressed once people could see functioning shale gas wells in the UK” (PA 2014). 
139 Some analysts suggest that the very low price level is to come to an end in the U.S. due to more market 
interconnectedness in the future (IEA 2015a), due to short term oversupply, and due to industry losses 
that will need to be balanced in coming years (Ahmed 2013).  
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pointing out that UK and European regulation require more environmental safeguarding 
than has been the case in the United States. Yet he was trying his best to curtail and cut 
many aspects of this regulation which he clearly saw as impediments (PA 2014). Words 
have certainly been followed by actions in the case of Cameron’s commitment to shale 
with a range of favourable policies (Cairney 2015; Carrington 2016) such as positive 
planning guidance (Gov.uk 2014), tax breaks, and local compensation incentives 
(Macalister and Harvey 2013). Yet, even in the industry, few seem convinced that Britain 
really has gone all out for shale or indeed that Britain’s very own shale revolution lies just 
around the corner (Cairney 2015; The Economist 2015a). Responsible for all economic 
and financial matters in the United Kingdom is the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
Head of Her Majesty’s Treasury, a position occupied by George Osborne since the 
beginning of shale gas debates in Britain until his departure in June 2016. Osborne was a 
strong and “enthusiastic” supporter of UK shale gas exploration (Williams 2013b) who 
promised that he “will make it [shale] happen” and wanted to see “rapid progress” in the 
matter (Osborne 2013). Specifically, the former chancellor considered shale gas a “low-
cost energy source” (Carrington 2013a). In 2013 he stated that he “want[s] Britain to be 
a leader of the shale gas revolution – because it has the potential to create thousands of 
jobs and keep energy bills low for millions of people” (Gosden 2013a; Macalister and 
Harvey 2013). In this spirit he called for a set of actions designed to influence the EU 
commission on the importance of shale gas for Britain and Europe” (Osborne 2015). Like 
Cameron, Osborne supported the as of yet unproven claims that unless Britain can “get 
on with fracking” one would “condemn [it] to higher energy bills and fewer jobs” 
(Gosden 2015b). To support his ideas, Osborne set out a new tax regime (Murray 2014) 
of which he said “I want to make the most generous [tax regime] for shale in the world” 
(Gosden 2013a).140 141 In late 2015 a letter was leaked showing that Mr Osborne considered 
“fast-tracking fracking” a “personal priority” (Carrington 2015b) and specifically urged 
ministers to make multiple interventions in order to “respond to the asks from [shale gas 
company] Cuadrilla” (Carrington 2015b). The letter was much condemned by the in-
house opposition i.e. the Labour party, which called the government “an unabashed 
cheerleader for fracking” (Carrington 2015b) as well as by private fracking opposition, 
                                                 
140 Yet companies interested in gas development and shale gas in Britain apparently did not call for or 
indeed immediately welcomed this move, at least not publicly. Instead several stated shortly after the new 
tax incentives that it was not taxes, but “planning permission and public support” which hindered shale 
gas exploration in the UK and which should therefore become priority issues to resolve (Gosden 2013a). 
141 Osborne definitely has a particular focus on the energy sector: for example, in his last autumn 
statement before the election, whilst in general supporting green energy, the only specific mentions he 
made in the energy sector focused entirely on support for gas (Gosden 2013c; Murray 2014).  
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who took it as confirmation of “collusion with the industry” (Carrington 2015b).142 143 144 
145 
The Lord’s Committee on Economic Affairs is another institution with influence on 
fracking in the UK and prepared a report on fracking in Britain, endorsing it. The Lord’s 
special report The Economic Impact on UK Energy Policy of Shale Gas and Oil was released in 
2014 and in general recommends that “the UK should seize the opportunity offered by 
its shale gas resources” (Lords’ Committee on Economic Affairs, 2014, 6). This is so shale 
could bring economic growth and employment, could support energy security and energy 
independence and “perhaps” cut prices (Lords’ Committee on Economic Affairs 2014, 
6). The Lords expressed their concern over regulatory uncertainty, which they deem is 
                                                 
142 Osborne is furthermore criticised by anti-fracking protesters for a reason outside of his concrete policy 
actions – because his family is connected to the pro-shale lobby. His father-in-law Lord Howell is 
president of the British Institute of Economics, which is backed by BP and BG group (Leftly 2013), and 
he sits on the Economic Affairs Committee in the Lords which recommended fracking to parliament.  
143 Since fracking became an issue there have been three Secretaries of Energy: Chris Huhne (LD), Ed 
Davey (LD) and Amber Rudd (Con). During his time as Energy Secretary, Chris Huhne cautioned against 
the hype for shale gas. He stated that it was unclear how “economically or environmentally viable” it 
would be to extract, that “at best, it’s years away” – and that it should not direct away plans for a mixed 
and balanced energy portfolio, and especially not turn focus away from renewables (Huhne 2011). Huhne 
strongly opposed “short-term, all-or-nothing bets”, which he considered the dash for shale to be, but 
preferred spreading the risk (Huhne 2011). He made explicit reference to the reality of climate change, 
considered renewable energy targets to be legally binding, and he in particular made reference to 
uncertainty in his opinion on shale: “Government should not pick winners. A White Paper from 2004 
estimated that oil would reach $23 a barrel by 2010; last year, another forecast predicted oil at $80 a barrel. 
Brent Crude is currently trading at $110. If we were to tie ourselves to one big bet, we would run 
unacceptable risks with our future” (Huhne 2011). Since leaving his post as Energy Secretary Mr Huhne 
has offered consistently different opinions on shale gas, as opposed to his government: in 2013 he 
mentioned that gas prices might be more easily lowered by importing U.S. gas to Europe, which he thinks 
the UK government should pressure for (Williams 2013a). Beyond that he criticised the relief given to 
fracking firms (Williams 2013a). In 2014 Mr Huhne branded the shale gas dash as “Cameron’s fairy tale” 
or “nirvana” (Huhne 2014); he seeks to back this up with “marketplace” evidence by stating that shares in 
Cuadrilla’s owner AJ Lucas were down to a quarter of what they were in 2009 (Huhne 2014).  
144 Ed Davey followed Huhne as Energy Secretary and head of the DECC and sent a cautious message 
about shale in the beginning, calling the shale enthusiasts “impatient” and questioning the possibility of 
lower consumer bills (Davey 2012; Gosden 2013b). He was accused of “blocking progress” in return and 
expressed a hope that he would after consideration find it “possible for me to give a green light to 
shale” (Davey 2012; Gosden 2013b). Davies insisted shale was “no quick fix and no silver bullet” but 
instead wanted to use it “sensibly and safely” (Chazan 2013). Commentators considered Mr Davey as 
balanced (Chazan 2013; Vaughan 2013a), neither accusing shale of all things evil (Vaughan 2013a) nor 
wishing to cut regulation. Under Davey’s leadership a DECC report was sent out including a direct 
warning that exploiting shale gas in the UK would cause global emissions to rise without any international 
climate deal (Vaughan 2013a). Like Huhne, only after leaving his post as Energy Secretary in 2014, Mr 
Davey has stated that much of the Conservatives’ plans around shale were “not backed by any evidence” 
(Gosden 2015a), questioning the idea of lower prices. He stated that parts of the Conservative Party are 
“crazy” because they want to “frack every bit of croquet lawn” in Britain (Gosden 2015a).  
145 After the 2015 general election, Conservative Amber Rudd was made the UK Energy Secretary and 
she was more supportive of shale gas; stating “we need more secure, home grown energy supplies - and 
shale gas must play a part in that” (Harrabin 2015a). In particular, she agrees with Osborne on the need to 
fast-track fracking applications, so they would no longer be drawn out. The cohesiveness of their 
opinions is not entirely surprising given that Ms Rudd was Mr Osborne’s private personal secretary 
previously. Ms Rudd echoes the claims that shale is “good for jobs” and “good for our energy security” 
(Rudd 2015) -  in fact she made a specific promise of “up to 60.000 new jobs” (Murray 2014). In her first 
interview since being appointed, Ms Rudd “said she would deliver shale now that the impediment of the 
Liberal Democrats had been removed” (Mathiesen 2015b).  
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hindering development – and think that a centralised top-down effort is needed (Lords’ 
Committee on Economic Affairs, 2014). They argued that there should be a committee 
of the cabinet, headed by the Chancellor, “dedicated to ensuring that his commitment to 
‘go all out for shale’ is matched by action” (Lords’ Committee on Economic Affairs 2014, 
6). The report endorses shale as an “urgent national priority” (Lords’ Committee on 
Economic Affairs 2014, 7). The select Lords appear as committed supporters of shale 
gas: they “strongly support the Government in their objective to exploit these resources 
but believe they the UK government need to do much more to encourage exploration 
and get development moving” (Lords’ Committee on Economic Affairs 2014, 5). Unlike 
the EU commission, they consider the UK regulatory framework for gas and oil 
operations complex and sufficient, yet untested onshore. Public concern about possible 
environmental or health risks are considered mostly unfounded: they are mentioned in 
the context of complaining about delays to fracking deployment on UK soil (Lords’ 
Committee on Economic Affairs 2014). Fear is expressed that such delays will drive away 
investors. This glowing endorsement of shale gas development has since managed to draw 
a lot of attention and critique, due to its one-sidedness but also due to the committee’s 
members, many of which are in some way or another connected to the industry or 
corporations interested in developing shale gas in the UK. The following Table 6 shows 
the members of the committee and their affiliations.  
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Peer Party Conflict of Interest 
Lord MacGregor of Pulham 
Market (Chair)  
Conservative Chairman, British Energy Pension Fund 
Trustees 
Chairman, Eggborough Power Ltd Pension 
Fund Trustees 
- Both now part of EDF Energy 
Baroness Blackstone  Labour n/a 
Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach  Conservative “Board Member of Goldman Sachs 
International, a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Goldman Sachs Group which advises 
companies in the field of oil and gas 
exploration.”(Lords’ Committee on Economic 
Affairs 2014, 95) 
Lord Hollick Labour Samson Resources 
Lord Lawson of Blaby  Conservative Central Europe Trust Company Ltd - Chairman 
(retired Dec 2012) 
Also Chairman of the Global Warming Policy 
Foundation 
Lord Lipsey  Labour Chairman Impower plc 2001-03 
Lord McFall of Alcluith  Labour FTI Consulting shares, fracking industry 
advisers 
Lord May of Oxford  Crossbench Member of the Committee on Climate Change 
Baroness Noakes  Conservative Shareholdings in energy companies including 
BP plc, Centrica, BG Group plc, Royal Dutch 
Shell plc, also shareholdings in BHP, Xtrata and 
Rio Tinto plc (mining) and Serco Group plc 
(support services) 
Lord Rowe-Beddoe  Crossbench n/a 
Lord Shipley  Liberal 
Democrat 
n/a 
Lord Skidelsky Crossbench Janus Capital Group - holds stakes in oil and gas 
firms 
Lord Smith of Clifton  Liberal 
Democrat 
n/a 
Table 6: Lord's Committe on Economic Affairs Connections with or Stakes in the Shale Gas Industry (Leftly 2013; Lords’ Committee 
on Economic Affairs 2014; Parliament UK 2016), own design 
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It is worrying that at least eight out of thirteen peers involved in the report on shale gas 
have financial or employment ties to corporations in favour of fracking in the UK and 
therefore likely stand to personally gain from shale development on UK soil. Their 
interests are mostly declared in the Lords’ register. Regardless, it is clearly difficult to 
maintain that this committee was independent.   
Beyond the independence of the official committee advising the government on shale gas, 
a key concern of lobbying watchdogs in the UK is the institution of non-executives or 
‘Neds’. The ‘Neds’ are over sixty advisors “largely drawn from Britain’s most impressive 
corporate talent” and spread out across different government departments in Whitehall 
to “help ministries run in a more business-like manner” (Leftly 2013). The current chair 
of Cuadrilla, Lord Browne, is the overall leader of this non-executive group of 
parliamentary advisers and therefore has a seat in the Cabinet Office itself. There is also 
Mr Laidlaw who is the non-executive in the Department for Transport and also chief 
executive of Centrica, which owns a large share of Cuadrilla’s Lancashire license. Another 
prominent Ned is Baroness Hogg who is both in the Treasury and a non-executive of the 
BG Group. Key private supporters of fracking are embedded in the UK government.  
Apart from these non-executives there are many industry secondees in senior positions 
at the DECC who are employees of gas companies with stakes in shale gas (Carrington 
and Sparrow 2013). There is no suggestion of malpractice with any of these advisers. 
However, it is a fact that they are in very influential positions and that they have clear 
motives to support pro-fracking policies in the UK. There are no comparable reports 
emerging about relations between the government and fracking opponents, which gives 
the impression of an imbalanced distribution of access. This impression is further 
supported by the fact that reportedly during a one-year assessment period (2010-2011) 
there were 195 recorded meetings between traditional fossil fuel energy companies or 
their lobby groups with DECC ministers compared to 17 meetings between DECC 
ministers and environmental campaign groups (Carrington and Sparrow 2013). This is a 
clear sign for the amount of a specific resource, namely time with policymakers, which 
the traditional fossil fuel industry currently enjoys in the UK. It also suggests higher levels 
of closeness and cooperation between them and the DECC.  
Anti-fracking campaigners but also other energy industry insiders are concerned by the 
fact that major energy-sector figures have secondary roles with access to Whitehall. 
Among the concerned parties are not only environmental campaigners but for example 
also an EDF Energy executive, who worries that “the Government's new-found 
commitment to shale has ended up hurting the French group's negotiations over building 
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a nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point” (Leftly 2013). There are also reports of donations 
to the Conservative party by key stakeholders in UK shale gas development (Doward and 
Helm 2012). It has emerged that industry and current government officials have shared 
pre-prepared PR statements on shale gas during a row of high-level dinner and drinks 
functions, specifically on how to deal with its opposition, while industry members shared 
lists of stakeholders necessary to target (Carrington 2014a). This is a very high degree of 
cooperation between policymakers and private interest groups. It may even suggest a 
situation of cultural capture – this level of joint preparation makes it appear as if 
government officials and gas industry members genuinely follow the same goals.  
Clearly there is a point to make here about the close lobbying relationship between the 
pro-fracking industry and lobby and policymakers in the UK. This ranges from personal 
connections through top governmental decision-makers including chancellor Osborne, 
or members of the committee providing judgment on shale gas such as Lord McGregor 
or Baroness Noakes, to in-house lobbyists such as the Chairman of Cuadrilla in the 
Cabinet Office and a member of BG Group in the Treasury. The literature and historical 
case studies strongly suggest that close relationships between private interest groups and 
legislators are very indicative of lobbying success, and in the United Kingdom, the picture 
bodes very well for the pro-fracking lobby.  
Beyond good relations with policymakers, it is important to note that all of the above 
discussed instances of lobbying have occurred in a framework of quiet politics. The 
lobbying tactics are comparatively covert and they seem to have targeted the specifics of 
regulation before the moratorium on fracking and again with renewed vigour since the 
moratorium was lifted. A clear example of how successes of the pro-fracking lobby are 
taking place through quiet politics rather than high politics is a minor change in defining 
the process of fracking that occurred in early 2016. Geologists reported that the UK 
government had changed the definition of what constitutes hydraulic fracturing to the 
point that a majority of fracking operations would no longer be defined as fracking at all 
(Carrington 2016). The new regulation which came into force on 6 April 2016 in fact 
excludes the UK’s only well so far, in Blackpool, from the definition, as well as almost 
50% of fracking wells currently active in the United States. Safety regulation such as 
independent inspection and waste management does not come into effect without 
meeting these definitions (Carrington 2016). This may be the strongest example yet of the 
success lobbying for shale gas in the UK has found through quiet politics – regulation for 
safety is promised publicly, but the rules for when they apply are changed without much 
notice. Of course, as is often the case when researching lobbying success, it is not possible 
 151 
to prove who specifically pressed for this change in definition. It is, however, entirely clear 
who benefits from the change in definition, and from the above analysis it is clear that 
those beneficiaries had very good access and opportunity for lobbying. So circumstantial 
evidence would suggest this regulatory detail is a major lobbying success for the pro-
fracking industry. The episode also compares to U.S. fracking lobbying strategies: a 
definition that excludes many drilling sites from fracking regulation is likely just as useful 
to the industry as a general clause excluding all waste from gas operations in the U.S. from 
environmental checks. Given the evidence of the provision of secondees and industry 
experts to the DECC rather than evidence of lobbyists influencing final votes on fracking, 
quiet politics and close connections seem to be the preferred option of lobbying for shale 
gas in the UK. There is a real similarity between the two country case studies on these 
issues.  
To follow up on this thought, the Figures 28 and 29 (BoardEX 2016) show the evidence 
one finds when cross checking for first degree and second degree connections between 
government regulators and interest groups with BoardEx. There is divergence in the 
amount of connections between energy companies, and also between those that are pro 
fracking and those that are against it. The graph of first degree current or revolving 
connections between regulators and those regulated reveals less connections than in the 
U.S. case.146 As can be seen, not all Neds are included by BoardEx, and neither are the 
Lord’s Committee members, hence several clearly influential individuals are missing from 
                                                 
146 The UK cabinet and U.S. government do not have the same number of members of course, and 
neither do the institutions. The comparison between different connections remains valid.  
Figure 28: Industry and Policy Institution Connections, 1st degree UK (BoardEx 2016), own design 
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this overview. There nevertheless remain strong cases of connection and revolving door: 
An employee of the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) began working as a 
non-executive director for Aurora Energy after half a decade with Ofgem yet kept his 
position with the regulator, a strategic director at British gas moved from there to become 
a Director General at the Department for Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA); and 
a director at Centrica became a chairman at the DECC.  
Already, the picture is different not only in numbers but also in comparison with the 
opposition: Friends of the Earth (FoE) members are well represented amongst UK 
policymakers. However, all of those counted are not formerly employed by or lobbying 
for, but are simply members of Greenpeace or FoE. Clearly, there is a difference – one 
cannot be a member or supporter of BP or Cuadrilla the way one can with Greenpeace 
or Friends of the Earth, and working together with somebody who is next to their other 
job also a member of FoE is not as significant as working together with a Cuadrilla board 
member. EDF, which has high stakes in developing nuclear energy in the UK and 
previously criticised the strong support for shale gas by the government (see above) is 
also well represented in DEFRA and Ofgem. The BoardEx analysis suggests the 
conclusion that based on available information, the practice of the revolving door is less 
frequent, and less exclusive, between the gas industry and groups interested in fracking 
with their regulators than is the case in the United States. The issue of revolving door 
movement has been raised and is likely in the UK energy sector, but the comprehensive 
analysis of connections suggests less closeness between regulators and industry than in 
the U.S. case. For example, the amount of people revolving between British Gas and 
DEFRA is likely not substantial enough to impact on regulation. However, BoardEx does 
Figure 29: Industry and Policy Institution Connections, 2nd degree UK (BoardEx 2016), own design 
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not count Neds such as Lord Browne or secondees such as the Centrica employees in the 
DECC, so the picture may be misleading. Moreover, single very influential individuals 
may be more effective in influencing policy than a great number of less high ranking in-
house lobbyists, and we know that these connections exist. 
Considering second degree connections, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, the two 
most outspoken anti-fracking lobbyists, appear to be very well represented in the UK 
government. Again, the connections with such an organisation may be weaker than those 
created through former employment or board membership of a firm. Regardless, the 
situation is clearly different to the U.S. scenario. This data does not validate a conclusion 
about regulatory and cultural capture similar to the U.S. case. There appears to be less of 
a case of interconnectedness between the UK gas industry with fracking interests and 
their future regulators. Based on this I cannot therefore conclude with confidence that 
the practice of the revolving door has affected UK shale gas policy. Supporters of shale 
gas outnumber its opponents in a strategic position to oversee its regulation. Yet through 
membership the environmental lobby against fracking has much better connections with 
the UK cabinet, energy and environment departments than their counterparts in the 
United States do. Consequently, it stands to reason that the U.S. and UK revolving door 
issues are distinctly different.  
Other aspects of lobbying activity remain noteworthy with regards to their likely impact 
on fracking policy decisions. In smaller numbers yet through significant positions, private 
interests concerned with the issue of shale gas development do have good access to 
governmental institutions in the UK, as evident from case examples discussed above. In 
this, the U.S. and UK cases bear similarity. Longstanding and regular relationships 
between lobbyists and industry persist (and remain unchecked for in-house lobbyists, 
facilitating their staying under the radar or public scrutiny). Many of these include the 
provision of expertise and information by industry members to policymakers. Lobbying 
efforts have also clearly occurred in situations of quiet politics.  
The UK case does not compare well with the situation in the US, but neither does the 




VI.3 Chapter summary  
In chapters three and four I could not establish a convincing rationale for each of the 
national governments in question to engage in fracking policy for reasons of national 
economic gains such as GDP growth, job creation or expected tax revenue. Especially 
for the case study of the United Kingdom, this data was unconvincing, preventing me to 
conclude a similar independent variable of promising expected utility influencing the 
decision on shale gas. Therefore, I proceeded to consider whether there was another 
group benefitting from these policy decisions on shale development and whether it was 
not in the public but in private interest to create pro-fracking policy. To provide a second 
and different narrative for the reasoning behind governmental preferences on shale gas 
in the U.S. and the UK, in this chapter and the previous chapter I made the case for the 
pursuit of private interests into fracking through lobbying and its potential effect on policy 
decisions. This is a traditionally considered approach of analysis within the social sciences 
and in political economy especially.  
Following the preceding theoretical chapter, my hypothesis for this chapter was that a 
final policy decision on shale gas development is open to influence from private interests 
that expect to benefit from fracking, rather than them being disregarded by a government 
considering only national or public expected utility. To assess the potential for industry 
interests influencing governmental preferences on shale gas development I identified key 
players interested in promoting or preventing shale gas development in the United States 
and United Kingdom, their resources and their access to policymakers, and also 
considered overall lobbying potential in the sector. As these were considered indicators 
for successful lobbying, I looked for evidence of lobbying through the provision of 
information and expertise, for lobbying through close relationships and cultivating 
connections between lobbyists and policymakers, and for lobbying activity in quiet 
politics. Both in the UK case and the U.S. case, evidence can be found for all of the above 
in favour of the oil and gas sector and the shale gas industry, over that of alternative 
energy or environmental lobbies.  
Close relationships between the pro-fracking lobby and policymakers and regulators are 
common place and abundant both in the U.S. and the UK. There is evidence of gas 
industry and gas lobby employees working on drafting legislation alongside policymakers 
in both countries, especially in the U.S., to such a degree that cultural capture could be 
expected to occur. For both countries, an analysis with the business intelligence tool 
BoardEx showed the amount of revolving door connections between governmental 
departments involved in fracking legislation and the industry they are supposed to 
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regulate. The number is more substantial in the United States. Particularly the U.S. 
Department of Energy is very interconnected with former and also current employees of 
the private oil and gas sector and their lobbies, notably API, BP, Exxon Mobile and 
Halliburton. In the UK, the anti-fracking lobby is represented in high numbers and better 
connected with Whitehall than their counterparts are in Washington. There are confirmed 
reports of lobby and industry experts specifically drafted or seconded to help write 
regulation on shale gas in both the UK and U.S. respective energy departments. This 
provision of expertise and introduction of experts was shown as a very useful lobbying 
tactic in the theoretical review.  
Evidence of lobbying regulatory and quiet politics rather than high salience votes can also 
be found in both countries. In the U.S., the fracking business is exempt from a 
considerable amount of environmental and safety legislation since the 2005 Energy Policy 
Act (partially because they helped writing it). In the United Kingdom commercial fracking 
has not yet begun, and the industry is younger, however lobbying meetings are taking 
place and already a coup has been realised by introducing a definition of fracking into the 
environmental assessment regulation which in fact excludes many fracking operations 
from the term and thereby prevents connected safety testing and procedures. Clearly, 
these outcomes suggest that lobbying is taking place and that it is successful enough to 
continue. There are differences. In comparison to the variety of agencies needed to 
approve a fracking license in the UK, amongst them BGS, HSE and European regulators, 
in the United States almost all regulation of onshore oil and gas production is left to the 
individual states, and there are great differences in between states’ legislation. As 
discussed, much of the regulatory process falls away as fracking in the U.S. is exempted 
from several environmental acts entirely, meaning that no disclosure of any chemicals 
used needs to be made; any chemicals, including toxic and carcinogenic, are allowed, and 
no public health or environmental safety assessments regarding these are required as part 
of regulation. Considering this is where much of the UK regulatory bodies are involved, 
it becomes clear that fracking permits in the United States are much more quickly 
obtained. More generally, I found evidence for a discrepancy in access, funding, and 
resources between the shale gas lobby and its opposition. This was less clear in the UK 
case where less information about lobbying spending is publicly available, but the general 
financial means remain substantially different. The fact that energy and gas licenses can 
be considered a private good the way they are treated in the U.S. and UK further adds to 
the possibility of lobbying success. Arguably UK and U.S. energy policy in the 21st 
century suggests that energy is a marketable private good. Energy resources that can be 
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exploited and sold by private companies in a market based system certainly fit the 
description. This is opposed to energy trade in other countries, for example in Venezuela, 
where Chavez decided to re-nationalise the nation’s petroleum resources (Simon 2007). 
Lobbying for private rather than public goods was found to be an indicator of greater 
lobbying potential in the theoretical review and it seems confirmed in the case of shale 
gas. The theoretical review has found differences in funding and resources to be especially 
influential in lobbying through the cultivation of relations with policymakers, attempting 
to address quiet politics, and for private goods. Considering the above analysis, both in 
the UK and in the U.S. the fracking lobby are likely to be very influential, especially in 
comparison with their direct opposition, which are environmental groups and alternative 
energy lobbies. Considering that lobbying for shale gas by major business groups appears 
successful whereas anti-fracking campaigners Greenpeace, FoE and civil actions groups 
have so far registered fewer results, I find more evidence of the exchange model of 
lobbying than of neopluralist theory applicable in the case study.  
My conclusion is that lobbying has an effect on energy policy in both countries. There is 
evidence of historical and recent situations in which lobbyists have affected energy policy 
regulation, and there is also evidence of revolving doors and increased access of lobbyists 
to governmental institutions tasked with energy policy decisions. The situation however 
is not equal in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the U.S., the situations is 
strongly skewed in favour of the pro-shale gas lobby. In the UK, environmental lobbyists 
have better access to government institutions and many current legislators have ties to 
environmental protection agencies. Yet the UK energy sector is still favourable towards 
the traditional oil and gas industry: “The incumbents and institutions overseeing the 
current energy system have too many interests in maintaining it, and the government has 
done nothing to change this” (Mitchell 2013).147 This would reinforce the theory that it is 
easier to lobby for the status quo.148 In this sense, renewable energy has less prospect of 
                                                 
147 The centralised nature of the English political system plays a role in this – the state by state differences 
in regulation of fracking in the U.S. make it much harder for federal legislators to regulate coherently, and 
much harder to gain an overview of lobbying tactics across the country.  
148 As discussed in detail in this thesis, an important aspect of any policy decision on fracking is the 
scientific and empirical uncertainty surrounding the process in the long-term. Pro- and anti- fracking 
campaigners alike are certainly guilty of pretending to have answers beyond those which they can actually 
support with evidence, scientific testing or other knowledge. Both the pro-fracking lobby and industry as 
well as the anti-fracking lobby and campaigners have been strongly criticised for misrepresenting scientific 
data and knowledge about hydraulic fracturing in order to get their points across: “the old saw about 
statistics — that, given enough spin, they can be used to support anything — is being increasingly applied 
to science, especially, critics say, when it comes to the fight over hydraulic fracturing” (Richardson 2015). 
For example, it is correct to say that industry claims and promises of lower gas bills are unsubstantiated 
and uncertain and considered untruthful by many experts; yet it is incorrect to state that experts agree on 
the opposite. For this reason a recent Greenpeace ad was banned by the Advertising Standard’s Authority 
ASA (Telegraph 2015; Mathiesen 2015a). Given that the ‘expert’ ASA cited to be in non-agreement was 
non-scientist, non-economist David Cameron, Greenpeace and other supporters were furious with the 
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success in the United Kingdom and the United States who both have a longstanding 
history with the fossil fuel sector. However, shale gas could also not be lobbied as easily 
in the UK as in the U.S. since it requires a certain amount of change and does not fit into 
the sector as neatly as it did in the U.S. where existing drilling fields infrastructure made 
the transition smoother.   
I find that in this chapter there is sufficient evidence of interest and opportunity in 
lobbying to assume that interests have an influence on governmental policy decision. I 
cannot conclusively prove this, yet all the signs and circumstantial evidence point in this 
direction. I find differences between the U.S. and UK case study, especially with regards 
to the revolving door saturation of policymaking institutions. However, the private 
interests pursuing fracking in both countries are more likely to have significantly impacted 
any governmental decision to allow fracking than a rational cost-benefit analysis of the 
public benefits through shale gas. Their efforts to enable fracking through watering down 
legislation, preventing environmental assessment but also simply their efforts to closely 
connect with policymakers are well-documented. The same cannot be said for the 
fracking-opposition. It is important to note that the situation in the U.S. and the UK is 
not mirrored and therefore the independent variable influencing fracking policy in this 
narrative is not perfectly similar.  
By following the logic of ‘qui bono’, in this chapter I arrived at the conclusion that there 
are very strong private groups who stand to benefit from favourable fracking policy or at 
least believe that they do so, and that these groups have been very active in lobbying shale 
gas. I find the explanatory power of the influence of fracking and gas industry on 
government decisions outweighs that of the national benefits from fracking. Arguably, 
when I accept the above evidence and circumstantial evidence as proof of much more 
successful lobbying on behalf of the pro-fracking interest groups, then the second 
narrative has proven more helpful in explaining fracking policy decision-making than the 
first in this thesis.149  
 
VI.3.1 Rationality of the pro shale gas lobbies  
In the literature review in chapter five I found suggestions that lobbying can occur 
irrationally and against a firm’s material interests. Since the analysis of the shale gas sector 
                                                 
decision and further convinced of foul play and conflict of interest. The current chair of ASA, Chris 
Smith, is also head of a fracking-industry-funded shale gas task force (Mathiesen, 2015).  
149 Albeit in both scenarios, there was more significant reason for the U.S. than the UK to engage in 
fracking.  
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in chapters two and four raised doubts about its potential and profitability, I want to 
briefly return to this issue now that I have discussed the influence of private interests.  
There are previous examples of lobbying in which stated and lobbied for goals appear to 
diverge from the lobbying firms’ material interests (Woll 2008). This may yet be the case 
with fracking after all. Case studies in which interest groups lobby to prevent change of 
which they ultimately benefit have been documented by other scholars (Fernandez and 
Rodrik 1991; Leighton and Lopez 2013; Rodrik 2014; Godwin et al. 2013). Fernandez 
and Rodrik in particular show in various case studies that “uncertainty regarding the 
identities of gainers and losers can prevent an efficiency-enhancing reform from being 
adopted, even in cases in which reform would prove quite popular after the fact” 
(Fernandez and Rodrik 1991, 1154). For a specific example one may consider the lobbying 
that went before the introduction of free trade liberalisation in Turkey in the 1980s: the 
policy changed was pushed through by the authoritarian government despite strong 
opposition by the business community. Yet the latter emerged to profit from it almost 
immediately and has since been its strongest defender (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991, 1147). 
Evidence shows that in the shale gas story, fundamental economic incentives are not 
always clear. Some companies drilling are allegedly not profiting from shale gas operations 
(Fowler 2012; Ahmed 2013; Inman 2014). Reserves have been overstated, and 
disappointing well data and the correcting down of reserve estimations in the U.S. shale 
gas story have led to comparisons with the dotcom bubble and have left many private 
companies with losses (Urbina 2011c; The New York Times 2011; W. Richter 2012; 
Anderson 2014; Lipton 2014; Neate 2015). Since 2012, Chesapeake Energy, Exxon Mobil, 
and BG have all had to accept substantial losses, and write down or sell shale assets 
(Ahmed 2013). That has not stopped firms from lobbying on the behalf of shale gas 
however. In some cases, it appears firms are actively lobbying something that has hurt 
their own material interests. 80% of U.S. shale gas production comes from five shale 
fields, several of which have been in decline since 2012 (Hughes 2012). In a meeting at 
the Council on Foreign Relations 2012 the then CEO of Exxon Mobile stated: “We are 
all losing our shirts today. We’re making no money. It’s all in the red” (Fowler 2012). 
Dozens of gas and oil companies went bankrupt in the United States in 2015, the top 60 
U.S. independent gas and oil firms have a combined net debt of $206bn (more than 
doubled since 2006) (Crooks 2016). Many shale gas companies have debts multiple times 
higher than their pre-tax earnings, and a third of U.S. oil and gas companies are rated low 
enough by S&P that they’re considered at high risk of default (Crooks 2016). Yet lobbying 
continues (Davenport 2015). The notion that “fracking lacks economic viability” (Reuters 
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2014a) has been raised by many experts. Insiders within the industry have repeatedly 
warned against shale gas (The New York Times 2011; Urbina 2011c; Bawden 2013; 
Reuters 2014a). Fracking has been called “inherently unprofitable”, a Ponzi Scheme or it 
has simply been stated that the economics of fracking “do not work” (Reuters 2014a). 
Especially in the United Kingdom, firms should be aware of this due to a difference in 
timing regarding the exploration, knowledge of the negative sides of U.S. experience, and 
knowledge about the difference between the U.S. and UK energy economies. In early 
2015, more oil and gas rigs in the United States were deactivated than any since 1987, and 
the trend is expected to have a severe negative impact on the U.S. economy (Neate 
2015).150 The low gas price they themselves helped create is very harmful to U.S. shale gas 
companies, as is the low global oil price since late 2014. The latter should be particularly 
cautioning to British interests, where the gas prices are linked to oil as in Europe.  
In the United Kingdom, Ofgem itself commissioned a report into shale gas which 
concluded that it was not likely a game changer for the country; Ofgem’s chief executive 
stated that shale gas would furthermore not have a significant impact on UK energy prices 
(Harvey 2013).151  
Whereas industry behaviour and industry logic behind decision-making is not part of my 
thesis, governmental decision-making is, and governments can be expected to be amongst 
the best-informed agencies about an economic situation such as the one described for 
shale gas above. Therefore, the incentive to provide for requests by the industry becomes 
less clear. Short of assuming that the U.S. and UK national government are willing to 
yield to industry requests in spite of severe doubts about the economics for fracking, I 
am left with an even stronger impression that something besides strong lobbying may 
affect governmental decision-making.152  
In the following two chapters I will consider a third different scenario with potential to 
impact decision-making on shale gas. My aim is to assess whether or not there is a strong 
impact of underlying ideas and cognitive factors recognisable in strategic policy papers 
which are biased in favour of supporting shale gas over alternative energy production.  
                                                 
150 I am not here considering the distinction between real economy and investor economy due to lack of 
space and research time.  
151 Former UK energy minister Huhne mentioned the valid notion of the interconnection of the 
European gas market, saying that even if “our brave frackers triumph over all these adversities and 
succeed in producing such vast volumes [we] have so many pipelines connecting us to the continent that 
if the price were lower here, some gas trader would buy in Britain and export it. Soon the prices would be 
virtually the same. For exactly this reason, energy prices were no lower than Germany's even when we 
were self-sufficient” (Huhne 2011).  




VII Chapter Seven. Cognitive capture: Theoretical review 
 
Following narratives on expected utility and on the influence of private interests, in this 
and the next chapter I will consider policy decisions that favour fracking through a third 
lens. This narrative is about the power of ideas and specific cognitive biases in 
policymaking. The hypothesis I consider in this chapter is that current strategy on energy 
policy reflects cognitive factors: ideas and biases that favour the policy path to the decision 
of shale gas development. The previous chapters have dealt with the purely calculative 
cost-benefit analysis for shale gas development by each respective government in the 
economic interest of their country, as well as with the notion that this process may be 
twisted towards private interests through lobbying power. In this and the following 
chapter I will engage with a third narrative of decision-making that includes two different 
approaches to cognitive factors which influence decision-making and preclude objectivity 
in the strictest sense. I am not arguing that these cognitive processes ultimately must lead 
to wrong decisions: I am arguing that they (are so powerful that they) distort the decision-
making process. To this end I review separate strands of literature concerned with 
cognitive and ideational influences on decision-making. The theoretical review is divided 
into these two sections: a political economy approach on the influence of ideas on strategy 
and decision-making, and a behavioural economics approach that focuses on the 
influence of cognitive biases on decision-making (which I touched upon in chapter three).  
 
 
VII.1 Ideas as cognitive constraints  
“Most important from the perspective of policy analysis, ideas determine the 
strategies that political actors believe they can pursue. … Expand the range 
of feasible strategies and you radically change behaviour and outcomes” 
(Rodrik 2013, 1). 
 
In this part of the chapter I discuss research in political economy around the question of 
when and why ideas matter for political outcomes. The argument put forward is that 
actors’ ideas about how the economy works substantially shape policy outcomes. This 
goes for both ‘big’ ideas such as a belief in the preponderance of Keynesianism or 
Neoliberalism, but also for smaller ones such as seeing an automatic connection between 
unemployment and inflation in the Philipp’s Curve that must then influence future policy 
decisions. The impact of ideas fits well in my thesis, both due to their importance in 
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political economy and because ideas are thought to matter especially in situations of risk 
and uncertainty. Writing on constructivist IPE theory, André Broome confirms the 
prevalence of ideas as “constructions of how the world works” (Broome 2013, 195). This 
is the case specifically in situations of uncertainty as described by Knight, in which 
outcomes of actions are not perfectly calculable (Broome 2013; see also Knight 1921; 
Blyth 2002; Seabrooke 2006; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010; Palan 2013).153 If actors 
cannot fully estimate their potential returns due to uncertainty, they may not know what 
their interests are. They will then rely on key ideas as guides more than in situations where 
they could calculate returns, i.e. uncertainty affects a decision-maker’s perception of their 
own interest (Blyth 2002, 2009). Blyth argues that in situations of uncertainty, the 
prerequisite for effective action is a shared idea between agents for interpreting the 
uncertainty (Blyth 2002, 47ff).  
A distinction can be made between ideas which are used instrumentally and ideas which 
are influencing decisions less consciously (Blyth 2009). To give examples, the former is 
considered prominently in research into how developmental ideas are used to influence 
economic policy in South America (Sikkink 1991); in thoughts by more rationalist scholars 
on ideas as roadmaps during uncertainty and hence focal points for coordination 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993); and in work on ideas shaping the EU’s monetary policy 
(McNamara 1999). The other role of ideas distinguished by Hall sees them used not 
instrumentally but as conventions (Hall 1989; 1993; Blyth 2009). This means that ideas 
acquire a life of their own once introduced and thus retain the power to bias future 
decisions through their mere presence and circulation (Blyth 2002; Berman 2006; Jabko 
2006).154 Because I am researching cognitive constraints, the second role of ideas is more 
interesting. Yet I am not making a point about the creation and introduction of ideas in 
order to influence policy: in this thesis, I consider the effect that ideas have on policy 
output. Hence the distinction does not affect my argument. I am examining the input 
side, namely key ideas which are apparent in strategy papers, but regardless of their origins, 
their effect on policy output remains the same. Who put the ideas into the policy papers 
and whether or not they did it purposefully is not the focus of research, but what they are 
                                                 
153 Broome sees uncertainty as a general factor furthering the currency of ideas as a topic in IPE research, 
stating that the “concept of Knightian uncertainty has had a major impact on the development of 
constructivist understandings in IPE of the interplay between actors’ interests and intersubjective ideas, 
while helping to boost the argument that ideas can trump interests as explanatory variables” (Broome 
2013, 195).  
154 Berman’s focus on the use of ideas by elites to refocus interests is not unlike Gramsci’s ideas of 
hegemonic stability in its focus on the active creation of a specific, limited space for interests to reside in, 
albeit with entirely different frames of reference (Berman 2006). 
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capable of doing once they are embedded and accepted. Therefore, I do not attempt to 
sort one from the other but rather to prove the existence of either or both.  
Amongst the first major scholars to combine interest and institutional approaches of IPE 
with an ideational approach were Hall and Katzenstein. Researching the behaviour of 
smaller states in the global economy Katzenstein discovered evidence for the impact of 
ideas that transcend interest struggle and institutional path design (Katzenstein 1985). He 
argues that ideas which were conceived around a perception of vulnerability that may no 
longer exist can influence policy in spite of powerful interests. Peter Hall’s research on 
the reception of Keynesian ideas in different countries focused on the active utilisation 
of ideas as resources to push for institutional change (Hall 1989;  1993; Baeck and Hall 
1990). His argument is that exogenous shocks such as those occurring in the 1930s do 
not smoothly lead to a change in policy preferences unless they are mediated and 
interpreted by ideas. Whether such mediation and interpretation is successful depends on 
how well the ideas fit within the structure of a country’s prevailing political discourse (Hall 
1989, 383; Blyth 2009, 211).155 In further work about interests, institutions and ideas in 
political economy, Hall concludes that ideas are in fact the key component of policy 
preference change (Baeck and Hall 1990; Hall 1993). In 1993 Hall argued “that policy 
change is typically highly constrained because the ideas that support the status quo remain 
extremely powerful” (Baumgartner 2013, 240). However, though most change is 
incremental, there is potential for dramatic change through paradigmatic shift. When 
change occurs, it must not necessarily alter the power relations between different interest 
groups: “reform often happens not when vested interests are defeated, but when different 
strategies are used to pursue those interests, or when interests themselves are redefined” 
(Rodrik 2014, 206). Policy change is likely to occur in situations where the status quo has 
been discredited sufficiently. Jones and Baumgartner argued in a similar fashion but with 
different methodology at the same time as Hall that “an important element of the 
likelihood of policy change is the staying power of the status quo” (Baumgartner 2013, 
255). Simon also lays great importance on the need for alternatives to prove themselves 
much more rather than pointing out inadequacies of the status quo. He argues that “once 
a theory is well entrenched, it will survive many assaults of empirical evidence that purport 
to refute it unless an alternative theory, consistent with the evidence, stands ready to 
replace it” (Simon 1979, 509).  
                                                 
155  Hall insists that focusing on ideas does not preclude a researcher from considering political agency: 
“The most important step we can take, however, is to note that it is not necessary to deny that politics 
involves a struggle for power and advantage in order to recognize that the movement of ideas plays a role, 
with some impact of its own, in the process of policymaking.” (Hall 1993, 289; 292) 
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The role of ideas in determining or altering preferences is not a new topic to the field of 
economic policy research but more novel than the approaches around interests and 
institutions (Blyth 1997; Rodrik 2014). There has been prominent research into ideologies 
having a strong influence on partisan politics for example, notably by Alesina and 
Rosenthal (1995), and more recently work on the formation of preferences through 
experience, societal influences or the media (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Yanagizawa-
Drott 2014; Rodrik 2014). For a broader context, one may recall the distinction between 
soft power and hard power made by Joseph Nye, in which soft power is the power to 
attract and convince rather than to command and coerce (Nye 2008). The power of ideas 
is a soft power, albeit there need not be a direct perpetrator executing that power. If an 
industry lobby or NGO gives out information to the government which informs on and 
enhances their view on shale gas, it is a direct use of soft power. But other ideas whose 
origin may be less clear, or even unintentional, nonetheless can wield the same kind of 
effective soft power.  
Government officials and those involved in policy legislation are proposing policies 
within a framework of certain ideas and assumptions about how different policies are 
supposed to work, about how the system functions. Economic policy research is often 
concerned with sharpening models, with adjusting ideas to finding the right model156 
(Rodrik 2014, 193). And yet, many agents discussed in economic research already “believe 
that they know how the world works, if not precisely, at least probabilistically” (Rodrik 
2014, 193). Their ideas and assumptions shape their expectations and their estimation of 
the consequences of their actions, in the political and the economic realm. Establishing 
policy preferences “involves complex ideational processes whereby policymakers 
assemble and assess information and construct pictures of reality” (Bell 2012, 671). These 
ideas can range from big ideas, such as a belief in the overwhelming benefits of a free 
market system over the merits of state intervention, to smaller, more specific ideas about 
how welfare should be distributed. Should for example de-commodified benefits depend 
on specific need, on previous contributions, or simply be equal for all (Esping-Andersen 
1990; van der Veen and van der Brug 2013)? An answer to this question implies not only 
normative preferences but a very specific assumption about how the economy works. 
These kind of expectations influence policy behaviour; and evidence which is inconsistent 
with the trusted models and expectations tends to be downplayed or ignored (Rodrik 
2014, 193).157 Financial deregulation and lack of oversight are now blamed by most 
                                                 
156 A model that can be empirically proven to work in the real world without raising normative problems.  
157 The simple broad decision whether to focus on demand side or supply side economic policies, possibly 
due to a perceived need to shift due to globalisation, can have a major impact on the availability of energy 
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policymakers for contributing to the manner in which the 2008 financial crisis unfolded. 
This leads to the conclusion that ideas about the financial sector are also to blame then: 
banks could not have argued for their own interests, for example less oversight, as 
efficiently had there not been an overall belief in deregulation, in less oversight and red 
tape. Large financial corporations could not have found as much support for their own 
partisan interests had they represented them as such. The accepted argument instead was 
that deregulation and the laissez-faire policies they were enjoying were in the interest of 
the entire economy, and this was outlined in ideas powerful enough to stick (Thompson 
2009; Nelson and Katzenstein 2010; Kwak 2013).158 This is important for my third 
narrative of analysis on the influence of ideas as a similar situation could be the case with 
shale gas. If governmental decision-makers are convinced about the benefits to the 
economy of a new fossil fuel source and unconventional gas, regardless of the accuracy 
of such benefits, it further serves to explain why private interests are successful in 
lobbying for shale gas.159 In this case cognitive capture leads to a decision favouring the 
advancement of shale gas policy notwithstanding information that may discredit the 
merits of fracking.160  
The power of ideas to influence policy is considered significant in political economy. In 
contemporary political economy research, approaches that focus on ideas are often 
connected to the theory of constructivism in social sciences but they do not have to be 
(Blyth 2002). Ideas are seen as necessary to interpret reality before decisions are made and 
action is taken, therefore they influence decision-making. Blyth suggests that “practicing 
social science without viewing ideas as fundamental to both the nature of human action 
and causation in social systems produces seriously misleading explanations” (Béland and 
Cox 2010, 83). Especially in situations of uncertainty about outcomes, ideas come into 
force. Accepted ideas are also considered to function as agents of the status quo, aiding 
it to prevail and slowing down change. Research in IPE that focuses on ideas is concerned 
with challenging the notion of a direct, automatic link between interests or goals and 
                                                 
economic options. Will the focus lie on digging for more, discovering new sources, supplying different 
energy? Or will it lie on consumer behaviour, on preserving more energy? 
158 Of course, it is entirely possible in this scenario that ideas were also disseminated through close contact 
between the financial and political sphere, as suggested in the cultural capture argument by Kwak.  
159 This notion may come about through shared understanding and cultural capture such as considered in 
chapter five – to verify this would be a very interesting possible future topic, and would require a detailed 
examination of not just the political decision-makers’ ideas but those of the closely connected industry 
and lobbying figures and then an assessment to see if key ideas match.  
160 The term cognitive capture is one that to the best of my knowledge, I alone have devised to specify 
this particular state of affairs. However, in the meantime it has been used once with a different 
connotation: Adair Turner in his role as the chair of the Financial Services Authority used the term 
cognitive capture in relation to what Kwak calls cultural capture, “to describe the tendency of financial 
regulators to engage in <problem solving with the [regulated] institution> rather than enforcing existing 
rules” (Kwak 2013, 78).  
 166 
outcomes rather than dismissing the importance of interests in political outcomes (Baeck 
and Hall 1990; Hall 1997; Woll 2008; Blyth 2009; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010; 
Leighton and Lopez 2013; Mitchell 2013; Rodrik 2014).161 Rodrik calls it a “mapping” 
between interests and policy outcomes, which he argues is not given but “depends on 
many unstated assumptions about the ideas that political agents have” (Rodrik 2014, 190). 
These ideas might range from very general ideas such as preconceptions about how the 
economy works to more specific ideas such as what policy tools one can make use of to 
push interests, and of course ideas about what those interests actually are. Questioning 
the link between interests and policy outcomes through introducing ideas as a factor does 
not undermine the focus on agency, political game or lobbying in this thesis. If interests 
are influenced by ideas, ideas can of course be challenged, manipulated or changed.  
 
 
VII.2 Common heuristics in decision-making under uncertainty  
“The deviations of actual behaviour from the normative model are too 
widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, 
and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative system” 
(Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky 1988, 167) 
 
In order to explore another avenue of cognitive bias, in the following paragraphs I discuss 
in more detail the constraints to rational decision-making first discovered by Tversky, 
Kahneman and like-minded scholars of decision analysis which I introduced in chapter 
three. Many important judgments that are made in situations of uncertainty concern 
questions such as: how likely is it that outcome B is a result of an event from process A? 
What is the likelihood that process A can result in outcome B (Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky 1982)? In answering these questions, people use a variety of heuristics and biases, 
such as how similar are A and B, or what is the causal relation between them. This section 
was prompted by suggestions that often enough, decision-making is influenced strongly 
by factors other than given information and material data as assumed by expected utility. 
There is evidence that information which is viewed as highly relevant and convincing by 
scientists concerned with the matter is “habitually ignored” by non-scientists, whilst 
                                                 
161 A strong point of ideas in political economy is that it can turn around the focus on interests – not 
exclusively considering the causal effect of interests on policy outcomes, but to presciently explain the 
interest formation. Naturally a weakness is the linking between ideas and outcomes – establishing the 
presence of ideas in actors is often possible, yet making the case for causality is very difficult. However, 
given that many praised books on interests and lobbying fall short of actually proving the connection – 
listing meetings between policymakers and interest groups, listing similar goals, yet being unable to prove 
lobbying in the strictest sense took place – this should no less preclude ideas from becoming the focus of 
research.  
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certain logically weak items of information “trigger strong inferences and action 
tendencies” in them (Nisbett et al. 1976, 116). The non-scientists in this statement also 
include other experts, politicians and governmental decision-makers (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
and Lichtenstein 1980; Sjöberg 1999; Allison and Zelikow 1999).162 For example, the 
effect of human activity on climate change and global warming is a scientifically proven 
phenomenon accepted by the entire scientific community except for a negligibly low 
number of scholars, many of which have links to the fossil fuel industry, and yet after 
almost thirty years of knowledge and research, this does not convince a majority of U.S. 
senators (Goldenberg 2015).  
Rather than providing a full list of all the heuristics discussed by Kahneman et al. I focus 
on major heuristics and those that have potential to impact on decision-making in my 
case study. That means that for example issues with information gathering will be 
excluded as they may affect an individual but certainly should not affect a governmental 
decision-maker with access to abundant amounts of data, teams of researchers and 
experts.163 The common bias representativeness is defined as 1) the level of essential similarity 
between an event and its parent population, and 2) the level of reflection of prominent 
features of the process which causes it (Bar-Hillel 1982, 69). The underlying assumption 
is that ‘like goes with like’, so causes and outcomes should be connected through 
similarity. It leads to overestimating events that seem more representative as being more 
likely. It is one of few widely recognised heuristics for decision-making under uncertainty 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Bar-Hillel 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 197; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 1972). To give an example I 
consider the case of guessing a student’s major, which was the task of an experiment 
Kahneman and Tversky conducted  (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982, 126ff). Test 
participants were given a description of a graduate student’s personality, called Tom, 
which they are told was written by a clinical psychologist when he was still in school 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982).164 Tom’s character description includes 
information stating that he is very moral, yet self-centred, highly intelligent yet uncreative 
                                                 
162 Again, Allison and Zelikow’s reworked Essence of Decision also shows well-documented misjudgements 
of risk and use of heuristics in case of uncertainty by governmental decision-makers as well as 
government organisations. As for experts: the misjudgement of risks is not only proven to have taken 
place in countless case studies with subjects such as university students, lay people or random sample 
groups, but in regards to scientific experts’ endeavours (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 1980; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Beck 1986, 1998; Wiener et al. 2013). A common heuristic is the dangerous 
overconfidence in current scientific knowledge and control.  
163 Other biases include for example adjustment and anchoring but they are not easy to translate from the 
individual to a government and are otherwise unlikely to apply to my case study (Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky 1982).  
164 This example is taken from (altered, but based on) Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982, 126ff).  
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apart from imagination around sci-fi, that he is orderly and dull, and that he was 
unsympathetic to others and shied interaction. The test subjects are first asked to predict 
in which academic field Tom was likely to be graduating. There was very strong agreement 
that Tom was least likely to major in humanities, social work or education, and equally 
strong agreement that he most likely majored in engineering or IT. The test takers were 
then in a second task asked to explain whether or not they believed projective personality 
tests were a good source of information for predicting future professional choices: most 
of them said that they did not. After completing these two tasks, respondents were told 
that Tom was in fact a graduate in the department for education and taking part in a 
special training program to work with disabled children. This did not prompt many test 
participants to reconsider their position; I will elaborate on their reaction later on in this 
chapter.  
The experiment is an example of representativeness, amongst other heuristics, for a 
variety of reasons. First of all, base rate information is entirely ignored. There are many 
more students of humanities and education than there are in IT (at the time of the 
experiment) yet this was entirely ignored by respondents in favour of guessing at 
similarity. Representativeness is the heuristic used when saying a child is likely to become 
a surgeon because it strongly resembles a famous one that is often seen on TV, or likes 
to wear a white coat, but without considering the child’s grades in science classes or the 
number of surgeons in the country. This kind of judgment can make a quick response 
easier – but often results in serious errors of judgment. Several factors that really should 
influence judgment, such as the base rate of information, have no influence on 
representativeness, or similarity between two events. In the case of Tom, the graduate 
student, reliability of the character witness and the degree to which such a description 
actually allows a prediction – which many respondents admitted they doubted – were 
equally ignored. That degree, also called predictability, is a very important factor however. 
If predictability of an outcome from several events equals zero, then the exact same 
predictions should be made for all of them. Nothing circumstantial should influence a 
decision. This is almost never the case in reality though; intuitive predictions often 
discount predictability (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982).  
Usually when given information fits well with a predicted outcome people are very 
confident in a connection between them. Kahneman and Tversky call this the ‘illusion of 
validity’, and in multiple further experiments show that it exists even when people are 
fully aware that there are factors which limit the predictability of an outcome or the 
accuracy of such a prediction (Tversky and Kahneman 1982b).  
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I chose to include representativeness in this discussion because it seemed a possibility that 
it would have an effect on the issue of shale gas development. A focus on the assumed 
similarity between gas and shale gas, or a comparison with the experience of shale gas 
development in the United States to judge what will occur in the UK, disregarding the 
discrepancy between the different resources and different country situations, would 
indicate the use of the representativeness heuristic.  
Another common heuristic is that of availability, which is related to representativeness but 
with a different process focus. Representativeness has more to do with misjudging the 
probability of a specific outcome, whereas availability is more about misjudging the 
specific probability. The availability bias is used when one “estimates frequency or 
probability [of an event] by the ease with which instances or associations could be brought 
to mind” (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 164). To put it another way: “[o]ne assumes that 
if examples are brought to mind quickly, then there must be a lot of them, or that if an 
association is easily made, then it must be accurate” (Taylor 1982, 191f). For example, 
when considering the risks of cancer, a person is likely to consider the number of cancer 
cases witnessed among their family and acquaintances. This is an instance in which 
familiarity affects the judgment of probability or frequency of occurrence. Such judgment 
can also be affected by other aspects of the information input, such as salience, or 
prominence of an issue. Kahneman and Tversky conducted an experiment in which they 
read out lists of famous people’s names to an audience and afterwards asked if the list had 
included more men than women or more women than men. Salience impacted the bias: 
If the male names on the list were more famous, the majority responded by saying the list 
had included more men even if this was untrue, and vice versa if the women’s names were 
more famous (Tversky and Kahneman 1982a). So the presentation and prominence of an 
issue also affects availability. As for prominence, for many seeing photographic evidence 
of a wounded toddler in Aleppo has more impact on the subjective judgment of such 
occurrences than reading a statistic about how many children die there. Moreover, timing 
affects availability: the more recent an event is the more likely it is available in somebody’s 
mind. Saying that a random child is likely to become a brain surgeon because it looks like 
a famous one is an example of representativeness. Agreeing when asked specifically if a 
random child will become a brain surgeon because one knows very many of them and 
therefore thinks it is likely even though they make up a tiny percentage of the work force 
is an example of availability.165  
                                                 
165 Naturally for this purpose I am excluding the unrelated issue that knowing somebody who knows very 
many brain surgeons might aid in becoming one, through connections and role models – hence the child 
in the example is not related, but random.  
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Availability can be a useful heuristic and it can lead to correct assumptions – frequently 
occurring events are often easier to recall than rare events, so the use of availability can 
lead to correct judgments. However, extreme but rare events, such as aeroplane crashes, 
are also easily recalled, but to assume they are frequent or likely because they are easily 
brought to mind is false. Availability depends on factors besides probability or frequency 
of event occurrence, and basing judgments on availability can therefore lead to errors in 
judgment and biases in decision-making. I chose the availability bias as it can also have an 
impact on shale gas development – earthquakes have been caused by fracking operations, 
and albeit minor or rare, this phenomenon may become strongly and predominantly 
attached to the resource. Similarly, as of 2016 only one country (with very specific 
structural predispositions) has experienced a well-documented so-called ‘revolution’ with 
shale gas, with most countries possessing minor shale gas reserves yet nothing of a size 
worth noting.  Naturally, the latter come less readily to mind when discussing shale gas 
options.  
Other oft-discussed heuristics in decision-making which fit the third narrative on 
cognitive capture in my thesis include the issue of causality and attribution, or causal judgment. 
Attribution theory is a topic in psychology which in its broadest sense comprises any 
efforts by lay people to “understand the causes and implications of the events they 
witness” (Ross and Anderson 1982, 129). It revolves around the understanding that 
people base their explanation and expectations on assumptions and data. Assumptions 
can be flawed, and their data can be inaccurate, biased or based on insufficient or 
unrepresentative information such as specific experiences. Beyond gathering the data, 
there must also be techniques for using and interpreting the data – rules and conceptual 
models that permit deductions. Attribution theory mainly deals with two cognitive tasks: 
causal judgment, and social inference. Causal judgment, once fixed on a certain conceptual 
model, is a heuristic that strongly affects judgment and decision-making and can do so 
erroneously if based on flawed assumptions. The bias exists because thinking is heavily 
causal, and thus any potential causal links or causal arguments are weighted more heavily 
than circumstantial evidence or evidence of a more abstract nature (Shafer 1984). Data or 
information of an assumed to be causal nature, even if wrong, will likely have a greater 
impact on decision-makers than other data which may be equally informative. As a causal 
schema is established, other information which does not fit this schema will be attributed 
with less or no significance (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 118). Making matter worse, 
Kahneman and Tversky found a “prevalent tendency to treat the [case example] as if it 
were perfectly valid, in spite of severe doubts” (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 128). 
Subjects in experiments were strongly inclined to trust suggested existing models of 
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explanation, however unlikely and unfitting they seemed for the case example, with only 
very few people suggesting the causal link or model might be invalid (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1980). This corresponds to the tendency of staying power of a status quo if it 
remains supported by powerful ideas discussed in the first part of this chapter. The refusal 
to reconsider assumptions about how things work is where serious issues may arise: once 
a connection is made, however wrong, it is difficult to challenge.  
To elaborate on this, I return to the example of Tom, the allegedly self-centred graduate 
student in education (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). Test participants had 
guessed his career choice as IT or engineering, based on a character description of him in 
high school. In a separate unrelated question, most respondents had expressed doubts 
about the reliability of predicting career choices through projective personality tests. 
Respondents were then told that Tom was in fact a graduate in the department for 
education and taking part in a special training program to work with disabled children. 
Immediately after the revelation they were asked to complete a new task: to explain the 
relation between his personality and his choice of profession, in the full knowledge that 
most of them had guessed it wrongly. This is where causal judgment plays a role. The 
majority of respondents decided to either focus on aspects of Tom’s personality 
description that they felt fit the picture after all – for example his moral sense – or to 
reinterpret his career choice to make it fit his personality test, suggesting it was taken up 
due to a need for dominance or order. This happened despite the fact that most 
respondents had said they were sceptic of the predictive power of personality tests. But 
once received, it was trusted. Their explanations were based on a verified fact (Tom’s 
career choice) and on a more detailed but potentially questionable description of his 
character from years before. Yet only around a fifth of the respondents mentioned the 
possibility that the personality description might have been inaccurate guesswork or that 
Tom’s character changed significantly since high school (Tversky and Kahneman 1980). 
Few respondents had the idea to reverse the direction and diagnose his character in light 
of his career choices. The conviction with which participants predict a career choice based 
on a personality description is evidence that people believe in a correlation between 
character and professional choices. This should imply that the other way around, 
professional choice is strongly diagnostic with regards to character. Given the example of 
Tom, in which his character and career choice do not seem to fit, diagnostic inference 
should result in questioning or revising the character description, or in questioning the 
link between character and career choice. But few test participants consider this. Tversky 
and Kahneman conclude that this shows the tendency of once-accepted causal 
connections and models of thinking to prevail against all odds (Kahneman, Slovic, and 
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Tversky 1982, 126ff). To return focus to cognitive capture, the lens of analysis created in 
this chapter, let us consider the impact this type of cognitive constraint can likely have on 
decisions even by official policymakers. It relates closely to lessons from the first half of 
this chapter which show the difficulty in discrediting a status quo as long as it is backed 
by accepted, prevalent ideas. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that predicting 
consequences from causes comes more naturally to human thinking than the reverse. 
Even if a model shows flaws, sticking to a causal connection that leads from action to 
consequence is easier than focusing on the outcome and reversing the logic. In other 
words, deduction is more trusted or generally found easier to apply than inference. To 
show the difference between causal and diagnostic reasoning, Kahneman and Tversky 
came up with the following problem set:   
“Problem 9: Which of the following two probabilities is higher? 
A) The probability that there will be rationing of fuel for individual consumers in the 
U.S. during the 1990s, if you assume that a marked increase in the use of solar energy 
for home heating will occur during the 1980s.  
B) The probability that there will be rationing of fuel for individual consumers in the 
U.S. during the 1990s, if you assume that no marked increase in the use of solar energy 
for home heating will occur during the 1980s.” (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 124) 
 
According to Tversky and Kahneman, one can choose between only two logical 
directions: to either assume that all “other things being equal, a marked increase in the 
use of solar energy can only alleviate a fuel crisis in later years” (Tversky and Kahneman 
1980, 124), because it adds to supply levels. The other option is to assume that “a marked 
increase in the use of solar energy during the '80s also provides a strong indication of an 
impending energy crisis” (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 124). Their reasoning is that the 
increase in the use of solar energy could only be economical if otherwise “fuel prices in 
the '80s are sufficiently high” (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 124). But this would suggest 
a shortage of fuel supply, which might lead to rationing. The causal judgment comes up 
with decreased probability for rationing, but the diagnostic judgment does the opposite. 
Therefore, an unreflective adherence to causal judgment constrains the cognitive process 
and affects ideas and subsequent decision-making.   
This section delivers more evidence on the resilience of the status quo. In the case of 
graduate Tom and other experiments, the case studies found that respondents were 
reluctant to reconsider an accepted causal model, no matter how unreliable or uncertain 
its ability to predict outcomes is seen. There further is evidence of a tendency for fluent 
adaptation of an old model to new facts.166 Causality thus can lead to exclusion of novel, 
                                                 
166 The overwhelming failure of test subjects in this experiment to reconsider the presented character 
description could be due to the nature and wording of the task at hand. This occurred to the authors, 
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different or ill-fitting data from decision-making. There is ample evidence of “the 
tendency to explain without revising, even when the model that is used in the explanation 
is highly uncertain” (Tversky and Kahneman 1980, 128). Explaining or predicting things 
based on an existing model of thought is a different type of causal reasoning than revising 
a theory or a model based on new information. To explain an observation, one needs to 
link it to fitting features of the existing model. To predict an outcome, one needs to guess 
which consequence most fits the model elements. But when new observation leads to a 
revision, the original theory or model of thought is questioned and changes are made 
based on new evidence. The bias of trusting in causality rather than new diagnoses makes 
this last action less likely.167 This heuristic fits together with work by political scientists on 
the power of ideas in decision-making discussed in the first half of this chapter on ideas 
and policy change, especially with findings about the dominance of the status quo.  
The above discussed heuristics have been accepted as influential on decision-making and 
as potential factors to distort rationality both by critics as well as by supporters and 
reformers of expected utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman, Slovic, 
and Tversky 1982). Decision-making is rarely based on a rational cost-benefit analysis, 
and even the proponents of modern expected utility theory and prospect theory agree on 
this. There are always biases. Constraints and biases have been suggested or even proven 
to be influential in shaping governmental decisions under risk (Allison and Zelikow 
1999).168 With the level of access to information and advisory councils only they have, 
governments should be better placed than most to take decisions under uncertainty. 
However, if policymakers are unaware of their own cognitive constraints, their ability to 
take well-considered decisions can be severely diminished just as it would be from 
surrounding themselves with experts and advisors drawn from only one particular 
advocacy group.  
                                                 
however they reason they are convinced the wording was less influential in this than the causality bias 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982, 126ff).  
167 Many inferences in regular decisions by both lay people and governmental decision-makers are based 
on theory and assumptions which are known to be incomplete or imprecise, and sometimes prove to be 
incorrect at a later point in time. People are aware of this and often are ready to admit that their theories 
might be flawed (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982, 126). In broader terms, this can be illustrated by 
shifts in economic policy goals and models over time. Keynesianism was once widely accepted as a good 
prescription of how to adjust economic policy to achieve growth, until it was replaced by the ideas of 
Milton Friedman’s Chicago school and Williamson’s Washington consensus.  
168 The following quote by Fischhoff et al. nicely summarises what this realisation might lead to in 
political circles: “For experts and policy makers, these findings pose what may be a more difficult 
challenge: to recognize and admit one's own cognitive limitations, to attempt to educate without 
propagandizing, to acknowledge the legitimacy of public concerns, and somehow to develop ways in 
which these concerns can find expression in societal decisions” (Paul Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 
1982a, 489). Naturally this should not suggest that governmental statements from now on include a 
blanket phrase stating ‘we’re probably biased, and likely wrong about this’. It is unclear what would be to 
gain from wilfully diminishing public confidence in such a way. But awareness is necessary to improve 
policy deliberation.  
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VII.3 Chapter summary  
To achieve a clearer understanding of non-material factors influencing decision-making 
in this chapter I considered the possibility of cognitive capture. Ideas guide strategy in 
that they provide a framework of what is possible and which options and interests are 
available to choose from. Besides or as part of guiding key ideas, cognitive biases including 
causal judgment, availability and representativeness can impact the thinking of decision-
makers. This way, systematic cognitive capture can present a situation in which certain 
ideas are entertained and others are not considered regardless of their value. 
Key ideas about how a system or a policy is supposed to work have been found to be 
influential on decision-making. My theoretical review finds that this application of ideas 
is if anything more pronounced in a situation of uncertainty, when there is no clarity about 
the outcome or particular winners and losers of an action. Often enough ideas are quite 
normative or complex and not easily proven as right or wrong. Yet there is nothing to 
suggest that ideas are less influential when they are scientifically inaccurate – false ideas 
can be just as powerful as correct ones. In this chapter I also reviewed specific cognitive 
heuristics, namely representativeness, availability and causality, which have been found to 
bias information and decision-making even in the face of accurate information. The 
approach by behavioural economics, economics and psychology confirmed arguments 
from the political economic theory about the power of ideas and judgments, especially 
the difficulty to draw into question the validity of the status quo.  
Despite their origins in quite different strands of literature, the two theoretical concepts 
can be combined around a similar focus of reasoning. Both approaches are concerned 
with the influence of certain reasoning on decision-making. For Béland and Cox, “ideas 
are causal beliefs … products of cognition … [ideas] are connected to the material world 
only via our interpretations of our surroundings [and] posit connections between things” 
(Béland and Cox 2010, 3). I find this view of ideas most helpful in combining the two 
bodies of literature considered in this chapter. Both are concerned with the influence on 
decision-making caused by ideational reasoning or indeed causal judgment and 
interpretation of material world issues and interests.  
In the next chapter I will consider evidence from U.S. and UK energy strategy to confirm 
if they appear to influence policy on shale gas. This task cannot be fulfilled by simply 
surveying energy policy papers, but through the interpretation of strategy as to their 
assumptions, key ideas and logical associations about the energy sector. The third part of 
the above theoretical review suggests that underlying ideas and understandings of the 
world, the system or the economy are likely highly influential in situations of decision-
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making, especially in situations of uncertainty. Shale gas development brings with it 
uncertainty about many of its consequences, and therefore I address the role of existing 
ideas about how the energy system works that likely influence policy.  
There is a possibility that a preferable solution to energy issues may lay outside of 
policymakers’ regular remit, that they simply do not have enough or the right ideas on 
their radar, or are constrained by cognitive biases. As Mitchell (2013) notes, a focal point 
of the debate around energy generation and energy security in the 21st century should be 
innovation and change in energy technology. Technological advancement changed the 
economics of communication in the past decades, and it is changing the regulatory as well 
as economic playing field for the media in the most recent years. This is widely accepted. 
As for the energy sector, there are many indications that systemic change is possible as 
well as desirable.169 The important point is the move to entirely different platforms. News 
and entertainment organisations are scrambling to improve their new media and especially 
their online content offers. Regardless, despite evidence that “given the opportunity, 
customers and citizens jump to invest in this latter future [renewable energy technology]” 
(Mitchell 2013), many policymakers and traditional energy providers are not leaping in a 
similar direction. When renewable zero marginal cost brings energy prices tumbling as it 
has in some instances in Germany for example, large energy companies will see falling 
profit whether they engage in it or not (Mitchell 2013). The success stories of countries 
and private interests that invest in renewables are convincing enough to prompt 
rethinking of energy policy (Usborne 2014; Parr 2015; Russell and Strachan 2015; Neslen 
2016). The issue with ideas being missing or wrong is not whether miscalculations or false 
facts can make their way into legislation (McQue and Macalister 2014). The issue is 
whether current strategies on energy policy are potentially biased towards the option of 
shale exploration. If, for example shale gas is seen as a continuation of the status quo and 
traditional methods of energy generation whereas renewable energies are seen as change, 
this may have a strong impact on policymaking.  
This chapter gives reason to consider every and all possible cognitive biases that may 
affect decision-making in energy policy, and to look for key ideas within the official 
governmental blueprint statements on energy. Such ideas may be based on specific causal 
judgments and biases, or consist of them. Arguments from the two different strands of 
                                                 
169 Some countries are already experiencing rapid change and economic growth due to innovation in the 
energy system (Lipp 2007; Neslen 2016; Taylor 2016; Shankleman 2016b). Certain private interests are 
also experiencing economic success with renewables investment (Usborne 2014; The Times of India 
2016; Shankleman 2016a). If the economic costs of fossil fuels included calculating health, pollution, 
clean-up and other environmental effects, then according to a report for the EU commission wind is 
already much cheaper than gas in the UK (Neslen 2014).  
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theory reviewed above have a different focus and basis, but they both form part of a larger 
argument about cognitive capture. Both can have the same effect, namely to influence 
and divert decision-making.  
To confirm my third narrative of the fracking story and review evidence of this in the 
case study of shale gas at hand, the institutions’ guiding strategy papers will be assessed 
as indicators of the framework of ideas surrounding energy decisions to examine ideas 




VIII Chapter Eight. Cognitive capture: Evidence from the strategy 
plans 
 
In this chapter I follow insights from chapter seven and examine official energy policy 
strategy papers to establish the existence of cognitive capture in the form of underlying 
ideas and biases, which the theoretical review suggests can alter and constrain decision-
making. My hypothesis for the chapter is that evidence of cognitive capture, through the 
presence of specific key ideas and cognitive biases, such as causal judgments, favours shale 
gas over other new resources for the energy sector. The 0-hypothesis to this is that 
strategy documents either include strong ideas that suggest a policy path other than the 
one including shale gas, or that they contain a multitude of ideas and no noticeable pattern 
of pro-shale gas related ideas. To this purpose I examine evidence gathered from strategy 
documents based on indicators drawn from the theoretical review. These indicators 
concern the prevalence of key ideas, and of the biases causal judgment, representativeness 
and availability. I review several key documents that are officially claimed to be the 
strategic guiding papers on energy policy in the United States and the United Kingdom 
which represent as well as inform ideas on energy policy strategy.  
It is impossible for me to conclusively prove that there is a direct effect of such ideas on 
ensuing policy outcomes. However, it is possible to review whether or not such ideas exist 
in the first place, and whether they fit with the policy decision of supporting shale gas 
development, thereby establishing probable cause. The practice of tracing ideas and their 
fit with policy decisions to demonstrate their significance for policy outcomes is 
established in political economy (Hall 1989). Difficulty arises as there is no clear cut path 
of methods to follow on how to establish the existence of an idea in a written document, 
and “the extent to which outcomes are directly attributable to these ideas is still difficult 
to ascertain” (Blyth 2009, 215). In fact, most of the research in this area is more concerned 
with the effects on policy outcomes by ideas the existence of which is already well-known 
and specifically articulated, such as a neoliberal belief in the benefits of trade 
liberalisation.170 There is no guidebook on how to prove the existence of an idea in a text. 
I am looking for more specific ideas and judgments made about the energy sector and 
select energy production sources. Béland and Cox suggest that a “way to make the case 
for ideational scholarship is [taking] an outcome of interests and show[ing] that ideas 
                                                 
170 In their ground-breaking work on the influence of ideas on policy, Peter Hall and his colleagues simply 
assume the existence of Keynesian ideas in the governmental sphere – they do not look for evidence of 
them in official statements.  
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matter in explaining it” (Béland and Cox 2010, 83). This is my approach, to see if I can 
explain the policy outcome of support for shale gas development by establishing that it 
matches the ideational repertoire of the countries. If this is the case and cognitive 
constraints can be proven as well, I have established what I label cognitive capture. In the 
first half of this chapter I analyse the strategy documents manually and summarise their 
core focus points briefly, as well as key ideas that can be found in them. This is to provide 
context which is important to text analysis to avoid misrepresenting its subjects of 
analysis. I further address this concern by introducing each document considering the 
time and circumstances of its creation where possible and or necessary. During the 
manual analysis I also establish key ideas as codes of association for causal judgment 
which I use in the second half of the chapter for further comprehensive statistical 
discourse analysis with the Provalis Research QDA Miner statistical tool. QDA Miner is 
a data analysis software package by Provalis specifically intended to be used in mixed 
methods research, for “coding, annotating, retrieving and analysing small and large 
collections of documents” (Provalis Research 2016).  
The second half of the chapter captures wider ideational and causal trends of the 
documents and also shows if underlying ideas clash with those promoted more 
prominently in the strategy blueprints. This is where I look for very specific causal 
judgments between energy sources and policy results.  
The focus for this chapter therefore lies on the input, i.e. the information side. On the 
output side, the depending variable, we know a decision has been made by both countries’ 
governments to approve and support shale gas development. Hence in order to trace 
specific ideas I am considering information produced by and informing the governments 
discussing key strategies and concerns before the state of policy implementation. Which 
information was presented to the decision-makers, do the strategy blueprint documents 
correlate or clash with their final political decision on shale gas? I work from the 
assumption that key policymakers are both involved in composing the strategy papers and 
then take their strategic cues from them. I consider the strategy documents under the 
theoretical lens of the literature previously reviewed and with the aim to find answers to 
the following questions: Which are the key ideas connected with the different energy 
sources? What is the tone of the connection between certain concepts such as 
environmental health or energy security and different energy sources, i.e. positive, 
negative, causal, or neutral? Is there a similarity or difference in core ideas and causal 
judgments between U.S. and UK energy strategy plans? Do the key ideas and themes 
change drastically between different documents? Is any evidence of the biases found in 
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the theoretical review noticeable in the strategy papers? Given the fact that I am not 
conducting controlled behavioural tests with policymakers but basing my conclusions on 
indicators of ideas expressed in strategy papers, detecting biases is a more complicated 
and different task relying on interpretation. It is difficult to establish concrete evidence of 
representativeness or availability outside of a controlled test situation, but this is possible 
through interpretation. Evidence of causal judgments has the best potential for content 
analysis in documents and a connected trend in favour of the status quo can also be 
detected in this form of data.  
The data considered in this chapter consists of the respective official energy strategy plans: 
in the United Kingdom these are the Energy White Papers from 2001 – 2015 and in the 
United States these are the Strategic Energy Plans commissioned between 2001 – 2015 
(DTI 2003, 2007; BERR 2008; DECC 2009, 2011, DoE 2006a, 2011, 2014a; White House 
2014). These documents are the blueprints for all energy policy within a country: they 
showcase the ideas held by official energy policymakers as well as the ideas that future 
policy is drawn from. Hence, they give a unique insight into the ideas and mind-set of 
those who end up drafting actual energy policy legislation within the specific departments 
dealing with this task, and how they may or may not change across time. To this line of 
research this is more conducive than official statements by elected Congressmen and -
women or MPs who are not actually tasked with writing energy legislation – hence I chose 
to consider the energy strategy papers over transcripts of parliamentary debates on the 
issue, after finding that the latter rarely go into detail and are mostly held by people not 
actually tasked with writing energy legislation. That is not to say that these public debates 
have no influence on the final energy policy, but that they do not substantially add to the 
review of strategy plans.171  
Through the analysis in this chapter I gain insights on strong underlying ideas about 
energy policy and specific biases such as causal judgments about different energy sources 
and policy outcomes. The results add to my analysis of factors that influence policy 
decision on shale gas development by preventing objective consideration due to cognitive 
biases.   
 
                                                 
171 Interviews would have been a helpful addition to the dataset. However, after completing a first round 
of interviews with parliamentary researchers and researchers at the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change in the United Kingdom, it became impossible to replicate these interviews in the United States 
during my research there. Hence interviews do not form part of my dataset in this chapter, but I 
acknowledge that they can be a fruitful future addition to the case study. 
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VIII.1 First evidence of cognitive capture in United States energy strategy: Context 
and key ideas 
In this section, I consider several documents officially designed to outline and guide U.S. 
American governmental energy strategy and policy decisions within the energy sector. 
The chosen documents, limited in number through the timeframe selected, are the 
following: Each of the U.S. Government’s commissioned Strategic Energy Plans, 
researched and written by the Department of Energy (DoE) between 2001-June 2016. 
That includes the DoE 2006 Energy Strategy Plan, the DoE 2011 Energy Strategy Plan, 
the DoE 2014-2018 (March 2014) Energy Strategy Plan and the All-of-the-Above Energy 
Plan 2014 (AOTA) (May 2014).  
 
VIII.1.1 The 2006 Department of Energy strategic plan  
In the 2006 Energy Strategic Plan the U.S. Department of Energy states that “over its 
history, DoE has shifted its emphasis and focus as the energy and security needs of the 
nation have changed” and it nowadays focuses on “energy, scientific, environmental, and 
national security goals” (DoE 2006, 6). The combination of goals shows the importance 
accredited to the energy sector and its relevance for security, but also appears to suggest 
the sector to be very adaptive to change in time. The key topics of the plan are – in that 
order – energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, 
environmental responsibility, and management excellence (DoE 2006, 7). The DoE 
Strategic Plan further outlines the DoE’s key ideas and aims for the development of new 
energy technologies, the improvement of energy independence, the protection of United 
States nuclear weaponry stockpile, and a renewed increase in U.S. American 
competitiveness in the global energy market. To help achieve these goals, President Bush 
launched two key research initiatives which the plan discusses: The American 
Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) to increase “investment in research and development, 
… and encourage(s) entrepreneurship and technology discovery” and the Advanced 
Energy Initiative (AEI) which promotes energy efficiency to lessen imports and increase 
energy independence (DoE 2006a, 6). AEI is also mainly responsible for the allocation of 
funds to advance renewables technology research, i.e. wind or solar, but also carbon 
capture and clean coal technology. Clearly this is kept separate from other investment in 
technology research. In the three years following the strategy plan with Bush still as 
president, the ACI was funded between 30-50% more than the AEI (DoE 2006b, 2007, 
2008), further suggesting different priority attributed to the goals. This idea of the 
importance of research and scientific innovation in the future to mitigate current as well 
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as future problems and challenges is repeated throughout the document (DoE 2006a). 
This focus suggests a heavy reliance on science and future scientific discoveries to do 
away with problems. It appears to be reserved for specific causes: the need for research 
is not nearly as strongly promoted for example when there is need for thorough scientific 
research to mitigate risks in the pursuit of shale gas development, as experts have criticised 
(Schrope 2013; Semeniuk 2014; McCarthy and Semeniuk 2014; Goodchild van Hilten 
2015). The DoE considers that its “principal tool for advancing technology is investing 
in high-risk, high-payoff energy research, development which the private sector would 
not or could not develop alone in our market-based economy” (DoE 2006a, 8). 
Willingness to invest appears to exist, but it is selective. While the trust in scientific 
innovation is strong, this brief outright dismissal of market-based options as insufficient 
seems unusual in a U.S. government publication. It does not engage with other sections 
of the same document which treat the efficient market-economy as a given and desirable, 
nor is it repeated in later U.S. strategy documents.  
The strategy plan repeatedly stresses the importance of keeping America strong 
economically and as a global leader, an end to which “reliable, clean and affordable 
energy” is a necessary means (DoE 2006a, 8). Nuclear energy is considered alongside 
renewables. The transport sector is pointed out as a very inefficient sector, and heavily 
reliant on foreign imports of petroleum and therefore weak in terms of energy security. 
(Shale gas cannot simply fix this issue.) Said dependence is the main criticism of fossil 
fuels in the document, and it is related more to oil than gas. A strong recommendation 
for renewables is a result from the finding that there is a connection between 
diversification of the “energy portfolio and increase [in] energy security” (DoE 2006a, 9). 
However, the plan is also filled with a notion of no urgency, and almost unlimited time in 
order to fix current or future issues in the future: The plan explicitly counts the aim of 
energy efficiency and less energy intensity as positive for the economy and conducive to 
enabling energy independence in one paragraph (DoE 2006a, 8). The rest of the sections 
on environmental protection and legacy are full of references to current and future 
technological advances that will solve current and future problems.   
Reviewing the strategy plan of 2006 almost a decade after its publication, I find that 
several items on its agenda showcase the inability to make detailed and accurate long-term 
economic predictions. As an example, in 2006 due to an increase in global and regional 
energy demand as well as production constraints, attested largely to the decline of 
resources and resource availability, gas and oil prices were rising rapidly and expected to 
continue rising without an end in sight (DoE 2006a; Romero 2004). In 2016, we know 
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better. In 2004 the U.S. imported 65% of domestically used crude oil (DoE 2006a), and 
the U.S. EIA forecasted that this would increase continuously (EIA 2005). The picture 
has changed dramatically since then: the U.S. market is flush with cheap domestic gas, 
and global oil prices fell lower than they had been in a very long time (IEA 2014). Said 
resource availability issues and rising prices were cited as key reasons to diversify the 
energy portfolio and invest, for example, in renewables – “energy diversity is essential for 
America’s energy security and economic prosperity” (DoE 2006a, 9). The necessity was 
expected to increase and diversify the U.S. energy mix and lessen dependence on imports 
of oil, “thereby reducing vulnerability to disruption and increasing the flexibility of the 
market to meet U.S. needs” (DoE 2006a, 9ff). The attitude I can detect towards renewable 
development appears to paint it mainly as a necessary step to take when the preferred 
sources of energy become troublesome to acquire. The document makes mention of 
“energy disruptions” and the high risk possibilities that natural disasters such as droughts, 
water shortages, earthquakes and others could have a potentially major impact on the 
energy supply and energy security of the United States. There is little effort made however 
to elaborate on the fact that it is the effects of the use of fossil fuels that cause these risks. 
It is worth noting that several of these risks have since been demonstrably linked to shale 
gas operations.  
A strong causal judgment is hinted at midway through the strategy plan: “Fuel prices will 
affect the rate at which many new energy-related technologies penetrate target markets. 
When fuel prices are high, typically large-scale market penetration occurs sooner than 
when fuel prices are low” (DoE 2006a, 12). In 2016 this has proven not to be so – the oil 
price had been very low for over a year and renewable technology flourished throughout 
this time and is set to be one of the cheapest energy sources in the U.S. in 2016 (Johnson, 
Yeh, and Hope 2013; Watson 2016). Yet when discussing the environment, the DoE 
warns that its ability to achieve the environmental responsibility goals might be hindered 
by changes in regulation – that requirements to comply with further environmental 
regulation might make it harder for them (DoE 2006a, 22). This seems like a prophylactic 
warning and as if the DoE does not desire any further environmental regulation. Concern 
about costliness are further expressed by the following reminder that a “factor that most 
of the energy technologies being researched by the Department have in common is that 
they are more costly than conventional technologies in today’s marketplace” (DoE 2006a, 
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12).172 This is also the case for unconventional shale gas of course, as chapter two and 
four have shown, but this fact is not as publicised.  
Key ideas in this report include that renewable energy technologies are considered 
ultimately inferior to traditional fossil fuels in their potential contribution to the economy 
but necessary as a second-best plan to help with energy independence and reduce 
emissions. Causal judgment is found about renewable energy as environmentally 
beneficial but costly. Environmental concerns are considered prominently but are not 
granted similar levels of urgency as energy independence. The U.S. energy sector was in 
a declining phase in 2006, with rising imports and high prices, and the 2006 energy strategy 
plan reflects this through a notion of some urgency and an attitude of future problem-
solving. Remedies to the problems of energy dependence, declining resources, and 
environmental hazards are suggested to lie in diversification and renewables amongst 
others, but there is no cheerleading for this option. There is a strong recurring idea notable 
around the importance of energy for national security through energy independence.  
 
VIII.1.2 The 2011 Department of Energy strategic plan  
The 2011 DoE Energy Strategic Plan was “intended to serve as a blueprint for the 
Department of Energy to help address the nation’s energy, environmental, and nuclear 
challenges through transformative science and technology solutions” (Schueler 2011). In 
its mission statement one reads that the way to ensure both American security and 
American prosperity lies in “addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges 
through transformative science and technology solutions” (DoE 2011, 5). This is not 
wildly different to the previous energy strategy paper. There is however more focus on 
the environment, at least in the summary pages, though this remains quite vague.  
The key plans outlined in this strategy document and found throughout are: to aid the 
transformation of the national energy system, to ensure U.S. leadership in clean energy 
innovation and technology, to invest in science, assure nuclear security and to create a 
new framework for energy policy (DoE 2011). The free market system as the ideal 
approach to a functioning energy market is considered as a given.  
The plan focuses heavily on U.S. leadership in all energy-related areas. Its authors 
ascertain an increasing challenge to U.S. leadership in many areas, such as IT, 
                                                 
172 Furthermore, there are multiple references to the DoE’s role and responsibility in safeguarding the 
nation from nuclear proliferation elsewhere and safeguarding the nation’s own nuclear power plants and 
nuclear weapons’ stockpile.  
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biotechnology, aerospace and many other technological industries. “American leadership 
in the clean energy revolution is essential to future economic competitiveness” (DoE 
2011, 3). However, they admit that “the  United States has lost its lead in many of the 
energy technologies that they developed” (DoE 2011, 3). In fact, the United States has 
been a net importer of high technology products since 2011 (DoE 2011; The World Bank 
2015). Renewable energy is considered more earnestly in this context of leadership, as if 
a key reason for engaging with them is the desire to not miss out on being a leader in 
another sector of the modern economy.  
As in 2006, a strong focus lies on innovation and supporting new technologies and 
constant invention, readily accepting the prospect of some of the investments failing. This 
appears to suggest that certain costs are tolerated. There is strong trust in increasing 
capacities of technology and that future problems can be fixed. Establishing leadership in 
energy innovation in general is seen as a way to ensure future economic revenues for the 
United States, but there is at this point little explicit connection made between renewable 
development and positive economic impact, other than the potential for leadership. The 
document is heavily focused on economic aspects related to energy, for example pleading 
the imperative to reverse the trend of decreasing manufacturing jobs within the United 
States.173  
The document stresses that the United States’ “excessive dependence on oil is taking 
them down an increasingly costly, insecure, and environmentally dangerous path” (DoE 
2011, 12). The dangers of energy dependence and climate change are deemed worthy of 
drastic measures for prevention: “The transition to a secure, low-carbon energy future 
requires nothing less than a new industrial revolution.” (DoE, 2011, p. 13). The risk of 
climate change is discussed with reference to emissions: “As part of prudent risk 
management, our responsibility to future generations is to eliminate most of our carbon 
emissions and transition to a sustainable energy future.” (DoE 2011, 12). Shale gas is of 
course not sustainable. The effect of climate change is accepted as a given, which is not 
necessarily the case for all American policymakers and bureaucrats. The comment is a 
most important statement in that it shows that in their strategy outline, the formulation 
of their goals and ideas 2011, the United States government clearly considers carbon 
emissions a risk. This not only further confirms the suitability of the focus on decisions 
under risk and uncertainty in this study for researching decision-making in energy policy, 
                                                 
173 In this spirit, the document praises the U.S. as being the place of the greatest research institutions in 
the world, a situation for which the department takes partial credit (DoE 2011, 12) but emphasises 
repeatedly that it considers this position of leadership at risk.  
 186 
it also confirms that the government in their expression of ideas considers them to be so. 
The latter inarguably clashes with the decision to support and invest in further 
unconventional fossil fuel production as has been the case with the commitment to shale 
gas exploration, making it an unusual policy choice at first glance. There is surprising 
vigour in the statements that “there is compelling evidence that carbon-dioxide emissions 
from human activities are adversely affecting the climate” and that “the conventional use 
of fossil fuels is a major source of these emissions” (DoE 2011, 12). These are strong 
statements for the government of a country in which climate change sceptics, albeit below 
1% of the scientific community, are represented almost equally in the media (Boykoff 
2007). But these insights are not used in the document to effectively employ rhetoric 
against increasing development of fossil fuel resources. Emissions also remain the only 
environmental hazard discussed in any detail. Considering the document relates a strong 
trust in the future effectiveness of carbon capture, this may not necessarily imply a need 
to turn to renewable energy.   
The 2011 strategy plan’s focus on the panacea that is new technology is a strong idea 
influencing the document in that it seeks to dispel the notion of limitations. Instead of 
focusing on the finite nature of the planet’s ecosystem, in this plan the idea is pushed that 
future inventions can change everything and fix problems of the current system, therefore 
investment in technological innovation almost absolves the government of certain hard 
decisions. But it also increasingly focuses on environmental issues, which is a change in 
trend since the 2006 document. The new Obama administration is of course responsible 
partially for a change in administration at the DoE in between 2006 and 2011 which may 
have to do with changes in style. Renewable energy sources however are not considered 
in any detail and the discussion of climate change remains much less specific than for 
example discussions of the energy sector’s overall impact on the U.S. economy. This 
appears as an example of availability: there is less experience with renewable sources, 
therefore they are not considered in as much detail and length. Key ideas promoted in 
this report include the importance of U.S. leadership and the importance of decreasing 
import dependence which is a theme carried onwards from the 2006 plan. The perceived 
vulnerability is carried on despite an actual improvement and change in the situation in 
the meantime. That energy independence leads to security and safety is a strong causal 
judgment that is not questioned: this non-consideration of details, and the priority 
attributed to this goal, facilitate the introduction of a short-term fix such as shale gas.  
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VIII.1.3 The 2014–2018 United States strategic planner and the 2014 all-of-the-above energy strategy 
as a path to sustainable economic growth   
With the 2014-2018 strategic plan the Department of Energy aims to address “energy, 
security, economic and environmental challenges facing the United States in the 21st 
century” – and declares itself ready to deliver solutions (DoE 2014a, 3). While all of the 
discussed energy strategy papers tend to mention climate change prominently, this is the 
first U.S. plan that begins by naming climate change as a primary challenge and priority 
in the energy sector in its opening message from the energy secretary (DoE 2014a). Major 
concerns of the plan are mitigating climate change and working towards U.S. energy 
independence. This focus is only a nominal change from the more general ‘energy 
security’, as it usually is understood as equivalent to energy independence in the U.S. 
strategy plans.  
Looking back from 2016, it appears as though there was an increase in the discussion of 
climate change at the same time that shale gas development flourished and first troubles 
of the industry became known. Alike previous strategic documents the DoE 2014-2018 
puts strong emphasis on the importance of scientific innovation and supporting research, 
and shows a strong belief in the power of future ideas to solve current problems.174 A 
third of the report is concerned with nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, dedicated to 
discussing the safety of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and working at the global level to reduce 
threats of nuclear weapons.  
The strategic plan that opened with a statement on climate change does deliver in the 
sense that commitment to renewables and environmental clean-up are discussed in much 
detail and with abundant examples of different programs that the department is 
supporting. It is very specific about different renewable initiatives and in fact all its policy 
recommendations, and makes several big concessions to the capacity of renewable energy 
to contribute to the U.S. economy. The focus on economic competitiveness and job 
creation is also very strong. There is further a strong focus on supporting scientific and 
technological innovation and for this purpose to support education in science, technology 
and engineering. Part of the strategy for departmental management is dedicated to the 
clean-up of chemical and nuclear waste. It is, however, clear that waste from other energy 
technologies is not considered worthy of discussion in this context. There is strong 
emphasis on both the moral and legal imperative of dealing with nuclear waste products 
                                                 
174 Further focus lies once again on nuclear weapons’ technology, non-proliferation and U.S. leadership in 
global energy transition.  In terms of substance it adds little outlandish or different material to the analysis 
that would diverge from previously pledged ideas and preferences. Also, it is very repetitive with its key 
themes.  
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to protect environment and health. This is not as of yet reflected in emphasis of dealing 
with environmental damage, risks to human health and the effect of waste from shale gas 
operations.  
None of the U.S. strategic plans regarding energy reviewed so far have mentioned the 
phenomenon of shale, shale gas or shale oil with a single sentence. There is talk of 
‘unconventional gas’, which includes shale as well as tight gas, in the context of future 
research and sharing of best practices. This is despite shale gas and oil becoming major 
factors within the U.S. energy sector by then.  
In the 2014-2018 plan the market is still considered the best and only system for the 
allocation of energy resources, there are simply fewer words spent on reaffirming this. In 
this document, the idea that the energy sector is vital to the job market is underlined, and 
further job creation and action to increase sector competitiveness are encouraged. The 
key idea of salvation through technological discovery and scientific research is carried on 
from the previous document, but here the policy plans connected are more concrete. The 
report also pays ample attention to national security defence and continues the trend 
towards an increasingly environmental framing of energy policy strategy. Alternative 
energy generation is considered more seriously than in the previous documents (this was 
expected with the switch from a Republican to a Democratic administration but did not 
manifest as strongly in 2011). Whereas the economic prowess of conventional fuels is still 
highlighted, the notion that renewables can yield economic results is promoted more than 
in the 2011 plan.  
The latest strategic planner for energy policy in consideration for this study is the “all-of-
the-above energy strategy” plan (AOTA from here on) “as a path to sustainable economic 
growth” (White House 2014). It entailed a new $27.9 billion Fiscal Year Budget request 
for the DoE (2.6% increase) from president Obama and was lauded to emphasise 
continued commitment to both national energy goals, “global leadership” in energy, 
energy security as well as low carbon goals (Moniz 2014). During the 2015 State of the 
Union address, President Obama said that “one of the biggest factors in bringing more 
jobs back is our commitment to American energy. The all-of-the-above energy strategy 
… is working, and today, America is closer to energy independence than we’ve been in 
decades” (Moniz 2015). Clearly the focus on U.S. energy independence is as strong as 
ever. The DoE explicitly considers energy dependence a risk: “Although international oil 
supply shocks and oil price volatility will always present risks, empirical evidence 
presented in this report suggests that further reductions in net petroleum imports will 
reduce those risks” (White House 2014, 6). Petroleum imports are again singled out as an 
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issue of dependence. The AOTA blueprint opens prominently with a reminder that the 
U.S. energy sector is in the middle of a phase of great “historic” change and 
transformation, and that it is experiencing considerable growth in almost all the sectors’ 
resource groups, including renewables as well as traditional fossil fuels (White House 
2014, 2).175  
The document can be roughly divided into three strategies which are described as key 
features of the blueprint: the support of economic growth and creation of new jobs in the 
energy sector, the advancement of energy security and energy independence, and a focus 
on cleaner, low carbon energy. Shale gas can only, in the best-case scenario, deliver the 
second out of those three objectives to the U.S., and only for a very limited time. There 
seems to be a clear hierarchy of ideas and of the three main stated goals in the strategy 
paper; the important progress of making the U.S. a leader in energy policy, for example, 
is discussed in length and only after continued support is explicitly pledged to this goal, 
the final sentence of the paragraph reads that  “(AOTA) will strengthen this progress” of 
energy independence and being the world leader in oil and gas supply “while deploying 
low-carbon technologies and laying the foundation for a clean energy future” (White 
House 2014, 3, 6). This appears as a purposeful ranking of goals in order of importance. 
The necessity of achieving (or, depending on the sector, preserving) U.S. leadership is 
highlighted as vitally important throughout the document, just as energy independence is.  
The fact that natural gas consumption has risen by 18% in the past decade is considered 
a success in the same spirit that an increase of energy in solar, wind and geothermal 
sources in the past half a decade is (White House 2014, 8–9). This is partly due to the fact 
that the increase in gas consumption goes hand-in-hand with the decrease in petroleum 
consumption and hence import. Secondly, this success is seen due to a slight decrease in 
CO2 emissions, as gas is widely considered cleaner than oil. The second point should be 
accepted with caution; both because shale gas has not replaced coal but often led to it 
being exported and burnt elsewhere, therefore not lowering overall emissions; and 
because emissions from shale gas are quite possibly much more potent than from 
conventional gas or coal (Hirst, Khor, and Buckle 2013; Harvey 2014a). The authors of 
the AOTA strategy paper readily admit that both of those changes as well as many other 
developments in the energy sector were previously unpredicted by the department (or 
other official sources known to them). They go on to make a new prediction that 
dependency on imports will decline in the future whilst the role of gas in the U.S. market 
                                                 
175 In its opening statement, the AOTA plan self-describes its strategy as “aggressive” (White House 2014, 
2). The executive summary and key chapters are full of references to climate change and the need for a 
low carbon transition.  
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will strengthen and continue. The irony goes unnoticed, yet it is evidence of the survival 
of a key idea that has guided U.S. energy strategy for decades: namely a strong belief in 
the power of the oil and gas sector, despite growing knowledge of declining resources and 
fossil fuels’ connection to global warming. This is a clear impact of causal judgment: the 
result of import dependency is not used to then engage in diagnostic inference and 
establish that the oil and gas sector has not delivered on this goal lately. Instead the 
judgment that the sector always delivers is trusted and therefore, only the direct 
neighbourhood of this issue is considered: more oil and gas is needed, rather than 
diagnosing that the association no longer works and finding an alternative that will lead 
to energy security and independence. This connection also confirms a status quo bias: the 
positive perception of fossil fuels’ effect on the economy has not been discredited enough.  
According to AOTA, it was partly the energy sector that helped along the U.S. recovery 
from the recent economic and financial crisis: “Rising domestic energy production has 
made a significant contribution to GDP growth and job creation.” (White House 2014, 
3). Much of this rising production can be attributed to shale gas, therefore a positive 
connection is made clear. A lessening of U.S. trade deficit since 2009 is also partially due 
to a decrease in oil imports – according to AOTA, this accounts for more than a fifth of 
the narrowing margin.176 Reasons for this include both the stark increase in domestic 
production of gas and oil as well as the greater use of biofuels and some advancement in 
energy efficiency, such as more efficient vehicles. Yet other reasons include the economic 
downturn and subsequent reduced energy demand (Mathieu, Spencer, and Sartor 2014). 
AOTA claims a rather unspecified growth in jobs around the energy industry largely to 
do with the expansion of the shale business – “employment in these sectors [oil and gas] 
increased by 133,000 between 2010 and 2013” (White House 2014, 15).177 This number is 
difficult to verify or back up. Natural gas is embraced and distinguished explicitly as a 
‘transitional fuel’: cleaner than many other traditional sources of energy, it is meant to aid 
the path towards a renewable energy future. In the same sections “some environmental 
                                                 
176 The DoE sees problems in the reliance the energy sector, especially the transportation sector, on heavy 
liquid fossil fuels, both for reasons of energy independence as well as in terms of environmental damage 
(White House 2014). “The convenience of high-energy content liquid fuels means that their role in the 
transportation sector could persist for decades”(White House 2014, 38f). It states that the DoE means to 
discourage this trend, however said convenience may serve as an explanation why the ideas and 
preferences have scarcely advanced in the decade spanned by the here-analysed strategy blueprints.  
177 This claim is unspecific (i.e. it does not say what jobs and in which sectors, because not just the 
industry directly is considered) and very contested by researchers (Cusick 2013; Christopherson 2015; 
FWW 2015).  
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concerns” in connection to natural gas are seemingly belittled and not discussed further 
(White House 2014, 40).178  
The document is at times less exact than desirable and does not shy away from 
exaggerated claims it later mitigates: for example it suggests that “The United States has 
emerged as the world’s leading producer of petroleum and natural gas” (White House 
2014, 13), only to concede at a different point in the document that in fact it is not that 
yet, because it only “leads in natural gas and is predicted by the International Energy 
Agency ‘to lead in oil as well within a few years’ ” (White House 2014, 3). This may be an 
editorial oversight but may also be purposeful; the reader who only skims headlines and 
executive summary would likely not notice. The report further claims that the U.S. has 
reduced its total carbon pollution since 2005 more than any other nation on the planet 
has reduced their respective ones, however there are no exact numbers or formulas 
referenced that would elucidate how it got to this result. It is not easily verifiable through 
brief research, only repeated on the White House website. World Bank data compilations 
do not, in fact, corroborate this claim (World Bank 2011). It is evident of a key idea or 
theme in the U.S. strategy paper: the notion of U.S. leadership and exceptionalism, which 
is very strong. The conservation of this perceived leadership is worth a lot to the authors 
of all of the U.S. strategy plans reviewed here.  
The half-sentence reminding the reader that in his last two State of the Union Addresses 
President Obama called on Congress to pass legislation to the effect that there would be 
a market incentive or market-based mechanism for reducing carbon emissions makes it 
clear that currently this is still in absentia (White House 2014, 36).179 It is also very 
unspecific. Along the document are mentioned many expenses taken by the government 
to support renewables, clean coal technology, renewables on public land, and private 
investors in renewables, to compensate for a lack of incentives in the free market, which 
they plainly say works better for fossil fuels. The impression one gets when reading is that 
renewable energies are considered to have special needs, and while the DoE wants 
everyone to know how much they have already and will further support them, they also 
insist on reminding the reader of their inferiority to conventional fuels.  
                                                 
178 There are remarks on the utility of gas as backup power for wind and solar plants. This is a new 
narrative for supporting gas and potentially shale gas, but a cost-benefit analysis of producing new shale 
gas only for this purpose is not attempted and unlikely to be convincing.  
179 “In the absence of market-based mechanisms to internalize the externality, it is appropriate to provide 
support through tax incentives and other measures commensurate with the value of the GHG reductions 
provided by those zero-emissions energy sources” (White House 2014, 36), for example the renewable 
energy production tax credit.  
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For the first time in 2014, nonconventional shale gas is explicitly mentioned in a 
governmental energy strategic paper (White House 2014). It is once used to label a figure 
and again in the context that research to “inform prudent local environmental regulation 
of hydraulic fracturing is actively under way” (White House 2014, 35). This seems rather 
late if not remiss, considering that at this point hydraulic fracturing on a major commercial 
scale had been an active part of the energy economy for around a decade.  
The AOTA focuses less on technical innovation than previous strategy plans; it still is full 
of references to national security, and strongly recommends free market solutions but it 
sees more limitations in these policy goals than the previous but not the first two reports. 
The market is in this case also used with reference to protecting the environment: that 
renewables may not be strong market competitors yet, but the market can fix this, adapt, 
and further their inclusion by providing incentives for low carbon energy generation. 
Overall the focus on environmental factors has increased, but they are implicitly given a 
lower importance in a ranking of priorities. The economic focus on the other hand is 
increasing both in frequency and priority. Key ideas promoted in this last available U.S. 
energy strategy blueprint include the connection of the gas sector to growth and jobs and 
economic recovery, as well as to increased U.S. energy independence and security. This is 
very clearly a fruitful base for the support and extension of favourable shale gas policy. 
Considering the results of chapter four, intentionally or unintentionally presenting the 
support of shale gas as based on job creation, ‘the economy’ and security concerns (while 
maintaining it is a cleaner fuel than others) also targets key public priorities.  
 
VIII.1.4 Preliminary analysis 
The U.S. energy strategy papers reviewed, in as far as they can be compared amongst 
themselves, have shown the existence of several noticeable key ideas that are informing 
their energy policy. Although there are different highlights in each strategic plan, one 
could not establish a major change or specific trend in between them. The 2006 energy 
plan stands out for a sense of urgency and looming doom, especially with regards to 
increasing import dependence, which leads it to partially condemn oil. The energy sector 
at the time was considered in decline, and the plan was, of course, also published by a 
different, Republican administration than the other three. The 2014 strategic plan is 
unique in that it is very specific in terms of detailed policy plans and statistical information 
about renewable technology developments for example, whereas large parts of the other 
plans focus only on broader themes and strategy for alternative energy.  
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Guiding ideas are discernible throughout all of the four U.S. energy blueprints. They 
concern the energy department’s priorities as well as judgments of energy sources and are 
indicative of cognitive capture in shaping and constraining the room for energy policy 
decisions. The need to achieve energy security and energy independence is very strong in 
these strategy plans. The terms are often used interchangeably: energy security is not 
deemed possible while dependent on imports. Because of this, oil and petroleum is at 
times portrayed unfavourably, but energy independence is not really negatively connected 
with the gas sector. The energy sector overall, but especially the gas sector, is often 
connected with the creation of jobs, and in later strategy papers specifically with helping 
the American economy on its way to recovery. These ideas, however flawed, can have a 
strong impact on policymaking regarding shale gas which is considered to decrease levels 
of import dependence in the short run.  
Environmental concerns are prominent, and clearly considered more seriously in the 
documents published under the Obama administration than in the 2006 plan. Yet 
renewable energy sources are discussed less frequently and less specifically than traditional 
fossil fuels (with the exception of the 2014-2018 strategy plan), despite a recurring focus 
on climate change and a slightly less discussed very general need for low carbon energy 
production. This could be an effect of availability: there is less experience with and 
knowledge of them. Furthermore, in terms of their capacity for growth and revenue, 
renewables are several times compared and considered inferior to fossil fuels, especially 
when competing in a market system, which indicates a strong causal judgment. If they 
really are considered gospel, these cognitive connections may have impacted policy 
planning around gas, shale gas and renewables. Renewables are unlikely to thrive in the 
market system if there is no belief in their ability to do so and subsequent policy action; 
just as there were few plans developed prior to 2008 into how to regulate the banking 
system more strictly because trending ideas did not suggest this course of action.  
Another idea is a strong trust that research and innovation, and constant technological 
improvement, will fix current issues in the future. The repetition of phrases in this spirit 
suggests that future generations and future administrations will come up with solutions 
to problems that are currently experienced but are not prioritised to be dealt with, such 
as perfecting carbon capture or belatedly attaching environmental regulation to drilling 
procedures. This is a problem, and could be indicative of the introduction of shale gas. 
Where it causes problems to the environment they are not prioritised and recognised 
sufficiently, or else put off to be dealt with in the future. This betrays an idea of ultimate 
control over the future of the energy sector that cannot be assumed: uncertainty may alter 
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the framework in which decisions are made to the point that plans made in 2014 may no 
longer be feasible in 2020.  
Another discernible idea is the need for U.S. American leadership in diverse areas, such 
as energy production (gas), technology and innovation, or simply with the country’s 
economy. This can affect the policy decisions around shale gas: arguably, this is an area 
where the United States can take up the mantle as pioneers again.  
The older policy blueprints show evidence of incorrectly and somewhat presumptuously 
predicting future developments yet setting out firm policy responses to imagined trends 
regardless. This fits in with a general trend of ignoring uncertainty in policymaking and is 
a major point in my criticism of shale gas policy. If uncertainty as well as warnings 
continue to be ignored, by the time shale gas reserves are depleted in the foreseeable 
future they will have diverted funds, efforts and resources from the renewable sector and 
worsened the environmental and possibly also the economic situation, generating new 
costs. The latest reviewed U.S. document, 2014-2018, still insists on the same 
transformations needed as its predecessors – systematic change was not made. This is 
quite possibly also in part a result of the introduction of shale gas into the energy mix 
which slowed the perception of a trend of resource depletion, altered the trade balance, 
and lowered gas prices for certain sectors, although not necessarily overall or for the 
regular consumer (see Chapter 4).   
The preliminary evidence from the U.S. strategy reports fits with my hypothesis in the 
sense that I do not find ideas or policy goals that would oppose the introduction of shale 
gas. Quite the opposite, the newly expanded U.S. gas sector is considered an asset to the 
economy that is creating jobs and is considered environmentally comparatively desirable. 
This is a guiding idea in all the of strategy papers: the gas sector is seen vital to the U.S. 
economy and even in particular to its recovery after 2008, and it is not seen as very 
environmentally harmful, even though a large share of it was constituted by shale gas at 
the time of writing of these strategy plans. The issues of global leadership and energy 
independence, both of which gas and also shale gas is believed to provide, are very 
strongly promoted in the documents. Clearly, while at times the documents look 
unfavourably on petroleum, mostly due to import dependence but also due to its 
environmental record, gas is seen as a separate entity. It is promoted as a powerful and 
necessary part of the U.S. economy: and clearly it has not been discredited in the ideas 
about energy policy. Instead it is connected to powerful ideas about economic success 
and U.S. leadership, so it is supported by very strong ideas. This is a status quo that is well 
protected in policymakers’ key ideas and will complicate any attempt at radical policy 
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change. As Rodrik (2014) put it, agents tend to believe they know how the world works 
and have a cognitive map of how to reach their goals: if they believe that only the free 
market works for an economic system and that only fossil fuels can work within a market 
system, then they will focus their efforts on how to fix glitches in this system. They will 
not then diagnose an inconsistency from the current economic situation and infer that as 
times have changed, fossil fuels can no longer deliver and reconsider their options more 
radically, promoting change and creating different causal connections. This sequence of 
events seems not to have been hindered at the outset by the fact that shale gas is not a 
typical fossil fuel.  
So far it appears that the U.S. strategy documents confirm the notion of my third 
narrative, namely the existence of cognitive capture in the form of ideational factors with 
potential influence on shale gas policy decisions. As the literature proposes that it might, 
in the United States energy sector the status quo has a strong effect on current 
policymakers and its guiding core ideas appear not to have been discredited enough. I will 
now turn to consider the UK energy strategy plans before following this summary of 
energy policy ideas with a statistical discourse analysis to consider whether there are 
specific causal associations made: i.e., especially whether certain energy sources are 
cognitively linked to energy policy goals such as leadership, security or jobs.  
 
 
VIII.2 First evidence of cognitive capture in United Kingdom energy strategy: 
Context and key ideas  
In this section I analyse the documents officially designed to outline and guide overall UK 
governmental energy strategy as well as concrete policy decisions in the energy sector. 
The selected documents are the following: All of the UK Government’s Energy Strategy 
Papers that fall in the selected timeframe, i.e. the UK Energy white papers 2003, 2008, 
2009 and 2011, asserting the “National Strategy for Climate and Energy” (HM 
Government 2009: I).  
 
VIII.2.1 The 2003 white paper: Our Energy Future  
The first UK energy strategy paper I review, the 2003 white paper ‘Our Energy Future – 
creating a Low Carbon Economy’ was in fact the first time in twenty years that a formal 
overall energy policy was established in the UK (DTI 2003; Helm 2008; Coriolis Energy 
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2014). The strategy document proclaims itself based on four key ideas: protection of the 
environment, reliable energy supply, affordability of energy and a belief in competitive 
markets. Already this is different to key goals in U.S. strategy papers. From the very 
beginning, the 2003 UK Energy white paper strikes a distinctive tone of dramatic 
inevitability: Climate change will happen, and its consequences will be costly and 
dangerous, the UK will become a net importer, renewables will become a dominant 
energy source.180 Of course, so far, they are not. The energy grid is outdated and not 
functional for modern energy supply and there will be no choice but to change and renew 
it (DTI 2003). The tone is unusual but environmental protection is not considered above 
and beyond all other issues and challenges; and part of the reason for the fatalistic 
language is informed strongly by the decline of resources and worries about energy supply 
security, not only by worries about global warming. While these issues are discussed in 
more detail the authors seem constantly to suggest that there is in fact no other option 
than to accept all of these premises and move on to dealing with them. Clearly this has 
not happened, but the tone of the 2003 white paper is remarkable.  
The document begins with a discussion of the loss of net exporter status, the expected 
further decline of the UK’s indigenous fossil fuel supplies, coal, gas and oil. This has of 
course since happened: the UK became a net importer of coal in 1984, of natural gas in 
2004, of natural gas liquids and crude oil in 2005, and of petroleum products in 2013 (EIA 
2014). The issue is approached differently in this white paper than in any other U.S. or 
UK strategy paper: the diminishing of these resources is not immediately handled as a 
significant problem. The 2003 white paper expresses its unconcern at becoming a net 
importer at various times, i.e. “being an energy importer does not necessarily make it 
harder to achieve energy reliability” or citing the fact that few of the world’s leading 
economies are energy net exporters (DTI 2003, 9). It is even suggested that there is no 
issue of dependency because there will be interdependency – “their energy being as 
important to us as their income from us is to them” (DTI 2003, 10). This logic has not 
been raised in any of the United States strategy plans and latter UK ones, where 
dependency is seen in varying degrees of negativity but never as such a non-issue. Instead, 
the 2003 white paper concludes that the best way to ensure energy security and reliability 
is to create diversity in every aspect, diversity of energy sources, suppliers and trade routes 
(DTI 2003, 9, 16f). Diversity above all is considered the best way to ensure against threats 
such as sudden price rises or even terrorism resulting in supply route disruption. This is 
                                                 
180 The last notion is especially surprising; it is for once formulated as if that was a simple policy measure 
that can be enforced. 
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mentioned in the 2006 and other U.S. strategy plans but never with such emphasis or in 
such a positive tone.  
The authors of the 2003 white paper make sure to strongly underline their idea that the 
new challenges facing the energy system, namely resource decline, climate change, 
outdated grid etc., provide in fact many new opportunities. They see opportunities for 
growth and revenue, opportunities to become experts and world leaders in new 
technologies (DTI 2003). Amongst those they see a distinctive chance to shift the UK 
economy to a more productive low carbon economy resulting in higher living standards. 
This is an unusual statement – usually the notion of a less energy intensive future involves 
the use of less energy and cutbacks in certain comforts. The idea to export cutting edge 
technology and create new jobs is lauded, however not specifically connected to any 
particular energy source. This is supported by the accepted idea that “bringing forward 
technological changes is a natural or necessary step to keep down costs to the UK and 
to avoid compromising our competitiveness” (DTI 2003, 57) The white paper states that 
the government will continuously encourage UK industry and UK businesses to make the 
most of said opportunities presented by moving towards a low carbon economy (DTI 
2003, 15).  
In the 2003 white paper the DTI presents very specific calculations confirming previous 
IPCC review results which suggest that actions currently planned to curb emissions and 
stabilise CO2 levels in the atmosphere
181 would lead to an average of GDP loss of around 
1% or less in developed countries by 2050 (DTI 2003, 15). This, according to the white 
paper, would be offset and justified by the decrease in risks associated with climate change 
thus achieved. This is very specific, and the only time this claim is made as such. Yet even 
in this document it remains a small note compared to the oppressing amount of 
connections between costs associated with the deployment of renewables, as the analysis 
later on in this chapter shows.  
Insistent focus on market-led solutions is noticeable throughout the document as well as 
expectation of rationality from consumers (i.e. it is considered rational that homes and 
business will make investments into energy saving measures to cut costs in the future). 
The absolute capability of a market-based system to face all these challenges is however 
questioned: “Where the market alone cannot create the right signals (for example on the 
environment) we will take steps that encourage business to innovate and develop new 
                                                 
181 At a maximum of 550ppm.  
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opportunities to deliver the outcomes we are seeking” (DTI 2003, 11).182 This notion of 
using market strategy only wherever possible corresponds to similar claims in the 2006 
U.S. energy strategy plan, as does the apparent paradox of juxtaposing this proposition 
with insistence on the success of the free, liberal energy market system. Again, the market 
system as such is not questioned: markets are desired but considered not adapted to 
certain current challenges, even if they are labelled as opportunities, and need to be fixed 
to work perfectly again. This is a distant indication of causal judgment: there is no 
inference leading to seriously reconsider whether the market works for the current energy 
landscape, or whether a (free) market situation exists. The fact that a market exists and 
that a market-based system is ideal for the energy sector is a causal judgment that is not 
altered – instead it is adapted to new realities by allowing for small fixes in the immediate 
neighbourhood of a problem found.  
The 2003 strategy plan contains a direct placement of blame: “climate change – largely 
caused by burning fossil fuels” (DTI 2003, 3). The document refers actively to reports by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as well as UN climate change 
related documents, with very specific data, whereas follow-up strategy papers tend to be 
much less specific, rather depicting climate change as a remote, non-specific threat in 
comparison. In this white paper, the problem is explained in detail as a very specific threat 
– i.e. outlining weather-related economic losses to communities and businesses in the UK 
in the past decades as well as predicting a considerable increase in flooding and extreme 
weather in the UK. This is a very explicit statement of linking threats and costs to fossil 
fuel, and does not leave room for the vagueness often connected with climate change. 
Rallying and securing international commitment to mitigating climate change is outlined 
as a key component of future UK foreign policy. Investment in climate change research 
and environmental technologies is equally suggested as a crucial base of future energy 
policies (DTI 2003, 46).183 The white paper’s overall focus is more on an analysis of issues 
and challenges facing the UK energy system and suggesting the necessity of a low-carbon 
economy than in actually outlining detailed policy responses. There is, in fact, very little 
concrete detail in terms of policies to be adopted, although there is of course some, as 
discussed above. The more specific (if not detailed in their implementation plans) policy 
                                                 
182  “Until the 1990s the energy system in the UK - as in most other countries - was largely owned and 
controlled by Government. Today the UK has one of the most open energy markets in the world. Open 
and competitive markets will remain vital to delivering the energy we need. But it is the Government’s 
responsibility to set the overall goals for UK energy policy and to ensure that our energy markets and 
other policies deliver those goals” (DTI 2003, 6).  
183 In 2003, the authors of the white paper conclude that “leaving action until the last minute is not a 
serious option. If we do not begin now, more dramatic, more disruptive, and more expensive change will 
be needed later on” (DTI 2003, 8).  
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goals set out by the 2003 white paper include the ambition for developed countries’ 
economies to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by around 60% until the year 2050. This 
appears to show the government’s acceptance of the recommendation by the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution to make this an achievable, enforceable policy 
goal and to become a world leader in emissions reduction (DTI 2003, 25). This goal will 
not be feasible if shale gas is developed on a major scale. Regarding renewables, the white 
paper authors profess support for large tidal and offshore wind farms, as well as smaller 
onshore wind farms; support for biomass, support for building new homes that are more 
energy efficient, and support for hydrogen as fuel. They also acknowledge the fact that 
“the cheapest, cleanest and safest way of addressing all our goals is to use less energy” 
(DTI 2003, 32) – an issue less clear or prominent in later UK energy policy strategy papers 
or in U.S. documents, except for the AEI initiative. It is considered economically and 
technologically viable to run a virtually zero carbon economy in the future (DTI 2003, 
104f).  
The authors acknowledge a need for large investments in order to update and replace the 
current energy infrastructure system of the UK (DTI 2003, 10, 14, 49). Part of this 
requires a change in the electricity distribution network as it is designed for a few, large 
central power stations and not smaller or decentralised power generation (DTI 2003, 
104f).184 Both the introduction of more renewable energy as well as the introduction of 
more onshore (shale) gas drilling into the energy mix would require major investment in 
the future. Therefore, any argument for shale gas and against renewables by pointing to 
the latter’s infrastructure costs is not immediately convincing.  
To summarise, a clearly and notably recurrent theme throughout the 2003 white paper is 
a call for cleaner energy. Climate change is accepted as a threat to be mitigated, while 
resource depletion is discussed but not considered as a major threat to the economy albeit 
a key issue requiring strong action. The document includes very strong ideas about which 
energy sources are good and which are bad for the environment, positing conventional 
fuels and alternative energy sources on opposite sides of the issue. A key idea notable in 
the white paper is the need for market-based solutions to current problems and belief in 
the free market, despite criticism of its shortcomings. In this document, the creation of a 
low carbon economy is still associated with revenue and growth. In fact tidal power and 
offshore wind are specifically mentioned as connected to business opportunities, but only 
after they have been adequately funded and researched (DTI 2003). Clearly renewables 
                                                 
184 Finally, it should be mentioned that the UK Energy White Paper 2003 called for and led to the 
creation of the UK Energy Research Council (UKERC) in 2004 (UKERC 2014).  
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are considered to be lagging behind conventional fuels, but this is seen as less of a 
problem. The notion of required funding is carried onwards, but this idea of major 
business opportunities connected to wind or other renewables is not as emphasised in 
future strategy plans. The idea of a need for energy independence so notable in U.S. 
documents is not strong in this white paper, but ideas about the importance of 
technological innovation and technological leadership are comparable. Of course they are 
not quite as strong, and not in the spirit of exceptionalism as hinted at in U.S. government 
statements. The 2003 UK energy strategy paper stands out from others, as will become 
clear in the next pages: it directly links climate change to fossil fuel production, and 
focuses on diversity in energy and on opportunities through a change to renewables, 
though it remains quite vague on these. It does not appear to justify the current 
government’s shale gas policy as clearly as I saw a justification for shale gas deployment 
in the reviewed U.S. documents.  
 
VIII.2.2 The 2008 white paper: Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power 
The 2008 Energy white paper of the United Kingdom, entitled “Meeting the Energy 
Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power” was composed by the Department for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and officially launched on May 23rd, 
2008. It is a follow-up to the 2006 energy review and largely draws on the conclusions 
gained in the aforementioned to discuss its consideration of widening the extent of 
nuclear power generation as an energy policy option for the United Kingdom.185 
Unofficially as well as in retrospect it has often been suggested that the 2008 strategy 
paper was intended to prepare for a move towards nuclear power as a dominant part of 
the energy strategy, which had not been prominent in the 2003 white paper (Helm 2008). 
The key goals the document aims to address “are the challenges the UK faces in 
addressing climate change and ensuring security of energy supplies” (BERR 2008, 8). 
Climate change is considered “quite simply the biggest challenge facing humanity” as 
proposed in his foreword by the prime minister (BERR 2008, 4). Specifically the role of 
nuclear in securing clean and affordable energy supplies is highlighted in consideration of 
recent declines of the UK’s North Sea oil and gas production (BERR 2008, 16). Energy 
security as well as climate change mitigation are to be reached with four policy goals in 
mind: cutting carbon emissions significantly; ensuring reliable energy supply; promoting 
sustainable economic growth; and improving productivity through competitive markets 
                                                 
185 This is why the 2006 review is not considered – they are extremely similar with large part identical.  
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(BERR 2008, 10ff).186 Again these goals differ from key priorities of the U.S. energy 
strategy at a first glance.  
Another key component of energy strategy discussed in the white paper is the 
establishment of more international energy cooperation and international energy 
framework to combat the effects of energy production on climate change, especially on 
EU level. There is a plan to set up legally binding targets within the UK economy to 
reduce emissions and supporting further transparency and competition in the 
international energy market and further liberalisation of the European one. The document 
shows the government’s willingness, even pledge to support low carbon technologies as 
much as possible, encouraging increasing international-domestic as well as public-private 
collaboration in this area both in terms of research and deployment (BERR 2008, 70, 72, 
110, 164, 170). In this category falls the launch of the Energy Technologies Institute and 
the Environmental Transformation Fund. Shale gas is unlikely to have been considered 
for this, as it was not a dominant issue for the UK yet or as widely reported from the U.S. 
case. In the 2008 white paper it prominently states – unlike in others reviewed – that 
renewables are not considered at a level yet where they can guarantee energy supply on 
their own, most certainly not in the UK (BERR 2008, 16).187 188 In terms of energy supply, 
the 2008 white paper on nuclear strategy confirms the UK’s commitment to bring up the 
shares in electricity generation generated by renewable energy to 10% in 2010 and 20% 
in 2020 – this target is unlikely to be met (Harvey 2014b).189 The white paper supports the 
continued recovery of remainders of the currently explored gas and oil fields in the North 
Sea, in a rather small and unspecified section of the overall document. It appears as so 
this is either not a main concern but room is left for future policy in this area, or as if this 
                                                 
186 According to the 2006 white paper, around 30-35 GW of electricity generation capacity will need to be 
added within the two decades following 2008 in order to fill the gap between energy supply and demand 
(BERR 2008, 13).  
187 Those regarding the business sector include the Carbon Reduction Commitment for businesses (by 
now relabeled as the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme) – which has since been criticised as trade offs to 
push the 6000 MWh of electricity limit further are quite possible (Kahya 2011) –, the introduction of new 
certificates regarding energy performances for businesses as well as public sector organisations, and a 
promise to extend the practice of smart metering to as many business premises as possible by 2012 
(BERR 2008). Proposals regarding the transport sector are less detailed – they include the introduction of 
a Low Transport Innovation Strategy and the government’s pledge to support the inclusion of aviation 
into the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (BERR 2008). (This legislation has been in the 
process of introduction since 2012, however it has already seen many national airlines such as the U.S.’ 
declare legal exemption from it before even implemented.)  
188 The document speaks repeatedly of introducing a mix of both incentives as well as rules and regulation 
alongside each other; in regards to energy efficient behaviour of households individuals, but also in 
regards to investment in cleaner energy by the industry (BERR 2008, 11, 31–33, 82, 107, 121 etc.). The 
authors insist strongly on independent regulation of markets as absolutely necessary, meaning 
independent from government, not from the market system (BERR 2008, i.e. 127).  
189 A focus on carbon capture and storage technology, the expansion of biomass operations as a source of 
energy production, and a commitment to increase the amount of biofuel used as transport fuel are 
supposed to deliver results.  
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strategy was purposefully not advertised. There is certainly discussion of the need for 
carbon capture, but it is not introduced as an overall panacea.  
The 2008 energy white paper’s focus lies mainly on making the case for building new 
nuclear power plants and increasing the role of nuclear in the UK’s energy mix. The report 
appears overconfident in politicians’ and scientists’ ability to control this process. The 
authors consider current regulation of nuclear energy safety in terms of health and 
environmental concerns both at home and abroad (where uranium will be mined) as 
absolutely sufficient (BERR 2008, 28, 77). Whilst the case for nuclear power is made, 
renewables investment is justified as a by-product. All the reasons the white paper authors 
name to divest and support nuclear could be used as support for renewables as well. Apart 
from a small section on finishing already tapped fields, further oil or gas development is 
not supported. Nuclear power is seen as clean, reliable and a promising energy source in 
itself, but also as an important bridge between the current energy system and an 
unspecified future system that relies on renewables which cannot yet be relied upon as 
they are not advanced enough though ultimately desired (BERR 2008).  
On the surface, the 2008 white paper shows a clear negative attitude towards oil and gas 
and traditional fossil fuels – notably oil receives more negative connotation than gas – 
and a seemingly complete acceptance of the necessity to mitigate climate change and 
secure clean energy supply for the future. The idea of connecting fossil fuels and 
environmental degradation is uncommonly prominent in this document, as is the threat 
of climate change to specific public and private goods. Conventional fuel is mentioned 
both as bad for the environment, and, which is more out of the ordinary, a few times as 
bad for energy security and potentially as adversely affecting the economy. Indicators 
suggesting grounds for the promotion of shale gas are not abundant in this white paper.  
 
VIII.2.3 The 2009 white paper: National Strategy for Climate and Energy  
The 2009 white paper “National Strategy for Climate and Energy” begins with a strong 
emphasis on “protecting the public from immediate risk” (DECC 2009, 2). The focus lies 
on risk as well as on uncertainty avoidance, as can be deduced from the loose explanation 
of risks that the public will need protection from. The risks discussed include climate 
change effects in general as well as water related issues, clean water protection but also 
specifically flooding. These are risks also associated with hydraulic fracturing. The 
transition is considered a logical move based on the costs and benefits: “In Britain, as our 
own reserves in the North Sea decline, we have a choice: replace them with ever-
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increasing imports, be subject to price fluctuations and disturbances in the world market 
and stick with high carbon” (DECC 2009, V) or “make the necessary transition to low 
carbon, right for climate change, energy security and jobs. … There will be costs to the 
transition. But they are far outweighed by the costs if we didn’t act” (DECC 2009, V). 
This statement however does not outweigh the amount of associations made between 
high costs and renewable energy and environmental legislation in the rest of the 
document. Even in this context, the choice is triggered not by climate change but by 
declining resources; the problems with the other option are import reliance and market 
risks, not environmental concerns. Considering the importance the 2003 white paper had 
already placed on a transition to low carbon, the 2009 strategy paper is somewhat 
surprising in its repetition of many of the original plan points (DTI 2003) as though they 
were novel. This appears as an admission to the fact that the topic had not progressed 
immensely in the years in-between.  
The white paper begins with an overall five-point plan: protecting the public from risk, 
namely climate change consequences such as flooding; mitigating no longer avoidable 
consequences of climate change; pursuing a new international climate change agreement 
in order to further mitigate climate change globally; turning Britain into a low carbon 
country; and supporting both the industry and individuals in preparing for and mitigating 
climate change (HM Government 2009: II).190 The white paper also supports the 
introduction of new nuclear facilities alongside alternative energy sources in order to 
boost energy supply while lowering emissions. In considering amounts of energy 
generated from each source, there is very little admission to the fact that problems might 
also be mitigated by using less energy, or that said option may no longer be open for 
debate within the context of declining resources. This is in contrast to the 2003 energy 
white paper, which considers less energy use as the theoretically most efficient way of 
dealing with all the challenges facing the UK energy system at once. Nothing is done to 
change perception on how much energy should be used, suggesting that the authors 
themselves do not perceive this as a possibility or solution. Therefore, a decrease in 
resources may be awarded more importance.   
The main body of the white paper focuses on the transformation of different sectors and 
how they were best to adopt to the transition; the energy sector first of all, then private 
homes and communities, workplaces and work opportunities, transport and finally land 
and farming. The currently discussed 2009 white paper credits itself with setting out “the 
                                                 
190 The strong focus on all things climate change and complete acceptance of its existence and its negative 
consequences is remarkable in light of future events, such as the imminent appointment of climate change 
sceptic Mr Owen Patterson as head of DECC (Carrington 2014b, 2012).  
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UK’s first ever comprehensive low carbon transition plan” (DECC 2009, 4). The white 
paper is set to deliver 18% emission cuts compared to the most recent (2008) levels by 
the year 2020 and over 30% compared to levels measured in the 1990s (DECC 2009).191  
Almost 20% of the white paper is focusing on homes, households and communities – 
though at the time only 13% of emissions came from private heating (DECC 2009, 82) – 
and how to include them in the move towards greener energy. The white paper includes 
a large section on aiding cost-vulnerable customers so that low income is not in the way 
of energy efficiency and encouraging communities to compete for green innovation. 
Around £3.2 billion were scheduled to be made available for these household-centred 
emission-cutting targets (HM Government 2009: 83). In comparison to this funding, or 
in comparison to the £4 billion the European Investment bank is making available for 
business-led energy projects in the UK (DECC 2009, 13), “£120 million investment in 
offshore wind, and investment of up to additional  £60 million to cement the UK’s 
position as global leader in marine energy” appear minor sums (DECC 2009, 113). This 
is an example of how concrete policy ideas clash with broader stated priorities.  
A section of the white paper is directly aimed at Ofgem, specifying their duty in protecting 
consumers by helping mitigate climate change and ensuring energy security (HM 
Government 2009, 4). Accepting climate change and preparing to deal with it is 
considered part of consumer protection. Throughout the document (HM Government 
2009, 11, 53, 55), Ofgem is repeatedly reminded that its key responsibility lies with 
“ensuring effective competition” as well as with “enforcing regulation in the energy 
market” (HM Government 2009, 55). Building several new nuclear power stations or at 
least for the government to facilitate that option to energy suppliers is also part of the 
white paper strategy.192  
In this white paper, climate change is treated as a very abstract problem, one that needs 
accommodation and handling, certainly, but without any concrete explanations as to why 
and how. It seems a step back from the previous white papers, especially the 2003 energy 
                                                 
191 It has more recently been reported by governmental advisors on climate change that the UK was quite 
“on track to miss its carbon targets in the 2020s” (Harvey 2013). Further targets set for the year 2020 
include electricity generation: 30% is intended to be generated from renewable energy sources by then, 
and 40% from low carbon energy sources in general. This target is also likely to be missed at this stage 
(Harvey 2014b) with renewables at around 5% and low carbon sources overall at 10% (DECC 2014). 
192 The White Paper was met with mainly positive if hesitant responses (Jha 2009, UKERC 2009) – at the 
time executive director of Greenpeace Sauven considered it a good plan, stating that apparently Ed 
Milliband, then Secretary of State, was “winning important battles in Whitehall”, and the Energy Savings 
Trust issued an equally supportive statement (Jha 2009). However, Sauven immediately cautioned that it 
was of utmost importance to now follow through on the outlined plans and equally important that the 
Treasury took it seriously (Jha 2009) enough to invest properly – showing he had doubts he shared with 
many about the transition from idea to policy. Many agreed that it was ambitious (Black 2009).  
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strategy paper. This is a possible result of the bias of availability: climate change effects 
are not obvious. Increased bouts of extreme weather in the UK, including flooding as 
well as heat waves, have certainly been noted. However, while climate change is 
mentioned, the connection of these exact risks with climate change or rather yet with 
factors that promote global warming, such as the burning of fossil fuels and CO2 
emissions, are not made plain as consequences. The causality seems distant at best, which 
differs from 2003. And climate change is less available than other energy related issues 
such as energy shortages in winter, or fuel poverty. But there has been much research and 
evidence into the effects, and the white paper does not reflect these.193 The notion of 
energy security as energy independence becomes more relevant in this white paper than 
it had been in previous ones; renewables are considered not for their convincing economic 
performance or environmental safety, but because they provide relief from import 
dependence. Shale gas support seems more possible based on core ideas in this white 
paper than the previous two. The timing may have had an effect: this white paper was 
published after the global financial crisis hit in full swing, which likely led to an increased 
focus on economic issues and economic security: shale gas is often presented as conducive 
to both.  
 
VIII.2.4 The 2011 white paper: Planning our electric future: A White Paper for secure, affordable and 
low‐carbon electricity 
The in 2016 latest available, 2011 white paper on energy for the United Kingdom focuses 
on electricity as a common denominator for all of its proposed efforts to ensure energy 
security as well as cheaper and cleaner energy supply for Britons. Three primary challenges 
are considered broadly within the overall energy security challenge: 1) diversification of 
supply, which lists both a diversification of sources as well as a diversification of imports 
to decrease dependence, 2) operational security to ensure that demand and supply even 
out, considering unpredictable changes to both, and 3) resource adequacy, meaning 
enough capacity to cover peak demand whenever necessary (DECC 2011, 10).194  
A concern about import dependency has risen on the list of priorities and this is visible 
throughout the document; in this sense, the 2011 white paper relates more closely to the 
                                                 
193 As a fitting illustration, the word combination “greenhouse gas” features more often in this document 
than the word “gas” in terms of natural gas – however the former is mainly name-dropped, again and 
again, whereas the latter appears in connection with rather specific plans and data.  
194 As the white paper is specifically concerned with electricity generation this spells a slightly different 
angle than for example with the plan focused on the future of nuclear energy – however, key ideas 
expressed in the papers remain the same and comparable despite a different core focus.  
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U.S. strategy plans. Energy security is discussed as a key priority here, and energy 
independence is also evidently considered as a part of ensuring energy security. This 
strongly differs from conclusions in the 2003 white paper and has the potential to affect 
support for shale gas as it is a domestic resource. Albeit most certainly a political hot topic 
by mid-2011, the entire 2011 DECC white paper on energy does not reference the 
phenomenon of shale gas once. 
The strategy paper’s authors point to recent failures of the electricity market, and its 
inability to meet future challenges in its current form or raise enough investment to even 
begin doing so. Readers are reassured in the same paragraph that ever since “the market 
was privatised in the 1980s the system has worked” (DECC 2011, 3). This is followed by 
judgment that general “market failures” are preventing energy sector investment (DECC 
2011, 59). The statement is unclear but intentionally so: criticism of the market system in 
general is not discussed, but specific failures to work for future needs are conceded, to 
give the impression that they simply need to be fixed. Unsurprisingly, reference then is 
also made to the inability of renewables to survive in the market system, leaving it rather 
unclear who is to blame for this. (Of course, it is also not true, considering conventional 
fuels also receive support.)  
In 2011’s white paper, the DECC insists that it is traditional energy, i.e. fossil fuels, that 
leave the UK energy market vulnerable to import dependence, to volatile price changes. 
They are also blamed for carbon emissions, which are accepted as harmful to environment 
and human health.195 Key aim is the diversification of supply and the discontinuation of 
import dependence. This resonates with the 2003 white paper, but the criticism of energy 
dependence is different.   
Low-carbon energy generators are seen as “at a natural disadvantage” (DoE 2011, 3) in 
the UK energy market; key aims of the DECC are therefore to make the market fairer 
and more open, to the low carbon technologies as well as to any smaller firms or new 
market entrants who currently have to compete strongly with the traditional ‘big six’ 
(DECC 2011, 89). The overall strategy proposed by the DECC to achieve this 
transformation is to convince investors of the low risk and high returns of investing in 
new energy methods. Sustainable energy is seen as desirable yet incapable of flourishing 
and delivering without major governmental support. Again, this is a simplified view and 
does not have to be the case in 2011. Further they wish overall to establish the kind of 
                                                 
195 “Instead [of traditional fossil fuels], we need huge investment in renewables; a new generation of 
nuclear stations; and, in time, gas and coal plants” but only if they “can capture harmful 
emissions.”(DECC 2011, 3).  
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system in which renewables and other low-carbon technologies are capable of competing 
with traditional fuels as well as with each other within the free market to achieve best 
innovation and results (DECC 2011).196 This is utterly incongruent with the introduction 
of favourable policy towards shale gas.  
To briefly summarise, the 2011 UK white paper continues to focus on climate change, 
supply security and other established topics from 2003-2009. An increased focus on 
energy independence as part of energy security is very notable. The 2011 white paper also 
voices the UK government’s desire for the UK to be “continuing to play an active role 
internationally” (DECC 2011, 60). While it does not compare in terms of frequency, this 
is noteworthy to the reader who just witnessed similar documents from the United States 
in which U.S. leadership in all parts of the sector is encouraged frequently and with 
emphasis. This could provide a reason for pursuing shale gas – the UK would be a leader 
of the technology in Europe, a status it has already given away with regards to renewables.  
The white paper shows stronger aspects of national security defenders framing than 
previous documents, and also increased signs of free market libertarianism, with the 
assumption that market failures to adapt can be corrected. Key ideas notable throughout 
the white paper are the notion that renewable energy does not work in a market system 
yet, and a stronger desire for UK leadership and independence than in previous strategy 
plans.  Overall, this white paper appears much more relatable to the support of shale gas 
and fracking policy than the first three UK energy plans: there appears to be a trend of 
key ideas developing in this direction.  
 
VIII.2.5 Preliminary summary and analysis 
In the above summary and review of UK energy strategy plans I established the existence 
of several key ideas that inform future energy policy as well as the existence of causal 
judgment constraining objective decision-making. I find that unlike their U.S. 
                                                 
196 And yet, already in its opening statements the white paper warns that investment in new energy 
generation alone cannot fix the UK problem with energy supply security – energy efficiency and lowering 
demand for energy are considered equally important. Here the “government recognizes that reducing 
demand is likely to be more cost-effective than building additional capacity” (DECC 2011, 11) yet also 
thinks that energy efficiency can reduce the consumer bills my more than six to eight percent (DECC 
2011, 12).  
Further there is recognition that “the current market price for electricity is driven by fossil plants, such as 
unabated gas-fired Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT), with much lower fixed costs relative to their 
operational costs in contrast to, for example, nuclear or offshore wind. Investors in non-gas fired 
generation are also disadvantaged by being exposed to more volatile and uncertain returns when 
compared to gas” etc. (DECC 2011, 6, 28). However, there is a section in recognition that “the social cost 
of carbon is not fully reflected in the market price as this does not take into account all of the damage 
caused by climate change” (DECC 2011, 7).  
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counterparts, the UK strategy papers on energy are quite different from one another in 
their insistence on key goals. All of them focus very strongly on climate change, which is 
an accepted reality and considered a risk and a challenge. The mitigation of climate change 
is promoted in all of the documents, and the UK plans sound more engaged with the 
specifics of environmental protection than the U.S. documents and consider it a priority. 
Yet if one looks closely, causal judgment on how costly renewables are and how incapable 
they are to function in a market system are plentiful. This is a key idea strongly present in 
the strategy repertoire. The belief in the market system is a key idea notable in all of the 
UK strategy papers just as in the U.S. ones, although there is more criticism of flaws in it 
such as problems with adapting to the new reality of changing energy sources. And 
renewable energy is strongly considered as being less or not at all capable of functioning 
in the market system. Again, it is an unverified assumption that renewable energy cannot 
compete in a free market with fossil fuels, which have not had to compete in a free market 
either in the UK (or the U.S.) thanks to subsidies and other governmental financial 
support (Macalister and Harvey 2013; Athena 2015; Carrington 2015d; International 
Energy Agency 2016; Global Subsidies Initiative 2016). However false, this casual 
judgment has the potential to seriously constrain policy options. If the goal is to achieve 
increased energy supply, increasing revenue and job availability and overall sector growth, 
and these goals are considered only achievable with fossil fuels and in a market system in 
which only fossil fuels can compete, the room for change in policy is severely limited. If 
we can assume such a map to exist in policymakers’ minds about how to achieve their 
goals, and know that shale gas (even if incorrectly) fits within the boundaries of such a 
map and renewables do not, then the policy decision to support it is a logical consequence.  
Comparing the UK plans with each other, there is a clear trend from a very specific 
language of why to transition to a cleaner energy sector to a more abstract and general 
language on the need for transformation between 2003 and 2011. This does fit with the 
trajectory of the shale story, because the UK came to the table later than the U.S. did. 
Unlike in the U.S. documents, climate change is a key priority in all of the UK energy 
strategy plants. Especially the 2003 energy white paper stands out in this sense, and might 
even be considered an outlier. It considers climate change effects and depleting fossil fuel 
resources not only as a risk and challenge but sees the need for new energy sources as an 
opportunity to reinvent, improve and strengthen a modern sector of the UK economy. It 
connects renewable technology less obviously with increased costs and investments than 
the other strategy papers do, and it very directly blames fossil fuels for climate change and 
climate change effects. The 2008 paper also makes this link directly while supporting 
nuclear power, but the association is less clear in the 2009 and 2011 papers. The earlier 
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two white papers (2003 and 2008) are very specific in their labelling of climate change 
prevention and mitigation as a priority, linking fossil fuels to environmental degradation 
and including detailed calculations for climate change effects and the costs to mitigate 
them. The 2009 and 2011 white paper equally warn of the doom of climate change, yet 
treat it in a much more abstract fashion. It appears that the availability heuristic associated 
with climate change which was less present in 2003 and 2008 energy strategy has returned 
to later documents (which suggests that when the issue is pushed purposefully, it is 
somewhat possible to move past its abstract nature).   
The importance of the UK energy sector to the country’s economy is emphasised similarly 
to how it is treated in U.S. documents, yet the energy trade deficit and net importer status 
are treated differently in the successive plans. While the U.S. papers all consider it a key 
priority, the 2003 energy white paper considers it almost as a non-issue, claiming that if 
the UK should depend on energy imports then their trade partner would equally depend 
on UK payments, seeing no danger of dependency. In comparison, the 2008, 2009, and 
2011 strategy papers are all more focused on energy security. It must be said that unlike 
in U.S. strategy plans, energy security often simply means security of supply in the UK 
context and not automatically independence of energy supply. The UK 2011 white paper 
is unique in that it lays stronger focus on energy security in combination with energy 
independence, but this does not compare to the U.S. emphasis on it. Again, this idea that 
energy independence is increasingly important could favour shale gas, which is perceived 
and presented as conducive to this goal. It could, of course, also favour investment into 
domestic sustainable energy sources, but due to causal judgment connections they are not 
considered fitting with other goals such as a market system or proven historical economic 
benefits such as those connected with oil and gas. All of the UK energy white papers lay 
importance on international cooperation to combat climate change and energy supply 
challenges, but the 2011 white paper places more emphasis on the UK as a strong 
international energy player.  
The 2003 and 2008 UK strategy papers adhere to environmental ideals and a negative 
discussion of fossil fuels and their decline to a point, but the goal of preserving the 
environment is not considered superior to others such as energy security. The idea that 
the market is the best system to allocate energy resources is notable in the UK papers just 
as in the U.S. documents, even if several of the documents contain strong criticism of 
market failures that need to be solved. But again, there is no diagnostic inference that then 
the free market system may not be ideal to trade a good as important to the economy as 
energy. Instead the causal judgment that the market system has always worked and is best 
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for an efficient energy sector is upheld and despite small failures not discredited. Hence, 
whether or not an energy source is perceived to be market compatible decides on the 
support is receives.  
It is impossible to fully verify this claim, but from the different focus on key ideas it 
appears that UK strategy papers have changed in time to the point that the governmental 
excitement about shale gas is reconcilable with overall plans of the 2009 or especially the 
2011 documents. Ergo one can locate some first evidence of influential factors into shale 
gas support for the UK case study in this third dimension on cognitive constraints. The 
development towards fracking support could not have been explained in light of the 2003 
energy white paper. In later white papers, an increasing focus on energy security and the 
causal judgment that is made about economic inferiority of renewables may lead to the 
assumption that there are plausible arguments to introduce more home-grown fossil fuels 
such as shale gas. Overall, in this first part of the analysis of the UK case I find evidence 
of ideational capture that would predict a focus on shale gas, but mostly in the later 
documents.  
The U.S. and the UK energy strategy appear very similar in ideas about the energy market 
system and its superiority in managing the energy sector despite acknowledgment of 
recent issues with it. There is also concurrence in the level of control they assume as 
climate change is shrouded in availability issues and as they trust in the future 
technological innovation that can fix current problems. The ideas found to be promoted 
in the first half of my evidence for the third narrative appear to be similar between the 
countries and also to fit the policy outcome. Therefore, they are likely influential on 
decisions about shale gas policy. It is not possible to identify all the persons involved in 
writing the strategy papers as usually the institution alone is given as author – but it is 
worth recalling findings from the second narrative to consider the possibility that industry 
employees were likely partially involved in drafting part of the strategy documents. 
Although this is not the key focus of this analysis, it does give one reason to think that 
certain ideas may have been introduced to the plans purposefully as well as through an 
element of cultural capture.  
In the next and final section, I am using Provalis Research QDA Miner’s statistical analysis 
tool to give a more detailed and more comprehensive analysis of specific ideas around the 
different energy resources. Specifically, I am looking for causal judgment as to the effect 
of these energy sources on key goals such as economic strength, leadership aspirations, 
energy security, or environmental health. To do this, all documents are uploaded into the 
QDA Miner repository and then used with QDA Miner WordStat which gives statistical 
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insights about textual information, for example about phrase clusters, frequency, word 
connections and such. I found the tool to be very helpful in managing the textual data, 
and to keep an overview while creating manual codes. However, once I had come up with 
my causal connections and coded them into groups, I found the tool to be not sufficiently 
succinct which is why every single connection and cluster identified was once again 
followed by manual analysis.  
 
 
VIII.3 A second discussion of ideas: frequency, causal judgment and association 
In this section I discuss findings of a statistical discourse analysis which I created and 
conducted by using the relevant documents in a QDA Miner database project, allowing 
me to perform a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS). The section 
expands upon results and impressions of the above qualitative content data analysis of 
key energy strategy documents by providing more comprehensive data on causal 
associations. This helps in considering underlying ideas and oft repeated and trusted 
causal associations rather than the ideas which are self-promoted as ‘key’ in the strategy 
papers.  
My research approach follows traditional social science methods of text-based content 
analysis, only aided by QDA in terms of organisation and data volume management and 
in order to quantify the usage of themes accurately.197 I began by analysing the documents 
in a conventional manual content analysis to elicit key terms or codes. This included the 
above context review to look for key ideas, as well as preliminary manual coding of any 
and all things relevant to key themes such as costs and security. I then conducted several 
QDA-assisted queries around the general categories of ‘fossil fuels’ and 
‘renewable/alternative energy’ as well as around each of the energy sources specifically. I 
considered subject frequency and category frequency and manually analysed each of the 
close to 2400 correlations to find and confirm causal associations and evidence of causal 
judgments. My results are summarised in the ensuing pages.  
A key element of the respective strategy plans of both the United States and the United 
Kingdom is the discussion of energy security. There are some claims that energy security 
                                                 
197 The distinction needs to be made between thematic and semantic qualitative analysis of textual 
contents; the following analysis will be focused on thematic analysis. If I reference particularly intriguing 
semantic or formational aspects of the documents, I will clearly point this out and separate it from regular 
thematic analysis. When referring to themes in a document I refer to not the general “subject matter of a 
document” but themes as content that reappears through “recurrent patterns that run through a text 
much as musical themes are melodic subjects embedded in musical compositions” (Roberts 1997, 36). 
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is a much contested concept and, according to a recent article, that there are no less than 
twenty different dimensions of energy security (Cherp 2012). For the purpose of this 
thesis their most common denominator, expressed in the definition by the International 
Energy Agency, will be used: “energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy 
sources at an affordable price” (International Energy Agency 2014). This includes 
ensuring long-term energy security, which might require long-term investments and 
adaptation to a changing system, as well as the capability to react promptly to short time 
changes in the energy system i.e. market-induced or political. The above Figure 30 and 
below Figure 31 give an overview of how the term energy security is causally related to 
the different discussed energy sources in both U.S. and UK documents (the percentage is 
of total mentions of the energy type).   
Data in Figure 30 above shows that energy security as a concept is more strongly linked 
to fossil fuels and hence traditional methods of energy generation than it is to renewable 
energy of all kinds, despite the fact that some of the reviewed documents spend 
considerably more words on the topic of renewables. This reads as evidence of causal 
judgment.  
Both positive and negative impacts by fossil fuels on energy security outweigh the effect 
renewables are considered to have on them. As long as this causal connection is not 
discredited and changed, then shale gas, which is often placed in the same context as 
conventional natural gas, would be a plausible answer to the question of security.  
Figure 30: Positive Impact on Energy Security (Based on Strategy Papers DoE 2006-2014 and DTI, BERR, DECC 2003-2011), 
own design 
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Figure 31 above shows that especially in the United States, fossil fuels are also seen as 
negatively connected to energy security, slightly more so than their positive connection 
with energy security. But looking more closely at the context, I found this is not due to 
major belief in the positive aspect of the supply strength of renewables. It is almost 
exclusively due to a fear of dependence on foreign imports of fossil fuels. It is most 
strongly connected to the first U.S. strategy document (2006) when around two thirds of 
petroleum were imported into the United States and the mood was urgent (DoE 2006a). 
The effect is almost dissolved when one divides sources between oil and gas: oil imports 
are seen as negative for energy security as there are only negative ideas associated with 
import dependence in U.S. plans. This causal judgment does not negatively affect gas 
however: gas is seen as quite positive (DoE 2006a, 2011; White House 2014).  
The positive role of fossil fuels for energy security is quite consistent in U.S. strategy 
documents after 2006 and in all of them for gas, just not for oil imports. This causal 
connection is also visible in the latter two UK strategy papers. Whilst it is possible that in 
the UK this was written with the knowledge of the American shale gas experience as an 
afterthought, it is in no way acknowledged; shale gas does not really feature in any of the 
strategy papers. There is a possible hidden agenda in some of the UK energy strategy 
papers: the criticism of fossil fuels and the positive impact on energy security from 
renewables is often found in the plan sections concerned with nuclear power (BERR 
2008; DECC 2009). When arguing in favour of more nuclear capacity, the latter tends to 
be presented as a support and bridge before renewables overtake the energy system. 
Figure 31: Negative Impact on Energy Security (Based on Strategy Papers DoE 2006-2014 and DTI, BERR, DECC 2003-2011), 
own design 
 214 
Hence in the white paper sections that suggest increasing investment into nuclear energy 
as the best choice for the UK, there are allowances made to renewables as well, and their 
role in ensuring energy security is increasingly considered and constituted. The sections 
supporting nuclear overlap with those that actively label fossil fuels as outdated or 
harmful, or strongly contend the idea that reliance on fossil fuels may actually endanger 
the goal of energy security for the UK.  
Overall throughout the white papers, the UK seems much calmer and content in its 
security situation within the European network, especially its trade connection with 
Norway. This is maybe surprising in light of recent policy statements about the need for 
shale gas to boost UK energy supply security (Cameron 2013; Osborne 2015; Harvey 
2015).  
A second strong result of the comprehensive analysis is the evidence that the concepts of 
economic profitability and financial burdens are very clearly distributed between the 
different energy sources. When looking for evidence that an energy source was linked to 
economic profitability, several paths of reasoning were considered during the codebook 
node collecting process. Any mention of it aiding economic growth, the creation of jobs, 
and the promise of revenue, and in general mentioning it as a positive opportunity for 
industry and business, were included. The resulting evidence of causal judgment is 
displayed in the following Figure 32 (in total mentions rather than percentage).  
Both in the U.S. and the UK strategy papers, fossil fuel energy sources are more strongly 
associated with revenue and economic profitability than renewables are. This is evidence 
of causal judgment and the mapping of ideas: the path to prosperity is linked to fossil 
fuels. To give an example of the type of causal connection found, consider the following: 
Figure 32: Positive Impact on Economy (Based on Strategy Papers DoE 2006-2014 and DTI, BERR, DECC 2003-2011), own 
design 
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“fuels that are the current lifeline of America’s economy—petroleum, natural gas, coal” 
(DoE 2006a, 8). Another important connection is that of jobs: “growth in oil and gas 
production has both directly and indirectly created jobs” (White House 2014, 15). “In 
addition to direct employment in resource extraction, jobs have been created in the 
companies that provide goods and services to those industries” as well as “local jobs” 
specifically (White House 2014, 15). Other connections are less telling and forceful, for 
example simply listing the high percentage of energy successfully generated by 
conventional fuels or the abundance of coal reserves, or stating how they meet the energy 
needs of the nation. In the United Kingdom energy white papers, fossil fuels are almost 
twice as likely to be causally linked to positive economic impacts as renewables. In the 
United States strategy plans the number is even higher, with more than double as many 
references to the economic benefits such as growth and jobs connected to fossil fuels 
than to renewables. While there is some variance between the years, there is no clear trend 
when taking into account the different lengths of some documents. I am not considering 
environmental health and growth as a positive economic effect in this context because 
this is clearly not considered in any of the documents; economic and environmental 
prosperity are kept quite separate. This is a further bias that constrains the support of 
renewable energy: counting environmental costs and benefits would fit them into the 
market based scheme of expected utility much more successfully.  
Adding to this picture in which conventional fuels work for the economic good and 
renewable energy does not, Figure 33 below shows the other side of the coin, the amount 
of future costs and challenges associated with the different energy sources.  
This figure shows clear evidence of causal judgment in the exact opposite direction than 
the bias visualised through the previous figure. Both in the U.S. strategy papers and their 
Figure 33: Costs and Challenges (Based on Strategy Papers DoE 2006-2014 and DTI, BERR, DECC 2003-2011), own design 
 216 
UK counterparts, renewables tend to be considered as very costly, in need of vast amounts 
of investments and unable to sustain themselves, much less appeal to the private sector 
by themselves. There is an abundance of points such as “generating electricity using 
renewables still costs more than fossil fuel generation and deployment is hampered by a 
range of barriers” (DECC 2009, 59), “the increase in energy bills is caused by the use of 
renewable generating technologies” (DECC 2009, 96f), or focus on the problem of how 
“low unsubsidised returns for renewable energy compare to traditional sources” (DoE 
2011, 13). Many associations are much less drastic and simply a neutral consideration of 
policy options, yet combining renewables with the idea of costs such as: “help bring down 
the cost of renewables in the future” (DECC 2009, 60), “support research and 
development efforts to reduce the costs of renewable energy technologies” (DoE 2006a, 
10) or simply a discussion of the average costs of solar energy. All of these small notices 
however add to the impression of causal judgment about renewables. Even if the 
discussion is positive and lauding a drop in costs for photovoltaic panels, the judgment is 
very clear: costs are always considered in connection with alternative energy sources, and 
rarely with conventional fuels. These stem from various suggestions of spending, 
including proposed investments, extra training and research, monetary incentives to be 
given, extraordinary costs of regulation and profits missed out on through obligations to 
renewables. The association is short-sighted given the success both countries as well as 
private firms and investors enjoy with renewable technology (Amin 2015; Lovins 2015). 
It also does not concur with several prominent statements in the documents such as the 
one about the costs of not transitioning being higher than the apparent high costs of 
reform (DECC 2009, V). This was put forward in some of the reports yet drowned in the 
amount of less prominent causal judgments declaring the opposite and focusing on the 
costs of renewables. Many of the associations of expenses with fossil fuels are only related 
to import dependence (more so in the U.S. than UK plans). Evidently, renewable energy 
sources are much more easily causally judged to create cost and expenses and loss of 
revenue than fossil fuels. In the UK case the latest strategy paper was printed before tax 
incentives were given to shale gas but regardless, for other conventional fuels they existed 
before, and all such incentives to fossil fuel production overall remain largely not 
emphasised. In the United States where the unconventional gas industry had already been 
enjoying favourable legislation and tax incentives for decades before the publication of 
the DoE’s latest energy strategy planner, this omission is also notable (Stevens 2010).  
Especially when it comes to association with market-based solutions and the free market, 
fossil fuels win out over renewables. Fossil fuels (despite incentives and tax breaks) are 
consistently discussed in context that makes use of market style vocabulary and it is 
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completely accepted that their performance in the market is successful. With regards to 
renewables however there are frequent reminders that they are not yet market compatible 
and need support to get to that stage. This is visualised in Figure 34 below. 
The number of occurrences are too low to be statistically significant to a quantitative 
analysis (65 causal associations are made). However, the direction of the causal judgment 
made is almost unanimous, which is noteworthy. Fossil fuels are considered to work in 
the market based system, which is strongly believed to be the best system to manage the 
energy sector in both countries - and renewable energy is not. This is entirely in dismissal 
of singled out phrases protesting ‘market failure’ which can be found in the strategy plans 
to place some of the blame on the market system rather than renewables, making them 
seem out of context. The finding albeit statistically weak is very indicative of the problem 
with instigating policy change against oil and gas and in favour of renewables. Trust in 
the power and efficiency of the market based system is a key idea for all of the energy 
policy blueprints, and renewable energy is not seen as compatible with it yet, whilst fossil 
fuels – somewhat falsely - are. There is no diagnostic inference of the fact that if the 
market place does not appear to work for renewables, maybe the market place is not as 
free and competitive as it is heralded to be, or maybe even that it is not as efficient for 
the energy sector as it is for other sectors. Another diagnostic inference that is avoided is 
the consideration of tax credits, incentives and favourable regulation granted to the oil 
and gas industry: this could lead one to infer that the strength of unconventional fuels on 
the market is not a given. However, this causal judgment is not altered: shale will simply 
be added to the model through small changes, but the model is not reconsidered.  
Finally, several other findings deliver relatively consistent results. One of them is the idea 
of positive or adverse effects which an energy source is assumed to have on the 
environment and climate change – both topics are much mentioned in all of the 
documents. Figure 35 below illustrates consistency in the ideas of connection between 
environmental issues and the energy sources. Overall, fossil fuel is seen to have a more 
Figure 34: Market Effects by Energy Source (Based on Strategy Papers DoE 2006-2014 and DTI, BERR, DECC 2003-2011), 
own design 
 218 
negative impact on the environment than renewable sources do. This leads to the 
conclusion that the environment and climate change are simply not priorities, despite the 
documents stating this.  
When renewables are seen as negatively impacting the environment this is largely to do 
with the impact on landscapes by wind turbines and similar apparatus, which is an issue 
raised by focus groups that were consulted (BERR 2008; DECC 2009). When fossil fuels 
are considered to have a positive impact on the environment, then the statements are 
about natural gas and therefore about shale gas which formed a large part of the U.S. gas 
revival in question. There are not many negative environmental connections involving 
gas: these either concern ‘fossil fuels’ in general or oil and petroleum in particular. The 
fact that gas is less harmful to the environment than oil or coal is mentioned in several 
U.S. and UK strategy plans. This should be read with caution for shale gas however, since 
fracking emissions are higher than regular gas emissions (Hirst, Khor, and Buckle 2013). 
Either way it is quite clear that research has not caught up yet with the effects of onshore 
unconventional gas drilling (Schrope 2013) but that most scientists see serious possibilities 
as well as first evidence of grave environmental damage (Ahmed 2014, Owen 2014, Lorde 
2013). Regardless, if the connection between gas and more environmental health is trusted 
Figure 35: Impact on the Environment (Based on Strategy Papers DoE 2006-2014 and DTI, BERR, DECC 2003-2011), 
own design 
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and the differentiation between gas and shale gas is also not made, this could be very 
indicative of a reason to support shale gas development. Furthermore, as the costs and 
benefits to the environment are judged separately from other economic costs and 
benefits, and subsidies to fossil fuels remain high yet unacknowledged, renewables cannot 
enter the cost-benefit analysis on their strongest terms.  
What is remarkable is that costs arising from environmental hazards are discussed yet kept 
entirely separate from other costs, such as investment, in these strategy papers. Without 
going so far as to consider different definitions of growth that include environmental 
factors (Ekins 2000), costs through environmental issues such as flooding should be 
considered together with other economic costs. Yet the issues remain overwhelmingly 
separate, except for the 2003 UK document and a few unspecific statements about the 
danger of climate change in the 2008 UK document which supported nuclear energy.  
 
 
VIII.4 Chapter Summary  
This chapter follows the prior case studies establishing the context that economic 
rationale alone is an unconvincing reason for shale gas policy decisions, but that private 
interests were likely influential, though not similar in the two case studies. In chapter 
seven I demonstrated through a literature review on the power of ideas and cognitive 
biases that these had potential to further influence the decision. To follow up on this 
hypothesis I conducted an explorative discourse analysis of the existing ideas around 
energy policy. My analysis into the official strategy papers that form a blue print for U.S. 
and UK energy policy shows that ideas and biases as derived from the previous theoretical 
chapter play a role in the outlining of strategy on energy. There is variation between the 
strategy papers, but not between the key ideas and biases.  
When perusing the examples of currently in use strategy papers it becomes evident that 
despite a different focus in the plans the policy tool repertoire has not changed drastically 
between 2003-2011 (UK) and 2006-2014 (U.S.) respectively. Evidence of particular ideas 
is found in the strategy documents: strong belief in the efficiency of the market-system is 
apparent, even if it is considered in need of tweaking. Environmental preservation is a 
much-discussed topic and key priority of the later U.S. and all of the UK strategy 
blueprints. It is not, however, considered an issue so paramount that it should be dealt 
with above other challenges. It further appears that the idea that renewable technology 
could lead to great economical advantage as well, an idea which appears to already be 
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considered in other countries (Germany, Norway, Portugal) has not quite arrived in U.S. 
and UK politics yet. The notion of energy playing a strong role in not just energy security 
but overall national security is very apparent in the U.S. strategy papers but not so in the 
UK documents, though there are mild references to it in the UK’s last, 2011, white paper. 
There is also a clear case to be made for existing causal judgments about the effect of 
different energy sources on environment, growth or security. Yet there is less clear 
evidence for the biases of availability and representativeness.  
I find evidence of divergent underlying ideas about the varying energy sources; they are 
connected to economic and environmental aspects with different causal assumptions, 
even if they are not heralded in the article headlines. Renewables are considered less 
compatible with the free market and as very costly, with less positive economic benefits. 
Causal judgment, or causal beliefs (which is a definition of ideas – see chapter seven), 
exist that strongly associates fossil fuels with jobs, growth and revenue, much less with 
investment costs. However, renewables are considered as better for the environment than 
fossil fuels (mostly excluding gas), which leads to the inference that this is less of a priority. 
Costs of climate change are not considered in these calculations (Amin 2015; Taylor 
2016). This is probable evidence of cognitive capture, specifically casual judgment. The 
policy support for shale gas fits very well with this narrative: it is a form of gas, which is 
judged positive for economic growth and jobs, and these are considered a priority over 
environmental issues.  
Despite some of the more prominent ideas leading in different directions, in pure 
frequency causal judgment on the capacities of different energy sources seem very 
unfavourable towards renewables and form a plausible ground for shale gas development 
to be considered. Several of the energy blueprints sound engaged with environmental 
concerns in first the manual content analysis, yet this is not reflected in the policy decision 
on shale gas and neither does it correspond to the underlying ideas and causal associations 
found. The white paper authors may flaunt their interest in the opportunities of change, 
but an analysis of causal judgment tells a different story that fits better to the support of 
shale. Overall in the strategy documents, fossil fuels are discussed more frequently than 
renewable sources. Gas seems to be much more of a topic than oil, or fossil fuels in 
general and beyond that, fossil fuels are constantly mentioned in the connection with 
carbon capture technology (except for the UK plan on nuclear power). At times the latter 
appears like an easily-achievable panacea for all potentially arising issues surrounding 
fossil fuel powered energy generation. This focus on gas bodes well for the introduction 
of shale gas into the mix in the belief that it is both more economically capable than 
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renewables and a much cleaner energy source than oil or coal. Causal judgments appear 
unaltered and trusted: there is little evidence of diagnostic inference which considers the 
new reality of the energy sector in the 21st century and come to the conclusion that 
methods and approaches need to be changed. New energy methods are neatly fit into the 
old models of thinking and causal judgment which determine policy strategy: since shale 
gas fits this model better than alternative energy sources do, a decision in its favour is 
logical based on this narrative.  
Much of the discussion around renewables remains abstract and intangible. Of course, 
they are the newer energy sources and we have less experience with them than we do with 
coal or gas. Regardless, there is much more knowledge and experience about renewable 
energy in circulation than is let on in most of the UK and U.S. strategy papers. In 
comparison, the sections concerned with fossil fuel related energy generation tend to be 
much more concrete in terms of policy goals and statistical data. This might be interpreted 
as a distant effect of the availability heuristic. There is less experience with renewables, 
hence they do not come to mind and are not considered as seriously as fossil fuels. 
Renewables are also often linked to climate change, in that they are needed to mitigate 
and curb it: the term climate change however suffers prominently from the bias of 
availability. Experiences with climate change are not as concrete – often enough, the 
association is not made. (Not everyone affected by Hurricane Katrina sees a direct 
connection between fossil fuels, carbon emissions, climate change and more extreme 
weather.) I found that climate change overall is a topic with which problems of availability 
exist: it remains less available in that it is not easily directly associated with a risk, unlike 
with other energy related issues such as energy shortages in winter or power plays around 
energy shortages or rising fuel prices. But there has been much research and evidence into 
the effects, for example by recent IPCC reports, and the energy strategy papers do not 
reflect those soundly except for the 2003 UK strategy paper. Causality and attribution of 
the effects of climate change remain vague, when mentioned. Climate change causing 
floods is considered, fossil fuels causing climate change is considered; that developing 
fossil fuels causes floods and thereby costs to the economy is a step not taken except in 
the 2008 UK paper on nuclear energy. There is previous research connecting climate 
change to availability (Sunstein 2005): the costs that it brings with it and that are to our 
current knowledge best prevented and mitigated through divestment and large scale 
introduction of clean renewable energy are factually but not cognitively available to 
governmental decision-makers even if they are privy to cutting edge research on the topic. 
They will not become cognitively available until the time has passed where these costs can 
be avoided. Until those costs however are clear, the benefits from perceived to be high 
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investment to mitigate them are also not cognitively available to policymakers. Only if on 
one hand, strongly salient effects of climate change such as hurricanes are linked to it 
while on the other hand it is connected with its causes, such as the use of fossil fuels, a 
strong response to climate change and ensuing change in the upkeep of the status quo are 
likely (Sunstein 2005, 8).  
The clear and similar findings from the U.S. and UK strategy papers to me suggest that 
there is very likely a situation of cognitive capture impacting decision-making in the energy 
sector in both countries. Key ideas exist about which energy source will strengthen the 
economy and which will cost it, with regards to which energy sources function well in a 
market-based system which is unanimously desired even though it is occasionally 
considered flawed in adapting to future challenges. And whilst the causal judgments about 
which energy sources impact the environment more severely also exist (more so in the 
UK than the U.S. case), these are not considered as much of a priority as economic 
growth. This kind of thinking suggests continued and renewed exploration of fossil fuel 
and specifically natural gas resources, even if they are unconventional, rather than a switch 
to renewables. This is ignoring evidence from other countries which have achieved 
economic successes with renewable energy rather than increased gas production, and 
especially the perceived incapability of renewable energy to compete in a real free market 
system is ignoring the fact that fossil fuels have been so well subsidised and supported 
that they mostly have not had to, either.198  
This concludes the third dimension of my analysis into factors influential on policy 
decisions favouring shale gas development. In the content analysis, I established several 
key differences as well as similarities between ideas on energy strategy in the UK and the 
U.S., however in the statistical discourse analysis I found much more correlation. Key 
ideas in both country’s official energy policy strategies concur in their judgment of energy 
sources’ abilities to a point at which the introduction of shale gas into the energy mix is 
rendered plausible. The status quo does not appear sufficiently discredited to validate 
radical policy change, but is supported by strong ideas about the economic superiority of 
                                                 
198 There is also a point to be made about the larger institutional similarity between the United States and 
the United Kingdom following the lesson of the institutional political economy approach that is Varieties 
of Capitalism. Both countries are classified as liberal market economies (LME), which focus more on 
short term capital information such as the stock market and therefore more on short term growth 
opportunities (Soskice and Hall 2001). LME’s are also characterised by a more competitive relationship 
between private firms, and niche production is less supported (Soskice and Hall 2001), therefore market 
advantage is likely to win out over joint efforts to cut unhealthy production habits: only a market 
incentive that works for everyone to give up on pollution is likely to come through. This was visible in the 
above reviewed strategy documents about the ideas on market competition. Yet in LMEs innovation and 
sector change is believed to be more radical (Soskice and Hall 2001) – this does not apply to the energy 
sector according to the ideas considered in the above discussion.  
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fossil fuel resources, of which gas forms a part, and ideational preference for a market-
based system in which only fossil fuels, not renewables, are considered able to sustain 
themselves. These ideas give the impression of being resilient throughout the documents 
analysed and over the time span of a decade in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The ideas appear entrenched or institutionalised. As Vivien Schmidt finds in a 
lesson from historical institutionalism: “once ideas are institutionalised, they represent 
powerful forces for continuity”, creating a “‘path dependence’ of existing ideas” and 
“constraints on alternatives” (Schmidt 2013, 37; Pierson 2004). I argue that such a path 
dependence exists in the energy sector of both the U.S. and the UK in favour of 
conventional over alternative energy sources, constraining policy change and thereby 
enabling what is seen as a continuation of the status quo through shale gas. Shale gas is 
not, in fact, a continuation of business as usual in the gas sector but instead requires large 
amounts of investment and in the United Kingdom an overhaul of the entire grid system. 
Whilst these are considered as impediments in connection with renewables in the above 
reviewed strategy plans, chapters two and four have shown that in the case of shale gas, 
similar costs exist but are largely ignored. While there is no evidence in the strategy papers 
for it, as shale gas is barely mentioned in them, this notion leads me to another tentative 
conclusion: Representativeness likely affects the shale gas issue in the UK. This 
representativeness is not directly reflected in the strategy papers but an interpretation that 
seems likely, yet which I cannot conclusively prove. The judgment process is as follows: 
that since previous gas (in Texas, or the North Sea) made the economy strong, so can 
shale gas. Again, the impediments to shale gas make this assumption inaccurate but do 
not stop it from being made. As Tversky and Kahneman suggest, a tendency exists to 
fluently adopt old models to newer facts if they appear at all related, and an illusion of 
validity is created when new information appears on the surface to fit with predicted 
outcomes: shale gas appears to be like gas, gas and fossil fuels are often connected to 
economic prosperity, so shale gas is promoted in the spirit of the same ideas. Wolf would 
call this the “confirmation bias – the tendency to interpret new information as support 
for pre-existing beliefs” (Wolf 2014).  
The interplay of ideational and heuristic constraints constitutes what I call cognitive 
capture, preventing outside ideas from gaining prominence and inducing policy change. I 
conclude that this narrative on cognitive capture is much more likely to be influential on 
the policy decisions to allow hydraulic fracturing of shale gas than an expected utility 
assessment of national benefits from the practice. This does not have to take away agency 
from interests i.e. explanatory value from the second narrative on lobbying influence (Hall 
1993, 289; 292). In fact, they likely corroborate each other: interest groups can serve to 
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support this cognitive capture – the powerful lobbyists of the oil and gas industry are also 
working to preserve the status quo, and have no reason to actively attempt and change 
governmental ideas about energy sources’ capacities, if they are aware of them.  
The uncertainty surrounding shale gas development makes my conclusion about the 
influence of cognitive biases no less likely: the energy strategy documents reviewed in this 
chapter provided several historical examples of energy policy decisions based on 
predictions made despite uncertainty which turned out faulty in less than a decade. For 
example, the suggestion that renewables could only flourish if conventional fuel prices 
were particularly high turned out not to be true as we know from experience in 2016, yet 
this is predicted by the 2006 DoE strategy paper: only a price rise for fossil fuels could 
further their development. Incidentally, in one of their logical examples to prove cognitive 
biases which I discussed in chapter seven (see page 172), Kahneman and Tversky, who 
explain causal judgment with this example, make the exact same causal judgment. Given 
that they made it several decades earlier it is less ill-considered than the DoE’s prediction, 
yet ultimately the relation was proven wrong.  
The previous points of analysis further seem to suggest that the status quo – a heavy 
reliance on traditional fossil fuels – is in effect not discredited enough for it to be given 
up for something that is considered in much more uncertain terms, i.e. alternative energy, 
due to lack of experience but also due to disregard of existing information and lack of 
research efforts. Hence my study contributes to the literature by finding further evidence 
of the resilience of powerful ideas supporting a status quo, and contributes to the story 
of shale gas by indicating that this false assumption of shale gas to fit into the status quo 
has gained it the support it enjoys.  
A further problem with cognitive capture and uncertainty is how selectively it affects 
decisions. The relative uncertainty over the specific effects of natural hazards and global 
warming leads to two very different outcomes. On the one hand, the problem of 
availability affecting climate change leads to a lack in efforts to combat it – not perfectly 
knowing what will happen means little is done to mitigate it. On the other hand, despite 
this uncertainty and availability problem policymakers appear to work with the idea that 
they have and will have total control over the situation. From the above reviewed 
documents, one gains the impression that there is an assumption that there will always be 
time for alternative energy in the future, when it is really necessary to implement it - until 
then, the perceived economic benefits of fossil fuels and shale gas can be enjoyed. This is 
despite evidence that incidents happen unexpectedly which can worsen the original 
condition on the basis of which policy is made. Recent incidents include the Fukushima 
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nuclear accident, increasing weather catastrophes or a sudden sinkhole turning a state’s 
aquifer and potentially other resources radioactive (Harrabin 2014b; Redfern 2014;  
Brown 2015; BBC 2016; Wingfield-Hayes 2016). Theoretical evidence of such thinking is 
found by Nisbett et al. (1976) who note that whilst people tend to always see their own 
behaviour as changing and adapting, they tend to view the behaviour of other people as 
stable (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 176).199 This heuristic cannot simply be translated 
from an individual (the example is often a bad chess player) to a highly capable 
government organisation: but the metaphor is not far off. These strategy blueprints are 
full of an optimism that humans can yet change their behaviour in time, become better, 
have better technology, and the eco-system can then be fixed.200 What is missing is the 
realisation that the planet, too, can and does change. Once a certain amount of change 
has occurred, there simply is no guarantee that humans or their governments will be able 
to adapt fast enough to mitigate the consequences without serious harm to millions. The 
assumption of control is entirely illogical.  
My third narrative concludes my framework of analysis for the decision-making on shale 
gas policy and contributes to the debate by confirming strong, and similar results between 
the two countries on cognitive capture.  
 
                                                 
199 False assumptions and predictions about new technology and future changes are not exclusive to lay 
people. Experts continue to err, even in their own specialised areas of work. Scientist were wrong when 
they described x-rays as harmless. Nobel prize winner Robert Millikan called the possibility of power 
through nuclear energy a “myth” less than ten years before it was confirmed, yet did not lose his 
reputation (González 2005, 64–65). When the United States government discovered it was working with 
entirely different numbers of magnitude for the risk assessment of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant 
they still did not close it until the accident happened.  




IX Chapter Nine. Conclusion 
 
The popular resurgence and hype around the so-called shale gas ‘revolution’ has become 
the topic of heated debate between supporters who see a welcome blessing in this newly 
accessible resource and critics who see another dirty fuel to accelerate climate change and 
to delay much needed change in the energy sector. The rationality of the decisions by the 
U.S. and UK governments to support shale gas development has been drawn into 
question. I therefore challenge the official, rational explanation based on economic 
opportunities behind the decision through a concise cost-benefit analysis and offer two 
different narratives helpful in explaining the support for shale gas.  
While the issue is still201 current and final outcomes of the dash for shale are uncertain, 
several years have passed since policy decisions to allow fracking were made and it is now 
possible to consider the circumstances of these preferences and retrace their formation. 
In this dissertation, I analysed factors that led to political support for hydraulic fracturing 
in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 21st century. In doing so, I gathered 
insights on obstacles to the transformation towards sustainable energy. I also added 
empirical substantiation to existing theoretical concepts about decision-making under 
uncertainty.  
To examine different aspects of the decision-making process, I approached the policy 
result to add shale gas to the energy mix through three separate narratives based on mixed 
theoretical approaches: a cost-benefit analysis for the expected utility of shale gas to each 
respective country’s energy mix, a review of the influence of private interest groups in 
favour of fracking, and an analysis of cognitive constraints which give advantage to shale 
gas over alternative energy sources. I found little confirmation of the benefits of fracking 
in the cost-benefit analysis, especially in the United Kingdom, where less promising 
geological features dampen the prospect for fracking and structural factors preclude the 
relatively fast integration of shale gas into the energy mix. The economic reasoning behind 
the U.S. shale story is also less convincing than many, including the U.S. and UK 
governments, proclaim it to be. My research found no support for the idea that shale gas 
could be used as a cleaner, transitional fuel: instead it is likely to have severely detrimental 
environmental effects. Furthermore, the use of shale gas presents a serious additional risk 
of accelerating global warming, both due to its ability to replace renewable energy on the 
agenda and due to its high greenhouse gas emissions. I found stronger support of the 
                                                 
201 In summer 2016. 
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shale gas story when researching private interests in this cause. The oil and gas sector in 
the United States has a history of high lobbying spending, and is very well interconnected 
with policymakers and regulators, with evidence of the revolving door practice. In the 
United Kingdom, there was less evidence of this and I found that the results were less 
conclusive due to different lobbying regulation and the fact that many instances of 
lobbying activity are able to go unreported. There was no evidence of a degree of 
revolving door practice between industry and regulators that matched the U.S. scenario. 
Yet I found that several instances of successful lobbying have taken place. Conclusively, 
private interests in both countries engaged in the type of lobbying deemed most successful 
by IPE literature. My third narrative of cognitive capture, in which I focused on key ideas 
purported within energy strategy documents as well as cognitive biases, best matched with 
and explained the policy result and showed promise as a key influence on shale gas 
decision preferences. Key ideas were discernible to comparable amounts in the strategy 
documents of both countries, for example about the importance of the sector and the 
panacea of technological innovation, or the superiority of a market-based system. 
Especially causal judgments about the costs and benefits of different fuel sources were 
evenly matched between the U.S. and UK plan, and strategy documents with few 
exceptions showed evidence of the availability heuristic impacting strategy regarding 
climate change and renewable energy.  
This enabled the finding that key ideas and cognitive biases exist in both countries’ 
strategic repertoires for the energy sector which benefit the introduction of a new fossil 
fuel resource, falsely believed to be quite clean, over change towards alternative energies. 
The empirical analysis adds to theoretical work on the influence of ideas in political 
economy, which is a more novel approach compared to the other two taken in this work. 
My study adds to this by substantiating claims about the power of ideas empirically as well 
as by furthering the theoretical concept through combining it with insights on cognitive 
heuristics from behavioural economics. It also adds to our understanding of reasons as to 
why some countries appear slow in their transition towards alternative energy generation.  
The research enabled reflection on the different theoretical approaches that underpin my 
different narratives of the shale gas story. In particular, it confirmed criticism of expected 
utility and the assumption of cost-benefit rationality in decision-making under risk. 
Assuming the respective national government to be amongst the most well-informed 
decision-makers possible, the cost-benefit analysis of shale gas assets should have led to 
a more cautious response in the United States than it did and should not have led to 
support for fracking in the United Kingdom at all. If environmental costs were considered 
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consistently as part of economic costs, shale gas should not have received the support it 
did in either country. The approach to explaining events and policy decisions by 
recounting the calculations of governments is the trademark of a rational actor approach 
common in public policy, the merit of which Allison and Zelikow (1999) and others have 
previously discredited. Instead, in my work I found confirmation of theoretical findings 
on the power of private interest groups (Gourevitch 1986; Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Culpepper 2010), in particular on the constitution of lobbying success through the use of 
quiet politics and close connections with policymakers as well as expertise provision. The 
argument of a lobbying advantage for those lobbying for the status quo is confirmed by 
the difference in U.S. and UK private interest pursuit. Given my brief comparison 
between the oil and gas sector’s lobbying power and the relative lobbying capacity of 
environmental groups, in view of political results for the fracking industry, I could not 
agree with findings of neopluralism or pluralism that suggest alike influence for different 
groups in society. Instead the gas lobby appears to be in a very privileged position 
compared to opponents of fracking, for example due to close connections with 
policymakers. Finally, the empirical results showed a commonality in the cognitive capture 
of U.S. and UK policymakers: core ideas and cognitive biases about the energy sector 
resemble each other strongly in the respective energy strategy blueprints, despite having 
diverging overt focus points across the documents. This last narrative especially helps 
shed light on reasoning behind the strong backing of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas by 
the U.S. and UK governments.  
This chapter concludes my thesis by giving a résumé of its main findings: the story of 
shale gas support in the United States and United Kingdom; the contributions to theory; 




IX.1 Results: The story behind support for shale gas  
In my thesis, I considered the policy outcome of allowing hydraulic fracturing through 
the lenses of three different narratives. The first focused on a rational cost-benefit analysis 
as befitting the decision-making by homo economicus and the official explanations of national 
and public benefits given for the renewed interest in the unsustainable energy source that 
is shale gas. My second narrative considered the impact of private interest pursuit on 
decision-making in the energy sector regarding fracking regulation. In the third dimension 
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of this thesis I focused not on interest but on the process of decision-making, by 
examining cognitive capture through the influence of ideational constraints and heuristics 
on the decision to allow fracking.  
Following a background on the characteristics of shale gas and hydraulic fracturing in 
chapter two, chapter three and four analysed the story of fracking from a rational actor, 
or homo economics, point of view. The third chapter introduced the reader to expected utility, 
a concept of cost-benefit analysis that is considered a standard approach for decision-
making under uncertainty and risk, as well as to theoretical and empirical criticism of this 
approach. The basic conclusion of expected utility is that utility is different to different 
agents and that ultimately the size of the expected pay-out or revenue from engaging in 
an activity that carries risk will decide if it is undertaken. The second most popular variant 
of expected utility, called prospect theory, builds on this with a distinction between costs 
and losses and an insight that losses may well be counted differently and higher than gains. 
In this chapter I also elaborated on the distinction between risk and uncertainty and the 
fact that this distinction is hardly ever applied correctly despite its significance for 
decision-making. Besides a lack of empirical evidence for the applicability of expected 
utility, there is a lack of articulation of normative arguments about the appropriateness of 
public policy decisions on the basis of expected utility. My empirical analysis of the shale 
gas story under the lens of expected utility led me to argue that supporting fracking is not 
a profound and necessary conclusion for either the United States or the United Kingdom 
based on assessing potential costs and benefits of the practice. I found some evidence 
that facilitated this kind of reasoning in the United States, for example favourable 
structural factors, such as a very well adapted existing energy grid and the incentive for 
private landowners to allow fracking due to their ownership of mineral resources and 
hence share in revenue. In some states, a number of jobs were created and incomes raised 
– yet the overall picture is less impressive than official accounts let on. It does not create 
an overwhelming argument in favour of allowing fracking in a manner as supportive and 
laxly regulated as the past two U.S. governments have allowed. The unsustainable nature 
of the resource was always obvious to decision-makers as were its environmental costs. 
There have also been many concerns regarding the economic performance of shale gas 
over the years, which the government must be aware of – its overall effect on the U.S. 
economy is considered negligible in comprehensive analyses (Mathieu, Spencer, and 
Sartor 2014). While more recently evidence emerged that shale could potentially harm the 
energy sector and economic recovery due to the increasing debt and difficulties of many 
companies fracking, it stands to reason that if they looked closely enough the successive 
U.S. governments in the timeframe must have known that shale gas was always unlikely 
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to create lasting economic benefits for the nation. In the United Kingdom on the other 
hand, almost no argument about the utility of fracking to the economy stands up to 
scrutiny: there is too little known about the reserves as of 2016, they are evidently 
unsustainable, and structural factors in the UK are not conducive to shale operations. 
Very high initial investment costs are required to bring shale gas into the UK energy mix, 
and to this end generous tax breaks were allocated to fracking alongside other favourable 
policies. As these supportive measures are the very aspects that are in general complained 
about and objected to in connection with renewable energy, their non-issue status in 
relation to shale gas appears illogical through a pure cost-benefit focus. The support of 
fracking is expressed in terms of standard economic arguments as to their economic 
benefit and success in the market-based system. There are direct comparisons drawn by 
the UK government elaborating that shale gas is an economically strong option compared 
to the amount of support and investment renewable energy needs (Leadsom 2015). I 
cannot confirm this position but can only question it given the evidence of the support 
that shale gas has enjoyed, ensuring it did not have to compete in a free market in the 
United States and will not have to do so in the United Kingdom either. My analysis 
suggests instead that there is no free, efficient market operating in the energy sector in 
either country, but rather that the market is heavily tilted by subsidies and preferential 
treatment of certain groups. Lastly, though neither is overwhelmingly promising in the 
long run, the prospects of shale gas in the United States and the United Kingdom have, 
in my analysis, shown to be so fundamentally different that there can be no reasoning of 
a common independent variable in this narrative. The U.S. has seen positive economic 
balances and short-term figures, which may be used to support short term policy 
narratives.   
Further notable results from this part of the analysis included the apparent exclusion of 
environmental costs from overall economic cost calculations, as well as the lack of 
consideration for uncertainty. Risks connected to shale gas are discussed albeit in a way 
that diminishes and almost belittles them, but there is no evidence that the concept of 
complete uncertainty or unknown unknowns has entered the decision-making process.  
Since expected utility or a ‘national interest’ supporting the expansion of shale gas 
exploration could not be established convincingly for either country, chapter five and six 
of my thesis were committed to exploring the potential impact of private interests on 
governmental decision-making regarding the energy sector. Lobbying is a notoriously 
difficult process to establish conclusively as theoretical works assume the strongest 
advances of lobbying to lie in non-transparent quiet politics and closed meetings between 
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policymakers and private interests. Nevertheless, by combining available reports of 
lobbying occurrences and general lobbying statistics regarding the energy sector, I 
developed a case which confirms evidence of what the theory considers indicators for 
successful private interest pursuit in the case of fracking. In chapter five I drew on 
international and comparative political economy lessons about lobbying private interests, 
focusing strongly on meta analyses of theoretical works and empirical case studies such 
as the ones by (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2013). While 
I found disagreement in the literature about whether or not business interests play a 
preferential role compared to other private interests, there was consistency in the notion 
that certain specific factors have proven to aid in lobbying success and especially aid 
lobbying success of businesses and resource-rich interests in a disproportionately strong 
way. One of these factors was the differentiation between lobbying for public and private 
good, and as energy is considered a mostly private good that is managed and allocated in 
competitive markets in both the U.S. and the UK, already a condition for lobbying was 
fulfilled. The level of complexity and uncertainty surrounding shale gas if anything helped 
the lobbying efforts, as industry expertise was arguably more in demand. In chapter six I 
examined more evidence to establish whether there are private interest groups with 
considerable interest in furthering shale gas production in either country, and whether or 
not they had been engaging in lobbying according to the premises of the preceding 
theoretical review in chapter five.  
Judging the effect of private interest pursuit on policy outcomes is a core topic of political 
economy and a topic often raised in combination with the energy sector. However, there 
has as of yet been no comprehensive comparative analysis of the situation regarding shale 
gas in the U.S. and the UK, only singular issue reports. My sixth chapter provides such 
an analysis as I compare the relative capacities of energy lobbies and their connections 
with policymakers, especially their institutional access through in-house and revolving 
lobbyists and the revolving door scenario. Using business analysis tool Boardex I found 
a plenitude of past and current connections between industry and regulating bodies in the 
United States, providing evidence for the common practice of the revolving door and 
indicating a strong potential for cultural capture as well. I could not establish a similar 
situation of private interests embedded in government institutions within the United 
Kingdom. (Again, this result may be connected to a difference in reporting lobbying in 
the two countries.) While there was less of a case to be made for the revolving door in 
UK departments, there was still plenty of evidence of close connections and frequent 
contact between lobbying and policymakers in both countries, a key suggestion of the 
literature of successful lobbying. I found reports of gas industry employees and even 
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senior level industry figures working as advisers or co-authoring legislation within the 
governmental departments on energy and environment just as in the United States.  
Consolidating my argument that the pro shale gas lobby has the potential for strong 
influence on policy output is the fact that in both countries, the anti-fracking lobby is 
disproportionately less engaged with policymakers, and where data is available the 
opposition is also shown to have fewer resources at their disposal. In the United 
Kingdom, there was a considerably higher number of connections between the key anti-
fracking lobbies Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth with policymakers than in the 
United States, although mostly through membership and not employment. Clearly the 
situation of lobbying through the revolving door practice is not similar in the two case 
studies. A different proposition of the literature, the success attributed to lobbying quiet 
politics rather than high salience issues, can also be confirmed in the case of shale gas 
lobbying. There is not much reporting around lobbying to influence the UK moratorium 
on fracking, for example, or open lobbying on the acceptance of the U.S. Energy Policy 
Act: but plenty of reports exist about changes in definitions of the fracking process, quiet 
exemptions from environmental legislations or private meetings between lobbyists and 
policymakers. Few of these measures will have reached public awareness or headline 
status, but for the industry they are considerable gains that make a significant difference. 
Lastly, in this narrative I find confirmation of the advantage of lobbying for the status 
quo over change since those interests lobbying for shale gas are often established private 
interests in the conventional gas sector, even if shale gas does not entirely fit the 
description. This would offer another reason why the analysis established higher lobbying 
success in the United States than the United Kingdom. The onshore gas industry is much 
larger and better established in the U.S. than the UK, and fewer structural changes are 
required for the introduction of shale gas: i.e. there is more of a status quo situation to be 
defended with shale gas.  
Accordingly, my analysis in chapter five and six led me to conclude that lobbying has 
certainly had an impact on policy decisions that support fracking but that the situations 
were not perfectly similar. This insight may not come as a surprise to some but by 
substantiating the claims with a thorough analysis of evidence and indicators I have 
contributed new evidence and content to the debate. As almost always in research on 
lobbying, I cannot conclusively prove that the non-reported meetings between industry 
and policymakers or the lobbying spending for example had the direct desired effect in 
policy outcomes. However, by asking ‘qui bono’ and providing credible motive as well as 
 234 
opportunity, I can make a convincing case that this is what happened with the story of 
shale gas.  
For the dissertation, overall this results in assigning more explanatory value to the second 
narrative of private interests than the first of expected utility considerations. Regardless, 
there are reservations and limits of its explanatory power to be considered: first of all, the 
case for lobbying could not be made as clearly and comprehensively in the UK as in the 
U.S., especially regarding the revolving door practice. The case is also less strong in the 
UK than the U.S. owing to less available information on lobbying statistics due to the 
insufficiency of the UK lobbying register, which does not require reports on several 
activities of lobbying.  
Secondly, the rationality of some of the business interests lobbying for the expansion of 
shale gas development in either country is questionable given the troubles faced by the 
industry in the U.S., which should serve as caution and discourage further industry 
engagement and investment. In any case, while I find more evidence of influence in the 
second narrative than the first, the situations in the UK and U.S. are too dissimilar to 
strictly agree on a common independent variable.  
In my third and final narrative in chapter seven and eight I considered the theoretical 
basis and empirical evidence for cognitive capture, a term I use to describe different forms 
of cognitive constraints precluding objective decision-making. This premise is based on 
behavioural economics literature about specific cognitive biases and heuristics as well as 
on more recent literature in political economy considering the impact of ideas on 
policymaking that is not only but especially pertinent in situations of uncertainty and risk. 
I elaborated on this literature in chapter seven and found that besides the overall influence 
of ideas guiding and constraining policy formulation, there is evidence of specific biases 
such as causal judgment, availability, and representativeness which can affect decision-
making profoundly and are applicable in the case study on shale gas. Scholars from more 
recent IPE theory, some of which classifies itself as constructivist, agree that a decision 
situation under uncertainty either creates or amplifies the need for reliance on ideas, a 
notion that dates back to Knight (Knight 1921; Blyth 2002; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 
2010; Broome 2013). I used the insights from behavioural economics to consider the 
influence of non-objective or erroneous ideas and found evidence that irrational biases 
influence and constrain thinking. A notable effect based on the study of ideas was their 
lasting power once accepted or what is called the resilience of the status quo – ways of 
thinking have to be thoroughly discredited and replaced with strong new ideas for there 
to be change.  
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In chapter eight I reviewed key ideas that are current in the U.S. and UK energy policy 
strategy documents and therefore can be taken to represent as well as inform ideas on 
further energy policy. This was done to gather clues about general ideas guiding energy 
policy to see if they provided for the inclusion of shale gas into the energy mix over and 
above alternative sources. Despite its currency, shale gas did not actually feature in any of 
the documents but one. My analysis showed that both the U.S. and the UK energy policy 
strategy promoted key ideas that, in combination, did not encourage the use of alternative 
energy sources over conventional fuels. All documents showed strong belief in the market 
system as the best method of allocation in the energy sector, even though some admitted 
it needed to be fixed of glitches, without acknowledging less than free market conditions 
within the sector. There was little to no belief in the ability of renewable energy to thrive 
or even survive in a market system; renewable energy sources were instead strongly 
associated with costs of a varied nature, but not strongly with economic benefits. Neither 
country’s successive administrations appear to adhere to the idea that transforming the 
energy sector can bring with it a multitude of benefits and opportunities not just to the 
environment, this point is clearer, but to the economy. The UK 2003 energy white paper 
is a bit of an outlier in this sense, as it does make allowance for economic opportunities 
of transforming the energy system – but overall alternative energy is still causally judged 
as costly. A key idea of the energy papers together is the notion that technology and 
innovation can solve problems in the future and a heavy reliance on uncertain 
technological advances. This corresponds with concerns about too much trust in science 
and technology by sociologists (Giddens 1998;  Beck 1986; Beck 1995) and hinders action 
designed to mitigate such problems, i.e. action to combat global warming through the 
introduction of renewable and sustainable energy. The trust in uncertain future 
technology to fix problems is incongruent with the disregard for negative uncertainty. 
There is ample evidence of unexpected risks severely impacting energy and environmental 
planning (Conley et al. 2016; BBC 2016) to assume they will continue to do so, but this 
does not affect decision-making, likely due to the availability heuristic.202 Climate change 
and to a lesser degree environmental preservation feature prominently in the energy 
strategy plans; yet neither is truly considered a priority above all others, despite opening 
quotes that describe it as a great or greatest challenge, notions which are not followed 
through with. Instead other ideas receive greater priority: in the U.S. documents, the need 
for energy security and especially energy independence is paramount, and the idea of U.S. 
American leadership is similarly influential. This is less notable in the UK, where energy 
                                                 
202 This echoes the challenger shuttle disaster story: Nasa was fully aware of the possibility of problems in 
cold weather with a small seal but ignored it – the seal failed during launch (BBC Magazine 2016).  
 236 
security does not immediately imply energy independence; the latter as a notion is rejected 
in the 2003 white paper yet increases over time and becomes more important in 2009 and 
2011. Energy sources are causally judged to contribute to energy security in varying 
degrees: fossil fuels are strongly positively associated with energy security and 
independence, as well as negatively, but this is only the case for oil and petroleum, not 
gas. Renewable energy sources are not judged to have a great effect on energy security, 
and this idea is very likely to influence policy decisions. Besides the assumption about the 
relation between specific energy sources and security, causal judgment also exists that 
strongly links fossil fuels, and gas especially, to economic benefits including growth, 
revenue and job creation. Casual judgments do not appear to change over time but stay 
relatively constant in the energy strategy plans, suggesting a repertoire of ideas used to 
inform policy decisions.  
The bias of availability has been linked to climate change in previous research and in the 
strategy documents therefore links to renewable energy, causally associated with a positive 
effect on the environment and climate change. A problem the effects of which cannot be 
felt directly at the present time suffers from availability, compared to other problems with 
effects immediately noticeable, such as fuel shortages or energy prices, a key concern for 
U.S. and UK citizens (Sunstein 2005; Dahlgreen 2014). For example, in a 1990s survey, 
more than sixty percent of poll takers in the U.S. supported the Kyoto Treaty and agreed 
that “protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot 
be too high and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of 
cost” (Sunstein 2005, 10). However, when asked if they would still support the Kyoto 
Treaty to protect the environment if this would cost the average U.S. household around 
$100 more per month, only 11% stated they would, the others were clearly not supportive 
regardless of costs. This suggests that in theory climate change and environmental 
protection is valued, but as long as it does not affect humans’ everyday lives in their own 
countries, they are not, in fact, willing to accept costs to mitigate it. As long as climate 
change remains a distant concept, and beset by the availability heuristic, and governments 
stick to key ideas and false assumptions such as that renewable energy must be less 
beneficial and more expensive than fossil fuels, progress is unlikely.  
Shale gas enters this discussion through the heuristic of representativeness that assumes, 
simply put, that ‘like goes with like’. Shale gas is demonstrably not like natural gas, its 
production is much costlier due to more complicated drilling well techniques and spread 
out resources, and its emissions are also much higher.203 Yet this is largely ignored in the 
                                                 
203 (Stevens 2010; Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011; Inman 2014) 
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way in which unconventional and conventional gas are considered similar, and does not 
in any manner impede the erroneous conclusion that if gas benefits the economy, so must 
shale gas. Uncertainty around fracking does not hinder its implementation the way 
availability affects climate change – it is associated with its parent population natural gas, 
and treated accordingly. Following the concept of causal judgment bias I can hence 
confirm that new realities appear to be assimilated into old models of thinking without 
revision of the model in the case of shale gas. There is potential for diagnostic inference 
that links new facts about the 21st century energy and environmental situation to conclude 
that trusted ideas about energy sources are not valid any longer, but this is not inferred. 
This omission is in disregard of scientific consensus about climate change and the risks it 
bears for humans and the economy, and in disregard of facts such as the allocation of 
subsidies and government investment towards energy sources, which show that fossil 
fuels receive more than renewable energy sources to this day (Sills 2011; IMF 2015; 
International Energy Agency 2016; Global Subsidies Initiative 2016).  
The evidence from the third narrative confirms, in my view, the effect that cognitive 
capture has on energy policy decisions, especially given the uncertainty of future 
outcomes. Guiding ideas, affected by causal judgments and other biases, suggest very 
specific policy responses and constrain others, and the decision to allow hydraulic 
fracturing for shale gas can be explained most convincingly by this dimension of the 
decision-making process. The status quo of ideas about fossil fuels is not questioned 
sufficiently despite them being judged negatively on their environmental record, which 
does not rank high enough on a list of priorities to discredit them. The impression of 
cognitive capture in U.S. and UK strategic ideas regarding energy policy is concurring and 
quite similar, and it represents the one narrative that shows most similarity on the 
independent variable. Having said that, clearly there are certain limitations to the claims 
one can make based on the research and results of this dissertation.204  
 
 
                                                 
204 Through my most dissimilar research design I have shown up the independent variables that share 
traits and therefore are likely the influential ones, but I cannot conclusively prove the internal decision-
processes of each of the involved policymakers and establish the validity of my conclusions beyond 
doubt.  
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IX.2 Theoretical implications  
The empirical analysis has facilitated reflection on several theoretical propositions 
regarding decision-making under uncertainty and risk specifically as well as core 
assumptions on decision-making from political economy theory.  
My analysis of the expected utility of shale gas development in the United States and the 
United Kingdom adds to empirical critique of the theory of expected utility on the rational 
expectations for decision-making under uncertainty. The evidence does not support the 
conclusion that a rational cost-benefit analysis of all available information on shale gas as 
well as a consideration of not available information was taken into account during 
decision-making. This clashes both with official policy statements which promote shale 
gas as cost-effective as well as with the notion of expected utility as a standard tool for 
the analysis of decision processes. I could also not confirm newer propositions made by 
prospect theory about the notion that losses are generally calculated higher than gains. 
Therefore, my dissertation adds theoretical criticism to the literature on expected utility.  
My second narrative of shale gas which considers private interests delivers more 
promising results in that considerable strength of the pro-shale lobby can be attested for 
in the United States in particular, while there is also some evidence, of a less 
comprehensive nature, about lobbying success for shale gas in the United Kingdom. In 
particular, my research confirms theoretical assumptions in political economy about key 
aspects of lobbying, namely the focus on quiet politics, the use of expertise and experts 
in furthering causes with policymakers, and that closeness between lobbyists and 
policymakers is considered conducive and worthy of effort. Especially in the United 
States, the oil and gas industry and the departments in charge of regulating them have 
been shown to be intertwined to a degree that brings to mind a scenario of the revolving 
door. Hence my findings add value to theoretical assumptions about both the methods 
and the effects of lobbying private interests with policymakers. Specifically, the finding of 
divergence between U.S. and UK lobbying strongly supports the theoretical finding that 
lobbying for a status quo is advantageous.  
But the narrative in which I found the most common ground between the U.S. and UK 
shale story, and the one which can add the most and more novel theoretical insights, was 
the third in which I consider cognitive capture. My statistical discourse analysis 
corroborated suggestions of cognitive biases present in strategic ideas that inform policy 
responses. I found confirmation for both political economy theories that purport the 
influence of ideas on policy output and the influence of cognitive biases. The frame of 
uncertainty that is present in shale gas adds to considerations that ideas are particularly 
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decisive in circumstances of uncertainty where returns cannot be calculated (bearing 
unknown risks). The findings on ideas correspond with the findings by Vivien Schmidt 
(2013) of institutionalised ideas creating a situation of path dependence that constrain 
alternative action and progress despite obvious fault lines. My findings in chapter eight 
highlight and reaffirm theoretical conclusions about the impact of cognitive biases on 
decision-making. This is specifically the case for the bias of causal judgment and 
association, which leads to an unwillingness to change assumptions and hence to attempts 
to match new information with old models of thinking, sustaining an illusion of validity 
until the last possible moment. These insights from behavioural economics and 
(constructivist) political economy on ideas and associations have previously not been 
considered in combination and here my work added a new possible avenue for theoretical 
refinement.  
The seventh and eighth chapter continued to bring up the notion that status quo is 
difficult to defeat, a notion that also featured in the previous chapters about the influence 
of private interests. This is an issue that is often brought up in connection with large 
organisations or bureaucracies, such as and especially government bodies.205 Again, my 
approach to this thesis was partially inspired by Graham Allison’s book Essence of Decision 
(Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999).206 207 As Allison puts it, “blueprints for action 
provide one set of opportunities and constraints” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 179). My 
comparative analysis of government policy on shale gas in the energy sector corresponds 
with Allison’s original theoretical propositions of the status quo’s power and resilience, 
or path dependence:  
                                                 
205 Governments and government departments are very large organisations and have been considered 
theoretically as such in successful research (Allison 1971; March and Simon 1993).  
206 At the time that criticism of expected utility theory in economics was mounting, March and Simon also 
discussed the cognitive limits of rationality in situations of decision-making for organisations (March, 
Simon, and Guetzkow 1958; March 1978; Simon 1979). They focus on the element of uncertainty in their 
case studies and point out uncertainty as the main limiting factor of rationality. These authors do not go 
as far as questioning the possibility of rational decision-making altogether. However, they consider 
rationality in preference formation impossible in uncertain conditions as they say rational decision-making 
requires full information: all alternative options, all alternatives to a perceived problem or risk must be 
known to the decision-maker (March, Simon, and Guetzkow 1958). Further the decision-maker must 
have some kind of criteria available and known to them that allow them to evaluate and rate or rank these 
options by desirability, which they must all be able to perceive. Already these requirements for a rational 
decision seem close to impossible in a situation of uncertainty or indeed in many situations, and violates 
requirements of expected utility. The authors conclude that such a scenario is highly unlikely in 
organisational life, i.e. that rationality is always limited by constraints in such an environment (March, 
Simon, and Guetzkow 1958). Hence, a “search for satisfactory rather than optimal options is the true 
criterion of most decision-making” (Selznick 1959, 912). Satisficing is the general rule – whenever a 
solution to a current issue is found, the search ends; not the best, but the first available solution counts 
(Allison and Zelikow 1999, 152; March and Simon 1993, 160–62).  
207 See also: North (1990), Pratt & Zeckhauser (1986), Moe (1984), Williamson (1985), Nelson & Winter 
(1982).  
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“Existing organisations and their existing programs and routines constrain 
behaviour in the next case: namely, they address it already oriented toward 
doing whatever they do.” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 145).  
 
Such repertoire, however, leads to the exclusion of further, new options, innovation and 
change; anything outside of the routine program becomes less likely to be considered.208 
This corresponds to Hall’s notion that previous experience strongly impacts on 
preference and interest formation (C. Woll 2008, 23). Writing extensively on the role of 
organisations in particular, Finnemore and Barnett confirmed their capacities for 
irrational and ‘pathological’ behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004).209 210 211 
Government organisations are thought to engage in satisficing rather than optimisation. 
Allison notes that this satisficing is strongly dependent on previous knowledge and 
experience and therefore unlikely to allow for change. “Societies and their organisations 
may become so dependent on a particular path towards prosperity … that, having chosen 
their instruments in the circumstances of the past, they are confined by them as they 
encounter new circumstances in the future” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 148f).212 This also 
resonates with Beck’s statement that the surrounding environment shapes policy 
preferences more than rational calculation. The case study evidence confirms such theory 
on path dependence: The U.S. and UK energy sectors are set up to process fossil fuel 
policy, not alternative courses of action.  
                                                 
208 An example of how organisational processes can destroy efficiency is described by the journalist and 
author Tom Wolfe in The Right Stuff. He details how the Mercury astronauts were configured and 
constrained by the common professional standards and rules applying to military test pilots in the United 
States which made little to no sense when applied to space exploration (Wolfe 2005). The example 
illustrates how efficiency as well as innovation often enough get bested and lose out to routine and 
repertoire. 
209 Besides a loss of control due to lack of expertise, standardization can mean that a mechanism to 
distribute and importantly to upgrade shared beliefs about what is right is lost. “Not norms and values, 
but taken-for-granted scripts, rules and classifications are the stuff of which [government organisations] 
are made of” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 15).  
210 A loss of control combined with a shift in norms contributes to what Douglass North labelled 
“institutions that are the underlying rules of the game” (North 1990, 5).  
211 The notion of institutions as processes influencing decisions corresponds with British political scientist 
Jim Bulpitt’s work about the effect of any support system on decision-making when discussing the effect 
of international on domestic politics (Bulpitt and John 2008; Bradbury 2010). The systems are created to 
ensure smooth operationality, however, they come with a string of contingencies and automatisation. 
When these systems are fully in place their maintenance “is fraught with danger precisely because it risks 
becoming an end in itself that distracts the politicians at the centre from their fundamental … purposes” 
(Thompson 2010, 388). This loss of overview is viewed as a handing over of the reigns and authority: 
“the risk for politicians in constructing an external support system as part of their domestic statecraft is 
that it distorts their political judgement” (Thompson 2010, 388).  
212 Allison considers the U.S. Army’s dramatic failure in the Vietnam war as one of the rare instances 
which led an organisation to reconsider their strategy. Except for these extreme situations, Allison states 
that “if a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organisational components must yesterday 
have been performing (or have had established routines for performing) an action only marginally 
different from today’s action” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 175).  
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Susan Strange, sometimes considered the founding mother of modern IPE, once 
suggested that humans tend to lean towards recreating or attempting to recreate history 
rather than imagining a new future (Strange 1998, 187). She was talking about the financial 
sector but the lesson applies to the energy sector as well. This statement is reiterated in a 
different vein by Wigan and Gammon who, also in work on the financial sector, consider 
the Freudian principle of constancy and find evidence for a “drive towards stasis” (Gammon 
and Wigan 2013, 205). They suggest that rather than gaining maximisation or pleasure, a 
desire for constancy often determines human agency: commitment to a status quo and 
investment into the ideas that support it can be strong enough to prevent change. My 
analysis of the guiding ideas underlying energy sector policy supports these theoretical 
assumptions.  
The research investigating this puzzle adds to a broader question at the very forefront of 
modern political economy: why are certain economically irrational decisions maintained 
despite concrete evidence to the contrary? “Why do such failed policies persist over long 
periods, even when they are known to be … wasteful and even when better policies 
exist?” (Leighton and Lopez 2013, 112). My findings suggest that at least in the case study 
on shale gas, close interaction between governments and industry but more than that 
cognitive constraints of guiding key ideas and causal judgment distort the decision-making 
process and lead to a situation of inertia in which repertoire policy is made and 
opportunities for change are constrained. Regarding research on decisions under risk and 
uncertainty in particular, my thesis also contributes the finding that ideas and cognitive 
capture are likely highly influential in the formation of risk preferences and should be 
considered a priority.  
 
 
IX.3 Epilogue and outlook 
This study has made a contribution to knowledge about the decision-making around shale 
gas policy as well as further contributions to the literature. Firstly, it provided an in-depth 
analysis of political reasoning and decision-making around the introduction of shale gas 
into the energy strategy in the United States and the United Kingdom. Secondly, it 
provided a new case study through which to explore expected utility, cognitive biases and 
political economy theory on interests and ideas. Thirdly, I identified a common factor 
behind U.S. and UK shale gas policy and added the narrative of cognitive capture by 
combining insights from political economy literature on ideas and behavioural economics 
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on cognitive biases. In delivering these contributions this dissertation has provided an 
answer to my overarching research question: Which factors shape the risk preferences of political 
decision-makers regarding fracking when the decision is made under uncertainty? I argued that the 
calculable economic factors surrounding shale gas exploration have not played a key role 
in the decision to allow fracking either in the U.S. or in the UK. Instead, the thesis showed 
that private interests had a significant impact on fracking policy but that the real similarity 
between my cases lies in the shared repertoire of ideas guiding energy policy and a similar 
level of cognitive capture.  
The theoretical implications of the study and especially of the third narrative on cognitive 
capture are worthy of further exploration and confirmation. In order to verify and assess 
results, more countries should be considered for future case studies, and a broader analysis 
on energy policy without the focus on shale gas specifically should be carried out. A 
comparison with energy strategy in Germany promises particularly interesting results and 
should follow this work to support the MDS-design, as the country has so far rejected 
shale gas development and has been comparatively successful in including renewable 
energy into its national energy supply. The key ideas and cognitive biases guiding and 
constraining private interests, whose influence on energy policy this case study confirmed, 
should be considered and compared to the ideas held by governmental decision-makers 
to establish a situation of shared cognitive capture which would combine it with cultural 
capture as intended by Kwak (2013). Another future step could be to look into the origins 
and creation of such networks of ideas, potentially linked to the new theory on knowledge 
regimes (Campbell and Pedersen 2014, 2015).  
The transformation of our energy system is a key political and economic challenge of 
global impact that needs utmost attention and effort if the risks and costs of global 
warming and environmental degradation, both of which are expedited by the use of fossil 
fuels, are to be mitigated. The issue has always been beset by the bias of availability: the 
associated problems do not come to mind easily and therefore are not a priority to resolve. 
When at school I was taught rhetoric with the example of Severn Suzuki’s speech at the 
UN Rio summit in which she berates global leaders acting “as if we have all the time we 
want and all the solutions” (Cullis-Suzuki 1992). I find that two decades later, major ideas 
about the energy sector still maintain this attitude and lack of urgency, even if the 
importance of climate change mitigation has registered since. My dissertation makes an 
addition to one aspect of our understanding as to why risks of such a magnitude are not 
being confronted with more drastic measures in the 21st century, as it begins to explain 
the puzzle that is the revival of unsustainable energy use through fracking. A change in 
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ideas is necessary to stop “taking ever-bigger gambles with the climate” (Wolf 2015) and 
to bring about significant change in the form of a transition to sustainable and cleaner 
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